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	 Abstract			 Following	Joseph	Stalin’s	death	in	1953,	Nikita	Khrushchev	became	leader	of	the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 ushered	 in	 a	 liberalization	 campaign	 that	 reverberated	outward	 to	 certain	 Eastern	 European	 nations.	 Canadian	 officials	 recognized	 that	limited	freedom	of	maneuver	was	conceded	to	certain	Eastern	European	nations,	in	addition	 to	 Yugoslavia’s	 existing	 independent	 position.	 This	 proved	 important,	 as	Communist	Eastern	Europe	became	a	deliberate	and	considered	factor	in	Canada’s	foreign	policy.	Canadian	Soviet	policy	thus	evolved	into	a	Canadian	policy	towards	Communist	 Eastern	 Europe,	 equipped	 with	 various	 nuances.	 Specifically,	 this	project	examines	Canadian	policy	with	Yugoslavia,	Poland,	and	the	Soviet	Union.			 By	 the	mid	1950s,	 a	general	 strategic	 stasis	existed	 in	 the	Cold	War,	which	led	to	something	of	a	political	balance;	as	a	result,	discovering	strategies	to	engage	in	 the	 Cold	 War	 by	 “other	 means”	 became	 necessary.	 Prime	 Minister	 John	Diefenbaker’s	Progressive	Conservative	 government	was	 committed	 to	preventing	the	spread	of	communism,	and	this	was	an	integral	component	of	its	foreign	policy	with	Communist	Eastern	Europe.		 This	 dissertation	 argues	 Canadian	 policy	 towards	 Communist	 Eastern	Europe	 during	 the	 Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	 period	 was	 not	 solely	 driven	 by	traditional	 geopolitical	 and	 geostrategic	 considerations,	 but	 was	 also	 concerned	with	non-military	Communist	tactics.	As	a	result,	Canadian	officials	pursued	closer	political,	 economic,	 and	 socio-cultural	 bilateral	 relations	 with	 select	 Communist	Eastern	 European	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 challenge	 Soviet	 hegemony	 in	 that	 region	and	 to	 combat	 Eastern	 European	 communism	 generally.	 Despite	 the	 differences	among	 Poland,	 Yugoslavia,	 and	 the	 USSR,	 Canada’s	 broad	 policy	 objective	 was	consistent:	 promote	 positive	 relations	 to	 expose	 Communist	 nations	 to	 Western	modalities	 in	 hopes	 of	 lessening	 communist	 influence	 globally.	 The	 Canadian	government	 during	 this	 period	 did	 not	 have	 a	 “grand	 strategy”	 that	 governed	 its	policy	 with	 the	 region.	 Instead,	 pragmatism	 prevailed	 as	 a	 number	 of	 ad	 hoc	developments	in	the	fields	of	economic	and	cultural	foreign	relations	contributed	to	the	 growing	 sense	 that	 Canada	 was	 engaged	 in	 Cold	 War	 diplomacy	 by	 “other	means.”		 	
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	 Introduction		
	 CANADA’S	COLD	WAR	BY	“OTHER	MEANS”		 By	 the	 mid-1950s,	 Cold	 War	 tensions	 hardened	 and	 nuclear	 stalemate	ensued.	As	historian	Larry	Collins	writes,	“victory	would	no	longer	be	measured	in	terms	of	 conventional	warfare;	winning	would	become	 too	 concrete	 a	 concept,	 so	the	 contest	 would	 devolve	 into	 a	 constant	 striving	 for	 ‘success’	 and	 the	 struggle	would,	 in	[Prime	Minister]	Louis	St.	Laurent’s	phrase,	become	essentially	a	contest	for	the	‘minds	of	men.’”1	Indeed,	as	historian	Odd	Arne	Westad	argues,	the	Cold	War	was	an	 ideological	 struggle	 for	competing	visions	of	modernity.2	Canadian	officials	believed	 Canada	 represented	 the	 quintessential	 good	 nation:	 politically	 able,	economically	sound,	and	socially	and	culturally	promising.	
	 It	 is	 true	 that	 John	 Diefenbaker	 was	 a	 Cold	War	warrior,	 and	 that	 Canada	under	 his	 leadership	 remained	 a	 Cold	 War	 nation	 committed	 to	 what	contemporaries	 perceived	 as	 the	 struggle	 against	 communism.	 Likewise,	many	 of	the	 Department	 of	 External	 Affairs	 mandarins,	 old	 and	 new,	 were	 Cold	 War	warriors.	 In	 fact,	 the	 struggle	 between	 democracy	 and	 communism,	 even	 if	oversimplified,	 was	 entrenched	 in	 the	 very	 core	 of	 Canada’s	 Communist	 Eastern	Europe	 policy.	 In	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 International	 Junior	 Red	 Cross	 Study	 Centre,	Diefenbaker	outlined	how	advances	 in	 sciences	 contributed	 to	 a	population	boom	that	would	constitute	added	challenges	to	mankind.	He	argued,	
																																																								1	Larry	Collins,	“Canadian-Soviet	Relations	During	the	Cold	War,”	in	Aloysius	Balawyder,	ed.,	
Canadian-Soviet	Relations,	1939-1980	(Oakville,	ON.:	Mosaic	Press,	1981),	47	2	Odd	Arne	Westad,	The	Global	Cold	War:	Third	World	Interventions	and	the	Making	of	Our	Times	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005).	
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	 					men	 everywhere	 are	 demanding	 new	 living	 standards,	 greater	equality	of	opportunity	and	the	hope	of	better	things,	rather	than	despair	which	 has	 been	 the	 lot	 of	 so	 many	 through	 the	 ages.	 The	 greater	 the	population,	 the	 greater	 the	 need	 of	 raising	 economic	 standards	 so	 that	there	will	 be	 sufficient	 [resources	 to	meet]	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 additional	multitudes	of	mankind.		 						It	is	under	these	circumstances	that	the	battle	for	the	minds	of	men	is	 taking	 place	 between	 those	 who	 believe	 in	 freedom	 under	 law,	 and	those	who	contend	that	communism	is	the	hope	of	mankind.3	Imbedded	 in	 this	 statement	 are	 two	 important	 elements:	 Diefenbaker’s	 strident	anti-communism	 and	 fear	 of	 communisms	 potential	 global	 spread,	 and	 his	awareness	of	 the	 importance	of	 economics	 to	 the	 future	of	nations.	These	 factors,	among	 others,	 contributed	 to	 Canada’s	 policy	 toward	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe	during	the	Diefenbaker	period.	
	 This	 dissertation	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 the	 period	 Prime	 Minister	 John	Diefenbaker’s	 Progressive	 Conservative	 government	 was	 in	 office,	 1957-1963.	Where	 appropriate,	 the	 project	 considers	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 Liberal	 governments	that	 preceded	 and	 followed	 the	 PC’s	 tenure,	 either	 for	 contextual	 purposes	 or	 to	demonstrate	 consistency	 across	 administrations,	 a	 theme	 understated	 within	existing	 historiography.	 The	 time	 frame	 under	 examination	 coincides	 with	 Nikita	Khrushchev’s	 time	 as	 leader	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 so	 the	 Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	period	will	mark	this	project’s	studied	period.	
	 Prime	Minister	Diefenbaker’s	PC	government	was	 committed	 to	preventing	the	spread	of	communism,	and	this	was	an	integral	component	of	its	foreign	policy																																																									3	Department	of	External	Affairs	(hereafter	DEA),	Statements	and	Speeches	(hereafter	S	&	S),	59/26,	“The	Aims	of	Capitalism.”	Speech	by	P.M.	Diefenbaker	to	the	International	Junior	Red	Cross	Study	Centre,	Toronto,	Ontario,	12	August,	1959.	
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with	Communist	Eastern	Europe.	Yet,	Canadian	officials	were	dedicated	to	reducing	international	tensions	through	East-West	bridge	building,	increased	communication	through	diplomatic,	economic,	and	cultural	contacts,	consistent	support	for	détente,	and	 the	 de-ideologization	 of	 Canadian	 trade.4	The	 St.	 Laurent	 Liberal	 government	established	 the	 general	 framework	 for	 this	 policy	 direction,	 and	 the	 Progressive	Conservatives,	once	 in	power,	 continued	 its	application.	The	global	strategic	stasis	that	 emerged	 led	 to	 something	 of	 a	 political	 balance;	 as	 a	 result,	 discovering	strategies	to	engage	in	the	Cold	War	by	“other	means”	became	necessary.	
	 To	 be	 certain,	 this	 period	 was	 not	 without	 conflict.	 In	 fact,	 the	 period	witnessed	 some	 of	 the	most	 heated	 global	 conflicts	 in	 the	 Cold	War,	 as	 historian	Michael	 R.	 Beschloss’	 book	 The	 Crisis	 Years:	 Kennedy	 and	 Khrushchev,	 1960-1963	attests.5	The	1958	Berlin	Crisis,	which	 led	to	the	construction	of	 the	Berlin	Wall	 in	1961,	the	1960	U-2	incident,	and	the	1962	Cuban	Missile	Crisis	are	testaments	to	the	fact	 that	 this	 period	 was	 replete	 with	 global	 political	 and	 military	 crises.	 While	Premier	Khrushchev	and	American	President	 John	F.	Kennedy	expressed	desire	 to	reduce	Cold	War	tensions,	they	often	clashed	on	important	issues.	In	June	1961,	the	two	 leaders	met	 in	Vienna	to	discuss	various	 issues,	 including	the	Berlin	question.	The	 talks	did	not	 go	 smoothly.	 In	one	 instance,	Khrushchev	 told	Kennedy	 “in	 cold	anger”	 that	 “American	 intentions	 [in	 Berlin]	 led	 to	 ‘nothing	 good.’”	 Khrushchev	complained	that	the	US	“stripped	the	Soviet	Union	of	its	rights	and	interests	in	West	
																																																								4	Costas	Melakopides,	Pragmatic	Idealism:	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,	1945-1995	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1998),	43.		5	Michael	R.	Beschloss,	The	Crisis	Years:	Kennedy	and	Khrushchev,	1960-1963	(New	York:	Edward	Burlingame	Books,	1991).	
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Germany	[…	and]	the	United	States	could	no	longer	follow	its	policy	of	 ‘I	do	what	I	want.’”6	Reflecting	on	 the	meeting,	Kennedy	bemoaned	how	Khrushchev	“just	beat	hell	out	of	me	[…]	If	he	thinks	I’m	inexperienced	and	have	no	guts,	until	we	remove	those	 ideas	 we	 won’t	 get	 anywhere	 with	 him.”7	The	 fact	 that	 a	 strategic	 stasis	existed	in	this	period	should	not	suggest	that	tensions	did	not	run	high.		
	 As	 his	 biographer,	 William	 Taubman	 argues,	 “Khrushchev	 tried	 bravely	 to	humanize	 and	 modernize	 the	 Soviet	 system.”	 While	 former	 Soviet	 leader	 Joseph	Stalin	 tried	 to	 isolate	 the	country	 from	 the	West,	Khrushchev	 “tried	awkwardly	 to	improve	relations	with	the	West.	He	also	attempted	to	revitalize	areas	of	Soviet	life	–	agriculture,	 industry,	and	culture,	among	other	things	–	that	had	languished	under	Stalin.”	But,	as	Taubman	also	suggests,	“too	often	Khrushchev	made	a	bad	situation	even	 worse.”	 Despite	 engaging	 in	 several	 summits	 with	Western	 leaders	 and	 co-authoring	the	partial	test	ban	of	1963,	“he	also	provoked	the	Berlin	and	Cuban	crises	and	escalated	the	arms	race	he	had	set	out	to	diminish.”8	
	 Still,	the	death	of	Soviet	leader	Joseph	Stalin	in	March	1953	had	ushered	in	a	series	 of	 important	 changes	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 which	 reverberated	 outward	behind	the	Iron	Curtain;	Eastern	European	nations	experienced	various	degrees	of	liberalization.	Canadian	officials	recognized	that	 limited	 freedom	of	maneuver	was	conceded	 to	certain	Eastern	European	nations,	 in	addition	 to	Yugoslavia’s	existing	independent	 position.	 This	 proved	 important,	 as	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe																																																									6	Beschloss,	The	Crisis	Years,	219.	7	Beschloss,	The	Crisis	Years,	225.	8	William	Taubman,	Khrushchev:	The	Man	and	His	Era	(New	York	&	London:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2003),	xix.	
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became	 a	 deliberate	 and	 considered	 factor	 in	 Canada’s	 foreign	 policy.	 Canadian	Soviet	 policy	 thus	 evolved	 into	 a	 Canadian	 policy	 towards	 Communist	 Eastern	Europe,	equipped	with	various	nuances.	
	 For	Canadian	officials,	certain	Communist	Eastern	European	nations	were	of	more	 interest	 than	others.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 Soviet	Union,	 Yugoslavia	 and	Poland	were	 seen	 as	 viable	 points	where	 communism	might	 be	 challenged	 through	 non-military	means.	In	1959,	in	a	speech	titled,	“Coexistence,	The	Communist	Challenge,”	Robert	Ford,	one	of	the	Department	of	External	Affair’s	(DEA)	foremost	experts	on	the	Soviet	Union	with	 career	postings	as	ambassador	 to	Yugoslavia	and	 the	USSR,	stated,	in	the	past		
	Any	 victories	 for	 communism	 meant	 victories	 for	 the	 USSR.	 But	already	in	the	present	period	it	is	becoming	clear	that	this	is	no	longer	strictly	 accurate.	 Yugoslavia	 resisted	 the	 thesis	 that	 communism	 is	synonymous	with	 the	word	of	Moscow,	 and	 still	 refuses	 to	 accept	 it.	[…]	And	considerable	concessions	have	had	to	be	made	for	Poland.9	Canadian	officials	understood	potential	ramifications	to	global	communism	of	bloc	disintegration	 and	 any	 further	departure	by	Yugoslavia	 and	were	 eager	 to	 exploit	any	degree	of	schism	within	Communist	Eastern	Europe.	The	Canadian	government	pursued	closer	relations	with	Poland	and	Yugoslavia	as	a	way	of	encouraging	their	autonomy	vis-à-vis	the	USSR,	hoping	to	provide	models	for	other	Eastern	European	nations	 to	 follow.	 Thus,	 as	 a	 middle	 power,	 Canada	 sought	 to	 exercise	 modest	
																																																								9	Library	and	Archives	Canada	(hereafter,	LAC),	MG31	E73,	Robert	Ford	Papers,	Vol.	2,	File	14.	Address	to	the	Heads	of	Mission	meeting,	Paris,	“Coexistence:	The	Communist	Challenge,”	October	1959.	
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influence	 in	 this	 period	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 subtly	 shift	 the	 international	 balance	 of	power	in	favour	of	the	West	through	non-military	means.	
	 Former	 diplomat	 and	 civil	 servant	 Arthur	 Andrew	 states	 that	 Canada	 was	“the	prototype,	if	not	the	inventor,	of	the	middle	power	concept.”10	In	the	minds	of	many	 Canadians,	 the	 nation	 “had	 done	 its	 full	 share	 in	 fighting	 and	 winning	 the	[Second	World]	War.	All	this	more	than	justified	its	claim	to	be	a	‘middle	power.’”11	Historians	Norman	Hillmer	and	 J.L.	Granatstein	accurately	 state,	 “if	 there	were	no	formally	 recognized	 middle	 powers,	 then	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 would	 simply	have	 to	 be	 adjusted	 to	 reflect	what	 Canada	was	 doing	 and	 could	 do	 on	 the	world	stage.”12	The	 idea	of	a	middle	power	remained	 imbedded	 in	the	minds	of	Canada’s	civil	 servants	 throughout	 the	 Diefenbaker	 period,	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 they	 sought	 to	utilize	the	concept’s	flexibility	in	multilateral	organizations	and	in	bilateral	relations	with	select	Communist	Eastern	European	nations.	
	 For	the	purpose	of	 this	study,	 the	Soviet	Union,	Yugoslavia,	and	Poland	will	be	examined,	since,	as	will	be	demonstrated,	various	Canadian	officials	centered	out	these	 nations	 as	 viable	 points	 for	 combating	 European	 communism.	 An	investigation	 of	 the	 USSR	 is	 fundamental	 to	 this	 project	 since	 Soviet	 actions	motivated	 Canadian	 officials	 to	 rethink	 their	 foreign	 policy	 direction	 in	 Eastern	
																																																								10	Arthur	Andrew,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	a	Middle	Power:	Canadian	Diplomacy	from	King	to	Mulroney	(Toronto:	James	Lorimer	&	Company	Ltd.,	1993),	x.	11	Norman	Hillmer	and	J.L.	Granatstein,	From	Empire	to	Umpire:	Canada	and	the	World	into	the	21st	
Century	(Toronto:	Thomson	Nelson,	2008),	161.	12	Hillmer	and	Granatstein,	From	Empire	to	Umpire,	163.	
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Europe.	Additionally,	Canadian	officials	viewed	the	Soviet	Union	as	the	epicenter	of	international	communism.		
	 Yugoslavia,	 while	 a	 committed	 communist	 nation,	 was	 independent	 of	 the	USSR	(with	the	Yugoslav-Soviet	split	in	1948)	and	was	not	part	of	the	Warsaw	Pact.	Since	 Yugoslavia	 was	 a	 strong	 proponent	 of	 non-alignment,	 and,	 as	 some	 would	argue,	the	unofficial	leader	of	the	movement,	Canadian	officials	saw	the	nation	as	a	“battleground”	 from	 where	 Canada	 could	 challenge	 European	 Communism.	 As	Canadian	officials	saw	it,	 if	Canada	could	help	“win	over”	Yugoslavia,	other	nations	could	 potentially	 be	 influenced	 to	 follow	 suit,	 attenuating	 Soviet	 influence	 in	 that	region.		
	 Unlike	Yugoslavia,	Poland	fit	tightly	within	the	Soviet	bloc.	Despite	Poland’s	unbridled	 commitment	 to	 communism,	 led	 by	 Wladyslaw	 Gomulka,	 it	 rejected	subservient	dependence	on	the	USSR.	Thus,	Polish	authorities	wielded	a	degree	of	independence	that	shaped	their	foreign	policy.	As	a	result,	Canadian	officials	sought	to	 cultivate	 closer	 relations	 with	 Poland	 to	 encourage	 that	 nation’s	 independent	course.	Despite	 the	differences	 among	Poland,	Yugoslavia,	 and	 the	USSR,	Canada’s	broad	 policy	 objective	 was	 consistent:	 promote	 positive	 relations	 to	 expose	Communist	 nations	 to	 Western	 modalities,	 in	 hopes	 of	 lessening	 communist	influence	 globally.	 A	 history	 that	 addresses	 this	 policy	 framework	 from	 a	 larger	regional	 perspective,	 covering	 the	 USSR,	 Yugoslavia,	 and	 Poland,	 has	 yet	 to	 be	written;	the	general	aim	of	this	project,	then,	is	to	fill	this	void.		
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	 This	 dissertation	 argues	 Canadian	 policy	 towards	 Communist	 Eastern	Europe	 during	 the	 Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	 period	 was	 not	 solely	 driven	 by	traditional	 geopolitical	 and	 geostrategic	 considerations,	 but	 was	 also	 concerned	with	non-military	Communist	tactics.	As	a	result,	Canadian	officials	pursued	closer	political,	 economic,	 and	 socio-cultural	 bilateral	 relations	 with	 select	 Communist	Eastern	 European	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 challenge	 Soviet	 hegemony	 in	 that	 region	and	to	combat	Eastern	European	communism	generally.	The	Canadian	government	during	this	period	did	not	have	a	“grand	strategy”	that	governed	its	policy	with	the	region.	 Instead,	pragmatism	prevailed	as	a	number	of	ad	hoc	developments	 in	 the	fields	of	 economic	and	cultural	 foreign	 relations	 contributed	 to	 the	growing	 sense	that	Canada	was	engaged	in	Cold	War	diplomacy	by	“other	means.”	
	 This	project	demonstrates	 that,	during	 the	Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	period,	Canada	pursued	a	pragmatic,	 yet	 rational,	policy	 that	marks	a	decisive	moment	 in	Canada’s	Communist	Eastern	Europe	policy.	Moreover,	 it	highlights	how,	at	 times,	Canada	 nuanced	 its	 approach	 to	 the	 Cold	War.	 By	 pursuing	 closer	 relations	 with	select	countries	in	this	region,	Canada	created	some	room	for	maneuver	as	a	middle	power	within	the	alliance	constraints	of	the	Cold	War,	occasionally	challenging	the	Cold	 War	 consensus	 that	 supposedly	 governed	 international	 power	 structures.	Overall,	 Canada’s	 policy	 towards	 the	 superpowers	 amounted	 to	 a	 sensitive	synthesis.	 Clearly,	 Canada	 was	 committed	 to	 the	 Western	 bloc	 and	 actively	contributed	to	this	alliance.	Yet,	 it	was	committed	to	moderation	in	both	Cold	War	
	 12	
rhetoric	 and	 in	 corresponding	 actions.13	By	 examining	 Canada’s	 foreign	 policy	 in	this	region,	we	de-centre	 the	master	narrative	 that	has	 traditionally	suggested	 the	respective	 blocs	 deferentially	 followed	 the	 rigid	 trajectories	 of	 their	 superpower	patrons.	 Additionally,	 this	 study	 suggests	 the	 Canadian	 government	 pursued	 a	three-pronged	 approach	 in	 the	 context	 of	 its	 pragmatic	 policy	 by	 “other	 means,”	consisting	of	political,	economic,	and	cultural	diplomacy.	
	 This	project	builds	on	and	extends	more	traditional	approaches	to	diplomatic	history.	In	the	Canadian	historical	context,	at	least	until	the	end	of	the	1960s,	a	focus	on	 the	 foreign	 policy	 elite	 is	 entirely	 justified.	 Foreign	 policy	 was	 undoubtedly	shaped	 to	 varying	 degrees	 by	 the	 structural	 realities	 of	 international	 politics	 and	domestic	 political	 considerations,	 but	 the	 power	 to	 shape	 policy	 in	 Ottawa	 was	exercised	 by	 a	 relatively	 select	 group	 of	 individuals.	 As	 will	 be	 shown,	 Canadian	diplomats	–	particularly	Canada’s	ambassadors	–	worked	to	nurture	diplomatic	ties,	even	 during	 times	 of	 Cold	War	 tension.	 Given	 this,	 the	 study	 does	 recognize	 the	particular	 importance	 of	 elaborating	 an	 intellectual	 history	 of	 Ottawa’s	 civil	servants’	fundamental	beliefs	and	assumptions.14	By	doing	so,	 it	will	be	possible	to	
																																																								13	Melakopides,	Pragmatic	Idealism,	42.	14	For	this,	memoirs	and	biographies	play	an	integral	role:	George	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	
Peacemonger:	The	Memoirs	of	George	Ignatieff	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1985);	Patrick	Kyba,	Alvin:	A	Biography	of	the	Honourable	Alvin	Hamilton,	P.C.	(Regina:	Canadian	Plains	Research	Center,	1989);	Robert	Ford,	Our	Man	in	Moscow:	A	diplomat’s	reflections	on	the	Soviet	Union	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989);	Charles	A.	Rudd,	The	Constant	Diplomat:	Robert	Ford	in	Moscow	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2009);	John	G.	Diefenbaker,	One	Canada:	
Memoirs	of	the	Right	Honourable	John	G.	Diefenbaker,	Vols.	I	&	II	(Toronto:	Macmillan	of	Canada,	1975,	1977);	Thad	McIlroy,	ed.,	Personal	Letters	of	a	Public	Man:	The	Family	Letters	of	John.	G.	Diefenbaker	(Doubleday:	Toronto,	1985);	Peter	Newman,	Renegade	in	Power:	The	Diefenbaker	Years	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart,	1973);	Basil	Robinson,	Diefenbaker’s	World:	A	Populist	in	Foreign	Affairs	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989);	Denis	Smith,	Rogue	Tory:	the	Life	and	Legend	of	John	G.	
Diefenbaker	(Toronto:	Macfarlane	Walter	&	Ross,	1995).	
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trace	the	degree	to	which	such	personal	beliefs	and	assumptions	transcended	into,	and	survived	as,	foreign	policy.		
	 In	 The	 Ottawa	 Men,	 historian	 J.L.	 Granatstein	 traces	 the	 development	 of	Canada’s	civil	service	from	1935-1957	and	argues	that	a	gifted	group	of	mandarins	collectively	shaped	Canada’s	policy	and	steered	the	country	into	a	new	direction	by	creating	 a	 sophisticated	 economic	 policy	 for	 Canada	 that	 recognized	 the	 nation	needed	to	trade	to	survive.	He	also	underscores	the	fact	that	the	mandarins	created	a	 foreign	 policy	 for	 Canada	 “that	 was	 at	 once	 nationalist	 and	 internationalist,	aggressive	and	responsible,	practical	and	 idealistic.”15	Granatstein	shrewdly	 insists	that	 this	 special	 group	of	 individuals	were	driven	by	openness	 to	 ideas,	which	 set	them	apart	 from	 the	 rest	of	 the	bureaucracy	and	determined	 their	 reaction	 to	 the	country’s	problems.16	The	study	ends	at	1957,	presumably	because	that	year	clearly	demarks	 the	 end	 of	 a	 long	 period	 of	 Liberal	 reign.	 This	 dissertation	 suggests	 the	timeline	 can	 be	 extended,	 with	 new	mandarins	 added	 to	 the	 list,	 such	 as	 George	Ignatieff	and	Robert	Ford.		
	 The	 progressive	 thinking	 and	 pragmatic	 policy	 development	 that	 began	during	 the	 post-war	 Liberal	 government	 continued	 with	 the	 Progressive	Conservatives,	 even	 as	 the	 international	 situation	 changed	 significantly.	 It	 is	important	 to	 recognize	 that	 many	 of	 the	 civil	 servants	 responsible	 for	 policy	development	 during	 the	 Diefenbaker	 years	 were	 part	 of,	 or	 at	 least	 shaped	 by,	
																																																								15	J.L.	Granatstein,	The	Ottawa	Men:	The	Civil	Service	Mandarins,	1935-1957	(Toronto:	Oxford	University	Press,	1982),	xii.	16	Granatstein,	The	Ottawa	Men,	xi.	
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Granatstein’s	“original”	mandarins.	As	such,	their	commitment	to	carving	out	a	niche	for	 Canada	 in	world	 affairs	 remained	 strong,	 pragmatic,	 and	nuanced.	Working	 to	engender	 closer	 political	 relations	 with	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe,	 while	simultaneously	promoting	commercial	links	and	cultural	exchanges,	were	methods	developed	and	executed	by	the	Ottawa	Men	 just	as	consistently	before	and	during	Diefenbaker’s	time	as	Prime	Minister.		
	 Understanding	the	fact	that	many	of	these	individuals	believed	Canada	could	and	 should	 go	 beyond	 traditional	 geostrategic	 and	 geopolitical	 methods	 for	influencing	 global	 affairs	 is	 crucial.	 If	 this	 is	 accepted,	 then	 the	 importance	 of	Canada’s	 commercial	 and	 cultural	 relations	 with	 Communist	 Europe	 can	 be	foregrounded	and	studied	as	real	and	significant	approaches	used	to	bridge	East	and	West.	 If	developing	political	 relations	with	Communist	Eastern	Europe	was	still	 in	its	nascent	phase,	doing	business	and	pursuing	exchanges	with	these	countries	was	even	less	developed.		
	 The	Canadian	government’s	 second	 foreign	policy	prong	 in	 this	 region	was	developing	 economic	 and	 commercial	 relations.	 To	 many	 contemporaries,	 the	postwar	world	witnessed	the	solidification	of	the	world	into	two	broad	ideological	camps.	 On	 the	 one	 side,	 led	 by	 the	 United	 States,	 were	 nations	 with	 economies	grounded	in	the	basic	tenets	of	capitalism	and	free	market	enterprise,	countries	that	were	generally	 anti-communist.	The	other	 side,	 led	by	 the	Soviet	Union,	practiced	Marxism,	were	primarily	driven	by	state-run	economies,	and	were	committed	to	the	
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global	 spread	of	 communism.17	When	considering	 its	 foreign	policy	objectives,	 the	Canadian	 government	 appeared	 content	 to	 adopt	 a	 simplified	 ideological	framework.	 It	 was	 generally	 understood	 by	 Canadian	 officials	 that	 the	 Cold	 War	economy	 that	 emerged	 after	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 pitted	 two	 rival	 economic	systems	against	each	other,	each	radically	different	in	terms	of	character	and	design.	The	 Western	 capitalist	 order	 was	 based	 on	 (at	 least	 theoretically)	 cooperation,	compromise,	 and	 shared	 mutual	 interests	 (recognizing	 there	 is	 an	 inherent	contradiction	 between	 the	 ideas	 of	 capitalism	 and	 cooperation).	 Conversely,	 the	Soviet	bloc	was	 founded	on	coercion,	control,	and	dependency.	While	 the	Western	model	“sought	to	create	an	open,	multilateral	world	economy,	the	Soviet	economic	order	 shunned	 international	 trade	 and	 foreign	 investment	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 closed,	state-controlled	 autarkic	 system.”18	Yet,	 as	 the	 Cold	 War	 fundamentally	 shaped	global	politics,	the	two	systems	edged	closer	to	one	another.		
	 International	 relations	 expert	 Ian	 Jackson	 contends	 that	while	 the	political,	diplomatic,	and	security	aspects	of	the	Cold	War	have	received	substantial	analysis,	“the	 economic	 factors	 behind	 the	 Cold	 War	 have	 received	 scant	 attention	 in	 the	literature.”	 Jackson	 further	 observes,	 “This	 is	 surprising	 given	 the	 centrality	 of	economics	 in	 the	 ideological	 conflict	 between	 Western	 capitalism	 and	 Soviet	
																																																								17	Canadian	officials	generally	adopted	a	simplified	perspective	of	Cold	War	divisions,	often	framing	it	as	a	struggle	between	democracy	and	communism.	It	is	important	to	remember,	however,	that	this	perspective	is	simplistic	and	ignores	the	Cold	War’s	manifestations	in	the	Third	World	and	other	parts	of	the	globe,	including	Francisco	Franco’s	Spain,	António	de	Oliveira	Salazar’s	Portugal,	Park	Chung-hee’s	South	Korea,	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	Taiwan,	and	Anastasio	Somoza’s	Nicaragua,	for	example.	18	Ian	Jackson,	“Economics	and	the	Cold	War,”	in	Richard	H.	Immerman	and	Petra	Goedde	eds.,	The	
Oxford	Handbook	of	the	Cold	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	53.	
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communism.”19	Speaking	 on	 Canada	 specifically,	 historian	 and	 international	 trade	expert	 Michael	 Hart	 laments	 how	 Canadian	 historians	 “tend	 to	 be	 fascinated	 by	security	and	political	events	and	pay	insufficient	attention	to	the	trade	dimensions	of	Canada’s	international	relations.”20	A	study	of	Canada’s	commercial	relations	with	Eastern	 Europe	 can	 helpfully	 supplement	 historical	 attention	 already	 paid	 to	summit	 meetings	 and	 East-West	 crises,	 by	 addressing	 some	 of	 the	 many	 other	“battlegrounds”	on	which	the	Cold	War	was	engaged.21	
	 The	 role	 ideology	 played	 in	 the	 Canadian	 government’s	 approach	 to	 its	commercial	 dealings	with	Communist	Eastern	Europe	 is	 significant.	When	dealing	with	the	Soviet	Union,	Canadian	officials	adopted	a	dualistic	approach.	While	Soviet	progress	in	trade	and	industrial	output	was	viewed	as	an	“economic	offensive,”	to	be	regarded	cautiously	and	even	suspiciously,	when	the	Canadian	government	sought	new	markets	 for	 the	 country’s	 growing	 surpluses	 of	wheat,	 ideology	 seemed	 less	important,	 and	 the	 USSR,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 Communist	 Eastern	 European	 nations,	were	welcomed	 as	 customers.	 In	 other	words,	 this	 region,	 particularly	 the	 Soviet	Union,	was	seen	as	both	a	competitor	and	customer.	There	is	a	link	between	these	
																																																								19	Jackson,	“Economics	and	the	Cold	War,”	in	Immerman	and	Goedde	eds.,	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	
the	Cold	War,	50.	20	Michael	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation:	Canadian	Trade	Policy	from	Colonization	to	Globalization	(Vancouver	&	Toronto:	UBC	Press,	2002),	482,	note	2.	21	To	date,	the	subject	of	American	economic	domination	in	Canada	has	been	well	researched	–	the	account	by	Liberal	Finance	Minister	Walter	Gordon,	A	Choice	for	Canada:	Imperialism	or	Colonial	
Status	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart,	1966),	is	a	fine	testament	of	contemporary	thinking.	Essentially,	Gordon	argues	that	Canada	had	become	free	from	Britain’s	colonial	influence	only	to	fall	prey	to	American	economic	imperialism.	See	Also,	Stephen	Azzi,	Walter	Gordon	and	the	Rise	of	
Canadian	Nationalism	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1999).	The	significance	of	understanding	Canadian	history	through	colonial	or	neocolonial	frameworks	has	been	well	established.	This	perspective,	however,	is	only	part	of	the	equation,	admittedly	an	appropriately	important	part.	
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two	perceptions.	When	engaged	in	commercial	dealings	with	the	USSR,	Yugoslavia,	and	Poland,	the	Canadian	government	hoped	doing	business	with	this	region	would	expose	 it	 to	 Western	 economic	 protocols,	 highlight	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 capitalist	system,	 promote	 bridge	 building,	 and	 generally	 weaken	 European	 Communism.	Thus,	 doing	 business	 with	 the	 region	 represents	 a	 pragmatic	 component	 of	 the	government’s	economic	statecraft.		
	 While	 Canadian	 commercial	 relations	may	 not	 have	 improved	 dramatically	during	 the	 Diefenbaker	 era,	 they	 did	 slowly	 develop	 in	 new	 and	 promising	directions.	 Of	 course,	 relative	 to	 Canadian-American	 foreign	 economic	 relations,	trade	with	 Communist	 Eastern	Europe	 paled	 in	 quantitative	 terms.	However,	 it	 is	important	to	remember	that	improving	bilateral	relations	with	communist	countries	was	 more	 about	 the	 broader	 political	 context	 within	 which	 these	 interactions	occurred.	So,	Canada’s	economic	relations	with	the	region	were	political,	ideological,	and	economical.	The	same	principle	can	be	applied	to	Canada’s	efforts	in	the	field	of	cultural	diplomacy.		
	 The	final	strategy	of	Canada’s	Cold	War	policy	by	“other	means”	during	this	period	was	 cultural	diplomacy.	A	 growing	number	of	 scholars	 are	 recognizing	 the	important	contribution	of	cultural	diplomacy	 to	 traditional	geopolitical	agendas	 in	an	 historical	 context.	 Increasing	 awareness	 in	 Canada	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 cultural	diplomacy	developed	from	the	mid-1950s	onward	and	was	largely	spearheaded	by	Ottawa’s	 civil	 servants.	 As	 the	 Cold	 War	 became	 more	 a	 competition	 to	 win	 the	hearts	 and	minds	of	 individuals,	 the	use	 and	 abuse	of	 hard	power	 –	 the	 ability	 to	
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coerce	through	military	and	economic	might22	–	was	no	longer	the	primary	driving	force	of	the	international	system.	A	growing	number	of	scholars	(mainly	those	who	have	 contributed	 to	 the	 rich	 and	 extensive	 American	 historiography	 on	 cultural	diplomacy)	 argue	 that	 the	 Cold	 War	 conflict	 was	 fought	 less	 with	 weapons	 that	could	kill,	and	more	with	words,	ideas,	and	exchanges.23	
	 Political	scientist	Andrew	Cooper	argues	that	cultural	diplomacy	“is	intended	to	 serve	a	variety	of	purposes	 […	and	 that]	 a	degree	of	promotion	and	 support	of	international	cultural	relations	by	a	government	is	an	essential	element	of	cultural	diplomacy.”24	Corroborating	this,	historian	Graham	Carr	adds:		
	…	like	classic	foreign	relations,	cultural	diplomacy	supports	“objectives	which	have	been	defined	through	normal	policy	channels.”	However,	it	is	 less	 focused	 on	 immediate	 outcomes	 and	 aims	 instead	 to	 broadly	“influence	 the	 elite	 or	 mass	 public	 opinion	 of	 another	 nation	 for	 the	purpose	 of	 turning	 the	 policies	 or	 views	 of	 that	 target	 nation	 to	advantage.”25		And	 this	 was	 precisely	 what	 many	 in	 the	 DEA	 strove	 to	 do.	 Spearheaded	 in	particular	by	Canadian	ambassadors,	Canada’s	foreign	policy	elite	promoted	cultural	relations,	 scholarly	 exchanges,	 and	 various	media	 communications	 as	 a	means	 of	engendering	closer	 ties	between	regions	and	exposing	Communist	Eastern	Europe																																																									22	Evan	H.	Potter,	Branding	Canada:	Projecting	Canada’s	Soft	Power	Through	Public	Diplomacy	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queens	University	Press,	2009),	ix.	23	Kenneth	S.	Osgood,	Total	Cold	War:	Eisenhower’s	Secret	Propaganda	Battle	at	Home	and	Abroad	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2006);	Yale	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War:	
Raising	the	Iron	Curtain	(Pennsylvania:	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2003).	24	Andrew	Fenton	Cooper,	Canadian	Culture:	International	Dimensions	(Centre	on	Foreign	Policy	and	Federalism,	University	of	Waterloo/Wilfrid	Laurier	University	&	The	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	1985),	3-4.	25	Graham	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind’:	Glenn	Gould’s	Tour	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	Culture	of	the	Cold	War,”	The	Canadian	Historical	Review,	Vol.	95,	No.	1	(March	2014),	3-4;	Robert	J.	Williams,	“International	Cultural	Programmes:	Canada	and	Australia	Compared,”	in	Canadian	Culture,	ed.	Cooper,	85;	and	Potter,	Branding	Canada,	32-33.	
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to	 Western	 modalities,	 thus	 bridging	 the	 ideological	 divide	 with	 the	 hopeful	expectation	of	slowly,	but	ultimately,	undermining	global	Communism.	
	 Similar	to	other	international	history	scholars,	this	perspective	is	inspired	by	the	 cultural	 turn	 in	 diplomatic	 history.	 This	 particular	 aspect	 of	 the	 dissertation	explores	 how	 Canadian	 authorities	 pragmatically	 engaged	 in	 ongoing	 efforts	 to	assess	 how	 Canada	 should	 associate	with	 Communist	 Europe	 in	ways	 that	would	effectively	 employ	 its	middle	 power	 position	 to	modestly	 influence	 global	 affairs.	Cultural	 diplomacy	 was	 still	 in	 its	 embryonic	 phase	 in	 Canada	 and	 proved	potentially	useful	because	of	 the	major	changes	 that	had	occurred	east	of	 the	 Iron	Curtain,	but	also	because	of	the	forward	thinking	attitudes	of	Canada’s	foreign	policy	elite.	This	 element	of	 the	dissertation	 further	 supports	 the	notion	 that	 this	period	was	a	key	moment	in	Canada’s	foreign	relations	with	Communist	Eastern	Europe.		
	 A	 full	 assessment	of	Canada’s	ultimate	 success	 in	 the	non-military	 realm	of	the	Cold	War	would	require	an	in-depth	examination	from	the	immediate	post-war	period	through	to	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1991,	a	time	frame	well	beyond	the	 scope	 of	 this	 project.	 This	 dissertation,	 focusing	 as	 it	 does	 primarily	 on	 the	Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	 years,	 nonetheless	 provides	 an	 in-depth	 examination	 of	Canada’s	 Cold	War	 by	 “other	means”	 during	 a	 key	 time	when	 the	 possibilities	 of	middle	 power	 engagement	 in	 cultural	 and	 economic	 diplomacy	 with	 Communist	Eastern	Europe	were	beginning	to	be	realized.	It	is	certainly	not	suggested	that	the	Diefenbaker	 government’s	 policy	 toward	 this	 region	 contributed	 directly	 to	 the	collapse	of	communism	and	the	eventual	downfall	of	the	Soviet	Union.	But,	as	many	
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historians	 have	 shown,	 the	 non-military	 fronts	 proved	 to	 be	 vital	 “battlegrounds”	during	 the	 Cold	 War,	 ones	 that	 undoubtedly	 influenced	 the	 conflict’s	 eventual	outcome.	Arriving	at	a	definitive,	quantifiable	conclusion	regarding	the	longer-term	impacts	 of	 Canada’s	 Communist	 policy	during	 the	Diefenbaker	 government	would	be	an	overly	ambitious	goal	for	this	study,	but	it	will	be	shown	that	Canada’s	pursuit	of	 closer	 ties	 with	 select	 Eastern	 European	 nations	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 itself	helped	to	bridge	the	divide	between	East	and	West.	
	 CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORKS		 On	 the	 international	 front	 during	 the	 Cold	War,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	weighed	more	 heavily	 on	 Ottawa’s	 mind	 than	 did	 Canada	 on	 the	 Kremlin’s.	 Yet,	 Canada’s	strategic	position	was	never	ignored	by	the	USSR,	primarily,	“as	the	record	suggests,	because	 of	 its	 proximity	 to	 the	 USSR’s	 principal	 rival,	 the	 United	 States.”26	As	expected,	 the	US	 figured	prominently	 in	 the	 formulation	of	Canada’s	Soviet	policy.	As	Leigh	Sarty	argues,	Canadian-Soviet	relations	can	be	understood	“as	one	side	of	a	larger	 triangle,	 in	 which	 ties	 between	Moscow	 and	 Ottawa	were	 shaped	 by	 their	respective	 concerns”	 with	 the	West’s	 leading	 power,	 the	 United	 States.27	In	 other	words,	“international	relations	between	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	were	shaped	by	developments	elsewhere	in	the	international	system,	and	in	particular	by	the	two	sides'	 respective	dealings	with	Washington.”28	This	 framework	 is	useful	because	 it	acknowledges	that	while	Canada	and	the	USSR	recognized	the	strategic	importance																																																									26	Leigh	Sarty,	“Lessons	of	the	Past?	Reflections	of	the	History	of	Canadian-Soviet	Relations,”	in	“Canada	and	the	USSR/CIS:	Northern	Neighbours”,	in	Kenneth	McRoberts,	ed.,	International	Journal	
of	Canadian	Studies,	Vol.	9,	(Spring),	1994,	14.	27	Sarty,	“Lessons	of	the	Past?,”	14.	28	Sarty,	“Lessons	of	the	Past?,”	11.	
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of	 one	 another,	 even	 if	 the	 recognition	 was	 lopsided,	 their	 relations	 were	 still	governed	by	broader	global	Cold	War	trends.29	This	framework	also	proves	valuable	for	recognizing	and	analyzing	any	 idiosyncrasies	 in	the	general	 trend	of	Canadian-Soviet	 relations,	 and	 it	 corresponds	with	 the	well-established	 notion	 that	 Canada	utilized	international	organizations,	such	as	the	United	Nations	(UN)	and	the	North	Atlantic	 Treaty	 Organization	 (NATO),	 to	 mitigate	 the	 asymmetrical	 nature	 of	 its	bilateral	relations	with	the	US.	This	framework	effectively	showcases	how,	at	times,	Canadian-Soviet	relations	contradicted	the	more	global	political	 trends	of	 the	Cold	War.	Yet,	 it	omits	 the	 fact	 that	other	geographical	 regions	contributed	 to	Canada’s	Soviet	policy	and	suggests	a	degree	of	passivity	that	is	somewhat	unwarranted.	This	project	 reveals	 that	 Canadian	 officials	 were	 acutely	 aware	 of	 changes	 occurring	behind	the	Iron	Curtain	and	pursued	a	policy	based	on	those	changes.	In	addition	to	the	impact	of	American-Soviet	relations	on	Canadian	foreign	policy	during	the	Cold	War,	Canadian	officials	were	aware	of	developments	within	 the	USSR,	or	between	the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 other	 Communist	 Eastern	 European	 nations,	 and	 this	 also	guided	their	policy	decisions	as	they	determined	policy	directions.	
	 Complementary	to	Sarty’s	framework	is	historian	Costas	Melakopides’	study	
Pragmatic	 Idealism:	 Canadian	 Foreign	 Policy,	 1945-1995.	 One	 of	 Melakopides’	principal	 arguments	 is	 that	 “post	 Second	World	War	 Canadian	 foreign	 policy	 has	been	 marked	 by	 impressive	 consistency,	 in	 both	 style	 and	 substance.”	 This	consistency,	 he	 argues,	 was	 a	 result	 of	 a	 conscious	 and	 sustained	 pursuit	 of	 a																																																									29	Historian	J.L.	Black,	in	his	edited	compilation	Canada	in	the	Soviet	Mirror:	Ideology	and	Perception	
in	Soviet	Foreign	Affairs,	1917-1991	(Ottawa:	Carleton	University	Press,	1998)	argues	that	Canada	did	indeed	figure	prominently	in	Soviet	Foreign	policy.	
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coherent	 set	 of	 foreign	 policy	 ends	 and	 means,	 and	 can	 be	 best	 designated	 as	Canadian	internationalism,	“which	should	be	understood	as	a	balanced	synthesis	of	idealism	 and	 pragmatism	 or	 as	 pragmatic	 idealism.”	 One	 of	 the	 central	 values	 of	Melakopides’	definition	of	 idealism,	and	crucial	to	this	project,	 is	Canada’s	belief	 in	“the	 importance	 of	 moderation,	 communication,	 generosity,	 and	 cooperation	 in	international	 affairs.”	 Regarding	 pragmatism,	 Melakopides	 suggests	 that	 one	 of	Canada’s	 major	 foreign	 policy	 goals	 since	 1945	 “has	 been	 to	 satisfy	 Canada’s	interests	 in	 the	 context	of	broader	 interests.”	As	a	 result,	 “the	pragmatic	–	 that	 is,	flexible,	adaptable,	and	workable	–	pursuit	of	Canada’s	interests	and	values	should	suffice	 to	 show	 that	 Canadian	 internationalism”	 exhibited	 calculated	 and	 sensible	foreign	 policy	 goals. 30 	Specifically,	 Melakopides	 examines	 Canada’s	 role	 in	peacekeeping	 and	 peacemaking,	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament,	 human	 rights,	ecological	 concerns,	 and	 foreign	 development	 assistance.	 The	 pragmatic	 idealism	framework,	however,	can	be	extended.	In	fact,	 it	provides	a	useful	 lens	to	examine	Canadian	political,	cultural,	and	commercial	policy	with	Communist	Eastern	Europe.	As	this	project	demonstrates,	Canadian	officials	understood	the	importance	of	open	lines	of	communication,	moderation,	and	cooperation	 in	 the	political,	 cultural,	and	commercial	 realms,	 and	 proved	 willing,	 and	 indeed	 eager,	 to	 modify	 their	 policy	direction	 as	 international	 currents	 changed.	 Utilizing	 this	 perspective	 contributes	effectively	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 policies	 of	 Prime	 Minister	 John	 Diefenbaker’s	Progressive	Conservative	(PC)	government	were	less	an	aberration	in	the	history	of	Canadian	foreign	policy	than	has	been	typically	argued	by	historians.																																																									30	Melakopides,	Pragmatic	Idealism,	3-5.	
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	 HISTORIOGRAPHY	
	 To	 date,	 Jamie	 Glazov’s	 Canadian	 Policy	 Toward	 Khrushchev’s	 Soviet	 Union	remains	an	authoritative	work	on	Diefenbaker’s	foreign	policy	with	the	Soviet	Union	and	 is	 closest	 in	 subject	matter	 to	 this	 dissertation.	 Yet,	 Glazov	 acknowledges	 his	work	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 an	 examination	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	 bilateral	 relations.	Generally,	Glazov	focuses	primarily	on	traditional	geopolitical	aspects	of	the	history.	His	 work	 also	 does	 not	 examine	 socio-cultural	 dimensions	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	relations.	 By	 covering	 the	 whole	 Khrushchev	 period,	 he	 examines	 foreign	 policy	towards	the	Soviet	Union	under	both	the	St.	Laurent	(1948-1957)	and	Diefenbaker	(1957-1963)	 governments.	 Glazov	 builds	 on	 Larry	 Collins’	 thesis	 that	 Canada’s	guiding	 principle	 was	 containment	 without	 ostracism:	 “[Canada]	 maintained	 that	lines	 of	 communication	 must	 be	 kept	 open	 to	 avoid	 exacerbating	 the	 conflict’s	intensity.”	 Collins	 summarized	 Canada’s	 policy	 toward	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	“containment	 with	 a	 ‘human	 face.’” 31 	In	 step	 with	 Collins’	 assertion	 that	 as	international	tensions	increased	Canadian	sovereignty	waned,	Glazov	proposes	that	Canada	 adopted	 a	 policy	 of	 “containment	 with	 accommodation,”	 serving	 as	 an	intermediary	in	the	East-West	conflict	that	was	“in	league	with	middlepowerism.”32		 Reinforcing	much	of	 the	scholarship	on	post-WWII	Canadian	 foreign	policy,	Glazov’s	 interpretation	 of	 Diefenbaker’s	 Soviet	 policy	 unfavourably	 compares	 the	dismal	failures	of	the	Progressive	Conservative	leader	to	the	so-called	‘golden	age’	of	Canadian	 foreign	 policy	 shaped	 by	 preceding	 Liberal	 governments.	 Early	
																																																								31	Collins,	“Canadian-Soviet	Relations	During	the	Cold	War,”	44.	32	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union,	XIII.	
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scholarship	 laid	 the	 groundwork	 for	 such	 interpretations,	 and	 few	 scholars	 have	subsequently	challenged	this	orthodox	view.33	
	 Scholars	 are	 correct	 to	 recognise	 the	 major	 international	 changes	 that	occurred	 during	 the	 1940s	 and	 1950s,	 changes	 that	 resulted	 in	 a	 new,	unprecedented	 global	 context	 within	 which	 Canada	 might	 expect	 to	 play	 a	 role	commensurate	with	its	middle	power	status.	The	focus	of	these	histories,	however,	is	less	on	the	new	international	climate	that	allowed	for	Canada	to	play	such	a	role.	Instead,	 they	examine	and	 trumpet	 the	 achievements	of	 a	Department	of	External	Affairs	 that	 rapidly	 expanded	 in	 numbers	 and	 stature	 to	 enable	 the	 Canadian	government	 to	 assume	 a	 more	 pronounced	 role	 in	 international	 affairs	 from	 the	mid-1940s	through	to	the	late	1950s,34	contributing	to	the	conception	of	the	golden	age	in	Canadian	foreign	policy.		
	 Initial	 scholarship	on	Canada’s	 early	Cold	War	diplomacy	also	 tends	 to	pay	less	attention	to	the	global	context	that	created	the	very	conditions	that	allowed	for	Canada’s	diplomatic	and	political	elite	to	shine.	Political	scientist	Denis	Stairs	notes	the	 irony	 in	 how	 “the	 mandarins’	 realist	 praxis	 [had]	 left	 them	 with	 an	 idealist	reputation.”35	According	to	historian	Adam	Chapnick,	at	the	outset	of	the	Cold	War,	America	 was	 “unusually	 open	 to	 ‘developing	 an	 extensive	 network	 of	 alliances																																																									33	Adam	Chapnick,	“The	Golden	Age:	A	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	Paradox”,	International	Journal,	Vol.	64,	No.	1,	Electoral	Politics	and	Policy:	Annual	John	W.	Holmes	Issue	on	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	(Winter,	2008/2009):	205-221.	34	For	example,	see	John	Hilliker	and	Donald	Barry,	Canada’s	Department	of	External	Affairs:	Volume	
2,	Coming	of	Age,	1946-1968	(Montreal	and	Kingston:	McGill-Queen's	Press,	1995).		35	Denis	Stairs,	“Realists	at	Work:	Canadian	Policy	Makers	and	the	Politics	of	Transition	from	Hot	to	Cold	War,”	in	Greg	Donaghy,	ed.,	Canada	and	the	Early	Cold	War,	1943	–	1957	(Ottawa:	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	International	Trade,	1998),	91-116.	
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throughout	 the	 free	 world,’	 […]	 enabling	 a	 temporary	 and	 disproportionately	effective	 team	 in	 Ottawa	 to	 engage	 actively	 at	 the	 most	 senior	 of	 international	levels.”36	“As	the	idea	of	a	golden	age	entrenched	itself	within	the	Canadian	foreign	policy	lexicon,”	Chapnick	suggests,	“academics	and	policy	practitioners	began	to	add	rigour	 to	 the	 standard	 understanding.”37	Before	 long,	 the	 histories	 of	 Canada’s	golden	age	cast	a	 tall	and	dark	shadow	on	most	 foreign	policy	subject	matter	 that	fell	outside	the	confines	of	this	period.		
	 By	 the	 time	 Diefenbaker	 gained	 power	 in	 1957,	 Canada’s	 international	influence	appeared	to	be	waning,	and	not	necessarily	for	reasons	entirely	under	the	government’s	 control.	 Juxtaposed	 against	 the	 golden	 age,	 Diefenbaker’s	 foreign	policy	has	been	portrayed,	somewhat	unjustly,	in	an	overly	negative	light.	It	appears	that	 many	 scholars	 paid	 little	 consideration	 to	 Trevor	 Lloyd’s,	 Canada	 in	 World	
Affairs,	 1957	 –	 1959,	where	 he	 argues	 Canada’s	 fall	 from	 grace	 was	 natural	 and	unavoidable.38	To	 understand	 the	 received	 interpretation	 of	 Diefenbaker’s	 foreign	policies,	one	need	only	look	to	the	chapter	titles	of	some	of	the	works	that	address	his	time	in	office:	“The	Demented	Decade,	1957-1968;”39	“Nuclear	Nightmares,	1957	
																																																								36	Chapnick,	“The	Golden	Age,”	p.	215.	Chapnick	was	quoting	Alan	P.	Dobson	and	Steve	Marsh’s	US	
Foreign	Policy	since	1945,	2nd	ed.	(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	2006),	29.	37	Chapnick,	“The	Golden	Age:	A	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	Paradox,”	215.	38	Trevor	Lloyd,	Canada	in	World	Affairs,	1957	–	1959	(Toronto:	Oxford	University	Press,	1968).	Lloyd	states	that	the	factors	that	perpetuated	the	inevitable	decline	of	Canada’s	international	influence	were:	Europe’s	economic	recovery,	the	fact	that	Khrushchev	had	altered	the	Cold	War	dynamic	to	the	detriment	of	smaller	states,	the	ending	of	domestic	political	stability	that	was	provided	by	the	long-governing	Liberal	party,	that	the	Canadian	economy	was	losing	strength,	morale	in	the	Civil	Service	was	deteriorating,	and	that	popular	expectations	of	Canada’s	role	in	the	world	were	growing	too	great	for	any	leader.	References	from	Lloyd’s	work	cited	here	are	found	in	Chapnick’s	“The	Golden	Age:	A	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	Paradox”,	209-210.	39	Robert	Bothwell,	The	Big	Chill:	Canada	and	the	Cold	War	(Concord,	ON:	Irwin	Publishing,	1998).	
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–	 1963;”40	“Crisis	 Years,	 1957-63;”41	“The	 Time	 of	 Troubles,	 1957	 –	 1968;”42	“The	Unraveling:	Conflicts	of	 Interest	 in	Diefenbaker’s	Policy	after	1961.”43	Significantly,	with	 the	 exception	 of	 all	 but	 the	 last,	 these	 chapters	 appear	 in	 monographs	 that	examine	 Canadian-American	 relations	 or	 Canada’s	 Cold	 War	 history,	 and	 focus	primarily	 on	 issues	 related	 to	 nuclear	 weapons,	 the	 Cuban	 Missile	 Crisis,	Diefenbaker-Kennedy	 relations,	 and	 continental	 defence	 generally.44	Geostrategic	and	 geopolitical	 focuses	 dominate	 the	 history.	 Specific	 examination	 of	 Canadian-Soviet,	 and	 Canadian-East	 European,	 relations	 is	 much	 less	 common.	 Moreover,	these	 histories	 do	 not	 cover	 the	 Diefenbaker	 period	 exclusively;	 rather,	 they	typically	portray	the	Progressive	Conservative	government	as	a	six-year	interlude	in	an	otherwise	lengthy	Liberal	era.45		
	 To	some	degree,	it	was	a	case	of	unfortunate	timing	for	Diefenbaker	because	he	assumed	power	 just	as	 important	developments	 in	 international	politics	at	that	time	 threatened	 to	 curtail	 any	 middle	 power	 prominence	 Canada	 had	 earlier	achieved.	It	is	not	inconceivable	that	Diefenbaker	has	disproportionately	shouldered	the	 blame	 for	 Canada’s	 declining	 international	 stature.	 There	 is	 certainly	 a	discrepancy	in	how	many	historians	have	harshly	and	fervently	criticized	his	policy,																																																									40	Robert	Bothwell,	Alliance	and	Illusion:	Canada	and	the	World,	1945	–	1984	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2007).	41	J.L.	Granatstein	amd	Norman	Hillmer,	For	Better	or	for	Worse:	Canada	and	the	United	States	to	the	
1990s	(Toronto:	Copp	Clark	Pitman	Ltd.,	1991). 42	Robert	Bothwell,	Canada	and	the	United	States:	Politics	of	Partnership	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1992).	43	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union.	44	Kevin	A.	Spooner,	Canada,	the	Congo	Crisis,	and	US	Peacekeeping,	1960-64	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2009).	Spooner	recognizes	that	much	of	Diefenbaker’s	tainted	legacy	is	due	to	his	struggle	to	define	a	clear	position	on	continental	defence,	2.	45	For	perhaps	the	most	explicit	example,	see	Peter	Regenstreif’s	The	Diefenbaker	Interlude:	Parties	
and	Voting	in	Canada,	an	Interpretation	(Toronto:	Longmans	Canada	Limited,	1965).	
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even	as	others	caution	that	it	“is	well	to	remember	[…]	that	many	of	the	changes	that	came	over	Canada	after	1957	were	not	of	that	government’s	making,	or	even	in	the	control	of	Canadians.”46	Indeed,	this	is	a	key	inconsistency	in	the	historiography	that	this	dissertation	probes.	Consider,	 in	1963,	 just	months	before	the	PC	government	was	voted	out	of	office,	diplomat	and	scholar	John	Holmes	stated,	
	To	 be	 quite	 frank,	 I	 will	 say	 that,	 having	 served	 both	 Liberal	 and	Conservative	governments,	I	am	less	inclined	to	[…]	regard	1957	as	a	watershed	in	our	foreign	policy.	However	important	internal	changes	may	seem,	external	changes	had	been	more	important.47		 Specific	 examinations	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations	 have	 received	 relatively	little	 attention,	 and	 the	 vast	 majority,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Glazov’s	 monograph,	comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 edited	 collections.	 Balawyder’s	 Canadian-Soviet	 Relations,	
1939-1980,	explores	a	number	of	themes,	driven	by	the	common	argument	that	the	relationship	between	Canada	and	the	USSR	followed	the	general	pattern	of	broader	Cold	 War	 trends	 and	 East-West	 relations.	 Balawyder	 maintains	 that	 Canada’s	relationship	with	the	Soviet	Union	went	through	five	phases;	phase	four,	from	1955	to	 1968,	 encompassing	 the	 Diefenbaker	 years,	 marked	 a	 transition	 period	 when	relations	 between	 the	 countries	 slowly	 began	 to	 improve	 on	 many	 fronts.	Unfortunately,	this	theme	goes	underexplored.		
	 The	gap	is	helpfully	 filled	to	some	degree	by	John	English’s	“Lester	Pearson	Encounters	 the	 Enigma,”	 in	 Canada	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Experiment.	 English	 asserts	
																																																								46	Bothwell,	The	Big	Chill,	54.	47	Trinity	College	Library	(hereafter	TCL),	John	Holmes	Papers,	Series	2,	Box	6,	File	13,	“Canadian	Foreign	Policy:	The	Role	of	a	Middle	Power.”	Address	by	John	Holmes,	Extension	Series,	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs	and	University	of	Alberta,	22	January	1963.	
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Pearson	was	vehemently	anti-communist	in	the	1930s,	referring	to	the	Soviets	and	their	 dictatorship	 as	 sub-human.48	America’s	 strident	 and	public	 anti-communism,	however,	 led	Pearson	 to	want	 to	keep	 lines	of	 communication	open	between	East	and	 West	 generally,	 and	 Canada	 and	 the	 USSR	 specifically.49	Essentially,	 while	Pearson’s	1955	visit	 to	 the	USSR	marked	 the	beginning	of	 the	 transition	period	 in	Canadian-Soviet	 relations,	 much	 is	 left	 to	 be	 said	 about	 this	 period.	 Broadly	speaking,	David	Davies’	edited	volume	(in	which	English’s	chapter	appears)	argues	Canada	“discovered	Russia	following	the	revolution,	and	viewed	the	country	as	both	an	 opportunity	 and	 a	 threat,	 and	 that	 Canada’s	 (and	 Canadians’)	 perception	 and	conception	of	Russia	has	been	in	constant	flux,	depending	on	the	circumstances	and	situation.50 	In	 the	 end,	 Davies’	 overall	 thesis	 reinforces	 existing	 claims	 about	Canadian-Soviet	relations.		
	 In	 his	 essay	 titled	 “Trade,	 Aid,	 and	 Economic	 Warfare,”	 Robert	 Mark	Spaulding	 reinforces	 the	 importance	 of	 economic	 factors	 to	 Cold	 War	 power	structures:	“Subsidized	trade	with	client	states	was	a	form	of	aid,	but	embargo	trade	between	the	blocs	became	a	type	of	economic	warfare;	foreign	aid	programs	were	a	form	of	East-West	competition	that	was	also	seen	as	a	variety	of	economic	warfare.”	Adding	further	nuance,	Spaulding	stresses,	“all	this	economic	activity	went	hand-in-hand	with	geopolitical	and	cultural	strategies	of	competition	between	rival	powers.	Communist	 and	 capitalist	 governments	 often	 deployed	 trade,	 aid,	 and	 economic																																																									48	John	English,	“Lester	Pearson	Encounters	the	Enigma,”	in	David	Davies	ed.,	Canada	and	the	Soviet	
Experiment:	Essays	on	Canadian	Encounters	with	Russia	and	the	Soviet	Union,	1900-1991	(Toronto:	Canadian	Scholars’	Press,	1994),	106.	49	English,	“Lester	Pearson	Encounters	the	Enigma,”	107.	50	Davies,	ed.,	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Experiment,17.	
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warfare	 to	 reinforce	 incentives	 and	 dissuasions	 designed	 to	 influence	 foreign	behaviours.”51	Canada	was	no	exception,	yet	its	tactics	have	gone	virtually	unnoticed	within	the	historiography.	
	 While	 the	 importance	 of	 economics	 to	 Cold	 War	 dynamics	 are	 slowly	entering	 the	 Cold	War	master	 narrative,	 so	 too	 are	 other	 important	 factors.	 That	said,	 understanding	 how	 the	 Cold	 War	 by	 “other	 means,”	 including	 cultural	diplomacy	and	 the	role	of	non-state	actors,	 contributed	 to	Canada’s	Cold	War	 lags	behind	 current	 historiographical	 trends.	 By	 comparison,	 the	 exploration	 of	American	 cultural	 diplomacy	 during	 the	 Cold	 War	 is	 receiving	 considerable	attention	in	the	United	States.52	
	 Equivalent	scholarship	to	address	the	Canadian	context	is	lacking,	with	some	notable	 and	 valuable	 exceptions.	 Hector	 Mackenzie 53 	and	 Graham	 Carr’s 54	innovative	work	on	Canadian	pianist	Glenn	Gould’s	1957	concert	tour	of	the	Soviet	Union	 are	 two	 notable	 examples.	 Janice	 Cavell’s	 “Canadiana	 Abroad:	 The	Department	 of	 External	 Affairs’	 Book	 Presentation	 Programmes,	 1949-1963”	highlights	 the	 DEA’s	 modest	 ability	 to	 create	 and	 nurture	 “the	 first	 sparks	 of	
																																																								51	Robert	Mark	Spaulding,	“Trade,	Aid,	and	Economic	Warfare,”	in	Richard	H.	Immerman	and	Petra	Goedde	eds.,	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	the	Cold	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	394-395.	52	For	instance,	Yale	Richmond’s	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War:	Raising	the	Iron	Curtain	(Pennsylvania:	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2003)	explores	how	exchanges	in	culture,	education,	information,	science,	and	technology	aided	in	the	collapse	of	communism,	due	to	increased	Western	influence	among	the	Soviet	intelligentsia.52	Jessica	C.	Gienow-Hecht	and	Mark	C.	Donfried,	in	Searching	for	a	Cultural	Diplomacy	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2010),	cast	the	net	wider	and	examine	regions	outside	of	the	more	common	transatlantic	circuit.	53	Hector	Mackenzie,	“Glenn	Gould	in	Russia:	Newly	Discovered	Documents	from	the	Archives	of	Canada’s	Department	of	External	Affairs	(1955-1957),”	Glenn	Gould,	Vol.	7,	no.	1	(Spring	2001):	3-13.	54	Graham	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind’:	Glenn	Gould’s	Tour	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	Culture	of	the	Cold	War,”	The	Canadian	Historical	Review,	Vol.	95,	No.	1	(March	2014):	1-29.	
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international	interest	in	Canadian	books.”55	Much	is	still	to	be	written	on	the	history	of	 Canadian	 cultural	 diplomacy	 and	 how	 it	 contributed,	 even	 if	 only	modestly,	 to	Canadian	 foreign	 policy	 objectives.	 What	 scholars	 must	 do,	 however,	 is	 pay	 less	attention	to	the	degree	to	which	cultural	diplomacy	impacted	relations	and,	instead,	recognize	it	as	part	of	Canada’s	pragmatic	strategy	for	containing	communism;	the	precise	 impacts	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 are	 not	 easily	 quantified.	 Similar	 to	conventional	foreign	relations,	cultural	diplomacy	supports	“objectives	which	have	been	defined	through	normal	policy	channels.”	 Immediate	outcomes,	however,	are	not	 the	 force	 driving	 cultural	 diplomacy.	 Rather,	 it	 aims	 to	 broadly	 “influence	 the	elite	 or	 mass	 public	 opinion	 of	 another	 nation	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 turning	 the	policies	or	views	of	 that	 target	nation	 to	advantage.”	56	It	 is	 important	 to	 integrate	cultural	 diplomacy	 as	 one	 component	 of	 the	 historical	 narrative,	 and	 as	 one	 of	Canada’s	non-military	strategies,	alongside	other	policy	practices.	
	 CHAPTER	SUMMARIES	
	 The	 project	 is	 broken	 down	 into	 three	 case	 studies,	 examining	 the	 Soviet	Union	in	chapters	one	and	two,	Yugoslavia	in	chapters	three	and	four,	and	Poland	in	chapters	 five	 and	 six.	 Chapter	 one	 summarizes	 the	 Canadian-Soviet	 relationship	from	the	Second	World	War	to	1957,	when	Diefenbaker’s	Progressive	Conservatives	took	 office.	 Then,	 it	 examines	 how	 changes	 behind	 the	 Iron	 Curtain	 caused	 a	reexamination,	 and	 ultimately	 a	 reevaluation,	 of	 Canada’s	 policy	 direction.	 Due	 to																																																									55	Janice	Cavell,	“Canadiana	Abroad:	The	Department	of	External	Affairs’	Book	Presentation	Programmes,	1949-1963,”	The	American	Review	of	Canadian	Studies,	Vol.	39,	No.	2	(2009):	81-93.	56	Robert	J.	Williams,	“International	Cultural	Programmes:	Canada	and	Australia	Compared,”	in	
Canadian	Culture:	International	Dimensions,	ed.,	Andrew	Fenton	Cooper	(Waterloo:	Centre	on	Foreign	Policy	and	Federalism,	1985),	85;	Graham	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind’:	Glenn	Gould’s	Tour	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	Culture	of	the	Cold	War,”	3-4;	and	Potter,	Branding	Canada,	32.		
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the	 strategic	 stasis	 that	 existed	 between	 the	 Cold	 War	 superpowers,	 Canadian	officials	viewed	the	Soviet	Union	not	exclusively	as	a	potential	military	threat;	they	also	 saw	 the	USSR’s	 non-military	 advances,	 particularly	 its	 economic	 offensive,	 as	dangerous	to	Western	democracy.	Canadian	officials	cultivated	closer	bilateral	 ties	with	the	Soviet	Union	in	an	attempt	to	disrupt	Soviet	hegemony	in	Eastern	Europe	and	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 West’s	 fight	 to	 contain	 communism.	 This	 chapter	 also	highlights	 the	growing	awareness	amongst	Canadian	officials	 that	perhaps	Canada	could	utilize	its	middle	power	position	to	effectively	build	bridges	between	East	and	West	and	fight	communism	from	behind	the	Iron	Curtain.	
	 During	the	Cold	War,	Canada	was	entrenched	firmly	within	the	Western	bloc	and	 politically	 supported	 its	 NATO	 allies.	 However,	 it	 also	 carved	 out	 a	 more	independent	position	towards	the	USSR	in	the	economic	and	cultural	realms;	this	is	the	 subject	 of	 chapter	 two.	 On	 the	 domestic	 front,	 surplus	 Canadian	 wheat	accumulated	as	 a	 result	of	 the	United	States’	PL	480	program.	New	markets	were	sought,	and	the	Soviet	Union	proved	an	expedient	customer	of	Canadian	wheat,	as	seen	 with	 the	 renegotiation	 of	 the	 1956	 trade	 agreement	 in	 1959.	 Despite	 the	relative	 commercial	 insignificance	 of	 the	 trade	 agreement,	 it	 was	 an	 important	bridge-building	exercise	for	the	two	nations,	with	economic	ties	proving	important	to	Cold	War	political	relations.	Cultural	exchanges	also	served	to	advance	Canada’s	interests	in	exposing	Soviet	society	to	Western	modalities	and	cultural	life,	and	this	chapter	also	explores	 the	benefits	 and	difficulties	associated	with	Canadian-Soviet	cultural	diplomacy.			
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	 Chapter	 three	 focuses	 on	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 diplomatic	 relations.	 Ongoing	tensions	 between	 Yugoslavia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 provided	 a	 fortuitous	opportunity	 for	Canada	 to	 cultivate	 closer	 ties	with	Yugoslavia.	 Canadian	officials,	particularly	 Canada’s	 ambassadors	 in	 Belgrade,	 utilized	 Canada’s	 middle	 power	status	to	find	common	ground	and	entice	Yugoslavia	out	of	isolation,	hoping	to	lure	it	closer	to	the	Western	camp,	despite	its	commitment	to	non-alignment.	The	visit	to	Ottawa	 by	 Yugoslavia’s	 Foreign	 Minister	 Koča	 Popović	 highlights	 the	 importance	each	country	attributed	 to	personal	contacts	on	 their	mission	 to	 improve	bilateral	relations.	 In	 addition,	 the	 visit	 demonstrates	 the	 challenges	 of	 pursuing	 foreign	policy	 objectives	 that	 were	 at	 odds	 with	 some	 domestic	 Yugoslav	 minority	communities.	
	 Chapter	 four	 examines	 the	 various	 cultural	 exchanges	 and	 commercial	relations	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia.	While	not	numerous,	 artistic,	 academic,	and	 research	 exchanges	 helped	 bridge	 political	 and	 ideological	 divides.	 Trade	between	the	two	nations	was	also	relatively	small,	with	the	sale	of	Canadian	wheat	accounting	for	the	majority	of	exports	to	Yugoslavia.	Nevertheless,	Canadian	officials	understood	 the	 political	 significance	 of	 such	 dealings,	 and	 trade	 with	 Yugoslavia	became	an	important	factor	in	Canada’s	economic	statecraft.	
	 Canadian-Polish	diplomatic	relations	are	the	subject	of	chapter	five.	Poland’s	national	art	treasures	were	hidden	in	Canada	following	the	Nazi	invasion	of	Poland,	and	disputes	surrounding	their	return	were	a	constant	issue	between	the	Canadian	and	 Polish	 governments.	 Once	 the	 treasures	were	 returned	 to	 Poland,	 diplomatic	
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relations	 improved.	 Canada	 cautiously	 sought	 to	 expose	 Poland	 to	 Western	modalities,	 and	 each	 nation	 sought	 to	minimize	 Cold	War	 political	 hostilities.	 The	nexus	 of	 middlepowerism	 ultimately	 governed	 Canadian-Polish	 relations,	 as	 each	nation	sought	to	navigate	the	often	contentious	Cold	War	atmosphere.		
	 Finally,	 chapter	 six	 examines	 Canadian-Polish	 cultural	 exchanges	 and	commercial	relations.	Cultural	relations	between	the	two	nations	were	modest,	but	the	 importance	 of	 exposing	 Poland	 to	 Western	 modalities	 made	 exchanges	 an	important	component	of	Canadian	policy.	This	chapter	explores	how	the	activities	of	the	 Canadian	 Broadcasting	 Corporation-International	 Service	 (CBC-IS)	 Polish	Division	dovetailed	with	External	Affairs’	policy	of	increasing	Polish	autonomy	vis-à-vis	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Expanding	 commercial	 relations	 with	 Poland	 was	 also	 an	important	component	of	Canada’s	Polish	policy.	Among	other	things,	Canada	agreed	to	 sell	 Poland	 wheat	 under	 Section	 21	 of	 Canada’s	 Export	 Credit	 Insurance	 Act,	which	highlighted	the	Canadian	government’s	ability	to	be	pragmatic	in	its	dealings	with	Communist	Europe.	
	 A	NOTE	ON	PRIMARY	SOURCES		 Research	for	this	dissertation	relied	on	archival	materials	from	Library	and	Archives	Canada	(LAC)	in	Ottawa.	Because	LAC	has	undertaken	a	reorganization	of	its	collection,	some	materials	normally	accessible	and	that	might	have	proved	useful	to	the	dissertation	were	closed	pending	processing,	the	Arthur	Andrew	Fonds	for	instance.	While	I	was	able	to	review	many	government	files	on	Canadian	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union,	Yugoslavia,	and	Poland,	access	was	at	times	inconsistent,	with	
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various	restrictions	still	imposed	on	many	files.	Private	collections,	including	the	papers	of	G.	Hamilton	Southam,	Canada’s	ambassador	to	Poland	from	1960-62,	also	have	textual	material	embargoed	by	varying	restrictions,	for	reasons	that	are	unclear.	Put	simply,	gathering	material	on	these	three	countries	was	an	ongoing	challenge.	Additional	insights	may	be	possible,	if	and	when	archival	materials	are	released	in	future.			 Other	Archives,	including	the	Diefenbaker	Canada	Centre	(DCC),	University	of	Saskatchewan,	Saskatoon,	and	Trinity	College	Library	(TCL)	were	consulted.	While	the	John	Holmes	papers	at	TCL	yielded	some	useful	material,	the	personal	papers	of	George	Ignatieff	were	not	especially	helpful	for	this	dissertation.	At	the	beginning	of	this	project,	I	was	eager	to	consult	the	rich	archival	collection	of	Soviet	sources	of	the	Centre	for	Research	on	Canadian-Russian	Relations	(CRCR).	I	was	both	surprised	and	disappointed	to	learn	that	the	collection,	previously	located	at	Georgian	College,	Barrie,	Ontario,	had	been	boxed	up	and	shipped	to	the	University	of	Alberta,	Edmonton.	Given	the	complexity	of	organizing	the	collection,	four	years	later,	it	remains	unavailable.	Admittedly,	this	was	one	of	the	project’s	major	disappointments.			 In	addition	to	archival	materials,	this	project	uses	various	government	publications,	including	Documents	on	Canadian	External	Relations	(DCER),	
Statements	and	Speeches,	and	House	of	Commons	debates.	Foreign	Relations	of	the	
United	States	(FRUS)	was	also	consulted	to	provide	American	context.	Various	contemporary	newspapers	were	also	consulted.
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Chapter	1	
	
Changes	Behind	the	Curtain,	the	Soviet	Economic	Offensive	&	Canadian-Soviet
	 Diplomatic	Relations			 As	 author	 Larry	 Collins	 suggests,	 “in	 a	 world	 dominated	 by	 hostile	 great	powers,	small	states	must	always	conduct	their	 foreign	affairs	with	due	regard	for	their	uniquely	vulnerable	positions.”1	In	fact,	 the	vulnerability	of	a	small	state	may	not	always	stem	solely	 from	 ideological	nemeses,	but	also	 from	close	allies.	Prime	Minister	 John	 Diefenbaker	 trumpeted	 Canadian	 independence	 in	 international	affairs	–	especially	in	the	face	of	American	encroachment	–	and	adjusted	his	policies	accordingly.	Assessing	Canadian	 reactions	 to	 Soviet	non-military	offensive	 activity	in	the	Cold	War	provides	an	opportunity	to	acknowledge	the	varied	dimensions	of	this	 global	 conflict	 and	 allows	 the	 Cold	 War	 to	 be	 understood	 with	 greater	complexity	and	in	more	nuanced	ways,	particularly	beyond	the	strictly	military	and	strategic	fields.			
	 To	 understand	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations,	 we	 must	 first	 examine	 how	Canadian	officials	perceived	the	situation	east	of	the	Iron	Curtain.	Canadian	decision	makers	 recognized	 the	 limitations	 of	 their	 foreign	 policy	 initiatives,	 but	 still	understood	well	 developments	 that	occurred	within	 the	USSR.	This	knowledge,	 in	conjunction	 with	 broader	 Western	 policy,	 drove	 their	 initiatives.	 Canadian	diplomats	and	other	officials	closely	assessed	the	motivations	and	actions	of	Russian	authorities	 and	 derived	 policies	 commensurate	 with	 Canada’s	 middle	 power																																																									1	Larry	Collins,	“Canadian-Soviet	Relations	During	the	Cold	War,”	in	Aloysius	Balawyder,	ed.,	
Canadian-Soviet	Relations	1939-1980	(Oakville,	ON.:	Mosaic	Press,	1981),	41.	
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position;	 their	 analyses	 were	 driven	 less	 by	 rigid	 ideological	 imperatives,	particularly	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 more	 by	 political	 and	ideological	changes	that	occurred	throughout	the	Communist	world.			 As	 Stalinist	 agendas	 that	 had	 traditionally	dominated	Eastern	Europe	were	replaced	 with	 more	 liberal	 Khrushchevian	 policies,	 Canadian	 officials	 knew	 the	region	had	to	be	reassessed.	Their	findings	indicated	that	Eastern	Europe	needed	to	be	seen	as	less	homogenous	than	previously	perceived.	Inevitably,	this	complicated	Canada’s	 Soviet	 policy	 by	 adding	 another	 important	 dimension	 to	 consider	 when	developing	regional	policy	towards	Communist	Eastern	Europe	generally.	
	 A	NEW	CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORK		 Writing	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 Collins	 suggested	 Canada’s	 guiding	 principle	 in	policy	toward	the	Soviet	Union	was	containment	without	ostracism.	Canada,	Collins	argued,	 “maintained	 that	 lines	 of	 communication	 must	 be	 kept	 open	 to	 avoid	exacerbating	 the	 conflict’s	 intensity.”	 He	 summarized	 Canadian	 policy	 toward	 the	Soviet	Union	as	“containment	with	a	‘“human	face.”’2	Building	on	Collins’s	assertion,	historian	Jamie	Glazov	proposes	that	Canada	adopted	a	policy	of	“containment	with	accommodation.”	 Glazov	 presses	 his	 argument	 further,	 however,	 and	 asserts	 that	Diefenbaker	single-handedly	distorted	Canadian	Soviet	policy	with	his	noted	1960	UN	 General	 Assembly	 address,3	a	 speech	 that	 Glazov	 maintains	 “shattered	 the	Canadian	strategy	of	accommodation.”4	Further	analysis,	however,	suggests	that	this	
																																																								2	Collins,	“Canadian-Soviet	Relations	During	the	Cold	War,”	44.	3	Jamie	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queens	University	Press,	2002),	xv.	4	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union,	105.	
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interpretation	 goes	 too	 far.	 Collins’	 initial	 interpretation	 –	 which	 argues	 that	continuity	prevailed	despite	Diefenbaker’s	UN	address	–	remains	valid	and,	in	fact,	is	reinforced	 when	 various	 other	 dimensions	 of	 Cold	 War	 foreign	 policies,	 such	 as	cultural	 and	 economic	 relations,	 are	 integrated	 into	 the	 overall	 analysis.	 If	we	 set	aside	 Glazov’s	 argument	 that	 Diefenbaker	 shattered	 Canada’s	 accommodationist	strategy,	 his	 label	 “containment	 with	 accommodation”	 still	 has	 merit.	 This	interpretation	does,	however,	suggest	a	degree	of	Canadian	policy	passivity.	As	this	project	 demonstrates,	 Canadian	 policy	 makers	 and	 civil	 servants	 proffered	 and	implemented	 quite	 pragmatic	 approaches	 to	 cultivating	 closer	 political,	 economic,	and	cultural	ties	to	build	bridges	between	East	and	West.	So,	the	interpretative	label	can	be	extended:	Canada’s	policy	 toward	the	Soviet	Union	and	Communist	Europe	during	the	Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	period	might	best	be	described	as	‘containment	with	accommodation,	through	pragmatic	cultivation’.		
	 CONTEXT:	CANADIAN-SOVIET	RELATIONS	FROM	WWII	TO	THE	1950s		 From	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations	typically	mirrored	broader	Western	and	shifting	trends	with	the	USSR.	When	Nazi	Germany	and	the	Soviet	Union	signed	the	Nazi-Soviet	Non-Aggression	Pact	in	1939,	Canada	had	two	ideological	adversaries.	Nazism	marked	the	extreme	right	and	the	Soviet	 Union	 occupied	 the	 extreme	 left	 of	 the	 political-ideological	 spectrum.	Standing	 firmly	 with	 its	 British	 ally,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 and	 Canadians	viewed	 the	Soviet	Union	and	domestic	 communists,	by	extension,	as	enemies.	 Just	under	 two	 years	 later,	 however,	 the	 Nazis	 turned	 on	 their	 once	 expedient	 ally;	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	became	allies.	At	once,	the	former	communist	menace	
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became	the	 juggernaut	of	 freedom,	confronting	 the	 tremendous	Nazi	onslaught	on	the	Eastern	 front.	 Canadians	 generally	 and	 sincerely	 admired	 Soviet	 heroics.	 Such	positive	 views	 quickly	 evaporated	 with	 the	 conclusion	 of	 hostilities	 in	 Europe,	Soviet	 cipher	 clerk	 Igor	Gouzenko’s	defection	 to	Canada,	 and	his	 revelations	of	 an	extensive	spy	network	operating	in	North	America.	The	once	adversary-turned-ally	was,	once	again,	an	enemy.	 			 Historian	David	Bercuson	recognizes	that	it	is	difficult,	and	somewhat	risky,	to	 summarize	 the	 views	 of	 a	 group	 as	 diverse	 as	 Canadian	 officials	 in	 the	Department	of	External	Affairs	 (DEA).	Overall,	 though,	 the	Ottawa	mandarins	who	dominated	 DEA	 policy	 certainly	 to	 the	 time	 of	 Stalin’s	 death	 in	 1953	 viewed	 the	Soviet	Union	as	inherently	aggressive	and	driven	by	both	historical	imperatives	and	communist	ideology	to	obtain	global	domination.5	Escott	Reid,	then	assistant	under-secretary	 of	 state	 for	 external	 affairs,	 and	 Hume	 Wrong,	 then	 associate	 under-secretary	 of	 state	 for	 external	 affairs,	 believed	 Soviet	 policy	 to	 be	 essentially	 self-interested	 and	 nationalistic.	 According	 to	 Bercuson,	 Wrong	 asserted	 that	 Soviet	leaders	 were	 “‘unmoved	 by	 […]	 humanitarian	 considerations.’	 Neither	 Reid	 nor	Wrong	feared	imminent	war,	but	only	because	of	the	relative	weakness	of	the	Soviet	Union.”6	Reid	produced	one	of	 the	 first	 comprehensive	 studies	of	American-Soviet	relations	 and	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 for	 Canadian	 foreign	 policy.	 He	argued	 that	 the	 Cold	 War	 was	 a	 conflict	 between	 ‘“two	 governing	 classes,’	 and	
																																																								5	David	J.	Bercuson,	“‘A	People	so	Ruthless	as	the	Soviets’:	Canadian	Images	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	Soviet	Union,	1946-1950,”	in	David	Davies	ed.,	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Experiment:	Essays	on	Canadian	
Encounters	with	Russia	and	the	Soviet	Union,	1900-1991	(Toronto:	Canadian	Scholars’	Press,	1994),	90.	6	Bercuson,	“‘A	People	so	Ruthless	as	the	Soviets,’”	90.	
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though	operating	under	incompatible	economic	and	political	structures,	[the	United	States	 and	 Soviet	 Union]	 each	 sought	 security	 through	 expansion.”7	Expansion,	 of	course,	 was	 not	 strictly	 territorial	 and	 military,	 but	 also	 political,	 commercial,	ideological,	 and	 cultural.	 From	abroad	 in	 the	mid	1940s,	Canadian	Ambassador	 to	the	Soviet	Union	Dana	Wilgress,	who	had	spent	ten	years	in	the	USSR	before	the	war	and	 spoke	Russian,	 shared	 the	 so-called	 ‘hard	 line’	 endorsed	 by	American	 Chargé	d’Affaires	 in	 Moscow	 George	 F.	 Kennan.	 Wilgress	 described	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 “as	hard,	opportunistic,	and	ready	to	take	advantage	of	any	sign	of	Western	weakness.”8		 Bercuson	 considers	 the	American	military	 to	 have	 been	 “periodically	more	radical	 in	 its	 assessment	 of	 Soviet	 intentions	 than	 was	 the	 Canadian,”	 primarily	because	the	US	Chiefs	of	Staff	“held	the	whole	burden	of	defending	the	West	on	their	shoulders.”9	Clearly,	 though,	 Canadian	 officials	 also	 viewed	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	 a	negative	light;	their	assessments	could	be	just	as	one-sided	and	alarmist,	and	their	antidotes	 for	 combating	 ostensible	 Soviet	 aggression	 just	 as	 tough	 as	 their	 US	counterparts.			 The	mid-1940s	witnessed	frustration	on	the	bilateral	Canadian-Soviet	front.	For	 instance,	when	 the	 Soviet	military	 attaché	 in	Ottawa	 requested	 permission	 to	visit	 the	 Arctic,	 or	 Soviet	 officials	 wanted	 to	 visit	 metallurgical	 laboratories	 and	mining	 operations,	 or	 Soviet	 scientists	 requested	 technical	 data,	 Canadians	requested	 reciprocity.	 Much	 to	 the	 frustration	 of	 Canadian	 officials,	 they	 were	
																																																								7	Collins,	“Canadian-Soviet	Relations	During	the	Cold	War,”	44.		8	Bercuson,	“‘A	People	so	Ruthless	as	the	Soviets,’”	91.	9	Bercuson,	“‘A	People	so	Ruthless	as	the	Soviets,’”	100.	
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turned	 down	 or	 more	 often	 ignored	 by	 their	 Soviet	 counterparts.10	How	 much	information	 Canadian	 officials	 would	 have	 granted	 the	 Soviets	 is	 unknown.	Information	 and	 technology	 were	 sources	 of	 power	 and	 tools	 to	 be	 wielded	 to	propel	the	nation	forward	in	its	quest	to	advance	society.		 While	bilateral	Canadian-Soviet	relations	in	this	period	were	complicated,	so	too	 were	 multilateral	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	 Historian	 William	McGrath	 accurately	 argues,	 “Canadian-Soviet	 relations	 in	 the	 UN	 reflected	 and	contributed	to	the	general	trends	in	East-West	relations,	through	the	Cold	War	and	Détente	 decades.” 11 	During	 the	 early	 post-war	 years,	 both	 countries	 had	reservations.	For	instance,	the	Soviets	were	wary	of	potential	control	of	the	UN	by	the	Americans	and	British,	who	were	expected	to	have	the	support	of	their	allies	and	client	 states.	 While	 Canada	 undoubtedly	 shared	 policy	 objectives	 with	 its	 key	western	 allies	 as	 the	 Soviets	 expected,	 it	 was	 nonetheless	 keen	 to	 enable	middle	powers	 to	 play	 an	 effective	 role	 at	 the	 UN,	 knowing	 the	 organization	 would	 be	dominated	by	the	great	powers.	 	Historian	Adam	Chapnick	argues	the	main	goal	of	Canadian	 representatives	 at	 the	 UN’s	 founding	 San	 Francisco	 conference	 was	 to	highlight	the	importance	of	the	“functional	principle,”	which	rationalized	that	states	with	 the	 capacity	 and	 willingness	 to	 contribute	 would	 receive	 influence	commensurate	with	their	contributions.12		
																																																								10	Donald	Page,	“Getting	to	Know	the	Russians	–	1943-1948,”	in	Aloysius	Balawyder	ed.,	Canadian-
Soviet	Relations,	1939-1980	(Oakville:	Mosaic	Press,	1981),	30.	11	William	McGrath,	“Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	at	the	United	Nations,”	in	Aloysius	Balawyder	ed.,	
Canadian-Soviet	Relations,	1939-1980	(Oakville:	Mosaic	Press,	1981),	84.	12	Adam	Chapnick,	The	Middle	Power	Project:	Canada	and	the	Founding	of	the	United	Nations	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2005),	3.		
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	 From	 the	 very	 outset,	 the	 Canadian-Soviet	 relationship	 in	 the	 UN	 was	troubled	when	the	Soviets	vetoed	Lester	Pearson	as	the	first	Secretary-General.	This	was	not,	however,	the	most	significant	Canadian	disappointment.	With	the	onset	of	the	 Cold	 War,	 Canadian	 officials	 quickly	 recognized	 the	 UN	 would	 not	 be	 the	effective	 international	 institution	 they	 had	 imagined.	 The	 UN	 Charter	was	 largely	based	 upon	 an	 assumption	 of	 great	 power	 unanimity,	which	 disintegrated	 almost	immediately.13	Confidential	 commentary	 prepared	 for	 the	 delegation	 to	 the	 UN’s	first	 General	 Assembly	 reveals	 the	 Canadian	 government	 was	 generally	 unhappy	with	 the	 Security	 Council.	 The	 Council	 was	 seen	 to	 have	 “done	 little	 more	 than	provide	 additional	 means	 of	 publicly	 expressing	 differences	 between	 the	 great	powers,”	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	was	 particularly	 blamed.	 The	 Canadian	 delegation	was	 advised,	 “The	 Security	 Council	 has	 been	 used,	 especially	 by	 the	 Soviet	Government,	as	an	instrument	in	the	war	of	nerves.	It	was	not	meant	to	be	such	an	instrument	 or	 to	 be	 an	 arena	 for	 gladiatorial	 contests	 between	 national	champions.”14	Western-Soviet,	 and	 therefore	 Canadian-Soviet,	 relations	 at	 the	 UN	continued	 in	 a	 strained	 manner.	 Whether	 issues	 were	 about	 political	 security,	economic	or	social	problems,	or	organizational	matters,	the	Great	Powers	typically	disagreed.			 In	 August	 1949,	 the	 Soviets	 joined	 the	 Americans	 in	 the	 exclusive	thermonuclear	 club,	 and	 Cold	War	 political	 tensions	were	 amplified	 and	widened	
																																																								13	McGrath,	“Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	at	the	United	Nations,”	86.		14	Commentary	for	the	Use	of	the	Canadian	Delegation,	Second	Part	of	the	First	Session	of	the	General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations	(Ottawa:	Dept.	of	External	Affairs,	1946)	Ch.	III,	p.	3,	as	cited	in	McGrath,	“Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	at	the	United	Nations,”	101.	See	also	Escott	Reid,	Radical	
Mandarin:	The	Memoirs	of	Escott	Reid	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989),	221-222.	
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into	the	economic	realm.	Just	months	prior,	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO)	was	formed,	and	Canada	played	a	notable	role	in	its	creation.	As	a	founding	member,	Canada	participated	in	multilateral	Western	efforts	to	regulate	exports	to	the	Soviet	Union	and	its	allies,	through	the	NATO	Coordinating	Committee	(COCOM).	Two	years	prior	 in	1947,	the	Export	and	Import	Permits	Act	provided	authority	 for	an	export	controls	list	to	ensure	that	“articles	having	a	strategic	nature	or	value	will	not	be	made	available	to	any	destination	wherein	their	use	might	be	detrimental	to	the	 security	 of	 Canada.”15	In	 other	 words,	 through	 the	 strict	 control	 of	 exports,	 a	form	of	economic	warfare	was	adopted	by	the	NATO	alliance	and	used	against	the	USSR	and	the	socialist	camp.		 Anxieties	continued	to	escalate	until	 Joseph	Stalin	–	the	Soviet	dictator	who	had	ruled	the	country	with	an	iron	fist	since	the	mid	1920s	–	died	in	March	1953.	In	the	 immediate	 period	 following	 Stalin’s	 death,	 there	 were	 many	 questions	surrounding	 Soviet	 motivations	 and	 intentions.	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 External	Affairs	(SSEA)	Lester	B.	Pearson	visited	the	Soviet	Union	in	1955,	keen	to	discover	what	 he	 could	 about	 Soviet	 intentions.	 This	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 watershed	 year	 in	Canadian-Soviet	 relations.	 “The	 prospect	 of	 improved	 trade	 relations	 was	 an	additional	 but	 decidedly	 secondary	 motive,”16	according	 to	 George	 Ignatieff,	 who	accompanied	 Pearson	 on	 his	 visit.	 Associate	 Deputy	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	Commerce,	Mitchell	Sharp,	and	diplomat	John	Holmes	and	Ray	Crépault	of	External	
																																																								15	Carl	H.	McMillan,	“Canada’s	Postwar	Economic	Relation	with	the	USSR	–	An	Appraisal,”	131,	n.10,	
Revised	Statutes	of	Canada,	1970,	Vol.	3,	Chapter	E-17,	165.	16	George	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger:	The	Memoirs	of	George	Ignatieff	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1985),	127.	
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Affairs	also	accompanied	Pearson.17	The	visit	proved	especially	significant	because	it	 marked	 the	 inauguration	 of	 Canadian	 wheat	 sales	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 which	continued	 steadily,	 albeit	 in	 varying	 degrees,	 thereafter.	 Yet	 the	most	memorable,	and	 perhaps	 comical,	 event	 of	 the	 visit	was	 the	 extraordinary	 drinking	 party	 that	occurred	when	Pearson	and	his	party	joined	Premier	Khrushchev	and	Chairman	of	the	Council	of	Ministers	Nikolai	Bulganin	for	what	has	been	described	as	“the	most	extraordinary	personal	encounter	between	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	during	the	Cold	 War.”18	While	 the	 visit	 brought	 trade	 advantages	 and	 possibly	 advanced	 an	agenda	of	scientific,	technical,	and	human	exchange,	Pearson	was	convinced	that	not	much	 had	 changed	 regarding	 Soviet	 aims.	 The	 USSR’s	 main	 objective	 remained	“security	for	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	triumph	of	communist	ideology	in	a	world	of	communist	states	controlled	and	dominated	by	Moscow.”19	Overall,	the	visit	did	not	alleviate	Canadian	fears;	it	may	have	heightened	them.	According	to	historian	John	English,	 Pearson	 “returned	more	 concerned,	 even	 fearful	 of	 the	 future.	 […]	 If	 the	visit’s	 aim	was	 to	 allay	 fears,	 build	 confidence,	 and	 respect,	 it	 failed	 to	 do	 so.	 He	came	home	knowing	 that	 the	Cold	War	would	not	 soon	 lose	 its	 chill.”20	It	 is	 quite	possible	that	Pearson’s	visit	to	the	USSR	set	a	precedent	for	Canada’s	political	elite	to	visit	 in	 the	 future	not	only	 the	USSR,	but	other	select	East	European	nations	as																																																									17	In	each	of	their	memoirs,	Pearson	and	Ignatieff	describe	in	detail	their	visit	to	the	Soviet	Union	and	provide	detailed,	and	at	times	colourful,	descriptions	of	events	and	of	the	personalities	they	encountered.	See	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	127-147,	and	Lester	B.	Pearson,	Mike:	The	
Memoirs	of	the	Right	Honourable	Lester	B.	Pearson,	Vol.	2,	1948-1957	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1973),	191-211.	DCER,	Vol.	21,	531-538,	also	covers	Pearson’s	trip.	18	John	English,	“Lester	Pearson	Encounters	the	Enigma,”	in	David	Davies	ed.,	Canada	and	the	Soviet	
Experiment:	Essays	on	Canadian	Encounters	with	Russia	and	the	Soviet	Union,	1900-1991	(Toronto:	Canadian	Scholars’	Press,	1994),	109.		19	Canada,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	31	January	1956:	716.	20	English,	“Lester	Pearson	Encounters	the	Enigma,”	115.	
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well.	 According	 to	 Soviet	 specialist	 Leigh	 Sarty,	 Pearson’s	 visit	 entrenched	 in	 the	Soviet	 leadership	 “a	 certain	 appreciation	 of	 the	 qualities	 that	 defined	 Canada’s	favourable	self-image	as	a	‘middle	power’	in	this	period.”	Moreover,	it	appeared	that	the	 Soviet	 leadership	 recognized	 the	 role	 of	 Canada	 as	 an	 “honest	 broker,”	which	could	“usefully	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	East-West	tensions.”21	
	 CHANGES	BEHIND	THE	CURTAIN		 Little	attention	has	been	paid	 to	how	Canada’s	Soviet	policy	was	shaped	by	its	relations	with	select	Eastern	European	states.	Even	less	attention	has	been	given	to	 Canadian	 officials’	 awareness	 of	 the	 domestic	 conditions	 of	 certain	 Eastern	European	countries	(including	the	USSR),	and	how	changing	political	trends	within	these	countries	impacted	Canadian	policy	toward	these	nations,	as	well	as	the	USSR.	While	 the	 Kremlin	 controlled	 the	 Eastern	 bloc	 tightly	 during	 Stalin’s	 reign,	 these	countries	 increasingly	 regained	 various	 degrees	 of	 autonomy	 after	 Khrushchev	came	to	power;	this	is	in	addition	to	Yugoslavia’s	independent	position.	As	a	result,	Canadian	officials	began	envisioning	new	policy	directions,	taking	into	consideration	the	new	conditions	spreading	across	the	region.			 The	 Twentieth	 Party	 Congress	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 convened	 in	 February	1956.	Emissaries	from	fifty-five	Communist	workers’	parties	attended,	including	the	leaders	of	all	Eastern	European	Communist	countries,	except	Yugoslavia.	Since	this	was	the	first	congress	since	Stalin’s	death,	“the	gathering	presumably	was	to	clarify	the	 post-Stalin	 party	 line,	 including	 the	 posthumous	 status	 of	 Stalin	 himself.”	
																																																								21	Leigh	Sarty,	“A	Middle	Power	in	Moscow:	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	from	Khrushchev	to	Gorbachev,”	Queen’s	Quarterly,		Vol.	98,	No.	3	(1991),	561.	
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Foreshadowing	what	was	to	come,	“when	delegates	first	entered	the	hall,	they	saw	a	large	statue	of	Lenin	in	its	usual	place	of	honour.	But	there	was	not	even	a	picture	of	Stalin.”	According	 to	Taubman,	 “the	 foreign	policy	 section	of	Khrushchev’s	 speech	broke	significantly	with	Stalinist	dogma.”	Khrushchev	stated	that	a	new	world	war	was	 “not	 fatalistically	 inevitable,”	and	 that	 “different	countries	could	 take	different	roads	to	socialism.”22	
	 In	 March	 1957,	 following	 the	 dismantling	 of	 the	 Soviet	 conservative	 old	guard	 and	 just	 months	 before	 the	 election	 of	 John	 G.	 Diefenbaker’s	 Progressive	Conservative	 government,	 the	 DEA’s	 European	 Division	 issued	 a	 memorandum	titled	 “The	 Canadian	 Attitude	 Toward	 the	 Soviet	 Satellites,”	which	 reiterated	 how	important	effective	control	over	the	Eastern	European	satellites	was	to	the	USSR’s	power	 position.	 Fundamentally,	 the	 memo	 questioned	 the	 very	 foundations	 of	Canada’s	Soviet	policy.	In	the	previous	four	years,	since	Khrushchev’s	rise	to	power,	it	 was	 recognized	 that	 a	 “more	 liberal	 policy	 has	 caused	 various	 Soviet	 blocs	 to	develop	a	more	nationalistic	and	 less	pro-Soviet	orientation.”	Treating	 the	various	blocs	 as	 a	 uniform	 appendage	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 memo	 asserted,	 was	counterproductive;	instead,	“it	would	be	in	[Canada’s]	best	interest	to	recognize	and	encourage	hopeful	 trends	 in	 these	 countries	without	 encouraging	violence,	 and	 to	modify	 our	 attitudes	 toward	 each	 state	 as	 the	 situation	 seemed	 to	 warrant.”23	In	other	 words,	 Canada	 should	 no	 longer	 simply	 view	 the	 USSR	 as	 the	 overarching																																																									22	William	Taubman,	Khrushchev:	The	Man	and	His	Era	(New	York	&	London:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2003),	270-271.	23	Documents	on	Canadian	External	Relations	(hereafter	DCER),	Vol.	23.	523.	Memorandum	by	
European	Division,	“The	Canadian	Attitude	Toward	the	Soviet	Satellites,”	Ottawa,	March	18,	1957.	DEA/50128-B-40.	
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policy	steward	of	 the	Eastern	European	region.	 In	 fact,	various	communist	nations	should	be	encouraged	to	follow	their	own	foreign	policy	initiatives.	Awareness	that	the	 Eastern	 bloc	 was	 less	 homogenous	 than	 once	 believed	 continued	 under	 the	Diefenbaker	government,	and	this	perception	began	to	shape	policy.	
	 A	 few	 months	 following	 the	 European	 Division’s	 memorandum,	 a	 new	assessment	 was	 conducted	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 recent	 Soviet	 events	 (namely	 the	changing	of	the	old	guard)	on	the	satellite	states.	The	change	to	the	Soviet	balance	of	forces	 caused	 a	 ripple	 effect	 throughout	 the	 Eastern	 bloc	 countries.	 However,	 the	shift	 in	 Soviet	 leadership	was	 not	 exactly	mirrored	 in	 the	 Soviet	 satellites,	 as	 had	typically	occurred	under	Stalin.	Traditionally,	if	Stalin	modified	the	power	structure,	“like	 water	 flowing	 between	 inter-connected	 vessels,”	 the	 satellites	 would	 have	followed	 suit.	 But,	 since	 the	 Twentieth	 Party	 Congress,	 the	 former	 automatic	adjustments	had	been	“subject	 to	some	modification.”24	Ultimately,	 for	 the	Eastern	bloc	 satellites,	 Khrushchev’s	 solidification	 of	 power	 meant	 “an	 affirmation	 of	 the	new,	 more	 independent	 relations	 between	 the	 USSR	 and	 the	 satellites.”	 The	memorandum	concluded:	
	The	proof	that	the	satellite	leaders	are	no	longer	the	complete	puppets	they	were	under	Stalin	is	demonstrated	by	the	varied	reactions	in	each	satellite	to	the	defeat	of	the		conservative	 leaders	 in	 the	 USSR,	 and	 in	particular,	by	 the	expulsion	of	moderates	 in	Bulgaria	while	extremists	in	 Rumania	 were	 dismissed.	 The	 establishment	 of	 collective	
																																																								24	Library	and	Archives	Canada	(hereafter	LAC),	RG25,	Vol.	39,	File	50170-40	part	1,	Memorandum	
European	Division	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Developments	in	the	Satellites	Since	the	Recent	Changes	in	the	Soviet	Praesidium.”	July	26,	1957.	
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	leadership	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 has	 greatly	 limited	 the	 personal	dependence	of	satellite	leaders.25	The	 European	 Division’s	 recognition	 that	 the	 satellites	 acquired	 at	 least	 some	autonomy	became	 integral	 to	 future	 policy	 development	 towards	 that	 region	 as	 a	whole.	Effectively,	Khrushchev’s	relaxation	of	control	of	the	Eastern	bloc	prompted	Canada	to	nurture	closer	ties	with	select	Eastern	European	countries	and	the	Soviet	Union	itself.		
	 In	a	reexamination	of	the	international	balance	of	power,	Robert	Ford,26	who	at	this	time	was	Canadian	ambassador	to	Colombia	but	still	a	preeminent	authority	on	the	Soviet	Union,	explained	that	Canada	was	actually	entering	an	era	of	greater	flexibility	 in	 the	 international	 arena,	 since	 the	 “very	 overwhelming	 power	 held	 in	equal	strength	by	the	two	superpowers	in	a	way	balances	out	and	permits	greater	independence	to	the	second	rank	powers,”	Canada	included.	Echoing	the	European	Division’s	view,	Ford	argued,	“the	only	area	where	[Canada	has]	a	good	chance	of	re-gaining	ground	is	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	and	this	may	prove	to	be	the	area	of	 the	greatest	 importance	 in	 the	struggle	with	Soviet	communism.”27	This	 train	of																																																									25	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	39,	File	50170-40	part	1,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Under-Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Developments	in	the	Satellites	Since	the	Recent	Changes	in	the	Soviet	Praesidium.”	July	26,	1957.	26	Historian	Charles	A.	Rudd	describes	Ford	as	“a	man	of	sharp	and	clear-headed	judgments.”	While	Soviet	experts	elsewhere	saw	“the	USSR	as	a	world	power	with	growing	capabilities	and	the	will	to	spread	communism,”	Ford’s	overall	assessment	“was	that	the	Soviet	Union	–	even	when	it	appeared	its	most	powerful	–	was	in	political,	social,	and	moral	decline.	[…]	He	saw	in	the	behaviour	of	the	leadership	poor	judgment,	rooted	in	Russian	psychology	and	Marxist	ideology,	and	the	distortions	and	misunderstandings	of	thinking	because	of	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	world.”	Rudd	explains	that	Ford,	“by	having	direct	contact	with	Russians	and	a	close	study	of	Russian	and	Soviet	history,	was	able	to	explain	Soviet	actions	that	often	seemed	baffling	to	the	West.”	To	Ford,	the	superpower	was	not	“a	riddle	wrapped	in	a	mystery	inside	an	enigma,”	as	it	had	been	described	by	former	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	in	1939.	Charles	A.	Rudd,	The	Constant	Diplomat:	Robert	Ford	in	
Moscow	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2009),	vii-viii.			27	DCER,	Vol.	25.	515.	Ambassador	in	Colombia	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“A	Re-Examination	of	the	Balance	of	Power”,	Bogota,	October	18,	1957.	DEA/50128-40.	Ford	was	the	
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thought	was	embraced	by	civil	servants	and	ministers	alike.	Addressing	the	subject	of	exchanges	between	Canada	and	the	communist	bloc,	SSEA	Sidney	Smith	advised	Cabinet	to	consider	these	on	their	merits.	He	suggested,	“On	exchanges	with	Poland	and	Yugoslavia,	 the	government	 should	be	as	 forthcoming	as	possible,	 in	order	 to	weaken	the	ties	of	these	countries	with	the	Soviet	bloc	and	to	increase	their	political	and	 commercial	 links	 with	 the	 west.”28	Crucially,	 Poland	 and	 Yugoslavia	 were	singled	out	as	countries	to	pursue,	for	reasons	the	present	work	will	explore	below.	Importantly,	 the	 recognition	 that	 Communist	 Europe	 was	 increasingly	heterogeneous	clearly	had	reverberated	up	through	the	Department	to	the	Minister,	who	now	also	espoused	this	view.		
	 It	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 that	 Canada’s	 Soviet	 and	 Eastern	 European	policy	was	driven	by	events	and	developments	east	of	the	Iron	Curtain,	either	within	individual	 countries	 or	 between	 the	 USSR	 and	 other	 socialist	 states.	While	 broad	East-West	 Cold	 War	 events	 and	 trends	 did	 influence	 Canadian	 policy,	 Canadian	officials’	 awareness	 of	 the	 domestic	 trends	 occurring	 within	 Eastern	 European	states	 also	 contributed	 to	 their	 policy	 choices.	 The	 forces	 driving	 Khrushchev’s	foreign	 policy,	 such	 as	 the	 change	 in	 Soviet	 leadership,	 were	 clear	 to	 Canadian	officials.	Behind	the	scenes,	the	European	Division	critically	and	rationally	examined	the	 changes	 occurring	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 paid	 particular	 attention	 to	transformations	 within	 the	 top	 political	 apparatus.	 They	 recognized	 changes																																																																																																																																																																						former	Head	of	the	European	Division,	and	despite	his	posting	as	ambassador	to	Colombia	he	remained	the	preeminent	departmental	expert	on	Soviet	affairs.	28	Cabinet	Conclusions.	Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR.	June	19,	1958.	RG2,	Privy	Council	Office,	Series	a-5-a,	Volume	1898.	Item	Number	17154.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=17154.	
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occurring	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Khrushchev’s	 slow	 liberalization	 and	 believed	 the	 Soviet	Union	was	no	 longer	governed	by	unyielding	Stalinist	 ideology.	 In	a	memorandum	to	Smith,	Under-Secretary	of	State	of	External	Affairs	(USSEA)	Jules	Léger	discussed	the	changes	in	the	Soviet	Presidium29	and	Council	of	Ministers	and	their	impact	on	Soviet	 foreign	policy.	Many	of	Stalin’s	conservative	old	guard	–	namely	Vyacheslav	Molotov,	 Lazar	 Kaganovich,	 and	 Georgy	 Malenkov	 –	 and	 others,	 including	 Dmitri	Shepilov,	Maksim	Saburov,	and	Mikhail	Pervukhin,	were	removed	from	positions	of	power	and	charged	with	obstructing	the	fulfillment	of	the	decisions	of	the	Twentieth	Party	Congress,	where	Khrushchev	denounced	Stalin’s	dictatorship.	According	to	a	Kremlin	communiqué,	they	were	“guilty	of	obstructing	the	development	of	peaceful	co-existence,	opposing	decentralization	of	Soviet	industry,	opposing	the	granting	of	material	incentives	in	agriculture,	and	opposing	the	abolition	of	all	manifestations	of	the	cult	of	personality.”30	Molotov	was	singled	out	because	he	opposed	the	idea	that	a	reduction	of	tension	in	international	affairs	could	be	achieved	by	personal	contacts	between	Soviet	and	Western	leaders.31	
	 By	mid-1957,	 Khrushchev	 had	 secured	 power	 after	 a	 transitional	 phase	 of	jockeying	 among	 party	 leaders.	 As	 a	 modernizer,	 he	 ushered	 in	 a	 new	 phase	 in	Soviet	 foreign	 policy	 and	 laid	 the	 ideological,	 institutional,	 and	policy	 foundations	
																																																								29	Formerly	the	Politburo.	30	DCER,	Vol.	25.	514.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	of	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	of	
External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	July	9,	1957.	DEA/50170-40.		31	DCER,	Vol.	25.	514.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	of	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	of	
External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	July	9,	1957.	DEA/50170-40.		
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for	 Soviet	 international	 behaviour	 up	 to	 and	 including	 the	 Gorbachev	 period.32	Under-Secretary	Léger	believed	Khrushchev’s	motives	 to	be	not	 only	political	 and	ideological	but	also	economic:				 We	can	expect	an	unrestrained	effort	to	accomplish	the	economic	ends	which	 Khrushchev	 has	 made	 clear	 are	 close	 to	 his	 heart	 –	 at	 home,	equality	with	 the	United	 States	 in	 per	 capita	 production,	 especially	 in	agricultural	 products;	 abroad,	 competitive	 co-existence	 until	 world	socialism	 is	 achieved.	 […]	 The	 foreign	 policy	 which	we	 have	 come	 to	associate	with	 Khrushchev	during	the	past	three	years,	and	which	was	interrupted	by	Hungary,	will		probably	continue.33	Marginal	 notes	 recorded,	 “PM	 has	 read	 and	 remarked	 that	 this	 is	 an	 excellent	paper”,34	suggesting	 Diefenbaker	 shared	 Léger’s	 opinion.	 Frequently,	 historians	have	argued	that	Diefenbaker	was	continuously	at	odds	with	the	DEA,	particularly	at	the	beginning	of	his	term,	but	this	suggests	otherwise;	here,	his	stance	regarding	the	new	Soviet	direction	aligned	with	that	of	the	Department.		 	
	 Diefenbaker	 and	 DEA	 officials	 also	 shared	 the	 view	 that	 Khrushchev	 was	different	 from	 his	 predecessor.	 Khrushchev	 welcomed	 competition	 with	 the	 US	throughout	the	world,	because	he	truly	believed	in	the	moral	and	eventual	material	superiority	of	 his	 socioeconomic	 system.35	According	 to	historian	Vladislav	Zubok,	Khrushchev	 “genuinely	 thought	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 could	 catch	 up	 with	 and	surpass	the	United	States	in	the	fields	of	science,	technology,	consumer	goods,	and	
																																																								32	Erik	P.	Hoffmann,	“Soviet	Foreign	Policy	Aims	and	Accomplishments,	from	Lenin	to	Brezhnev,”	in	Frederic	J.	Fleron	Jr.,	Erik	P.	Hoffmann,	and	Robbin	F.	Laird,	eds.,	Classic	Issues	in	Soviet	Foreign	Policy:	
from	Lenin	to	Brezhnev	(New	York:	Aldine	de	Gruyter,	1991),	60.		33	DCER,	Vol.	25.	514.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	of	State	of	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	
State	of	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	July	9,	1957.	DEA/50170-40.	34	DCER,	Vol.	25.	514.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	of	State	of	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	
State	of	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	July	9,	1957.	DEA/50170-40.		35	Erik	P.	Hoffmann,	“Soviet	Foreign	Policy	Aims	and	Accomplishments,”	62.		
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overall	 living	 standards.”36	Oleg	 Troyanovsky,	 Khrushchev’s	 assistant	 for	 foreign	affairs,	 states	 that	 immediately	 following	 Stalin’s	 death	 in	 1953	 the	 international	situation	was	so	tense	that	“another	turn	of	the	screw	might	have	led	to	disaster.”37	Yet,	 the	 screw	 initially	 loosened	 following	 Khrushchev’s	 ascension	 to	 power,	 and	international	tensions	lessened	temporarily.	Troyanovsky	argues,	“Khrushchev	was	the	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 effort	 to	move	 the	world	 away	 from	 the	 edge	 of	 the	abyss,	 where	 it	 stood	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 1953.”38	Whether	 Khrushchev	 actually	moved	the	world	away	from	the	edge	of	the	abyss	in	the	late	1950s	is	secondary	to	the	 point	 that	 he	 was	 unlike	 his	 predecessor,	 a	 fact	 Canadian	 officials	 had	recognized.	
	 Some	 within	 the	 DEA	 were	 concerned	 that	 because	 Khrushchev’s	 position	was	not	as	authoritative	as	Stalin’s,	his	policy	aims	were	also	not	as	unshakeable	and	definite.	 If	 Khrushchev’s	 grip	 on	 power	 ultimately	 proved	 not	 as	 tight	 as	 Stalin’s,	there	could	be	negative	repercussions.	In	a	note	on	Soviet	intentions	prepared	for	a	summit	 meeting	 in	 1958,	 Assistant	 Under-Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 External	 Affairs	John	Holmes,	who	 also	 served	 briefly	 in	 the	 USSR	 in	 the	 late	 1940s,	warned	 that	Khrushchev	“must	also	listen	to,	and	in	some	cases	give	way	to,	powerful	economic	interests	and	to	lobbies	or	cliques	within	the	Central	Committee	or	among	Ministers.	
																																																								36	Vladislav	M.	Zubok,	A	Failed	Empire:	The	Soviet	Union	in	the	Cold	War	from	Stalin	to	Gorbachev	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2007),	175.	37	Oleg	Troyanovsky,	“The	Making	of	Soviet	Foreign	Policy”	in	William	Taubman,	Sergei	Khrushchev,	and	Abbot	Gleason,	eds.,	Nikita	Khrushchev	(New	Haven	&	London:	Yale	University	Press,	2000),	209.	38	Troyanovsky,	“The	Making	of	Soviet	Foreign	Policy,”	210.		
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We	can	never	be	sure,	 therefore,	whether	 the	pure	Khrushchevian	conception	will	triumph	at	any	particular	moment.”39	Somewhat	optimistically,	Holmes	stated,	there	is	a	certain	amount	of	good	evidence	for	accepting,	at	least	to	some	extent,	the	interpretation	of	Khrushchev	as	the	force	of	liberalism	which	is	 given	 to	 us	 by	 Tito	 and	 Gomulka.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 crudities	 of	 his	propaganda	and	the	vehemence	of	his	language,	there	is	in	Khrushchev	a	certain	rationality	and	sober	common	sense	with	which	one	might	come	to	terms.40		In	the	end,	however,	Holmes	preached	prudence.	He	was	nervous	that,	in	its	study	of	Soviet	 intentions,	 the	 DEA	 could	 not	 know	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Soviet	 intentions	were	 firm	 or	 transient.	 “Khrushchev	 is	 probably	 quite	 sincere	 in	 his	 desire	 for	peaceful	 co-existence,”	 stated	 Holmes.	 But	 the	 real	 trouble	 had	 less	 to	 do	 with	Khrushchev’s	 intentions	 and	more	 to	 do	with	 the	 fact	 “that	 Khrushchev	might	 so	easily	 be	 pushed	 aside	 by	 someone	 else	 equally	 sincere	 but	 with	 an	 even	 less	attractive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union.”	 To	 drive	 the	 point	home,	Holmes	presented	a	cautionary	rhetorical	question:		
What	if	we	were	to	accept	Khrushchev’s	intentions	as	fixed	Soviet	policy	and	 reach	 with	 him	 an	 agreement	 which	 would	 be	 a	 perfectly	satisfactory	agreement	so	 long	as	Khrushchev’s	policy	maintained,	only	to	find	out	that	the	man	in	whose	conception	of	Soviet	interests	we	had	placed	our	 trust	was	deposed	a	 few	months	after	a	Summit	meeting	or	had	lost	his	influence	to	a	group	which	would	exploit	the	settlement	in	a	different	way?41	
																																																								39	DCER,	Vol.	25.	517.	Memorandum	from	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	March	24,	1958.	DEA/50346-1-40.	40	DCER,	Vol.	25.	517.	Memorandum	from	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	March	24,	1958.	DEA/50346-1-40.	41	DCER,	Vol.	25.	517.	Memorandum	from	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	March	24,	1958.	DEA/50346-1-40.	
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In	 other	 words,	 while	 Holmes	 may	 have	 been	 willing	 to	 cautiously	 trust	Khrushchev’s	 policies	 and	 intentions,	 he	 did	 not	 necessarily	 trust	 the	 capricious	political	dynamic	–	whether	real	or	perceived	–	that	existed	in	Soviet	Russia.		
	 Canadian	 officials’	 awareness	 of	 the	 changing	 dynamics	 behind	 the	 Iron	Curtain	 resulted	 in	 a	 renewal	 of	 existing	 policy,	 originating	 from	 the	 European	Division.	A	firm	understanding	that	the	region	was	no	longer	dominated	like	it	once	was	 under	 Stalin	 led	 officials	 to	 see	 the	 benefits	 of	 pursuing	 bilateral	 foreign	relations	 with	 the	 USSR	 as	 well	 as	 select	 Eastern	 European	 nations,	 particularly	Poland	 and	 Yugoslavia.	 This	 highlights	 how,	 during	 this	 earlier	 period,	 Canadian	officials	 were	 pragmatic	 in	 their	 thinking.	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 Canadian	 officials’	attempt	 to	 reduce	 Soviet	 hegemony	 over	 Eastern	 Europe	 was	 not	 simply	 an	afterthought	 related	 to	 broader	 East-West	 trends,	 but	 rather	 a	 calculated	 move	pursued	by	the	government	to	exercise	influence	as	a	middle	power	against	Eastern	European	communism.	
	 By	studying	the	dynamic	between	Canada	–	a	secondary	power	–	and	certain	Eastern	European	countries	–	secondary	powers	relative	to	the	USSR	–	we	see	how	the	 Cold	War	was	 not	 simply	 a	 rigidly	 binary	 contest	 between	 two	 superpowers.	Instead,	 conflicts	 played	 out	 in	 a	 much	 more	 fluid	 and	 complex	 manner,	 with	countries	pursuing	policies	that,	at	times,	could	be	driven	more	by	their	own	needs	and	 less	 by	 stiff	 dualistic	 conceptions	 of	 ideological	 division.	 This	 highlights	 the	importance	of	middlepowerism	to	 the	Cold	War	conflict,	and	 illustrates	how	some	secondary	 powers	 calculated	 changing	 trends	 within	 other	 similarly	 powerful	states.	
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	 THE	ECONOMIC	OFFENSIVE		 The	recognition	of	changing	tides	behind	the	Iron	Curtain	contributed	to	the	perception	of	 the	Soviet	Union	as	more	than	simply	a	political	and	military	threat.	For	 Canadian	 officials,	 Soviet	 non-military	 actions	 were	 also	 considered	 real	challenges	to	Western	democracy	and	normal	international	commercial	relations.	In	particular,	 Soviet	 advancements	 in	 trade	 and	 commercial	 relations	 were	 viewed	through	 an	 ideological	 lens.	 Consequently,	 Soviet	 economic	 competition	 became	inextricably	 associated	 with	 the	 global	 spread	 of	 communism.	 Canadian	 officials,	adopting	 contemporary	Cold	War	parlance,	 deemed	 this	 competition	 an	 economic	offensive.	The	so-called	economic	offensive	was	seen	as	a	direct	challenge	to	Canada	and	 the	West’s	 economic,	 political,	 and	 social	 systems.	When	 expedient,	 however,	Canadian	officials	viewed	the	Soviet	Union	not	only	as	a	potential	economic	threat,	but	 also	 a	 commercial	 possibility.	 Said	 differently,	 the	 USSR	 was	 seen	 as	 both	 a	competitor	and	customer.	“Canadians,	more	so	than	any	other	people	in	the	world,”	stated	Holmes,			depend	 on	 trade	 for	 their	 national	 prosperity.	 […]	 So	 we	 must	 be	energetic	in	promoting	our	commerce	and	exploiting	our	resources.	We	must	 take	a	very	earnest	 interest	 in	 international	 trade	and	monetary	organization,	 encourage	 investments,	 and	 keep	 sweet	 our	 general	political	relations	with	countries	all	over	the	world	–	whose	habits	and	governments	we	may	not	like	but	with	whom	we	have	to	buy	and	sell.42	To	fully	understand	Canadian-Soviet	relations	during	this	period,	the	significance	of	the	 so-called	 Soviet	 economic	 offensive	 must	 be	 woven	 into	 the	 fabric	 of	 our	understanding	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	 diplomacy,	 just	 as	 fears	 of	 Soviet	 military	expansionism	 and	 their	 nuclear	 capabilities	 were	 recognized	 as	 integral	 to	 the																																																									42	TCL,	John	Holmes	Papers,	Series	2,	Box	11,	File	15,	“The	Nature	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy.”	Address	by	John	Holmes	to	The	Canadian	Council	of	Churches,	11	February	1958.	
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political	 discourse	 of	 the	 late	 1940s	 and	 early	 1950s.	 Concern	 over	 Soviet	 non-military	advances	was	rooted	not	simply	in	political	ideology,	but	was	also	related	to	Canadian	 officials’	 pragmatic	 approach	 to	 Cold	 War	 diplomacy	 with	 respect	 to	political	 and	 foreign	 economic	 relations	 and	 to	 their	 recognition	 of	 Canada’s	position	as	a	middle	power	in	the	fight	against	Soviet	communism.		
	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 fear	of	Soviet	non-military	advancements	was	widespread	among	officials	and	politicians	alike	in	Ottawa	is	an	important	factor	in	appreciating	the	significance	of	what	they	perceived	to	be	a	real	and	potential	threat	to	Western	democracy.	In	1954,	Robert	Ford	argued	in	a	paper	titled,	“Relations	with	the	USSR:	A	 Reassessment,”	 that	 the	 “primary	 Soviet	 threat	 was	 not	military;	 it	 was	 one	 of	economic	and	political	disintegration.”43	Shortly	after	the	Twentieth	Party	Congress	in	February	1956,	the	Soviet	government	released	100,000	copies	of	Yu.	B.	Borisov’s	booklet,	 “On	 Peaceful	 Coexistence	 and	 the	 Co-operation	 of	 Two	 Systems.”	 It	optimistically	 explained	 that	 socialism	 would	 win	 a	 complete	 victory	 on	 an	economic	 battleground,	 and	 that	 new	 countries	 emerging	 from	 colonialism	would	adopt	the	Soviet	model.	Moreover,	Borisov	stressed	how	peaceful	co-existence	was	not	only	possible,	but	also	necessary	to	ensure	international	socialism’s	success.44	
	 As	 leader	 of	 the	 opposition	 in	 1956,	 Diefenbaker	 recognized	 that	 the	hydrogen	bomb	brought	equality	in	military	preparedness	and	argued	that	the	USSR	would	 not	 try	 and	 overrun	 the	 world	 by	 force.	 In	 the	 House	 of	 Commons,	 he	reasoned,																																																										43	Rudd,	The	Constant	Diplomat,	39.		44	J.L.	Black,	Canada	in	the	Soviet	Mirror:	Ideology	and	Perception	in	Soviet	Foreign	Affairs,	1917-1991	(Ottawa:	Carleton	University	Press,	1998),	236.	
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the	 USSR	 has	 changed	 its	 course	 to	 an	 economic	 offensive.	 […]	 They	have	 changed	 from	 a	 reliance	 on	 military	 force	 to	 a	 reliance	 on	economic	 infiltration.	 […]	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 new	 scheme	 shows	 a	flexibility	of	policy	under	the	present	leaders	that	Stalin	never	achieved	or	never	tried	to	achieve.45	Diefenbaker	recognized	the	shift	in	Soviet	policy	from	the	hardline	Stalinist	position	to	 Khrushchev’s	 more	 pragmatic	 policies	 and	 emphasized	 that	 it	 was	 the	 Soviet	market,	not	Soviet	missiles,	that	posed	a	threat	to	Canada.	Once	in	office,	he	did	not	stray	from	his	belief	that	the	Soviets	were	a	clear	economic	competitor.	In	a	speech	delivered	 in	Montreal,	addressing	the	challenges	of	Soviet	 technology,	Diefenbaker	discussed	Russia’s	successful	launch	of	the	first	artificial	satellite.	He	stated	that	one	lone	 scientist	 pouring	 over	 his	 books	 or	 working	 with	 a	 few	 associates	 in	 a	laboratory	 did	 not	 accomplish	 the	 feat.	 Diefenbaker	 emphasized	 the	 “vast	combination	of	scientific	institutions	and	factories,	carrying	out	the	ideas	of	an	army	of	 the	 most	 highly	 trained	 scientists,	 engineers,	 and	 technicians.”46	Diefenbaker	highlighted	the	Soviet	arsenal	of	people	pushing	forward	what	was	perceived	as	the	juggernaut	 of	 Soviet	 industry;	 he	 recognized	 that	 the	 industrial	 and	 economic	footing	 was	 vast,	 strong,	 and	 continuing	 to	 develop.	 While	 the	 launch	 of	 a	 space	satellite	certainly	showcased	Soviet	missile	delivery	capabilities,	Diefenbaker	chose	to	emphasize	 the	 industrial	and	 technological	capacity	required	behind	 the	scenes	for	 such	 an	 impressive	 accomplishment	 that	 would	 contribute	 to	 the	 further	development	of	Soviet	industry.	
																																																								45	Hansard,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	1956,	Vol.	I:	718-719.	46	DEA,	(S	&	S),	57/36,	“The	Challenge	of	Soviet	Technology.”	Address	by	P.M.	Diefenbaker	at	McGill	University’s	Convocation,	Montreal,	Quebec,	7	October	1957.	
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	 Canadian	 officials	 generally	 believed	 that	 Khrushchev	 was	 sincere	 about	peaceful	co-existence.	The	general	consensus	was	that	the	Soviets	were	pushing	to	outflank,	 and	 ultimately	 overtake,	 the	 West	 through	 economic	 tactics.	 Assistant	Under-Secretary	 for	 External	 Affairs	 J.	 B.	 C.	 Watkins, 47 	who	 also	 served	 as	Ambassador	to	the	Soviet	Union	from	1954-56,	stressed	the	military	stalemate	that	confronted	 the	 US	 and	 USSR.	With	 a	 dash	 of	 dark	 humour	 and	 bleak	 candidness	Watkins	stated,	
[b]oth	 the	 US	 and	 the	 USSR	 now	 had	 enough	 hydrogen	 bombs	 to	annihilate	 each	 other	 if	 either	 one	 of	 them	 had	 a	 sufficiently	 strong	suicidal	 impulse	 to	 attack,	 or	 if	 somebody	 on	 either	 side	 made	 a	mistake.	The	Russians	are	as	much	the	prisoners	of	this	new	situation	as	 the	 Americans.	 In	 NATO	 parlance,	 they	 are	 "interdependent"	 —	with	 a	 vengeance.	While	 it	 is	 fairly	 obvious	 that	 neither	 particularly	relishes	 this	 constrained	 bedfellowship,	 so	 to	 speak,	 the	 Russians	seem	to	have	adjusted	to	it	more	quickly	than	the	Americans,	possibly	because	 they	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 thinking	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 atomic	stalemate	 at	 least	 since	 1954,	 and	 the	 full	 implications	 of	 the	 new	weapons	have	had	more	time	to	penetrate.48		As	 Canadian	 officials	 began	 conceptualizing	 the	USSR	 as	 an	 economic	 threat,	 they	began	seeing	firsthand	the	potential	impact	of	Soviet	commercial	advancements.	
																																																								47	Watkins’	death	during	an	interrogation	by	the	RCMP	for	alleged	espionage	with	the	Soviet	Union	sometimes	overshadows	the	life	and	career	of	the	diplomat.	Despite	the	allegations,	contemporaries	described	him	as	“a	gentle,	sociable	man	who	took	as	much	pleasure	in	good	food,	fine	wine	and	tobacco	as	he	did	in	an	evening	of	cultured	conversation.”	Historians	Dean	Beeby	and	William	Kaplan	explain	that	colleagues	fondly	remembered	Watkins’	despatches	and	letters	from	Moscow.	“Even	his	RCMP	interrogators,”	Beeby	and	Kaplan	explain,	“took	delight	in	reading	the	hundreds	of	despatches	and	letters	they	had	to	study	for	evidence	of	disloyalty.	The	documents	acquired	a	reputation,	years	after	they	were	written,	as	literary	gems	that	one	read	as	much	for	pleasure	as	for	information.”	Similar	to	Robert	Ford,	Watkins	was	deeply	aware	of	the	internal	struggles	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	his	despatches	“offer	a	glimpse	of	a	vast	country	struggling,	under	the	tyranny	of	Joseph	Stalin,	to	rebuild	after	the	devastation	of	the	Second	World	War.”	No	evidence	was	ever	found	linking	Watkins	to	aiding	the	Soviets	in	any	capacity.	John	Watkins,	Moscow	Despatches:	Inside	Cold	War	Russia,	eds.	Dean	Beeby	and	William	Kaplan	(Toronto:	James	Lorimer	&	Company	Ltd.,	1987),	xvi-xvii.	48	DCER,	Vol.	25.	518.	Memorandum	from	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	External	Affairs	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	of	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	March	31,	1958.	DEA/50128-40.	
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	 Even	 Commonwealth	 connections	were	 not	 impervious	 to	 Soviet	 economic	competition.	 Historian	 Ian	 Drummond	 explains	 that	 Canadian-Soviet	 competition	always	 related	 to	 “fabricated	 materials	 inedible”	 (FMI).	 	 These	 goods	 are	comparatively	 simple	 manufactures,	 like	 lumber,	 plywood,	 paper,	 aluminum,	 and	other	non-ferrous	metals.	During	the	late	1950s	and	60s,	Canadian	exporters	began	to	 meet	 new	 Soviet	 competition	 in	 several	 of	 these	 commodities,	 including	aluminum	 for	 the	 first	 time.49	The	 competition	 was	 especially	 noticeable	 in	 the	United	Kingdom,	a	comparatively	open	market	that	had	traditionally	imported	most	of	 it	 lumber	 and	 aluminum.	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	 Commerce	 Gordon	 Churchill	addressed	Canadian	aluminum	exports	specifically,	in	the	House	of	Commons:		 	
[w]e	have	looked	into	that	threat.	We	have	made	representations	to	the	United	Kingdom,	one	of	the	great	buyers	of	our	aluminum,	asking	them	to	continue	to	purchase	the	Canadian	product	despite	offers	that	might	be	made	by	the	Russians	at	a	much	lower	figure.	[…]	We	are	fully	aware	of	the	threat	posed	by	the	economic	warfare	of	communist	countries.”50		By	 this	 time,	 Canadian	 exporters	 were	 complaining	 that	 Soviet	 competition	 was	“unfair,”	 that	Soviet	producers	 “did	not	know	what	 their	goods	cost,”	or	even	 that	Soviet	 exporters	 deliberately	 dumped	 commodities	 so	 as	 to	 disorganize	 world	markets.	These	views	were	less	frequently	voiced	as	time	passed,	and	according	to	Drummond,	 “there	 can	be	 little	doubt	 that	Soviet	 competition	became	 less	 ‘unfair’	with	each	succeeding	year.”	Besides,	Soviet	producers	and	exporters	certainly	knew,	
																																																								49	Ian	M.	Drummond,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition	from	the	Revolution	to	1986.”	In	David	Davies,	ed.,	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Experiment:	Essays	on	Canadian	Encounters	with	Russia	and	
the	Soviet	Union,	1900	–	1991	(Toronto	&	Waterloo:	Centre	for	Russian	and	East	European	Studies	&	Centre	on	Foreign	Policy	and	Federalism,	1994),	143.	50	Canada,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	19	July	1958:	2385-2386.	
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in	ruble	terms,	whether	or	not	 they	were	making	a	profit	or	a	 loss	on	each	export	transaction.51		
	 Drummond	 explains	 that	 Soviet	 aluminum	 exports	 were	 part	 of	 a	 broader	export	 drive	 in	Western	 Europe,	 but	 from	 the	 Canadian	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 export	drive	seemed	to	be	concentrated	on	FMI,	and	especially	on	aluminum	and	softwood	lumber.	From	1957	to	1959,	Soviet	sales	of	aluminum	to	Western	Europe	rose	by	40	percent,	 and	 to	 the	 UK	 by	 approximately	 70	 percent.52	One	 year	 after	 Churchill’s	statement	 to	 the	 House	 of	 Commons,	 the	 Commonwealth	 Liaison	 Committee	reported	 that	 the	 USSR	 had	 agreed	 to	 limit	 its	 sales	 of	 aluminum	 to	 the	 UK.	 The	report	warned,	however,	that	the	threat	was	not	abated,	since	“there	is	a	continuous	danger	 that	 bloc	 exports	 of	 this	 commodity	 could	 be	 channeled	 from	 the	 Eastern	European	 satellites.”53	Moreover,	 the	 USSR	 sought	 to	 export	 aluminum	 to	 West	Germany,	 India,	 and	 Spain,	 all	 important	 markets	 for	 Canadian	 aluminum. 54	Canadian	 forest	 exports	 also	 faced	 competition,	 since	 the	USSR	 had	 “substantially	increased	 its	 softwood	 lumber	 exports	 to	 the	United	Kingdom.”55	Soviet	 economic	advances,	 then,	 directly	 challenged	 exports	 in	 Canadian	 resources.	 Even	 long-standing	Commonwealth	connections	were	at	times	in	jeopardy	due	to	the	enticing	
																																																								51	Drummond,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition	from	the	Revolution	to	1986,”	146.	Drummond	also	points	out	that	because	Soviet	internal	prices	were	often	irrational,	the	full	cost	of	the	inputs	was	certainly	not	always	charged.	But	the	same	could	have	been	said	of	capitalist	manufacturers,	especially,	perhaps,	in	such	FMI	industries	as	forest	products	and	aluminum.	146.	52	Drummond.	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition	from	the	Revolution	to	1986,”	144.	53	LAC,	RG6,	File	10-33/119	box	123,	Report	Commonwealth	Liaison	Committee,	“Trade	with	the	Sino-Soviet	bloc,”	5	March	1959.	54	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6911,	File	4901-M-b-B-40	part	2,	Report	Commonwealth	Liaison	Committee,	“Trade	with	the	Sino-Soviet	bloc,”	27	October	1958.	55	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6911,	File	4901-M-b-B-40	part	2,	Report	Commonwealth	Liaison	Committee,	“Trade	with	the	Sino-Soviet	bloc,”	27	October	1958.	
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prices	 offered	 by	 the	 Soviet	 bloc.	 Essentially,	 the	 Soviet	 drive	 to	 increase	 exports	represented	 potentially	 dangerous	 political	 and	 ideological	 leverage	 on	 a	 global	scale.	
	 Liberal	 Leader	 of	 the	 Opposition	 Lester	 Pearson	 also	 recognized	 the	competition	posed	to	Canadian	trade	by	Soviet	economic	advancement	and	asserted	that	the	Soviets	were	dumping	goods	onto	the	world	market	for	more	than	simply	economic	 reasons.	 Pearson	 summed	 up	 the	 situation	 by	 stating,	 “experience	 in	Europe	during	recent	months	has	shown	that	with	respect	to	commodities	such	as	lumber,	pulp,	aluminum,	oil,	and	rails,	[the	Soviets]	are	putting	these	goods	into	the	market	 at	 a	 price	 with	 which	 on	 this	 side	 we	 cannot	 compete.”56	The	 economic	offensive	was	not	 just	 a	propaganda	ploy	used	by	 the	Diefenbaker	 government	 to	justify	its	foreign	policies	or	to	raise	fear;	rather,	Canadian	politicians,	regardless	of	political	 party,	 perceived	 the	 Soviet	 economic	 offensive	 as	 a	 real	 challenge	 to	Canadian	commercial	relations.	
	 The	increased	Soviet	presence	in	global	markets	was	reinforced	with	refined	and	 insistent	 business	 tactics.	 The	 Russians	 were	 not	 only	 advanced	 weapons	makers,	but	also	shrewd	businessmen.	In	the	House	of	Commons,	Conservative	MP	Joseph	 Van	 Horne	 asserted	 the	 Soviets	 have	 “more	 aggressive	 and	 more	 expert	selling	agents	and	the	impression	they	give	to	buying	countries	is	this:	‘We	want	the	business	and	we	will	do	what	we	have	to	do	to	get	it.’”57	Van	Horne	explained	that	while	on	a	business	trip	in	Paris,	he	and	Commercial	Attaché	Robert	Campbell	Smith																																																									56	Canada,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	(July	18,	1958)	Vol.	III,	p	2414.	57	Canada,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	(July	19,	1958)	Vol.	III,	p.	2450.	
	 61	
visited	 the	 presidents	 of	 two	 of	 the	 largest	 buyers	 of	 pulpwood	 in	 France.	 Each	previously	 purchased	 the	 product	 from	Canadian	 companies	 and	 had	 done	 so	 for	many	years,	but	they	had	switched	to	purchasing	pulpwood	from	the	Soviet	Union.	According	 to	 both	 French	 businessmen,	 the	 quality	 of	 Russian	 wood	 was	 good,	contracts	were	carried	out	to	the	letter,	and	no	complaints	arose	about	the	quality	or	quantity	involved.	In	the	end,	“they	get	a	better	deal	from	[the	Soviet	Union]	than	they	 get	 from	 Canada.”	 Van	 Horne	 added,	 “Russia	will	 accept	 [France’s]	 currency	while	we	sit	back	and	insist	on	dollars.	Russia	does	business	how	and	where	it	can	be	done.”58	
	 In	 the	 House	 of	 Commons,	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 External	 Affairs	 Sidney	Smith	 asserted	 that	 “[b]y	 economic	 penetration,	 by	 barter	 systems	 and	 loans	 and	other	means	[the	Soviet	Union	is]	making	advances.	[…]	To	me,	that	might	mean	that	they	will	win	the	victory	without	ever	firing	a	shot.	I	regard	this	as	one	of	the	most	urgent	 aspects	 of	 our	 foreign	 relations.”59 	Soon	 afterwards,	 Smith	 warned	 the	Cabinet	Defence	Committee	that	“Soviet	economic	strength	and	the	use	made	of	that	strength	 throughout	 the	world,	poses	 a	 threat	 to	 the	West	 as	 formidable	 as	 is	 the	Soviet	military	threat.”60	
	 By	 the	 late	1950s,	anxiety	over	what	contemporaries	considered	 the	Soviet	economic	offensive	was	reinforced	in	a	number	of	ways:	by	Soviet	Deputy	Premier	Kozlov’s	 visit	 to	 American	 industrialists;	 by	 the	 five-year	 Anglo-Soviet	 trade																																																									58	Canada,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	(July	19,	1958)	Vol.	III,	pp.	2449-2450.	59	Canada,	House	of	Commons,	Debates,	(July	25,	1958)	Vol.	III,	p.	2664.		60	DCER,	Vol.	25.	74.	Memorandum	from	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Cabinet	Defence	
Committee,	Ottawa,	August	14,	1958.		
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agreement,	which	called	for	greatly	expanded	trade;	by	the	global	dip	in	tin	prices	as	a	result	of	 increased	Soviet	sales;	by	the	USSR’s	agreement	to	 loan	$100	million	to	Ethiopia,	another	$100	million	to	Argentina,	and	$378	Million	to	India;	and	by	4,000	Communist	bloc	technicians	who	“roam	the	world.”61	Since	Canada	and	Russia	share	similar	 geographical	 and	 natural	 environments,	 the	 export	 of	 natural	 and	manufactured	 resources	 was	 of	 particular	 concern	 to	 Canadian	 officials	 and	exporters.	A	1958	report	by	the	Commonwealth	Liaison	Committee	stated	that	the	very	 nature	 of	 the	 Soviet	 bloc	 economic	 system	 could	 destabilize	 global	markets.	Considerations	 of	 price	 and	 cost	 and	 the	 pressure	 of	 private	 interests	 that	 are	normal	 to	 a	 capitalist	 system	 could	 largely	 be	 ignored	 by	 these	 countries.62	As	 a	result,	 these	 tactics	were	 expected	 to	prove	particularly	problematic	 for	Canadian	exports.	 The	 fear	 of	 the	 economic	 offensive	 was	 political	 and	 ideological	 with	respect	 to	 the	 global	 spread	 of	 communism,	 but	 these	 Canadian	 concerns	demonstrate	how	global	commercial	relations	are	rarely	isolated	from	international	politics.	
	 In	 1959,	 the	 prime	minister	 delivered	 a	 speech	 titled	 “A	 Re-Assessment	 of	Soviet	Attitudes,”	 in	which	 he	 highlighted	 his	 understanding	 that	Khrushchev	 had	altered	 his	 foreign	 policy	 course	 from	 Stalin’s:	 “Mr.	 Khrushchev	 is	 a	 realist.	 He	knows	 that	 modern	 warfare	 is	 self-defeating	 and	 cannot	 be	 employed	 in	 the	traditional	way	to	back	up	the	aims	of	foreign	policy.	The	thought	of	nuclear	war	is	
																																																								61	Ramond	F.	Mikesell	and	Donald	A.	Wells,	The	Soviet	Economic	Offensive	(Toronto:	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs,	1959),	1.		62	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6911,	File	4901-M-b-B-40	part	2,	Report	Commonwealth	Liaison	Committee,	“Trade	with	the	Sino-Soviet	bloc,”	27	October	1958.	
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no	 less	 appalling	 to	 Mr.	 Khrushchev	 than	 it	 is	 to	 the	 West.” 63 	Diefenbaker	understood	that	Khrushchev	had	recognized	world	domination	could	no	 longer	be	achieved	at	the	barrel	of	a	gun,	or	the	tip	of	a	missile.	Diefenbaker’s	statement	also	reinforces	the	importance	the	Canadian	government	attached	to	the	changes	in	the	power	 dynamic	 among	 Soviet	 leaders.	 Diefenbaker	 was	 correct	 to	 assume	 that	Khrushchev	 did	 not	 want	 nuclear	 war.	 As	 historian	 Kitty	 Newman	 observes,	“Khrushchev	 was	 acutely	 aware	 of	 the	 terrible	 impact	 of	 atomic	 warfare	 on	 the	human	race.”64	
	 Undersecretary	 Norman	 Robertson	 shared	 the	 view	 that	 the	 Soviets	conceived	 of	 communism’s	 ultimate	 victory	 not	 necessarily	 in	 military	 terms,	primarily	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 nuclear	 stalemate.	 In	 a	 memorandum	 to	 his	minister,	Robertson	stated,			
	 [t]here	is	no	doubt	in	my	mind	that	the	Soviet	 leaders	still	believe	in	the	inevitable	supremacy	of	Communism.	They	believe	also	that	their	political	 and	 economic	 systems	 are	 better	 than	 those	 of	 the	 free	nations.	 The	 evidence	 is,	 however,	 that	 they	 no	 longer	 think	 war	between	themselves	and	the	capitalist	countries	to	be	an	inevitable	or	even	 necessary	 step	 in	 their	 attempt	 to	 communize	 the	 world.	Moreover,	 they	 seem	 to	 recognize	 that	 a	major	war	would	 result	 in	their	own	destruction.65	
																																																								63	DEA,	(S	&	S),	59/41,	“A	Re-Assessment	of	Soviet	Attitudes.”	Speech	by	P.M.	Diefenbaker	to	the	Men’s	and	Women’s	Canadian	Club,	Halifax,	Nova	Scotia,	14	November,	1959.		64	Kitty	Newman,	Macmillan,	Khrushchev	and	the	Berlin	Crisis,	1958-1960	(New	York:	Routledge,	2007),	9.	As	early	as	1954,	when	Khrushchev	was	working	to	solidify	his	power	in	1954,	a	report	prepared	by	eminent	Soviet	scientists,	including	the	Director	of	the	Soviet	nuclear	effort	since	1943,	Igor	Kurchatov,	warned	Khrushchev	that	mankind	would	face	an	enormous	threat	of	extermination	of	life	on	earth	if	nuclear	war	was	waged.	V.	Zubok	and	C.	Pleshakov,	Inside	the	Kremlin’s	Cold	War:	
From	Stalin	to	Khrushchev	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1996),	188-194.	65	LAC,	MG32	B13,	Howard	Green	Papers,	Vol.	8,	File	9,	File	No.	R4469-0-1-E,	Memorandum	for	the	
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Howard	 Green	 became	 secretary	 of	 state	 for	 external	 affairs	 following	 Smith’s	sudden	death	in	1959.	When	assessing	Green’s	legacy	in	External	Affairs,	historians	have	 typically	 highlighted	 his	 gladiatorial	 efforts	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 nuclear	disarmament.	Yet,	Green	was	also	fundamentally	aware	of	the	USSR’s	growing	non-military	 advancements	 and	 what	 these	 could	 mean	 to	 the	 world	 at	 large.	 With	regard	to	Canada	specifically,	Green	warned	that	the	USSR’s	drive	to	expand	export	markets	 was	 of	 particular	 concern,	 since	 many	 items	 were	 competitive	 with	Canada’s.	In	a	speech	to	the	Vancouver	Board	of	Trade,	Green	made	clear	that	while	NATO	was	initially	created	for	the	main	purpose	of	providing	security	in	the	face	of	growing	Soviet	military	advancements,	 the	“Soviet	challenge	was	 in	 the	process	of	change	–	that	we	are	entering	upon	a	new	phase	of	international	relations	in	which	[…]	competitive	co-existence	in	the	economic	and	ideological	spheres	will	continue	unabated.”66	In	 comparison	 to	 the	 potential	 threat	 of	 Soviet	 aggression,	 for	which	the	 alliance	 was	 initially	 created,	 Green	 maintained	 that	 the	 Soviet	 economic	offensive	was	no	 less	demanding	 and	 that	 all	NATO	member	nations	 realized	 this	fact.67	
	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 growing	 economically	 was	 not	 solely	viewed	as	a	threat,	however.	For	instance,	Green	suggested	it	could	be	advantageous	to	Canada:	“Trade	is	[…]	a	two-way	business,	and	increased	exports	from	the	Soviet	group	 of	 countries	 can	 mean	 increased	 opportunities	 to	 sell	 our	 goods	 to	 them.	
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Without	in	any	way	minimizing	the	risks	of	East-West	trade,	I	would	say	that	there	is	 no	 need	 for	 any	 suggestion	 of	 defeatism	 about	 our	 prospects.”	 In	 other	words,	Green	viewed	the	USSR	as	both	a	competitor	and	customer.	Green’s	logic	was	rooted	in	his	understanding	that	the	USSR	was	inclined	to	improve	its	domestic	standard	of	living.	As	a	result,	the	Soviet	Union	could	“absorb	large	imports	of	many	goods	from	Western	 countries	 in	 return	 for	 Soviet	 exports.”68	The	 Soviet	 effort	 to	 increase	integration	within	a	competitive	international	market,	Green	believed,	could	benefit	Canadian	industries	with	a	surplus	of	goods	to	sell.	Essentially,	Green	believed	in	the	need	to	preserve	a	balance	between	optimism	and	caution	when	it	came	to	potential	benefits	and	downfalls	of	the	so-called	economic	offensive.	Canadian	officials’	beliefs	that	the	Soviet	Union	no	longer	wanted	war	but	that	it	posed	an	economic	offensive	were	intrinsically	linked.	Though	it	is	hardly	surprising	the	Soviet	Union	sought	and	pursued	 economic	 expansion	 and	 international	 trade,	 the	 ideological	 fear	 of	 the	spread	of	communism	led	Canadian	officials	to	see	these	efforts	as	an	“offensive”	in	the	Cold	War.	
	 CANADA,	NATO,	AND	THE	USSR’S	NON-MILITARY	ADVANCEMENTS		 The	belief	 that	war	was	not	 inevitable	 is	an	 important	 ideological	shift	 that	occurred	during	the	Khrushchev	years,	and	speaks	to	the	 fact	 that	Canada’s	Soviet	and	 Eastern	 European	 policy	 was	 largely	 impacted	 by	 internal	 political	developments	 east	 of	 the	 Iron	 Curtain.	 Ideology	 aside,	 the	 economic	 and	 political	“threats”	 posed	 by	 Soviet	 communism	 were	 clearly	 entrenched	 in	 the	 minds	 of	
																																																								68	LAC,	MG32	B13,	Vol.	8,	File	9,	File	no.	R4469-0-1-E,	Howard	Green	Papers,	External	Affairs	
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Canadian	officials	long	before	the	Diefenbaker	government	arrived	in	office,	and	the	efforts	to	counter	these	threats	in	a	multilateral	framework	can	be	dated	to	NATO’s	creation.	 During	 negotiations	 to	 establish	 the	 alliance	 in	 the	 late	 1940s,	 Canadian	delegates	 pressed	 for	more	 than	 simply	 a	military	 coalition.	 Then	 Prime	Minister	Louis	St.	Laurent	and	External	Affairs	Minister	Lester	Pearson	hoped	that	the	treaty	would	also	establish	a	basis	for	the	gradual	political	and	economic	unification	of	the	North	 Atlantic	 community. 69 	Many	 mandarins	 at	 External	 Affairs	 shared	 this	perspective.	 For	 instance,	 Norman	 Robertson	 was	 not	 insensitive	 to	 the	 dangers	posed	by	the	Soviet	Union,	but	his	major	interest	in	the	proposed	alliance	was	with	the	 economic	 and	 political	 problems	 it	 might	 help	 to	 resolve,	 and	 he	 saw	 the	usefulness	of	it	as	an	instrument	of	Canadian	economic	foreign	policy.70	As	a	result	of	 this	 thinking,	 Canadian	 negotiators	 argued	 for	 what	 became	 Article	 2,	 close	collaboration	 within	 the	 alliance	 on	 cultural	 and	 social	 issues,	 and	 specifically	economic	cooperation.		
	 In	 the	 end,	 however,	 Article	 2	 proved	 more	 useful	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 domestic	politicking	in	Canada	than	as	real	grounds	for	alliance	cooperation.71	Escott	Reid,	a	self-proclaimed	 radical	mandarin,	was	 disappointed	 that	NATO	did	 not	make	 real	efforts	 to	 achieve	 economic,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 cooperation	 or	 to	 promote	
																																																								69	Escott	Reid,	Radical	Mandarin:	The	Memoirs	of	Escott	Reid	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989),	233.	70	J.L.	Granatstein,	A	Man	of	Influence:	Norman	A.	Robertson	and	Canadian	Statecraft,	1929-68	(Deneau	Publishers	&	Company	Ltd.,	1981),	236.	71	For	instance,	St.	Laurent	and	Pearson	felt	that	Article	2	needed	to	be	strengthened	in	part	because	an	election	was	close	on	the	horizon	and	they	understood	that	the	public	would	want	a	strong	non-military	commitment	and	a	promise	for	a	strong	social,	economic,	and	cultural	mandate.	James	Eayrs,	
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democracy	within	member	 states.72	Enthusiasm	 for	Article	2	 seemed	 to	 evaporate	once	the	Treaty	was	signed	and	ratified;	despite	the	efforts	by	Canadian	officials	to	incorporate	 it	 into	 the	Treaty,	 little	was	done	 to	 translate	 the	Article’s	 aspirations	into	practical	accomplishments.73	It	is	important	to	note	that	even	during	the	early	phases	of	 the	Cold	War,	as	divisions	were	solidified	and	alliances	 formed,	plans	 to	counter	non-military	advances	were	also	a	crucial	component	of	Canadian	officials’	thinking.	 Yet,	 despite	 the	 NATO	 alliance’s	 theoretical	 appreciation	 that	 a	 unified	counteroffensive	 against	 Soviet	 non-military	 advances	 may	 be	 advantageous,	 the	lack	of	alliance	cooperation	on	this	front	persisted.		
	 In	 1959	 Ford	 asserted,	 “[t]he	 Russians	 wanted	 to	 expand	 the	 areas	 of	Communist	influence	and	undermine	the	[NATO]	alliance,	not	by	force	but	by	means	of	 ‘ideological	 drives,	 trade,	 and	 aid’	 and	 by	 using	 skillful	 diplomacy	 consisting	 of	‘peace,	disarmament,	and	normalcy,	 including	the	possibility	of	gradually	breaking	up	the	NATO	alliance.’”74	To	the	USSR	and	Soviet	bloc	countries,	the	NATO	alliance	was	more	than	a	military	threat	as	well.	Yet,	when	it	came	to	each	other’s	respective	alliances,	both	East	and	West	typically	chose	to	emphasize	publicly	military	threats	over	potential	economic	perils.	Perhaps	both	the	Canadian	and	Soviet	governments	believed	that	society	generally	found	it	easier	to	imagine	their	cities	being	leveled	by	nuclear	bombs	than	to	comprehend	the	possible	threat	of	a	shifting	global	economy.		
																																																								72	Escott	Reid,	Time	of	Fear	and	Hope:	The	Making	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty,	1947-1949	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart,	1977),	220.	73	Eayrs,	In	Defence	of	Canada,	175.	74	LAC,	MG31	E73,	Robert	Ford	Papers,	Vol.	2,	File	14.	Address	to	the	Heads	of	Mission	meeting,	Paris,	“Coexistence:	The	Communist	Challenge,”	October	1959.	
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	 Diefenbaker	 expressed	 concerns	 similar	 to	 those	 of	 Ford	 and	 Cabinet	colleagues	 regarding	 the	 Soviet	 threat	 to	 the	 NATO	 alliance.	 Khrushchev’s	restructured	 foreign	policy	 of	 conciliation,	 he	warned,	 “offers	 a	 better	prospect	 of	driving	wedges	into	the	ranks	of	his	diplomatic	adversaries,	of	creating	splits	among	members	of	NATO.”75	Just	as	he	believed	Khrushchev	wanted	to	splinter	the	NATO	alliance,	Canada	wanted	to	help	pry	apart	the	Eastern	bloc	from	the	clutches	of	the	Soviet	Union,	while	simultaneously	promoting	 further	divisions	between	 the	USSR	and	other	communist	nations,	such	as	Yugoslavia.	Indeed,	the	NATO	alliance	viewed	Soviet	economic	advancement	as	an	issue	to	be	kept	at	the	forefront	of	its	agenda.	A	1960	press	communiqué	noted	that	the	Permanent	Representatives	were	instructed	to	follow	up	previous	studies	in	order	to	enable	them	to	“watch	the	developments	of	the	 Communist	 economic	 offensive	 and	 to	 concert	 the	 necessary	 defensive	measures.”76	While	the	alliance	would	not	formulate	a	cohesive,	collective	response	against	the	economic	advancements	of	the	Eastern	bloc,	its	members	were	willing	to	discuss	 the	 matter	 with	 one	 another	 and	 to	 discuss	 openly	 how	 the	 economic	advances	might	impact	the	alliance.	
	 In	 1960,	 a	 Canadian	 statement	 on	 East-West	 relations	 delivered	 to	 the	Chairman	 of	 the	 NATO	 alliance	 noted	 the	 differing	 opinions	 expressed	 on	 the	advisability	of	Western	 leaders	engaging	 in	a	preliminary	discussion	of	 trade	with	the	USSR	at	an	upcoming	summit	meeting.	Canada	believed	 the	alliance	should	be	
																																																								75	DEA,	(S	&	S),	59/41,	“A	Re-Assessment	of	Soviet	Attitudes.”	Speech	by	P.M.	Diefenbaker	to	the	Men’s	and	Women’s	Canadian	Club,	Halifax,	Nova	Scotia,	November	14,	1959.	76	LAC,	MG32	B13,	Howard	Green	Papers,	Vol.	10,	File	5,	File	No.	R4469-0-1-E,	NATO	Information	
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prepared	 to	 do	 so,	 since	 the	 “current	 Soviet	 trade	 programme	 has	 special	significance	for	Canada	because	many	of	the	main	exports	of	the	USSR	compete	with	Canadian	 commodities.”77	Further,	 the	 statement	 affirmed	 that	 Canada	 believed	growing	 East-West	 trade	 relations	 “must	 be	 a	 part	 of	 any	 broad	 efforts	 to	 reach	peaceful	 settlement	 of	 outstanding	 problems	 between	 the	 Soviet	 bloc	 and	 the	West.” 78 	This	 meant,	 broad	 discussions	 between	 Soviet	 Russia	 and	 Western	representatives	of	NATO	could	be	pursued,	but	specific	and	detailed	discussions	on	particular	economic	and	 trade	developments	should	not	 take	place	at	 the	summit.	Individual	countries	should,	along	with	 the	proper,	national	organizational	bodies,	engage	in	bilateral	conversations	with	Soviet	bloc	countries.		
	 On	the	whole,	Canadian	representatives	felt	that	NATO	had	a	continuing	role	to	play	as	a	forum	for	confidential	consultation	on	the	economic	field,	“but	not	as	an	agency	for	Western	action.”	Combating	Soviet	economic	advancements	directly	was	not	 the	 job	 of	 NATO.	 Rather,	 it	 was	 the	 Canadian	 position	 that	 “the	 Communist	economic	challenge	must	be	met	by	pursuing	effective	policies	 in	the	international	specialized	 bodies	 concerned	 with	 economic	 questions	 and	 in	 bilateral	 relations	with	 other	 countries”	 (emphasis	 added).	 Canada	 did,	 however,	 believe	 that	NATO	should	remain	broadly	vigilant	of	the	Soviet	economic	challenge	and	keep	it	“under	close	examination.”79		
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	 Overall,	the	Canadian	position	held	that	NATO’s	main	role	should	be	to	keep	a	“close	 watch	 over	 developments,	 domestic	 and	 external,	 in	 communist	 economic	policies,	 pointing	 [out]	 danger	 areas	 which	 deserve	 special	 attention”	 since	 the	communist	 economic	 challenge	 “is	 bound	 to	 become	 increasingly	 serious	 and	widespread.”80	When	 it	 came	 time	 to	 take	active	measures	against	 the	Communist	economic	challenge,	Canada	recognized	 the	 limitations	 inherent	 in	Article	2	of	 the	Treaty	and	asserted,	“it	was	never	intended	that	NATO	should	be	an	instrument	for	the	implementation	of	economic	policies.”81	The	fact	that	the	Canadian	government	wanted	 NATO	 only	 to	 provide	 general	 and	 broad	 oversight	 suggests	 Canada	considered	its	own	direction	and	policy	for	combating	the	Soviet	economic	offensive	would	be	more	effective	and	would	better	serve	its	own	national	interests.	
	 BILATERAL	SUMMITRY		 Changing	 political	 dynamics	 behind	 the	 Iron	 Curtain	 prompted	 Canadian	officials	 to	 reconsider	 their	Eastern	European	policy	and	promoted	open	political-diplomatic	discourse.	While	Soviet	economic	expansion	was	certainly	perceived	as	a	potential	 threat	 to	Canadian	 commercial	 endeavors,	 this	did	not	 inhibit	Canadian-Soviet	 political	 dialogue.	 Frank	 and	 open	 discussions	were	 a	 favourable	 course	 of	action	 pursued	 by	 the	 Diefenbaker	 government,	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 approach	pursued	by	the	previous	Liberal	government.	In	the	end,	however,	because	Canada	was	 tightly	ensconced	within	NATO,	progressive	and	meaningful	bilateral	political	
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dialogue	 was	 inherently	 limited.	 Middle	 power	 influence	 could	 not	 easily	 be	exercised	 in	 bilateral	 relations	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 because	 Canada	 was	 also	constrained	by	its	military	alliance.	
	 Despite	 fundamentally	 different	 political	 and	 ideological	 positions,	 official	representatives	 from	Canada	and	 the	USSR	were	willing	 to	promote	a	 cordial	 and	professional	political	 relationship.	Much	has	been	made	of	 the	 series	of	high-level	visits	 in	 1959,	 including	 British	 Prime	 Minister	 Macmillan	 and	 Vice-President	Richard	Nixon’s	visits	 to	Moscow,	and	Mikoyan’s	visit	 to	 the	US,	 for	 instance.	This	bilateral	summitry,	as	Diefenbaker’s	foreign	policy	steward	and	liaison	between	the	Prime	 Minister’s	 office	 and	 the	 DEA	 Basil	 Robinson	 suggests,	 contributed	 to	 a	significant	 reduction	 in	 East-West	 tensions.82 	Meetings	 between	 the	 great	 and	middle	 powers,	 however,	 have	 remained	 relatively	 unexamined,	 despite	 their	contribution	to	international	political	relations.		
	 The	significance	of	great	power-middle	power	bilateral	meetings	must	not	be	over-exaggerated.	At	the	same	time,	they	should	not	be	ignored,	since	they	highlight	the	very	 real	 role	middle	powers	played.	The	news	 that	Khrushchev	was	going	 to	visit	the	United	States	in	1960	raised	immediately	the	question	whether	he	should	be	 invited	 to	Canada.	According	 to	Basil	Robinson,	Diefenbaker	kept	weighing	 the	arguments	for	and	against	this	possibility.	On	the	positive	side,	such	visits	made	for	good	publicity;	 they	were	consistent	with	his	well-advertised	belief	 in	the	value	of	personal	 contacts;	 and	 public	 opinion,	 on	 the	 whole,	 favoured	 an	 invitation	 to																																																									82	Basil	Robinson,	Diefenbaker’s	World:	A	Populist	in	Foreign	Affairs	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989),	101.	
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Khrushchev.	And	on	a	much	more	personal	note,	if	Diefenbaker	were	to	be	involved	in	a	meeting	with	Khrushchev,	he	would,	in	Robinson’s	words,	“be	entering	into	an	exclusive	fraternity	of	leaders	who	had	gone	into	the	ring	with	Khrushchev.	Such	an	occasion	would,	in	theory	at	least,	consummate	his	standing	on	the	world	stage	and	would	match,	 if	not	 surpass,	anything	Pearson	had	done	publicly	 in	 relations	with	the	 Soviet	 government.”	As	 for	potential	 negative	 consequences,	many	of	 the	East	European	 groups	 in	 Canada	 –	 Hungarian,	 Ukrainian,	 and	 those	 from	 the	 Baltic	regions	–	would	be	bitterly	opposed	to	any	gesture	which	might	be	 interpreted	as	conciliatory	towards	the	USSR.83		
	 In	 a	memorandum	 to	 Diefenbaker	 regarding	 the	 possibility	 of	 Khrushchev	visiting	Canada,	additional	positive	consequences	not	mentioned	by	Robinson	were	outlined.	 For	 instance,	 since	 one	 of	 the	 underlying	 considerations	 of	 President	Dwight	 Eisenhower’s	 invitation	 to	 Khrushchev	 was	 the	 view	 that	 the	 visit	 would	provide	 a	means	 of	 correcting	Khrushchev’s	 profound	misconceptions	 of	 political,	social,	 and	economic	 life	 in	 the	United	States,	 a	visit	 to	Canada	would	presumably	heighten	whatever	 influence	his	visit	 to	North	America	might	have	 in	 this	respect,	particularly	 by	 providing	Khrushchev	with	 the	 opportunity	 to	 become	 acquainted	with	 the	 Western	 way	 of	 life	 as	 pursued	 by	 a	 middle	 power.	 Also,	 a	 visit	 could	possibly	correct	the	misconception	regarding	the	relationship	between	Canada	and	the	United	States.	A	visit	to	Canada	coming	after	his	stay	in	the	US	would	provide	an	opportunity	 for	 Khrushchev	 to	 gain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 this	relationship	 than	 if	he	was	 to	only	visit	 the	US.	Lastly,	discussions	 in	Ottawa	with																																																									83	Robinson,	Diefenbaker’s	World,	101-102.	
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Khrushchev	on	outstanding	East-West	issues	would	provide	him	with	an	indication	of	 the	 solidarity	 of	Western	 views	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 permit	 him	 to	 view	 the	West’s	 position	 from	 a	 different	 perspective	 than	 may	 have	 been	 the	 case	 in	Washington.84		
	 In	the	end,	while	Khrushchev	never	came	to	Canada,	other	high	level	Soviet	officials	did.	For	instance,	in	November	1959,	on	a	stopover	flight	to	Mexico	and	the	US,	Deputy	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Council	 of	Ministers	 Anastas	Mikoyan	 visited	Halifax.	His	 welcoming	 party	 included	 the	 Premier	 of	 Nova	 Scotia,	 Robert	 Stanfield,	 the	federal	Minister	of	Fisheries,	Angus	MacLean,	and	the	Chief	of	Protocol	of	the	DEA,	H.F.	 Feaver.	 Minutes	 before	 landing,	 Mikoyan	 was	 greeted	 with	 a	 radio	 message	from	Diefenbaker	welcoming	him	to	Canada.	
	 Much	 to	 the	 surprise	 of	 the	 visiting	 delegation	 and	 their	 Canadian	 hosts,	 a	large	 number	 of	 journalists	 and	 radio	 and	 television	 operators	 awaited	 them;	Mikoyan	promptly	agreed	to	go	to	C.H.N.S.	radio	station	for	an	interview.	According	to	 Feaver,	 Mikoyan	 “was	 very	 adroit,	 evasive,	 amusing,	 forceful,	 voluble	 and	friendly.”	After	his	 interview,	Mikoyan	went	 to	 some	effort	 to	make	a	 good	public	impression	 as	 he	 seized	 the	 opportunity	 to	 talk	 to	 two	 groups	 of	 people.	 To	 one	group,	comprised	mostly	of	women,	he	had	this	to	say:		
I	bring	you	a	message	from	the	women	of	the	Soviet	Union.	They	send	greetings	of	friendship	to	you	women	of	Canada	and	want	me	to	tell	you	that	their	greatest	wish	is	for	peace	throughout	the	world	so	that	they	-	and	 the	 women	 of	 all	 countries	 -	 can	 live	 in	 happiness	 with	 their	families.																																																										84	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	9.2,	Memorandum	to	the	Prime	Minister,	“Possible	Benefits	accruing	from	a	visit	to	Canada	by	Khrushchev,”	August	19,	1959.	
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Later,	 a	 dinner	was	 held	 in	Mikoyan’s	 honour.	 In	 the	 end,	 Feaver	 concluded,	 “the	stop-over	visit	can	be	regarded	as	successful	from	both	the	Canadian	and	the	Soviet	viewpoints.”85	
	 According	to	Canada’s	ambassador	in	the	USSR,	David	M.	Johnson,	Mikoyan’s	brief	visit	 to	Halifax	 “received	very	 full	 coverage	 in	 the	Soviet	press.”	Both	Pravda	and	Izvestia	carried	full	stories.	According	to	Johnson,	they	paid	particular	attention	to	Mikoyan’s	discussions	with	“ordinary	Canadians,	 in	particular	Canadian	women,	and	with	trade	union	leaders	from	the	Atlantic.”86	It	is	likely	that	Mikoyan	engaged	with	 the	 Canadian	 crowds	 for	 propaganda	 purposes,	 not	 because	 he	 was	 a	communist,	 but	 simply	 a	 politician.	 Regardless,	 Mikoyan’s	 brief	 stop-over	 visit	suggests	 that	each	country	was	willing	 to	encourage	political	cooperation,	and	 the	willingness	to	cooperate	filtered	down	from	those	in	positions	of	high	power.	
	 Although	 Khrushchev	 never	 visited	 Canada	 and	 never	 formally	 met	Diefenbaker	 face	 to	 face,	 the	 two	 leaders	 did	 exchange	 letters	 in	 late	 1958,	 on	Khrushchev’s	 initiative.	 Khrushchev’s	 letter	 to	 Diefenbaker	 was	 part	 of	 a	 larger	letter	 writing	 campaign	 to	 various	 Western	 leaders.	 In	 April	 1958,	 Khrushchev	explained	 to	 Diefenbaker	 that	 the	 Soviet	 government	 “has	 decided	 to	 stop,	unilaterally,	the	testing	of	all	types	of	atomic	and	hydrogen	weapons	from	March	31,	1958.”	 Khrushchev	 then	 called	 upon	 the	 Canadian	 government	 to	 support	 its	
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initiative. 87 	According	 to	 Basil	 Robinson,	 while	 brainstorming	 ideas	 with	Diefenbaker	 about	 the	 direction	 and	 tone	 of	 his	 response,	 the	 Prime	 Minister	insisted	 on	 reversing	 the	 Soviet	 tactic	 of	 forcing	 Western	 governments	 into	 a	position	 of	 having	 to	 answer	 questions	 “by	 asking	 certain	 questions	 of	 Mr.	Khrushchev.”	While	Robinson	stressed	to	the	Under-Secretary	that	Diefenbaker	was	just	 “throwing	 out	 ideas	 for	 consideration	 and	 that	 he	 was	 open	 to	 official	recommendations,”	 it	was	also	 clear	 that	 the	Prime	Minister	was	emphatic	on	 the	decision	to	“take	the	offensive	in	the	correspondence	with	the	Soviet	Government”	and	was	“attracted	by	the	tactic	of	asking	questions	of	Mr.	Khrushchev.”88	
	 The	DEA	and	SSEA	Smith	agreed.	Smith	stated,	“if	we	the	take	the	offensive	in	our	reply	it	undoubtedly	creates	a	good	balance	in	exchanges	with	the	Soviet	Union.”	Smith	then	warned	that	it	would	be	“unprofitable	at	this	stage	to	carry	this	approach	to	 the	 point	where	we	might	 encourage	 the	 Soviet	 leaders	 to	 prolong	 their	 letter	writing	 campaign…”	 In	other	words,	 Smith	agreed	 that	 an	 “offensive”	 approach	 to	the	 reply	was	 good,	 if	 a	more	 conciliatory	 tone	 could	 be	 simultaneously	 pursued.	Importantly,	 Smith	 reiterated	 the	 well-established	 DEA	 policy	 that	 “initiatives	should	 be	 developed	 within	 the	 NATO	 Council.”	 He	 lamented	 that	 imaginative	approaches	in	this	context	could	be	difficult,	but	suggested,		
Canada	 can	 exercise	 a	 considerable	 influence	 in	 an	 indirect	 way	 by	helping	 to	 develop	 programmes	 of	 action	 through	NATO	 and	we	 [the	DEA]	believe	that	this	is	preferable	to	the	taking	of	any	special	initiative																																																									87	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	7.2,	Message	from	N.S.	Khrushchev,	Chairman	of	the	Council	
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in	dealings	with	the	Soviet	Union	which	Canada	might	find	it	difficult	to	carry	further	alone.	89	Smith’s	statement	that	Canada	could	best	influence	global	affairs	within	the	confines	of	 its	 alliance	 network,	 a	 hallmark	 of	 Canadian	 foreign	 policy,	 is	 evidence	 that	Canadian-Soviet	political	relations	were	inherently	limited.	In	the	end,	the	response	to	Khrushchev	balanced	conciliation	with	posing	questions,	the	approach	favoured	by	both	Diefenbaker	and	the	DEA.	
	 In	 his	 reply,	 Diefenbaker	 stated	 that	 Canada’s	 reaction	 to	 Khrushchev’s	announcement	 to	 stop	 nuclear	 testing	 has	 been	 cautious,	 “and	 that	 a	 sense	 of	uneasiness	 has	 modified	 the	 satisfaction	 we	 were	 tempted	 at	 first	 to	 entertain.”	Diefenbaker	explained,	“it	 is	axiomatic	that	disarmament,	 to	be	significant	 in	these	times,	must	be	the	product	of	negotiations	and	agreement	among	nations.	The	world	can	hardly	 be	 expected	 to	 repose	 confidence	 in	 the	potential	 results	 of	 a	 decision	which	could	be	reversed	overnight,	and	without	consultation,	by	your	government.”	He	then	asked	Khrushchev	to	clarify	his	“position	with	regard	to	the	establishment	of	 an	 international	 system	 for	 the	 verification	of	 nuclear	 tests.	Assuming	 that	 you	are	willing	to	exchange	views	on	this	problem	with	other	governments,	I	should	be	interested	to	know	what	type	of	practical	measures	you	have	in	mind	to	ensure	that	tests	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 were	 not	 being	 conducted	 anywhere	 in	 the	 world.”	Diefenbaker	 then	 reminded	 Khrushchev	 of	 his	 government’s	 refusal	 to	 carry	 out	mutual	 inspection	 of	 Arctic	 regions	 and	 again	 offered	 “to	 make	 available	 for	
																																																								89	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	7.2,	Memorandum	from	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	the	Prime	Minister,	“Reply	to	Khrushchev	Letter,”	April	25,	1958.	
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international	inspection	or	control	any	part	of	[Canada’s]	territory,	in	exchange	for	a	comparable	concession	on	your	part.”90		
	 A	 few	 weeks	 later,	 Mikoyan	 explained	 to	 Ambassador	 Johnson	 that	Khrushchev	 believed	 Diefenbaker’s	 letter	 was	 based	 on	 “a	 misunderstanding	 of	Soviet	 policy,”	 yet,	 “appreciated	 the	 spirit	 in	 which	 it	 was	 written.”91	Khrushchev	did,	in	fact,	write	back	to	Diefenbaker.	In	a	rather	long	nine-page	letter,	Khrushchev	responded	by	focusing	mainly	on	the	United	States’	position	and	its	past	actions.	For	instance,	 to	 the	 Prime	 Minister’s	 accusations	 that	 unilateral	 cessation	 of	 nuclear	tests	 is	 essentially	 meaningless,	 Khrushchev	 rebutted	 by	 discussing	 in	 detail	 US	bomber	 flights	 close	 to	 the	 Soviet	 border.	 In	 light	 of	 such	 actions,	 Khrushchev	insisted,	it	is	unfair	to	suggest	that	unilateral	cessation	of	nuclear	tests	is	“somehow	reduced.”	 Regarding	 Diefenbaker’s	 proposal	 for	 arctic	 inspection,	 Khrushchev	explained	that	such	actions	would	“not	even	promise	to	completely	stop	the	flights	of	bombers	with	atomic	and	hydrogen	bombs	toward	the	Soviet	Union”	since	it	only	“relates	 to	 one	 sector	 of	 the	 external	 border	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 does	 not	concern	 other	 areas	 from	 which	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 USSR	 can	 be	 made	 and	 where	American	air	bases	are	located.”92	
	 In	a	discussion	with	Soviet	Ambassador,	Dimitri	Chuvahin	immediately	after	reading	Khrushchev’s	 letter,	Diefenbaker	 “expressed	pleasure	with	 the	 tone	of	 the																																																									90	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	7.2,	Outgoing	Message	from	DEA	to	Various	Missions	
Abroad,	“Prime	Minister’s	Reply	to	Khrushchev	Letter,”	May	9,	1958.	91	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	7.2,	Telegram	from	Moscow	to	DEA,	“Talk	with	Mikoyan,”	May	19,	1958.	92	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	7.2,	Message	from	N.S.	Khrushchev,	Chairman	of	the	Council	
of	Ministers	of	the	USSR	to	the	Rt.	Hon.	John	George	Diefenbaker,	the	Prime	Minister	of	Canada,	May	30,	1958.	
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opening	 paragraphs	 and	 affirmed	 his	 belief	 in	 the	 value	 of	 a	 frank	 exchange	 of	views.”93	In	essence,	the	general	appeal	for	political	openness	is	what	characterized	Canadian-Soviet	 political	 relations	 during	 this	 period,	 although	 both	 governments	remained	skeptical	of	the	other’s	motives.	Canadian	officials,	including	Diefenbaker,	were	 hesitant	 to	 present	 ideas	 and	 suggestions	 to	 the	 USSR	 outside	 the	 NATO	framework.	The	belief	 that	outstanding	 international	 issues,	 such	as	 arms	 control,	must	be	pursued	by	a	united	Western	front	remained	at	the	core	of	Canadian	policy.	As	a	result,	bilateral	political	relations	between	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	would	remain	 limited,	 never	 going	 beyond	 a	 rather	 confined	 exchange	 of	 broad	 ideas,	couched	 within	 the	 context	 of	 Cold	 War	 alliances.	 This,	 then,	 highlights	 the	importance	 of	 other	 fields	 in	 Canadian-Soviet	 Cold	 War	 relations,	 particularly	commerce	 and	 culture.	 This	 understanding	may	 also	 help	 re-contextualize	 certain	other	 diplomatic	 episodes	 that	 have	 been	 critically	 scrutinized,	 specifically,	Diefenbaker’s	1960	United	Nations	General	Assembly	address.		
	 Diefenbaker	considered	his	 speech	 to	 the	United	Nations	on	September	26,	1960	 an	 important	 moment	 in	 Canadian	 Cold	 War	 diplomacy,	 but	 it	 was	 less	prodigious	in	its	impact	on	Canadian-Soviet	relations,	despite	one	historian’s	claim	that	the	“speech	can	be	seen	as	a	watershed	in	Canada’s	Soviet	policy	that	shattered	the	 Canadian	 strategy	 of	 accommodation.”94	Other	 scholars	 have	 focused	 on	 the	speech-writing	(or	editing)	process	that	endured	for	four	long	days	to	highlight	the	
																																																								93	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	7.2,	Memorandum	for	the	USSEA,	May	31,	1958.	94	Jamie	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queens	University	Press,	2002),	105.	
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turbulent	 relationship	 between	 the	 prime	 minister	 and	 the	 DEA.95	Consistently	underlining	 all	 perspectives	 is	 the	 undisputed	 fact	 that	 Diefenbaker’s	 speech	was	motivated	 by	 his	 desire	 to	 speak	 on	 behalf	 of	 what	 were	 deemed	 the	 “captive	nations.”	In	fact,	Robinson	states	Diefenbaker	“simply	insisted	on	our	helping	him	to	find	dramatic	language	in	which	to	attack	Khrushchev,	with	particular	reference	to	Soviet	domination	of	Ukraine	and	the	Baltic	states.	That	was	Diefenbaker’s	primary	aim.”96	
	 Diefenbaker	 used	 the	 speech	 to	 launch	 a	 Cold	 War	 rhetorical	 assault	 on	Khrushchev	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Government,	much	 like	 the	 one	 he	 accused	 the	 Soviet	leader	 of	 having	 delivered:	 “Mr.	 Khrushchev,	 in	 a	 gigantic	 propaganda	 drama	 of	destructive	misrepresentation,”	declared	Diefenbaker,	 “launched	a	major	offensive	in	the	Cold	War.”	Diefenbaker	then	continued	in	full	Cold	War	tenor:	
I	turn	now	to	a	subject	dealt	with	at	great	length	by	the	Chairman	of	the	Council	 of	 Ministers	 of	 the	 USSR,	 the	 subject	 of	 colonialism.	 […]	[Khrushchev]	 has	 spoken	 of	 colonial	 bondage,	 of	 exploitation	 and	 of	foreign	yokes.	Those	words,	uttered	by	the	master	of	the	major	colonial	power	 in	 the	world	 today	[…]	 I	pause	 to	ask	 this	question:	How	many	human	 beings	 have	 been	 liberated	 by	 the	 USSR?	 […]	 How	 are	 we	 to	reconcile	 the	 tragedy	of	 the	Hungarian	uprising	 in	1956	 […]?	What	of	Lithuania,	Estonia,	Latvia?	What	of	 the	 freedom-loving	Ukrainians	and	many	other	Eastern	European	peoples	which	I	shall	not	name	for	fear	of	omitting	 some	 of	 them?	 […]	 There	 can	 be	 no	 double	 standard	 in	international	affairs.	I	just	ask	the	Chairman	of	the	Council	of	Ministers	of	 the	USSR	to	give	to	those	nations	under	his	domination	the	right	to	
																																																								95	For	detailed	accounts	of	the	context	surrounding	Diefenbaker’s	UN	address	and	various	reactions	afterward,	see	Robinson,	Diefenbaker’s	World,	151-156;	Denis	Smith,	Rogue	Tory:	The	Life	and	Legend	
of	John	G.	Diefenbaker	(Toronto:	Macfarlane	Walter	&	Ross,	1995),	372-377;	and	Glazov,	Canadian	
Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union,	99-105.	96	Robinson,	Diefenbaker’s	World,	153.	
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free	elections—to	give	 them	 the	opportunity	 to	determine	 the	kind	of	government	they	want	under	genuinely	free	conditions.97	Western	 leaders	 heralded	 Diefenbaker’s	 speech	 a	 major	 success,	 and	congratulations	flowed	in.	American	Ambassador	to	the	UN	James	Wadsworth	called	it	 “truly	 magnificent.”	 Both	 President	 Eisenhower	 and	 British	 Prime	 Minister	Macmillan	 warmly	 approved	 Diefenbaker’s	 efforts,	 and	 “the	 whole	 episode	 gave	[him]	a	burst	of	exhilaration.”	Not	only	that,	“there	was	a	general	enthusiasm	for	the	speech	 from	 all	 parties,	 most	 daily	 newspapers,	 and	 the	 ethnic	 press.” 98	Diefenbaker’s	 biographer,	 Denis	 Smith	 explains,	 “Macmillan’s	 advisors	 told	Robinson	‘that	Diefenbaker’s	hard	line	with	the	Soviet	Union	had	made	it	easier	for	Macmillan	to	try	to	adopt	a	statesmanlike	pose	and	thus	preserve	for	himself	some	chance	of	exerting	a	mediatory	influence	on	Moscow.’”	In	the	end,	however,	it	was	to	no	 effect,	 since,	 as	 Smith	 explains,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 “had	 given	 up	 on	 negotiation	with	the	West.”	Khrushchev	was	waiting	for	the	change	of	American	leadership…”99	Similarly,	 Diefenbaker’s	 address	 did	 not	 effectively	 alter	 the	 course	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations.	 Given	 that	 Diefenbaker	 and	 Macmillan	 confronted	 the	 same	international	 context	 and	 that	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations	 were	 fundamentally	shaped	 by	 Canada’s	 position	within	NATO,	 a	 fact	 readily	 recognized	 by	 the	USSR,	Diefenbaker’s	 disparaging	 speech	was	merely	 attributed	 to	 its	 position	within	 its	alliance	 system.	While	 Khrushchev	 had	 not	 attended	Diefenbaker’s	 speech,	 Soviet	representative	Valerian	Zorin	had	and	walked	out	of	the	General	Assembly	halfway																																																									97	John	G.	Diefenbaker,	“Soviet	Colonialism”,	Address	before	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	September	26,	1960,	in	Arthur	E.	Blanchette,	ed.,	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	1955-1965:	Selected	
Speeches	and	Documents	(Ottawa:	McClelland	and	Stewart	Limited,	1977),	20-22.	98	Smith,	Rogue	Tory,	376-377.	99	Smith,	Rogue	Tory,	377.	
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through.	 Jamie	 Glazov	 explains,	 “Pravda	 claimed	 that	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 was	mouthing	 the	 ‘chimers’	of	American	bourgeois	propaganda,	while	 Izvestia	 charged	that	his	statements	were	‘slanderous’	and	‘a	cheap	masquerade.’”100	As	Collins	aptly	states,	 Diefenbaker’s	 “attack	 was	 biting,	 perhaps	 strident,	 but	 represented	 no	departure	 from	 well-established	 themes	 in	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations.”101 	While	dramatic,	 the	 speech	 was	 not	 nearly	 as	 pivotal	 as	 has	 been	 suggested	 by	 both	historians	and	Diefenbaker.	
	 CONCLUSION		 Until	 Stalin’s	 death	 in	 1953,	 Canadian	 officials	 generally	 viewed	 the	 Soviet	Union	as	 a	hostile	 entity,	worthy	of	 skepticism.	The	 changing	of	 the	Kremlin’s	 old	guard,	 however,	 ushered	 in	 a	 new	 era	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations	 and,	subsequently,	 Canadian-Eastern	 European	 relations,	 as	 the	 USSR	 reduced	 its	hegemonic	 dominance	 over	 the	 region.	 Political	 developments	 east	 of	 the	 Iron	Curtain,	 then,	 significantly	 shaped	 the	 international	 context	 of	 Canadian	 foreign	policy	 and	 caused	 the	 Canadian	 government	 to	 reevaluate	 its	 relations	 with	 the	Soviet	Union.	The	 increased	autonomy	acquired	by	a	number	of	Eastern	European	states	 placed	 these	 nations	 on	 the	 foreign	 policy	 agenda	 of	 Canadian	 officials	 and	soon	 began	 to	 impact	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations,	 adding	 new	 dimensions	 and	complexities	to	potential	policy	directions.	
	 Additionally,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 increasingly	 paid	 attention	 to	 the	Soviet	Union’s	non-military	Cold	War	endeavors,	particularly	what	was	deemed	the																																																									100	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union,	102.		101	Collins,	“Canadian-Soviet	Relations	During	the	Cold	War,”	57.	
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USSR’s	economic	offensive.	Fear	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	non-military	capabilities	dates	to	the	late	1940s,	as	was	seen	with	the	Canadian	government’s	desire	to	incorporate	Article	2	into	the	NATO	treaty.	Yet	Khrushchev’s	slow	liberalization	process,	as	well	as	his	emphasis	on	“peaceful	co-existence,”	meant	that	the	Soviet	economic	offensive	was	at	 least	perceived	as	 less	 threatening	 than	 the	policies	of	 the	Stalinist	 regime.	Certainly,	 Khrushchev’s	 strategic	 motivations	 and	 intentions	 were	 not	 entirely	trusted,	 but	 the	 reality	 of	 nuclear	 stalemate	 led	 Canadian	 officials	 to	 believe	 the	Soviet	Union	would	pursue	global	communist	domination	not	by	force,	but	by	other	means.	 By	 cultivating	 closer	 bilateral	 relations	with	 Eastern	 European	 nations,	 as	well	 as	 with	 the	 USSR	 itself,	 Canadian	 officials	 thought	 they	 could	 disrupt	 Soviet	hegemony	in	the	region	and	ultimately	contribute	to	the	West’s	fight	to	contain,	and	even	 combat,	 Soviet	 communism.	 Moreover,	 this	 policy	 approach	 reflected	 a	developing	awareness	amongst	Canadian	officials	that	it	might	be	possible	to	carve	out	a	niche	for	a	middle	power	to	effectively	fight	communism	from	behind	the	Iron	Curtain.
	 83	
Chapter	2		
Foundations	of	International	Friendship:	Commercial	Relations	and	Cultural	
	 Exchanges	between	Canada	and	the	USSR	
		 An	 early	 sign	 that	 the	 USSR	 took	 Canada	 seriously	 as	 a	 player	 on	 the	international	 scene	 was	 the	 appointment	 of	 Dr.	 A.	 A.	 Aroutunian	 as	 Soviet	ambassador	 to	 Canada	 in	 late	 1958,	 replacing	 Dimitri	 Chuvahin.	 According	 to	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	 State	 for	External	Affairs,	 John	Watkins,	 “the	 request	for	the	appointment	of	[Aroutunian]	as	Ambassador	[…]	can	only	be	interpreted	as	Soviet	recognition	of	the	growing	importance	of	Canada	in	international	affairs	and	particularly,	perhaps,	in	the	economic	field.”	Watkins’	opinion	about	Aroutunian	was	confirmed	 by	 Canada’s	 ambassador	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 David	 M.	 Johnson	 who	stated,	“he	indulged	in	less	propaganda	than	most	other	Soviet	diplomats.”		Johnson	explained	that	most	Western	colleagues	shared	his	high	opinion	of	Aroutunian.1	
	 By	profession,	Aroutunian	was	an	economist	and	lawyer	who	worked	in	the	Economics	Department	of	 the	Foreign	Ministry	before	being	promoted	 to	Head	of	the	First	European	Department.	 Fluent	 in	both	English	and	French	 (in	 addition	 to	Russian	 and	 Armenian,	 his	 native	 republic),	 Aroutunian	 was	 described	 as	 an	amicable	 civil	 servant	with	 a	 sharp	mind.	Watkins	 ended	 his	memo	 by	 asserting,	“that	 in	 sending	 to	Canada	one	of	 its	most	brilliant	 and	personable	diplomats,	 the	Soviet	 Government	 sincerely	 wishes	 to	 improve	 relations,	 increase	 cultural	
																																																								1	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	No.	2462-40	part	8,	Despatch	for	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Aroutunian	–	The	New	Soviet	Ambassador	to	Canada,”	January	5,	1959.	
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exchanges,	and	expand	trade.”2	Watkins	proved	correct.	In	his	conversation	with	the	Head	 of	 the	 DEA’s	 European	 Division,	 Henry	 Davis,	 Aroutunian	 explained	 that	 he	considered	good	trade	relations	and	cultural	exchanges	two	important	foundations	for	 international	 friendship.	The	development	of	 these	 two	crucial	 cornerstones	 is	the	subject	of	this	chapter.	By	pursuing	commercial	and	cultural	relations	with	the	USSR,	 the	Diefenbaker	administration	 continued	 forth	 in	 the	direction	pursued	by	the	 previous	 Liberal	 government.	While	 Canadian	 and	 American	 policy	 regarding	cultural	 relations	 was	 closely	 aligned,	 reflecting	 consistency	 within	 the	 Western	alliance,	it	was	American	commercial	policy	that	led	Canada	to	pragmatically	search	for	 new	 markets	 behind	 the	 Iron	 Curtain.	 This	 shows	 how	 at	 times	 Canadian	interests	diverged	from	the	American	government.	This	chapter	also	highlights	the	dualistic	nature	of	Canada’s	Soviet	policy,	and	how	the	USSR	was	viewed	both	as	a	Cold	War	competitor	and	an	expedient	customer.	
	 AMERICA’S	PL	480	PROGRAM		 Room	 for	 political	 maneuver	 between	 the	 two	 nations	 was	 limited	 by	Canada’s	 firm	 position	within	 the	 NATO	 alliance.	 Additionally,	 the	 strategic	 stasis	that	 had	 developed	 between	 the	 superpowers	 affected	 Canada’s	 approach	 to	 the	Soviet	Union,	leading	it	to	engage	in	the	Cold	War	by	other	means.	The	general	Cold	War	 order	 that	 governed	 global	 politics	 should	 not	 be	 overstated,	 however,	 since	other	 factors	 also	 impacted	 the	 Canadian-Soviet	 relationship.	 Remarkably,	 the	effects	 of	 America’s	 Agricultural	 Trade	 Development	 and	 Assistance	 Act	 of	 1954,	
																																																								2	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3247,	File	No.	5926-40,	Memorandum	for	Mr.	Feaver,	“Appointment	of	Soviet	Ambassador	to	Canada,”	October	9,	1958.	
	 85	
commonly	referred	to	as	PL	480	or	Food	for	Peace,	is	largely	absent	from	the	history	of	Canada’s	Soviet	Policy.	Arguably,	aggressive	giveaways	by	the	United	States	under	PL	480	provoked	Canada	to	pursue	wheat	sales	behind	the	Iron	Curtain.	William	E.	Morriss’	 work,	 Chosen	 Instrument:	 A	 History	 of	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	 Board:	 the	
McIvor	 Years,	 is	 an	 important	 analysis	 that	 helps	 contextualize	 Canada’s	 broader	agricultural	policies	and	provides	a	crucial	 framework	 for	understanding	Canada’s	economic	policy	toward	Communist	Europe	specifically.	3	
	 As	 Morriss	 explains,	 PL	 480	 was	 the	 most	 pervasive	 of	 the	 programs	instituted	 by	 the	 Americans	 to	 dispose	 of	 surplus	 agricultural	 products.	 “The	Americans,”	asserts	Morriss,	 “were	about	to	turn	the	whole	pattern	of	world	grain	trade	around	and	assume	a	dominant	position	from	which	they	would	not	retreat.”4	The	Canadian	Wheat	Board’s	 1954-1955	annual	 report	 stated,	 “‘[t]he	 effect	 of	 the	United	 States’	 disposal	 program	 […]	 was	 to	 considerably	 narrow	 the	 range	 of	markets	 for	 Canadian	 wheat	 and	 to	 substantially	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 our	 wheat	exports.’”	 In	 mid-1956,	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	 Board’s	 chief	 commissioner,	 George	McIver,	 wrote	 to	 Marvin	 McLain,	 undersecretary	 of	 agriculture	 in	 Washington,	outlining	the	extent	of	the	incursion	by	the	Americans	into	Canadian	markets:		
We	have	recently	examined	our	position	 in	 fourteen	countries	which	have	been	in	receipt	of	wheat	under	your	disposal	program.	In	these	countries	 our	 exports	 so	 far	 recorded	 in	 our	 crop	 year	 were	 at	 the	level	of	31	per	cent	of	our	exports	to	the	same	countries	 in	1953-54,																																																									3	William	E.	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument:	A	History	of	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board:	the	McIvor	Years	(The	Canadian	Wheat	Board,	1987).	This	is	a	remarkable	book	that	details	the	first	twenty-five	years	of	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board	(1935-1960)	during	which	time	it	grew	from	a	temporary	instrument	of	income	stability	in	a	critical	period	of	economic	distress	and	environmental	disaster	in	Western	Canada	to	a	major	competitive	force	in	the	world	grain	trade.	4	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	218.	
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while	the	United	States	has	increased	its	exports	to	258.4	per	cent	of	the	1953-54	level.	This	is	the	sort	of	thing	that	continues	to	disturb	us,	especially	when	we	can	and	are	maintaining	our	position	 in	markets	where	ordinary	competitive	conditions	prevail.5	The	 American	 concessional	 sales	 program	 was	 seriously	 jeopardizing	 Canadian	wheat	 exports;	 it	 appears	 the	 Soviet	 economic	 offensive	 was	 not	 the	 only	commercial	threat	to	Canada.	PL	480	caused	a	major	backlog	of	Canadian	grain,	as	silos	began	to	bulge.	The	mood	in	Western	Canada	was	unsettled	by	tensions	over	international	 trade	 in	 wheat	 and	 the	 subsequent	 backlog	 of	 wheat;	 Canada	 was	compelled	to	find	other	markets.	Historian	Michael	Hart	explains	that	by	1962	“the	world’s	grain	trade	had	clearly	fallen	into	a	pattern	of	commercial,	concessional,	and	communist	 sales.	 The	 International	Wheat	 Agreement	 (IWA)	 covered	 commercial	sales;	 US	 PL	 480	 covered	 concessional	 sales;	 and	 the	 Canadian	Wheat	Board6	had	become	 the	main	 player	 in	 sales	 to	 communist	markets.”7	Yet,	 wheat	 agreements	between	Canada	and	Communist	Europe	actually	originated	almost	a	decade	earlier.		
	 	As	 early	 as	 1952,	 Canadian	 officials	 had	 made	 tentative	 forays	 with	European	 communist	 countries,	 with	modest	 success	 selling	wheat	 and	 barley	 to	
																																																								5	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	219.		6	The	Canadian	Wheat	Board	was	formed	in	1935,	during	the	Great	Depression,	as	a	means	of	stabilizing	farm	incomes.	One	of	its	main	efforts	was	to	negotiate	bilateral	and	multilateral	wheat	agreements.	While	World	War	II	helped	stabilize	many	sectors	of	the	economy,	wheat	prices	remained	low,	so	in	1943	the	government	stepped	in	to	use	its	emergency	powers	to	suspend	trade	in	wheat	and	add	to	the	powers	of	the	Wheat	Board,	making	it	the	exclusive	marketing	agent	for	the	wheat	farmer.	The	Wheat	Board	announced	the	prices	it	would	pay,	bought	the	grain,	stored	it,	and	marketed	it	abroad.	Once	established,	these	powers	remained	the	core	of	government	policy	through	the	1990s.	By	the	second	half	of	the	1950s,	the	Wheat	Board	exercised	not	only	control	over	trade	in	wheat,	oats,	and	barley,	but	also	over	any	product	containing	more	than	25	percent	of	these	grains	by	weight.	In	1957	and	1958,	importers	needed	licenses	and	Board	permission	to	import	a	wide	range	of	products,	including	pastas,	cake	mixes,	and	animal	feed.	Michael	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation:	Canadian	
Trade	Policy	from	Colonization	to	Globalization	(Vancouver	&	Toronto:	UBC	Press,	2002),	189	–	191.	7	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation,	231.	
	 87	
Poland,	Czechoslovakia,	Yugoslavia,	and	Hungary,	often	on	credit	terms.8	The	sale	of	wheat	 to	 the	Soviet	Union	and	Eastern	Europe	became	possible	only	after	 Stalin’s	death,	since	he	would	have	preferred	to	starve	millions	of	people,	as	he	did	in	1932	and	 1947,	 instead	 of	 purchasing	 foreign	 wheat.	 Spending	 hard	 currency	 to	 avert	famine	was	a	significant	shift	in	Soviet	political	culture.	As	discussed	in	chapter	one,	a	real	breakthrough	in	Canadian-Soviet	relations	occurred	in	1955,	when	Secretary	of	 State	 for	External	Affairs	 Lester	Pearson	visited	 the	 Soviet	Union.	Although	 the	prospect	of	improved	trade	was	of	secondary	importance	to	this	diplomatic	mission,	as	George	Ignatieff,	a	DEA	official	at	the	time,	suggested,9	the	visit	nonetheless	set	in	motion	“a	pattern	for	negotiation	with	other	state-trading	nations,	notably	those	of	Eastern	Europe.”10	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union	reached	a	bilateral	trade	agreement	that	 extended	 most	 favoured	 nation	 (MFN)	 status	 to	 the	 USSR.	 On	 February	 29,	1956,	Soviet	Deputy	Minister	of	Foreign	Trade	S.	A.	Borisov	exchanged	letters	with	Pearson,	 covering	 the	purchase	 of	wheat.	 It	was	 announced	 that	 the	 Soviet	Union	agreed	to	purchase	1.2	million	to	1.5	million	tonnes	of	wheat	within	the	next	three	years,	 in	 annual	 amounts	 ranging	 from	 four	 to	 five	 hundred	 thousand	 tonnes.	Essentially,	 the	 agreement	 linked	 the	 granting	 of	 MFN	 tariff	 treatment	 to	 Soviet	goods	 entering	 Canada	 with	 Soviet	 commitments	 to	 purchase	 Canadian	 wheat.11																																																									8	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation,	229.	9	See	chapter	one,	page	49.	10	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	235.	11	Soviet	state	trading	procedures	(by	which	imports	are	determined	centrally	according	to	plan	targets	specified	in	physical	terms,	rather	than	through	market-price	mechanisms)	limited	the	significance	of	Soviet	preferential	treatment	extended	in	reciprocity	for	Canadian	MFN	privileges.	In	these	circumstances,	Soviet	requirements	for	Canadian	grains	provided	mutually	advantageous	quid	
pro	quo	for	MFN	treatment.		Carl	H.	McMillan,	“Canada’s	Postwar	Economics	Relations	with	the	USSR-An	Appraisal,”	in	Aloysius	Balawyder,	ed.	Canadian-Soviet	Relations,	1939-1980	(Oakville:	Mosaic	Press,	1981),	132.	
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This	proved	to	be	an	important	moment	in	Canadian-Soviet	commercial,	and	for	that	matter	political,	relations.		
	 The	adverse	 effects	of	America’s	wheat	disposal	program	continued	during	the	Diefenbaker	government.	As	did	the	notion	that	commercial	sales	to	Communist	countries	could	very	well	provide	fortuitous	political	returns.	In	July	1958,	Finance	Minister	Donald	Fleming	forwarded	to	Diefenbaker	a	memorandum	prepared	by	his	department	on	the	subject	of	 the	American	surplus	disposal	policies.	The	ominous	undertones	confronted	by	the	previous	Liberal	government	were	echoed:		
	Exports	 of	wheat	 from	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 1956-57	 crop	 year	were	 the	highest	on	record	and	accounted	 for	43	per	cent	of	world	export	trade	in	wheat.	Disposals	under	US	government	programmes	were	29	per	cent	of	world	exports.	Despite	this	achievement,	North	American	stocks	of	wheat	increased	because	of	a	decline	in	Canadian	exports	 and	 an	 increase	 in	 Canadian	 carryover.	 The	 conclusion	 is	inescapable	that	the	US	record	was	reached	partly	at	the	expense	of	the	Canadian	wheat	grower.12	No	 ideological	 lens	 was	 applied	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 America’s	 PL	 480	 program	 on	Canadian	sales,	otherwise	the	term	“American	economic	offensive”	might	have	been	fitting.	 Not	 only	 did	 America’s	 aggressive	 tactics	 push	 Canada	 to	 seek	 markets	behind	the	Iron	Curtain,	they	highlight,	from	an	historical	perspective,	that	cold	hard	economic	 and	 political	 gains	 were	 at	 times	 pursued	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 Cold	 War	alliance	commitments.	
	 RENEWING	THE	1956	CANADIAN-SOVIET	TRADE	AGREEMENT		 Four	 months	 following	 Fleming’s	 memorandum,	 Cabinet	 discussed	 the	renewal	of	 the	Canada-USSR	 trade	agreement	of	1956.	A	 joint	memorandum	 from																																																									12	DCER,	Vol.	25.	171.	Minister	of	Finance	to	Prime	Minister,	“Disposal	of	United	States	Agricultural	Surpluses”,	Ottawa,	July	21,	1958.	J.G.D./VI/729.3,	Vol.	486.	
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the	Minsters	 of	Trade	 and	Commerce	 and	External	Affairs	 asserted	 that	 renewing	the	trade	agreement	would	be	beneficial	for	a	number	of	reasons.	From	a	domestic	agriculture	 point	 of	 view,	 a	 renewed	 agreement	 would	 be	 of	 “considerable	importance	to	Canada	and	to	Western	wheat	producers.”	Significantly,	the	ministers	also	highlighted	the	political	benefits:	
A	continuation	of	the	Agreement	would	appear	desirable	also	from	the	political	 point	 of	 view.	 Political	 considerations	 played	 an	 important	part	 for	 both	 sides	 when	 the	 present	 agreement	 was	 negotiated	 in	1956.	 It	 was	 the	 view	 of	 the	 Canadian	 Government	 that	 a	 trade	agreement	could	help	to	establish	mutual	trust	and	reduce	suspicion.	Trade	 agreements	 provide	 one	 of	 the	 few	 points	 of	 mutually	advantageous	 contact	 between	 East	 and	 West,	 and	 may	 help	 to	influence	 the	 Soviet	 leaders	 away	 from	 their	 isolationist	 approach.	Renewal	of	 the	Canada-USSR	Agreement	would	not	be	without	value	in	 this	 direction.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 its	 expiration	 would	 be	 more	consequential	and	might	well	be	interpreted	as	a	deterioration	in	our	political	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union.13	The	 fact	 that	 the	 Canadian	 government	 viewed	 such	 agreements	 as	 a	 means	 to	establish	 mutual	 trust	 and	 simultaneously	 reduce	 suspicion,	 as	 well	 as	 Soviet	isolationism,	 was	 foundational	 to	 Canada’s	 policy	 toward	 Communist	 Eastern	Europe.	 In	essence,	 these	beliefs	drove	the	government’s	policy	direction.	Concern	that	 Soviet	 officials	 would	 interpret	 the	 agreement’s	 expiration	 to	 be	 a	 sign	 of	deteriorating	 relations	 is	 further	 evidence	 that	 political	 considerations	 influenced	commercial	 relations	with	 the	 Soviet	Union.	Good	 relations	with	 the	 Soviets	were	important	 to	 Canadian	 officials	 because	 a	 sound	 relationship	 created	 opportunity	for	 Canada	 to	 exercise	 some	 middle	 power	 influence	 through	 East-West	 bridge-building.																																																									13	DCER,	Vol.	25.	521.	Memorandum	from	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	and	Acting	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs	to	Cabinet,	“Canada-USSR	Trade	Agreement”,	Ottawa,	November	18,	1958.	Cabinet	Document	No.	321-58.	
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	 Ultimately,	 Canadian-Soviet	 commercial	 relations	 between	 1957	 and	 1962	remained	 relatively	 small.	 While	 Canadian	 policy	 towards	 Communist	 Europe	during	 this	 same	period	may	be	described	as	decisive	 in	 relation	 to	 foreign	policy	generally,	this	observation	applies	less	to	Canada’s	commercial	exports	to	the	USSR.	Instead,	Canadian-Soviet	commercial	relations	during	this	period	can	be	seen	more	as	a	means	to	improve	political	relations.	Negotiations	still	continued	with	the	1956	Canada-Soviet	 trade	 agreement	 renewed	 in	1960,	 but	 exports	 to	 the	 Soviet	Union	were	minimal	at	best	and	virtually	non-existent	in	1960	and	1962.14	Regardless,	the	fact	remains	that	the	two	nations	continued	negotiating	and,	as	a	result,	sustained	a	commercial	dialogue	important	to	the	overall	Canadian-Soviet	relationship.		 A	BALANCING	ACT		 Viewed	 from	 the	Soviet	perspective,	 a	 renewal	of	 the	 trade	agreement	was	not	 to	be	 taken	 for	 granted.	One	of	 the	underlying	 issues	 complicating	 a	 renewed	agreement	 was	 that	 the	 Soviets	 were	 unhappy	 with	 the	 large	 trade	 imbalance	between	 the	 two	 countries.	 The	 ongoing	 negotiations	 were	 indicative	 of	 the	differences	between	the	Soviet	state-trading	system	and	Canada’s	market	capitalist	system.	Because	 the	Soviet	government	directly	controlled	 imports	and	exports,	 it	was	able	to	enter	into	agreements	that	committed	to	specific	amounts	of	imports.	In	return,	 the	 Soviets	 sought	 a	 more	 firm	 commitment	 regarding	 the	 amount	 of	
																																																								14	Ian	M.	Drummond,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition	from	the	Revolution	to	1986.”	In	David	Davies,	ed.	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Experiment:	Essays	on	Canadian	Encounters	with	Russia	and	
the	Soviet	Union,	1900	–	1991	(Toronto	&	Waterloo:	Centre	for	Russian	and	East	European	Studies	&	Centre	of	Foreign	Policy	and	Federalism,	1994),	142;	R.V.N.	Gordon,	Commercial	Counsellor,	Moscow,	“USSR	–	Progress	and	Prospects,”	Foreign	Trade,	Vol.	119,	No.	10,	18	May	1963.	
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Canadian	 imports	 from	 the	 Soviet	 market.15	Given	 the	 Western	 capitalist	 system,	this	 was	 not	 feasible.	 Although	 Canadian	 officials	 knew	 the	 Soviets	 were	 uneasy	about	 the	 trade	 imbalance	 and	 wanted	 this	 addressed,	 initially	 the	 Canadian	position	was	 firm.	 An	Aide	Mémoire	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Embassy	 reassured	 the	 Soviets	that	the	agreement	was	seen	as	important	and	stressed	the	desire	“to	encourage	the	further	development	of	mutually	advantageous	trade	relations	between	Canada	and	the	USSR”	But,	the	Canadians	maintained	that	they			 	 have	noted,	however,	 that	 [a	previous]	 Soviet	Aide	Mémoire	makes	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 exchange	 of	 letters	 of	 the	 present	agreement	 under	 which	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 undertook	 to	 purchase	annually	specified	minimum	quantities	of	Canadian	wheat.		 		 	 In	 the	Canadian	view	this	undertaking	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	present	 trade	 arrangements	 and	 the	 Canadian	 Government	 attaches	particular	importance	to	the	inclusion	of	similar	Soviet	commitments	in	any	renewal	or	extension	of	the	present	Agreement.16		Simply	 put,	 Canada	wanted	 a	 Soviet	 commitment	 to	 purchase	wheat	 in	 quantities	similar	 to	 those	 under	 the	 1956	 agreement,	 and	 it	was	willing	 to	 push	 the	 Soviet	Union	to	obtain	such	a	commitment.	
	 To	potentially	allay	Soviet	apprehensions	about	the	trade	imbalance,	USSEA	Norman	 Robertson	 recommended	 that,	 if	 the	 Soviets	 undertook	 good	 purchase	obligations,	 Canadian	 officials	 could	 indicate	 certain	 steps	would	 be	 taken	 by	 the	government	 to	 encourage	 sales	 to	 Canada.	 Specifically,	 Robertson	 recommended	that	Canada	issue	a	government	statement	 in	support	of	expanded	two-way	trade;	officially	 support	 a	 trade	 mission	 to	 the	 USSR,	 in	 which	 the	 government	 would																																																									15	DCER,	Vol.	25.	521.	Memorandum	from	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	and	Acting	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs	to	Cabinet,	“Trade	Agreement”,	Ottawa,	November	8,	1958.	Cabinet	Document	No.	321-58.	16	DCER,	Vol.	25.	523.	Deputy	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	to	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce,	“Proposed	Reply	to	Soviet	Aide	Mémoire”,	Ottawa,	December	9,	1958.	DEA/6226-A-40.	
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participate;	and	promise	the	assistance	of	the	Canadian	trade	commissioner	service	in	 seeking	 out	 markets,	 in	 Canada,	 for	 Soviet	 products.17	These	 were	 so-called	“presidential”	promotions.	
	 Prime	 Minister	 Diefenbaker	 also	 supported	 renegotiation	 and	 encouraged	Canadian-Soviet	 trade.	 In	 discussion	 with	 Soviet	 Ambassador	 Aroutunian,	Diefenbaker	expressed	his	understanding	that	the	USSR	wished	to	increase	two-way	trade.	 He	 explained	 to	 Aroutunian	 that	 the	 Alberts	 Group	 –	 a	 select	 group	 of	prominent	 Canadian	 businessmen	 who	 represented	 the	 directorates	 of	 160	Canadian	companies	–	had	recently	visited	 the	Soviet	Union	and	were	“very	much	impressed	 by	many	 aspects	 of	 Soviet	 society.”18	This	was	 indeed	 true.	 In	 fact,	 not	long	before	meeting	with	Aroutunian,	Diefenbaker	was	debriefed	by	the	group.	The	men	were	sincerely	enthralled	with	certain	qualities	of	the	Soviet	Union,	 including	advances	in	its	steel	industry,	electrical	engineering,	and	research	and	development.	Beyond	 industry,	 the	 Canadian	 businessmen	 also	 positively	 noted	 “the	 brightness	and	 intelligence	of	Soviet	children.”	Still,	 some	members	of	 the	group	warned	that	the	 “Soviet	 authorities	 are	 gathering	 information	 about	 the	 economy	 of	 the	 free	world	 and	 are	 entering	 into	 an	 economic	 war	 with	 an	 integrated	 programme.”	Overall,	 however,	 the	 group	 maintained	 that	 Canadians	 had	 much	 to	 learn	 from	their	 Soviet	 counterparts	 and,	 in	 fact,	 had	 a	 duty	 to	 learn	 from	Soviet	 advances	 if	Canada	 was	 to	 stand	 a	 chance	 in	 ongoing	 commercial	 competition.	 They	 also	
																																																								17	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	No.	2462-40	part	8,	Memorandum	for	the	Minister,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	Negotiations,”	January	26,	1959.	18	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	No.	2462-40	part	8,	Memorandum	for	the	Minister	from	H.B.	Robinson,	“Prime	Minister’s	conversation	with	Soviet	Ambassador,	February	4,”	February	4,	1959.	
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maintained	that	the	Russian	people	appeared	not	to	harbour	any	animosity	towards	Canada;	 yet,	 it	 appeared	 that	 many	 Canadians	 held	 negative	 perceptions	 of	 the	Soviet	 Union.	 According	 to	 one	 group	member,	 this	was	 because	 “most	 people	 in	Canada	relied	on	newspapers	for	information.”	Regardless,	Diefenbaker	encouraged	the	group	to	express	their	ideas	to	various	circles,	expecting	that	“the	presentation	of	their	views	to	the	public	would	stimulate	profitable	discussion.”19	
	 In	 addition	 to	 informing	 Aroutunian	 about	 the	 Alberts	 group,	 Diefenbaker	indicated	that	Canada	was	prepared	to	appoint	a	trade	commissioner	to	Moscow.20	Clearly,	Diefenbaker	tried	to	 impress	upon	Aroutunian	the	Canadian	government’s	desire	and	willingness	 to	expand	 trade	with	 the	Soviet	Union,	or	at	 the	very	 least,	export	its	surplus	grain.		
	 Despite	Canadian	officials’	assurance	 that	 steps	would	be	 taken	 to	promote	Soviet	imports	to	Canada	in	a	“presidential	manner,”	Soviet	officials	were	not	willing	to	 continue	 the	 obligation	 to	 purchase	 a	 minimum	 quantity	 of	 Canadian	 wheat	annually.21	By	 mid-1959,	 negotiations	 seemed	 at	 a	 stalemate.	 Finally,	 in	 October,	following	a	visit	to	Canada	by	five	Supreme	Soviet	deputies	–	including	Mr.	Kobanov,	a	former	Soviet	Minister	of	Foreign	Trade	–	discussions	resumed.	This	time,	it	was	the	Soviets	who	were	firm.	The	Soviet	counterproposal	called	on	Canadian	officials	to	do	everything	 in	 their	power	 to	ensure	 the	value	of	Canadian	 imports	 from	the	
																																																								19	Diefenbaker	Canada	Centre	(hereafter	DCC),	File	MG1/XII/A/6,	“Prime	Minister’s	Meetings	with	the	Alberts	Group,”	n.d.	1958.	Microfilm,	000144	–	000147.	20	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	No.	2462-40	part	8,	Memorandum	for	the	Minister	from	H.B.	Robinson,	“Prime	Minister’s	conversation	with	Soviet	Ambassador,	February	4,”	February	4,	1959.	21	LAC,	RG2	B2,	Vol.	2742,	File	No.	C-20-5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet	from	the	Minister	of	Trade	and	
Commerce,	“Canada-USSR	Trade	Agreement,”	July	15,	1959.	Cabinet	Document	214-59.	
	 94	
USSR	 would	 annually	 amount	 to	 no	 less	 fifty	 percent	 of	 Soviet	 purchases.	 If	Canadian	imports	fell	below	this	level,	the	Soviet	undertaking	to	purchase	Canadian	goods	would	be	proportionally	reduced.22	This	became	known	as	the	1:2	ratio.	
	 The	 reason	 the	 Soviets	were	 less	 eager	 to	 commit	 to	 purchasing	 Canadian	wheat	had	little	to	do	with	the	political	and	commercial	dynamics	between	the	two	countries.	Instead,	the	explanation	for	Soviet	reticence	relates	to	the	notion	of	self-sufficiency	 embedded	 within	 Soviet	 policy.	 Spearheaded	 by	 Premier	 Nikita	Khrushchev,	 in	 1953	 the	 Soviets	 embarked	 on	 the	 “Virgin	 Lands”	 campaign.	 This	was	 an	 audacious	 attempt	 to	 open	 Kazakhstan	 to	 the	 plow,	 which	 would,	 it	 was	hoped,	 alleviate	 the	USSR’s	 food	 shortages	and	once	again	 turn	 the	nation	 into	an	exporter	of	wheat.23	The	success	of	the	campaign	was	sporadic.	1958	and	1959	were	particularly	 good	 years, 24 	and	 happened	 to	 coincide	 with	 Canadian-Soviet	renegotiations.	It	is	likely	that	the	success	of	the	Virgin	Lands	campaign	had	a	direct	impact	 on	 the	 renegotiations	 during	 this	 time.	 Productivity	 steadily	 decreased	following	 the	1959	harvest.25	Productivity	would	never	match	a	1956	 record.26	By	1963,	 the	Canadian	government	would	 reap	 the	benefits	 of	 the	 ailing	 campaign,	 a	development	discussed	below.	
																																																								22	LAC,	RG2	B2,	Vol.	2743,	File	No.	C-20-5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Canada-USSR	Trade	Agreement,”	October	2,	1959.	Cabinet	Document	346-59.	23	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	235;	William	Taubman,	Khrushchev:	The	Man	and	His	Era	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2003),	260–262.	24	Frank	A.	Durgin,	“The	Virgin	Lands	Programme,	1954-60,”	Soviet	Studies,	Vol.	13,	No.	3	(Jan.,	1962),	265-70.	25	Taubman,	Khrushchev,	516.	26	Interestingly,	1956	was	the	most	successful	year	of	the	Virgin	Lands	campaign,	which	was	also	the	year	the	first	Canadian-Soviet	Trade	agreement	was	reached.	1955,	however,	saw	severe	drought	in	the	region	and	the	crop	yield	was	poor.	
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	 Nevertheless,	 negotiations	 continued	 and	 while	 discussions	 were	 cordial,	both	sides	were	unwilling	 to	stray	 from	their	 firm	policy	position.	To	recapitulate,	the	 Soviets	 had	 taken	 the	 stance	 that	 the	 purchase	 obligation	was	 one-sided	 and	could	not	be	repeated.	On	the	Canadian	side,	 the	government	maintained	 it	would	not	undertake	a	purchase	commitment;	since	Soviet	MFN	treatment	had	little	or	no	value,	a	necessary	equivalent	for	the	extension	of	MFN	treatment	by	Canada	was	a	purchase	commitment	on	the	Soviet	side.	In	response,	the	Soviet	government	issued	the	1:2	ratio	proposal.	This	proposal	did	not	 involve	a	purchase	obligation	 for	 the	Canadians	but	 did	maintain	 one	 for	 the	 Soviets.	 The	main	difference	was	 that	 the	obligation	 would	 be	 proportional	 (or	 double)	 that	 of	 Canadian	 imports	 from	 the	Soviet	Union.	 Still	unhappy	with	 the	Soviet	 counterproposal,	Canadian	negotiators	countered	 once	 more.	 Again,	 they	 attempted	 to	 obtain	 an	 unqualified	 Soviet	purchase	 commitment	 by	 setting	 out	 in	 greater	 detail	 the	 kind	 of	 “presidential	assistance”	Canada	might	be	able	to	give	to	the	efforts	of	Soviet	export	agencies	to	increase	their	sales	in	Canada.	Soviet	officials	rejected	this	offer.27		
	 Canadian	 officials	 did	 not	 want	 to	 lose	 the	 Russians	 as	 an	 importer	 of	Canadian	 goods.	 A	 memorandum	 to	 Cabinet	 from	 the	 SSEA,	 supported	 by	 the	Ministers	of	Finance	and	Trade	and	Commerce,	noted	how	“the	USSR	is	beginning	to	play	a	much	more	active	part	in	world	trade,	both	as	an	exporter	and	an	importer,	and	many	of	our	most	 important	 trading	partners	(including	the	United	Kingdom)	have	already	tried	to	ensure	themselves	a	share	of	growing	Soviet	trade	by	signing	
																																																								27	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	5937,	File	No.	C-20-5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Canada-USSR	Trade	Agreement,”	January	7,	1960.	Cabinet	Document	14-60.	
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trade	agreements	with	the	Soviet	Government.”28	Put	differently,	Canada	should	do	what	 it	 can	 to	ensure	a	 renegotiation	of	 the	 trade	agreement	 in	order	 to	keep	 the	Canadian	fork	in	the	Soviet	pie	for	potential	future	indulgence.	
	 Negotiations	 did	 continue,	 and	 an	 agreement	 was	 eventually	 reached.	Essentially,	the	new	Canadian-Soviet	trade	agreement	was	a	modified	version	of	the	1956	 agreement,	with	 the	 1:2	 ratio	 at	 its	 core.	 The	 Soviets	 agreed	 to	 import	 $24	million	 worth	 of	 Canadian	 goods,	 and	 in	 exchange	 Canada	 agreed	 to	 import	 $12	million	worth	of	goods	from	the	USSR.	In	addition,	the	Canadian	government	would	take	 necessary	 steps	 to	 encourage	 and	 assist	 Soviet	 exporters	 to	 find	 Canadian	markets.	 The	 agreement	 was	 far	 from	 spectacular.	 In	 fact,	 from	 the	 Canadian	vantage,	 it	 must	 have	 been	 disappointing,	 especially	 in	 the	 face	 of	 continuous	pressures	from	the	United	States’	PL	480	program,	which	showed	no	sign	of	abating.	The	Canadian	government,	however,	would	have	to	wait	a	further	three	years	before	a	new	agreement	could	be	negotiated	with	the	Russians.	
	 Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce,	Gordon	Churchill	went	to	Moscow	to	sign	the	Protocol	agreement.	Before	he	left	Canada,	Churchill	was	rather	skeptical	of	the	Soviet	 Union	 and	 viewed	 it	 through	 a	 darkly	 tinted	 ideological	 lens.	 His	 visit,	however,	had	a	profound	impact	on	his	perception	of	 the	Communist	superpower.	Upon	 his	 return	 to	 Canada,	 he	 wrote	 Diefenbaker	 a	 letter	 detailing	 his	 “revised	opinion	 of	 the	 Russian	 leaders.”	 Personal	 contact	with	 Soviet	 leaders	 Frol	 Kozlov	and	 Anastas	 Mikoyan,	 Canadian	 Ambassador	 David	 Johnson,	 and	 the	 Indian	 and																																																									28	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	5937,	File	No.	C-20-5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Canada-USSR	Trade	Agreement,”	January	7,	1960.	Cabinet	Document	14-60.	
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French	Ambassadors	shaped	Churchill’s	new	attitude.	He	came	away	convinced	the	USSR	genuinely	sought	peace	and	friendly	relations	and	was	further	impressed	with	Mikoyan’s	honest	acknowledgement	 that	he	 “did	not	expect	 [the	USSR]	 to	become	self-sufficient,”	which	explained	the	desire	to	develop	trade.		
	 Churchill	said	that	he	doubted	“very	much	many	of	the	stories	we	have	read	about	Russia,”	and	he	believed	the	Indian	ambassador’s	hypothesis	that	the	“West	is	still	thinking	of	the	Russia	of	Stalin’s	day.”	Also	illuminating	is	Churchill’s	confession	that	 he	 entertained	 “doubts	 also	 of	 American	 opinion	 concerning	 Russia	 and	 our	impressions	 of	 Russia	 are	 likely	 derived	 largely	 from	 American	 accounts.”	 He	suggested	 to	Diefenbaker	 that	 Canada	 occupied	 a	 unique	position	 in	 international	opinion	and	could	“play	a	very	important	role	in	easing	the	tensions	between	Russia	and	the	United	States.”	He	then	urged	Diefenbaker	to	seriously	consider	visiting	the	USSR.	 Churchill’s	 concluding	 remarks	 are	 revealing:	 “I	 freely	 admit	 that	 this	 is	 a	changed	point	of	view	for	I	have	been	anti-Russian,	but	I	have	so	many	reservations	in	 my	 mind	 concerning	 American	 foreign	 policy	 and	 Big	 Four	 meetings	 that	 I	consider	that	something	further	should	be	done.”29	
	 Churchill’s	 letter	 to	 Diefenbaker	 deserves	 careful	 analysis.	 As	 the	 only	Cabinet	 minister	 in	 the	 Diefenbaker	 government	 to	 visit	 the	 USSR,	 he	 was	 in	 a	unique	position	 to	 advise	 the	Prime	Minister.	Moreover,	 as	Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	Commerce,	 he	 saw	 firsthand	 the	 effects	 of	 America’s	 PL	 480	 program	 and	 how	 it	impacted	 Canadian	 grain	 exports.	 Perhaps	 most	 telling	 is	 his	 change	 of	 heart																																																									29	DCER,	Vol.	27.	504.	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	to	Prime	Minister,	“Visit	of	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	to	Moscow”,	Ottawa,	April	27,	1960.	J.G.D./VI/846/U56.	
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regarding	the	USSR	and	his	inherent	suspicion	of	the	United	States.	Churchill’s	views	are	 a	 reminder	 that	 the	 West	 was	 not	 entirely	 homogenous,	 despite	 outward	appearances	 of	 bloc	 solidarity.	 Clearly,	 Churchill	 felt	 superpower	 diplomacy	 was	flawed	 and	 believed	 Canada	 had	 an	 opportunity	 to	 ease	 tensions	 by	 using	 its	position	 as	 a	 middle	 power.	 While	 Churchill’s	 appeal	 to	 Diefenbaker	 to	 visit	 the	Soviet	 Union	 came	 to	 naught,	 Canada	was	 still	 able,	 in	 a	modest	 and	 roundabout	way,	to	exert	influence	on	the	USSR	by	cultivating	positive	relations.		
	 The	 new	 trade	 agreement	 committed	 the	 government	 to	 finding	 ways	 to	promote	 Soviet	 imports.	 During	 his	 time	 in	 Moscow,	 Churchill	 was	 approached	about	opening	a	trade	office	in	Montreal.	The	DEA	and	the	Department	of	Trade	and	Commerce	 agreed	 that	 this	 could	 prove	 advantageous,	 and	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	Canadian	 obligation	 to	 help	 facilitate	 greater	 two-way	 trade,	 recommended	 that	Canada	agree.	Concerns	 that	 the	Soviets	would	use	 the	 trade	office	as	a	 footing	 to	engage	 in	 “subversive	 or	 intelligence	 activities”	 were	 raised,	 but	 were	 not	considered	 sufficiently	 serious	 to	 derail	 the	 idea.	 Diefenbaker	 argued	 that	 this	would	 be	 to	 “Canada’s	 advantage	 in	 light	 of	 the	 two	 to	 one	 Soviet	 purchase	obligation,”	 and	 Cabinet	 agreed	 to	 allow	 the	 Soviets	 to	 establish	 a	 trade	 office	 in	Montreal.30	Interestingly,	and	for	reasons	that	are	unclear,	the	Soviets	did	not	reply	
																																																								30	Cabinet	Conclusions.	Opening	of	a	Soviet	Trade	Office	in	Montreal.	12	July,	1960.	RG2,	Privy	Council	Office,	Series	A-5-a,	Volume	2747.	Item	Number	19960.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/	politics-government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/image.aspx?Image=	e000982344&URLjpg=	http%3a%2f%2fcentral.baclac.gc.ca%2f.item%3fop%3dimg%26app%3dcabinetconclusions%26id%3de000982344&Ecopy=e000982344.	
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to	Canada’s	offer	 to	establish	 the	Montreal	 trade	office	 in	1960,31	and	 it	 is	unclear	whether	the	office	was	ever	actually	established.	
	 After	 the	 major	 1956	 trade	 agreement,	 trading	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union	staggered	 along.	 In	 1961,	 for	 instance,	 Canada	 exported	 to	 the	 USSR	 $24	million	worth	of	 goods.	 This	 represented	only	0.5	per	 cent	 of	 Canada’s	 total	 export	 sales.	And	despite	the	1960	trade	agreement	that	outlined	the	1:2	ratio,	Canada	imported	only	 $2.7	 million	 from	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 truly	 an	 insignificant	 amount	 given	Canada’s	total	imports	of	$5.8	billion.32	Major	changes,	however,	were	about	to	take	place.	In	September	1963,	under	the	new	Liberal	government	of	Lester	Pearson,	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board	made	its	largest	single	sale	to	date	to	the	Soviet	Union.	The	Canadian	government	agreed	to	sell	5.3	million	long	tons	of	wheat	and	500,000	tons	of	flour	over	the	following	ten	and	a	half	months.33	In	that	year,	Canada’s	exports	to	the	USSR	rose	from	$3.3	million	to	$150	million,	almost	entirely	due	to	the	sale	of	wheat.34	Wheat	sales	to	the	Soviet	Union	thereafter	continued	to	be	an	integral	part	of	 Canada’s	 exports.35	Although	 quantities	 fluctuated	 in	 subsequent	 decades,	 they	generally	followed	an	upward	trend.36	
																																																								31	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	5196,	File	8810/USY-5,	Numbered	Letter	USSEA	to	Canadian	Embassy,	Moscow,	“Soviet	Trade	Office	in	Montreal,”	October	26,	1962.	32	Drummond,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition,”	142.	33	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	254.	34	Drummond,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition,”	142.	35	This,	of	course,	is	in	addition	to	the	sale	of	wheat	in	massive	quantities	to	Communist	China,	which	began	in	1960.		36	For	instance,	Canada	exported	80	million	cwt	(cwt	means	hundredweight;	one	cwt	equals	45.36	kg)	in	1972,	70	million	in	1973,	98	million	in	1980,	85	million	in	1981,	and	154	million	in	1984.	Drummond,	“Canadian-Soviet	Trade	and	Competition,”	142-143.	
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	 While	 wheat	 exports	 to	 the	 USSR	 during	 this	 period	 were	 more	 a	 bridge-building	 exercise	 than	 a	 decisive	moment,	 in	 terms	 of	 direct	 impact	 on	Canadian-Soviet	 political	 relations,	 they	 are	 not	 without	 significance.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 the	fact	 that	wheat	 sales	were	 limited	due	 to	good	harvests	within	 the	Soviet	Union	–	partly	due	to	the	intermittent	success	of	the	Virgin	Lands	campaign	–	corroborates	the	 notion	 that	 Canadian	 relations	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 were	 significantly	influenced	by,	and	partly	at	the	mercy	of,	events	and	trends	within	the	USSR	itself.	Additionally,	 the	 renegotiation	 of	 the	 1956	 trade	 agreement	 highlights	 the	fundamental	differences	between	 the	economic	systems	 in	 the	 two	nations.	Soviet	officials	 were	 never	 overly	 eager	 to	 renew	 the	 agreement,	 at	 least	 not	 when	 it	involved	 a	 purchase	 obligation	 comparable	 to	 the	 1956	 agreement.	 In	 turn,	 they	tried	 to	 negotiate	 an	 import	 commitment	 by	 Canada,	 something	 a	 government	cannot	easily	 implement	 in	an	open,	capitalist	system.	Surely,	Soviet	officials	were	aware	 of	 this.	 On	 reflection,	 it	 is	 likely	 Soviet	 officials	 were	 playing	 the	 role	 of	shrewd	businessmen,	 simply	 trying	 to	obtain	 the	best	possible	means	 to	 level	out	the	 trade	 imbalance.	 On	 the	 Canadian	 side,	 officials	 sympathized	with	 the	 Soviets	and	agreed	to	promote	Soviet	imports	to	Canada	in	a	“presidential	manner.”	
	 Perhaps	most	interesting	are	Churchill’s	revelations	following	the	signing	of	the	1960	agreement.	His	change	of	heart	is	a	testament,	as	he	freely	admitted,	to	the	influence	 that	 both	 the	 popular	 media	 and	 the	 United	 States	 at	 large	 had	 on	Canadian	perceptions	of	 the	Communist	superpower.	Additionally,	Churchill’s	visit	highlights	the	importance	of	personal	contact.	Both	Canada	and	the	USSR	believed	in	the	power	of	personal	contact	as	a	means	to	reduce	mutual	suspicion.	In	an	attempt	
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to	minimize	 tensions,	 each	 country	 pursued	 exchanges	 of	 various	 types,	 and	 they	became	an	 integral	part	of	Canadian-Soviet	 relations.	While	each	country	believed	that	exchanges	could	be	advantageous,	no	agreement	existed	between	the	nations	in	the	 cultural	 field,	 and	 rather	 surprisingly,	 no	 official	 agreement	 was	 ever	 signed.	Still,	 even	without	 a	 formal	 agreement	 between	 the	 two	 nations,	 the	 exchange	 of	peoples,	 ideas,	and	cultures	came	to	be	more	 fully	 integrated	 into	Canadian-Soviet	relations.	
	 CULTURAL	PURSUITS		 In	1955,	the	USSR	started	a	proactive	mission	of	cultural	exchanges	with	the	creation	 of	 the	 Soviet	 All-Union	 Society	 for	 Cultural	 Relations	 with	 Foreign	Countries	 (VOKS). 37 	Slowly,	 Soviet	 officials	 realized	 that	 conventional	 Soviet	propaganda	strategies	that	relied	heavily	on	anti-Americanism	were	not	working	in	the	United	States;	this	led	the	Soviets	to	rely	less	on	negative	propaganda	and	more	on	 cultural	 diplomacy.38	The	 high	 point	 in	 Soviet-American	 cultural	 relations	was	the	 signing	 of	 an	 official	 cultural	 agreement	 between	 the	 two	 governments	 in	January	1958.39	The	USSR	and	the	United	Kingdom	also	signed	a	cultural	agreement	in	 1959.40	Khrushchev,	 then,	 promoted	 a	 policy	 that	 focused	 less	 on	 denouncing	
																																																								37	In	fact,	beginning	in	the	early	1920s,	the	Soviet	Union	adopted,	in	addition	to	classic	instruments	of	foreign	policy	such	as	diplomatic	and	consular	systems,	an	entire	network	of	so-called	“cultural”	organizations.	The	purpose	of	this	network	was	to	attract	members	of	intellectual	professions	and	progressive	bourgeoisie	from	Western	nation-states.	Jean-Francois	Fayet,	“VOKS:	The	Third	dimension	of	Soviet	Foreign	Policy,”	in	Jessica	C.	E.	Gienow-Hecht	and	Mark	C.	Donfried,	eds.,	
Searching	for	a	Cultural	Diplomacy	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2010),	33.	38	Rósa	Magnúsdóttir,	“Mission	Impossible?:	Selling	Soviet	Socialism	to	Americans,	1955-1958,”	in	Gienow-Hecht	and	Donfried,	eds.,	Searching	for	a	Cultural	Diplomacy,	50.	39	Magnúsdóttir,	“Mission	Impossible?,”	50.	40	Graham	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind’:	Glenn	Gould’s	Tour	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	Culture	of	the	Cold	War,”	The	Canadian	Historical	Review,	Vol.	95,	No.	1	(March	2014),	8.	
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Western	 ideology	 and	 more	 on	 promoting	 Soviet	 achievements	 in	 science,	technology,	sports,	and	culture.41	
	 The	cultural	diplomacy	prong	of	Canada’s	foreign	relations	with	Communist	Europe	 was	 being	 developed	 before	 Diefenbaker	 came	 to	 power.	 According	 to	historian	Graham	Carr,	how	Canada	could	best	respond	to	Soviet	cultural	initiatives	came	at	a	watershed	moment	 in	a	national	discussion	about	public	policy	and	 the	arts.	 The	 Report	 of	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 on	 National	 Development	 in	 the	 Arts,	Letters,	and	Sciences	(1949-51),	known	as	the	Massey	Report,	had	conveyed	a	new	vision	for	Canada’s	cultural	development	in	which	the	state	would	play	a	vital	role.	The	final	chapter	of	the	Report	advocated	a	more	robust	international	presence	for	the	arts	and	stressed	the	value	of	cultural	exchanges.42	
	 	In	 general,	 the	 DEA	 supported	 the	 initiative,	 at	 least	 in	 theory.	 Lester	 B.	Pearson’s	 visit	 to	 the	 USSR	 in	 1955	 confirmed	 for	 him	 the	 Soviet	 desire	 to	 place	culture	high	on	the	 international	agenda.	Pearson	was	exposed	to	Russian	cultural	life	and	“concluded	that	it	was	precisely	because	‘the	Russians	come	vividly	to	life	in	an	artistic	or	cultural	atmosphere,’	that	sending	Canadian	performers	was	the	‘best	way	 to	 reach	 Communist	 peoples’	 and	 ‘lower	 the	 curtain.’”43	Later,	 in	 a	 highly	detailed	memorandum,	Pearson	explained	to	Cabinet,	“the	Canadian	reaction,	both	official	 and	 unofficial,	 has	 been	 to	 welcome	 any	 genuine	 improvement	 of	 the	
																																																								41	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind,’”	8.	42	Government	of	Canada,	Report,	Royal	Commission	on	National	Development	of	the	Arts,	Letters,	and	Science	(1949-51)	(Ottawa:	King’s	Printer,	1951),	253-54,	as	quoted	in	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind,’”	9.	43	LAC,	MG26,	Vol.	52,	N1,	file	6,	Lester	B.	Pearson,	extract	of	diary	included	in	Memorandum	for	the	
Prime	Minister,	November	1,	1955,	as	quoted	in,	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind’”,	9.	
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atmosphere	which	might	be	created	by	increased	exchanges.”	He	then	outlined	the	possible	benefits	to	Canada;	this	approach	was	readily	adopted	by	the	Diefenbaker	government	and	is,	therefore,	worthwhile	examining	in	detail.	
	 Pearson	explained	that	 increased	contacts	and	exchanges	would	have	many	advantages:	first,	they	might	help	to	remove	the	Soviet	misconception	that	Canada	is	a	member	of	an	aggressive	Western	alliance	that	intends	to	attack	the	Soviet	Union	and	would	help	put	new	 ideas	 into	 the	minds	of	people	who	 in	general	have	been	kept	 in	 complete	 ignorance	 of	 the	 outside	 world	 for	 several	 decades;	 second,	 in	scientific	 and	 technical	 fields,	 in	 which	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 ahead,	 Canadian	research	and	 industry	could	gain	 information	and	 learn	of	new	 innovations;	 third,	from	 an	 intelligence	 standpoint,	 Canada	 stood	 to	 gain	 in	 almost	 every	 field,	 since	Soviet	knowledge	of	Canada	so	greatly	exceeded	Canadian	knowledge	of	the	Soviet	Union;	lastly,	as	far	as	visits	to	Canada	were	concerned,	while	Canadians	may	not	be	able	to	convert	from	Communism	the	sort	of	people	selected	to	come	to	the	country,	it	 was	 possible	 to	 at	 least	 show	 them	 the	 nation,	 have	 Canadians	 and	 Russians	interact,	 and	 explain	 to	 them	 Canadian	 policies	 in	 ways	 that	 must	 improve	 their	understanding	 of	 Canada	 and	what	 freedom	means,	 which	 could	 then	 have	 some	effect	on	others	when	they	returned.	Any	potential	negative	ramifications	associated	with	 exchanges	 related	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 espionage	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 “Soviet	visitors	 may	 be	 used	 to	 select	 persons	 and	 intelligence	 targets	 for	 subsequent	exploitation	by	the	Russian	Intelligence	Service.”	Pearson,	however,	explained	that	these	 risks	 could	be	 “kept	within	bounds	 if	 the	Canadian	public	 is	made	aware	of	
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them,	and	if	our	internal	security	service	is	given	sufficient	resources	to	carry	out	its	task.”44	The	benefits,	in	the	end,	exceeded	any	potential	risk.	
	 The	memorandum	also	distinguished	between	 the	 exchange	of	 information	and	 visits.	 Action	 regarding	 the	 exchange	 of	 information,	 Pearson	 explained,	 had	been	satisfactorily	settled.	Essentially,	unclassified	information	could	be	given	only	when	 some	 useful	 return	 could	 be	 anticipated.	 The	 decision	 in	 each	 case	 was	 a	departmental	 or	 agency	 responsibility,	 and	 reports	were	 to	 be	 submitted	 twice	 a	year	 to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Security	 Panel	 summarizing	 the	 information	 sent.	 If	private	 organizations	 in	 Canada	 requested	 advice	 on	 the	 subject,	 they	 were	 also	requested	to	seek	reciprocity	as	much	as	possible.		
	 Decisions	regarding	the	exchange	of	visits	posed	more	difficult	problems	and	was,	Pearson	admitted,	still	evolving.	He	asserted,	“It	is	not	sufficient	for	us	merely	to	reciprocate	visits	proposed	by	the	Soviet	Government.	We	must	take	the	initiative	ourselves	in	fields	of	special	interest	to	us,	in	order,	among	other	things,	to	forestall	undesirable	initiatives	from	them.”	It	was	recommended	that	the	actions	pertaining	to	 the	 exchange	 of	 information,	 as	 outlined	 above,	 become	 official	 policy.	Additionally,	 Pearson	 recommended	 that	 an	 Interdepartmental	 Panel	 on	 the	Exchange	 of	 Visits	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Bloc	 be	 established	 to	 implement	 policy.	 The	Panel	was	to	be	responsible	 to	Cabinet	 through	the	Secretary	of	State	 for	External	
																																																								44	DCER,	Vol.	23.	Part	II.	508.	Memorandum	from	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Cabinet,	“Exchange	of	Visits	and	Information	between	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union,	”	Ottawa,	February	3,	1956.	Cabinet	Document	No.30-56.	
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Affairs,	and	was	to	consist	of	high-ranking	officials.45	Among	other	things,	the	Panel	was	to	establish	liaison	with	appropriate	Government	departments	and	agencies;	to	deal	with	such	unofficial	organizations	and	persons	and	to	advise	the	Government	of	forthcoming	unofficial	visits	in	either	direction	and,	as	appropriate,	to	advise	on	and	assist	with	arrangements;	to	ensure	that	the	Security	Panel	and	the	Joint	Intelligence	Committee	are	informed	of	such	visits;	to	initiate	proposals	for	official	or	unofficial	visits	 to	and	 from	Soviet	bloc	countries;	and	 to	keep	under	continuous	review	the	subject	of	exchange	of	visits	with	Soviet	bloc	countries.46	Foremost,	the	Government	considered	that	exchanges	“should	be	based	on	the	principle	of	reciprocity,	and	that	there	should	not	be	a	marked	imbalance	of	visits	in	either	direction.”47		
	 Recommendations	for	a	more	liberal	exchange	policy	came	to	a	sudden	halt	when	 the	 Soviets	 crushed	 the	 Hungarian	 Uprising	 in	 November	 1956.	 Advising	Pearson,	USSEA	Jules	Léger	suggested	in	light	of	Soviet	actions	in	Hungary,	that	no	immediate	 initiatives	 regarding	 exchanges	 with	 the	 USSR	 be	 taken	 and	 that	 the	government	 defer	 any	 Soviet	 proposals	 in	 the	 field.	 Interestingly,	 Léger	recommended	the	government	“give	most	careful	consideration	to	adopting	a	more	liberal	exchanges	policy	towards	the	satellites	in	the	light	of	the	changing	situation	in	that	area.”	He	believed	much	could	be	gained	by	encouraging	more	contacts	with																																																									45	Specifically,	the	Chairman	of	the	Panel	was	to	be	the	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs.		Its	permanent	members	were	to	consist	of	the	Secretary	of	the	Cabinet	and	the	Commissioner	of	the	R.C.M.	Police.	The	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Intelligence	Committee	was	to	attend	meetings,	and	Deputy	Ministers	and	Heads	of	Agencies	were	to	attend	when	visits	of	interest	to	them	were	discussed.	However,	the	foregoing	officials	were	permitted	to	be	represented	by	senior	members	of	their	staffs.	46	DCER,	Vol.	23.	Part	II.	508.	Memorandum	from	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Cabinet,	“Exchange	of	Visits	and	Information	between	Canada	and	the	Soviet	Union”,	Ottawa,	February	3,	1956.	Cabinet	Document	No.30-56.	47	DCER,	Vol.	23.	Part	II.	508.	Aide	Memoir	from	Jules	Léger	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	March	28,	1956.	
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“a	country	such	as	Poland,	which	had	made	considerable	progress	in	breaking	away	from	 complete	 domination	 by	 Moscow.”48	Pearson	 agreed,	 as	 indicated	 by	 three	separate	marginal	notes.		
	 It	 was	 not	 until	 April	 1957	 that	 the	 Canadian	 government	 resumed	discussions	on	exchanges,	just	ahead	of	the	change	in	governments	from	St.	Laurent	to	 Diefenbaker.	 It	 was	 still	 the	 view	 that	 Canada	 should	 pragmatically	 pursue	exchanges	with	Poland,	while	avoiding	all	exchanges	with	Hungary.49	By	this	time,	a	number	of	Soviet	requests	remained	outstanding,	and	the	Canadian	Department	of	Transport	was	 eager	 to	 exchange	 information	 on	 northern	 affairs	 and	 to	 arrange	visits	 related	 to	 icebreaker	 construction. 50 	While	 exchanges	 on	 icebreaker	construction	had	to	wait,	the	Soviet	Foreign	Ministry	agreed	to	a	regular	exchange,																																																									48	DCER,	Vol.	23.	Part	II	518.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	for	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	Soviet	Union”,	Ottawa,	December	20,	1956.	DEA/12230-40.	49	DCER,	Vol.	23.	Part	II	519.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	for	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR	and	the	Satellites”,	Ottawa,	April	17,	1957.	DEA/12230-40.	50	Another	sore	spot	for	Canada	proved	to	be	its	inability	to	pursue	an	exchange	of	visits	regarding	icebreaker	construction.	Since	mid-May	1956,	the	Department	of	Transport	was	planning	to	build	several	icebreakers	and	was	eager	to	pursue	exchanges	on	this	front	with	the	USSR.	According	to	the	DEA,	the	“Soviet	Union	occupies	a	recognized	position	in	the	field	of	icebreaker	construction,	and	has	recently	launched	an	atomic-powered	vessel	of	this	type.”	In	late	1956	an	exchange	in	this	field	was	suggested	to	the	Soviets	and,	in	fact,	agreed	to.	In	light	of	the	events	in	Hungary,	however,	and	the	subsequent	deterioration	of	relations,	the	exchange	was	temporarily	deferred.	In	April	1957,	the	Department	of	Transport	asked	that	the	request	be	resumed,	and	the	Visits	Panel	agreed	that	exchanges	could	be	“cautiously	resumed.”	In	December	1957,	the	Department	of	Transport	indicated	that	it	was	officially	ready	to	proceed	with	the	request,	and	in	early	1958,	SSEA	Sidney	Smith	recommended	that	cabinet	approve	the	exchange,	“which	is	clearly	in	the	interests	of	Canada.”	Cabinet,	however,	and	for	reasons	that	are	disappointingly	unclear,	did	not	believe	that	it	was	an	appropriate	time	to	authorize	the	visit.	An	exchange	in	this	field	was	not	referred	to	again	during	the	Diefenbaker	government,	and	the	topic	was	summarily	dropped.	LAC,	RG2	B2,	Vol.	2742,	File	No.	C-20-5,	Memorandum	to	the	Cabinet	from	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affair,	“Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR	on	Icebreaker	Construction,”	January	22,	1958;	Cabinet	Document	28/58;	Cabinet	Conclusions.	Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR	on	Icebreaker	Construction.	30	January	1958.	RG2,	Privy	Council	Office,	Series	A-5-a,	Volume	1898.	Item	Number	16801.	http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/cabinet-conclusions/Pages/image.aspx?Image=	e001098232&URLjpg=http%3a%2f%2fcentral.bac-lac.gc.ca%2f.item%3fop%3dimg%26app	%3dcabinetconclusions%26id%3de001098232&Ecopy=e001098232.	
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with	 the	 Canadian	 Department	 of	 Northern	 Affairs,	 of	 special	 publications	 on	Northern	development,	produced	by	the	Soviet	Arctic	Scientific	Research	Institute.51	
	 But	 arguably	 the	most	 remarkable	 event	 in	 Canada’s	 cultural	 diplomacy	 in	1957	was	pianist	Glenn	Gould’s	 tour	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	which	took	place	 in	May.	Gould	became	the	first	North	American	pianist	to	perform	in	the	USSR,	giving	eight	concerts	 in	Moscow	and	Leningrad.52	According	 to	historian	Graham	Carr,	Gould’s	tour	was	a	huge	success,	and	while	the	state	played	no	role	in	the	organization	of	the	tour,	 Gould’s	 performance	 showcased	 Canadian	 talent	 and	 cultural	 maturity.	“Pianists	were	 the	 gladiators	 of	 the	 cultural	 Cold	War,”	 states	 Carr,	 and	 the	 press	praised	his	performances,	stressing	that	he	was	able	to	accomplish	“what	statesmen	failed	to	do	by	softening	the	Russians.”53	Indeed,	“Gould’s	tour	reflected	the	growing	importance	of	 cultural	diplomacy	as	 a	way	 to	 exercise	Cold	War	 foreign	policy	by	ostensibly	non-political	means.”54	As	well,	it	demonstrated	to	Canadian	officials	the	positive	 impact	 non-state	 actors	 can	 have	 on	 international	 relations	 and	 the	importance	 of	 cultural	 diplomacy	 to	 Canada’s	 foreign	 relations	 with	 Communist	Europe.	 Canadian	 performing	 artists	 that	 followed	 in	 Gould’s	 precedent-setting	footsteps,	during	the	Diefenbaker	years,	are	discussed	below.	
	 THE	CULTURAL	AGREEMENT	DEBATE			
																																																								51	LAC,	RG85,	Vol.	1515,	File	1005-5	part	3,	Numbered	Letter	The	Canadian	Embassy,	Moscow	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Exchange	of	Publications	on	Northern	Affairs,”	May	22,	1957.	52	For	a	full,	rich	history	of	Gould’s	tour	and	how	it	contributed	to	Canadian	cultural	diplomacy,	see	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind.’”	53	“Triumphant	Glenn	Slips	Home	Again,”	Telegram	(Toronto),	18	June	1957,	as	quoted	in	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind,’”	19.	54	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind,’”	29.	
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	 Although	Canadian	officials	recognized	the	importance	of	cultural	exchanges,	Canada	and	the	USSR	never	actually	signed	a	formal	agreement,	in	contrast	with	the	United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 despite	 the	 efforts	 by	 individuals	 on	 both	sides	of	 the	 Iron	Curtain.	While	discussions	between	Canadian	and	Soviet	officials	from	1958	 to	 the	end	of	1959	suggested	an	agreement	might	actually	be	 reached,	there	were	 still	 signs	both	Canada	and	 the	USSR	remained	hesitant.	By	 the	end	of	1959	 and	 early	 1960,	 an	 agreement	 appeared	 much	 less	 likely.	 Oddly,	 and	 for	reasons	 that	 remain	 disappointingly	 unclear,	 discussions	 on	 the	matter	 appear	 to	have	abruptly	stopped.	
	 	In	February	1958,	Soviet	ambassador	Chuvahin	met	with	SSEA	Sidney	Smith,	and	they	discussed	how	the	two	nations	might	increase	cultural	exchanges.	At	this	point,	 however,	 Smith	 explained	 that	 the	 government,	 for	 “purely	 domestic	purposes”	 wished	 to	 move	 slowly	 on	 cultural	 and	 scientific	 exchanges.	 Smith	assured	Chuvahin	that	should	“the	Conservative	Government	[return	following	the	federal	 election],	 it	 would	 continue	 to	 favour	 expanded	 cultural	 contacts,	 […but]	pressure	from	the	Soviet	side	on	these	matters	during	the	pre-election	period	would	be	embarrassing.”	 In	other	words,	 the	Conservatives	did	not	want	 to	appear	 to	be	schmoozing	 with	 the	 Soviets	 during	 an	 election.	 Chuvahin	 then	 asked	 if	 Canada	would	 consider	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 cultural	 agreement	 similar	 to	 one	 recently	concluded	 in	 Washington,55	to	 which	 Smith	 explained	 that	 he	 “personally	 was																																																									55	The	preamble	of	the	agreement	reads	as	follows:	“…	As	a	result	of	these	negotiations,	which	have	been	carried	on	in	a	spirit	of	mutual	understanding,	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	have	agreed	to	provide	for	the	specific	exchanges	which	are	set	forth	in	the	following	sections	during	1958	and	1959	in	the	belief	that	these	exchanges	will	contribute	significantly	to	the	betterment	of	relations	between	the	two	countries,	thereby	contributing	to	a	lessening	of	international	tensions.”	New	York	
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inclined	at	present	to	favour	ad	hoc	arrangements”	since	with	formal	arrangements	there	was	a	“tendency	to	consider	proposals	on	the	basis	of	how	they	fitted	into	the	terms	of	the	agreement	rather	than	on	their	individual	merits.”56	The	discrepancy	in	opinion	regarding	the	most	effective	way	to	pursue	cultural	exchanges	is	evident	in	Smith	and	Chuvahin’s	discussion,	and	these	differences	were	never	reconciled.	
	 Two	months	later,	the	DEA	revisited	the	topic	of	cultural	exchanges	with	the	USSR.	 Léger	 reminded	 Smith	 that	 in	 his	 letter	 to	 Nikolai	 Bulganin,	 the	 Soviet	Chairman	of	the	Council	of	Ministers,	the	Prime	Minister	expressed	the	willingness	of	the	Canadian	government	to	develop	the	exchange	of	visits	with	the	USSR.	Léger	also	 clarified	 that	 “on	 several	 occasions	 the	 Soviet	 authorities	 have	made	 it	 clear	that	 they	 regard	our	policy	on	 the	 exchange	of	 visits	 as	 less	 than	 satisfactory	 and	have	sought	to	associate	this	with	the	development	of	trade	with	Canada,	including	the	 purchase	 of	 wheat.”	 For	 Smith’s	 approval,	 the	 Under-Secretary	 submitted	 a	Cabinet	 memorandum	 intended	 to	 solidify	 Canadian	 policy.57	While	 the	 Liberals	were	in	office,	Léger	was	the	chief	architect	for	the	draft	outlining	Canada’s	cultural	exchange	policy,	approved	by	St.	Laurent’s	Cabinet.	Two	years	later,	again	Léger	was	presenting,	 largely	verbatim,	 the	 same	policy,	which	meant	an	ad	hoc	 approach	 to	cultural	 exchanges	 with	 as	 much	 reciprocation	 as	 possible.	 Like	 the	 Liberals,	 the	Progressive	 Conservatives	 saw	 the	 value	 in	 exchanges,	 from	 both	 political	 and	technical	vantages.	One	stark	difference	was	 the	new	government’s	desire	 to	 limit																																																																																																																																																																						
Times,	“Text	of	the	Joint	Communique	of	U.	S.	and	Soviet	Union	on	Cultural	Exchanges,”	January	28,	1958.	56	DCER,	Vol.	25.	501.	Memorandum	from	Assistant	Under-Secretary	for	External	Affairs	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	February	7,	1958.	DEA/12230-40.	57	DCER,	Vol.	25.	502.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	for	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	Ottawa,	April	18,	1958.	DEA/12230-40.	
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publicity	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 given	 the	 Soviet	 intervention	 in	 Hungry	 in	 1956.	Nonetheless,	as	was	the	case	two	years	earlier	under	the	Liberals,	the	Diefenbaker	Cabinet	approved	the	proposed	policy.58	
	 Perhaps	aware	of	the	Cabinet’s	recent	policy	decision,	Chuvahin	followed	up	in	July	with	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	J.	B.	Watkins	and	passed	 along	 a	 copy	 of	 an	 agreement	 the	USSR	had	 recently	 signed	with	Norway.	The	Soviet	ambassador	suggested	that	Canadian	officials	consider	“something	along	the	 same	 lines.” 59 	The	 Soviets	 were	 clearly	 eager	 to	 get	 an	 official	 cultural	agreement.	The	Canadians,	however,	remained	less	enthusiastic.	For	instance,	when	discussing	 a	note	 to	be	 sent	 to	 the	 Soviet	 ambassador,	 Léger	pointed	out	 that	 the	phrasing	 was	 “intended	 to	 discourage	 Soviet	 interest	 in	 a	 cultural	 agreement,	 at	least	at	this	stage.”60	This	did	not	mean	that	Canadian	officials	were	uninterested	in	exchanges.	 Quite	 the	 opposite	 was	 true.	 The	 government	 gave	 the	 Soviets	 a	substantive	 list	 of	 proposed	 exchanges	 in	 seven	 different	 fields:	 an	 exchange	 of	official	 delegations	 in	 the	 field	 of	 northern	 affairs;	 the	 Department	 of	 Transport	wished	to	arrange	an	exchange	of	specialists	 in	icebreaker	design;	the	Department	of	Fisheries	wished	to	arrange	an	exchange	of	fisheries	experts;	the	Department	of	Mines	and	Technical	Surveys	wanted	to	arrange	an	exchange	of	experts	in	the	fields	of	mining	and	metallurgy;	 the	Associate	Director	of	 the	National	Gallery	of	Canada	wanted	 to	 visit	 Soviet	 museums;	 the	 National	 Research	 Council	 was	 prepared	 to																																																									58	DCER,	Vol.	25.	503.	Extracts	from	Cabinet	Conclusions,	“Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	June	19,	1958.	DEA/12230-40.	59	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	8,	Memorandum	European	Division	–	File,	July	31,	1958.	60	DCER,	Vol.	25.	504.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	external	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	August	22,	1958.	DEA/12230-40.	
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consider	 exchanges	 of	 delegations	 of	 scientists	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 chemistry,	 physics,	biology,	mathematics,	and	technology;	and	the	DEA	proposed	a	visit	by	a	Canadian	hockey	team	to	play	a	series	of	games	in	the	USSR.61	The	variety	of	 fields	 in	which	Canada	 was	 interested	 demonstrates	 broad	 intradepartmental	 interest	 in	 the	exchanges	 policy.	 Various	 Canadian	 ministries	 and	 agencies	 appeared	 keen	 to	gather	and	share	information	with	the	Communist	superpower.	
	 The	Soviets	did	not	relent	in	their	pursuit	of	an	official	cultural	agreement.	In	early	1959,	the	Soviet	Ambassador,	Aroutunian	met	with	the	Head	of	the	European	Division,	Henry	Davis.	During	their	conversation,	Aroutunian	stressed	that	cultural	relations	 were	 “the	 other	 important	 foundation	 for	 international	 friendship”	 (in	addition	 to	 commercial	 relations).	 He	 then	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 had	three	 different	 types	 of	 cultural	 arrangements.	 First	 –	 and	 Aroutunian’s	 most	preferred	–	was	a	general	cultural	agreement,	like	the	one	recently	concluded	with	Norway	and	already	proposed	to	Canadian	officials	as	a	model	(as	noted	above).	The	second	type	was	an	agreement	relating	to	a	stated	programme	of	exchanges	over	a	specific	period,	which	was	the	type	concluded	with	the	United	States.	The	third,	and	the	Soviets	least	preferred,	was	an	ad	hoc	arrangement	on	specific	visits.		
	 Davis,	 however,	 explained	 to	 Aroutunian	 the	 reasons	why	 Canada	was	 not	attracted	 by	 the	 proposal	 for	 a	 general	 agreement.	 First,	 Canada	 had	 no	 general	cultural	 agreement	with	 any	 country.	 Davis	 stressed	 that	 Canada’s	 “constitutional	position	 was	 such	 that	 the	 Federal	 Government	 lacked	 authority	 in	 many	 fields																																																									61	DCER,	Vol.	25.	504.	Memorandum	from	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	
State	for	external	Affairs,	Note	No.	35,	“Exchange	of	Visits	with	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	August	19,	1958.	DEA/12230-40.	
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which	 a	 cultural	 agreement	 would	 normally	 cover.”	 Second,	 no	 federal	 agency	existed	for	developing	cultural	exchanges,	nor	were	any	funds	devoted	to	promoting	them.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 Davis	 explained,	 officials	 did	 not	 believe	 a	 cultural	agreement	would	 contribute	 on	 the	 Canadian	 side	 to	 the	 development	 of	 cultural	contacts.	Moreover,	Davis	defended	Canada’s	position	by	stating	how	an	agreement	might	actually	“be	misleading,	and	hence	damaging	to	[Canadian-Soviet]	relations,”	particularly	 since	 the	 government	 “was	 in	 no	 position	 to	 take	 any	 initiative.”	Aroutunian	explained	that	“he	understood	the	point	[Davis]	had	made,”	but	insisted	that	a	general	agreement	would	be	useful.	The	Ambassador	assured	Davis	 that	an	agreement	“could	be	proposed	in	terms	which	would	take	account	of	the	Canadian	situation.”	 While	 Davis	 gave	 no	 commitment	 to	 an	 agreement,	 he	 expressed	 the	government’s	 willingness	 to	 at	 least	 examine	 a	 Soviet	 proposal	 should	 one	 be	forthcoming.62	
	 After	 Davis’	 discussion	 with	 Aroutunian,	 it	 seemed	 likely	 that	 the	 Soviets	would	present	 some	kind	of	 draft	 agreement.	None	 came,	 however,	 and	Canadian	officials	were	 rather	unimpressed,	 as	outlined	 in	Norman	Robertson’s	despatch	 to	Canadian	Ambassador	Johnson	in	Moscow:	“Although	we	consider	that	a	reasonable	balance	has	been	maintained	in	the	official	visits	exchanged	thus	far,	[…]	our	note	of	August	19	constitutes	the	first	official	initiative	taken	by	the	Canadian	Government	[…]	and	we	regard	the	Soviet	Government's	failure	to	respond	to	it	as	an	inexcusable	delay.”	Robertson	then	instructed	Johnson	“to	take	the	first	opportunity	available	at	
																																																								62	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	8,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Under-Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Conversation	with	the	Soviet	Ambassador,”	February	5,	1959.	
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a	 senior	 Foreign	 Office	 level	 […]	 to	 clarify	 our	 position	 as	 outlined	 above.”	Furthermore,	Ambassador	 Johnson	was	 to	note	 that	Canada	might	be	prepared	 to	consider	 an	 agreement	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 USSR-USA	 agreement,	 if	 the	 Soviets	cared	to	present	such	a	proposal.	Regardless,	Canadian	officials	“expected	to	get	an	early	and	adequate	response	from	the	Soviet	Government	to	the	exchange	proposals	put	forward	in	our	note	of	August	19,	1958.”63	
	 Shortly	 after,	 Johnson	 replied	 to	 Ottawa	 and	 divulged	 a	 fascinating	revelation.	 After	 talking	 with	Mikoyan	 and	Mr.	 Belokhvostikov,64	Johnson	 learned	that	it	was	not	the	Soviet	Foreign	Ministry,		
	but	[Yuri]	Zhukov,	the	Chairman	of	the	State	Committee	for	Cultural	Relations	 with	 Foreign	 Countries,	 who	 is	 anxious	 to	 conclude	 an	agreement	 with	 [Canada].	 Neither	 Mikoyan	 nor	 Belokhvostikov	seemed	to	know	much	about	the	subject	when	I	spoke	to	them.	Mr.	Zhukov,	 I	 am	 told,	 thinks	 that	 his	 future	 career	 depends	 upon	 the	number	of	cultural	agreements	he	can	conclude.65	Johnson’s	 explanation	 perhaps	 reveals	more	 about	 the	 Soviet	 bureaucracy	 than	 it	does	about	Canadian	policy	initiatives.	The	fact	that	Mikoyan,	the	Deputy	Chairman	of	the	Council	of	Ministers,	knew	little	about	a	Canadian-Soviet	cultural	agreement	reveals	 a	 real	 likelihood	 of	 lack	 of	 coordination	 between	 Soviet	 departments.	Moreover,	 Zhukov’s	 belief	 that	 his	 future	 career	 depended	 upon	 the	 number	 of	
																																																								63	DCER,	Vol.	26.	356.	Secretary	of	State	for	external	Affairs	to	Ambassador	in	the	Soviet	Union,	“Proposed	Cultural	Agreement	Between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	May	29,	1959.	DEA/2462-E-40,	Despatch	No.	S-340.	64	The	author	is	unaware	of	who	this	official	is,	but	assumes	he	worked	in	the	Soviet	Foreign	Ministry.		65	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40	part	9.2,	Despatch	Canadian	Ambassador,	Moscow	to	Secretary	
of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Proposed	Cultural	Agreement	between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	June	25,	1959.	
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agreements	 signed	 by	 the	 USSR	 highlights	 a	 persistent	 issue	 during	 the	 Soviet	period:	the	notion	that	quantity	often	trumped	quality.66	
	 The	 final	 sign	 that	 a	 cultural	 agreement	 could	 come	 to	 fruition	 came	 from	Davis.	 In	 a	memorandum	 to	 the	DEA’s	 Information	Division,	 he	 explained	 that	 he	finally	had	the	chance	to	talk	with	Aroutunian	about	the	status	of	“negotiations,”	 if	that	is	in	fact	what	they	could	be	called.	By	no	means	was	he	optimistic.	Davis	was	convinced	Soviet	officials	intentionally	avoided	agreeing	to	exchanges	proposed	by	Canada	that	would	balance	those	that	were	of	prime	importance	to	them.	He	cited,	for	 instance,	 their	 continued	 attempt	 to	 organize	 visits	 in	 which	 they	 were	interested	 through	direct	contact	with	Canadian	agencies,	 such	as	 the	Engineering	Institute	of	Canada.	Davis	then	reiterated	the	constitutional	limitations	that	affected	the	 Canadian	 position,	 but	 emphasized	 the	 government’s	 willingness	 to	 explore	“general	statements	accompanied	by	an	agreed	programme	for	a	stated	period.”	He	then	detailed	what	this	might	mean	from	the	Canadian	perspective:	
	The	 programme	 could	 be	 in	 two	 sections,	 one	 agreeing	 to	 official	visits	 and	 the	 other	 section	 taking	 note	 of	 projected	 non-official	visits.	 In	 respect	 of	 the	 latter	 the	 governments	 would	 agree	 to	facilitate	 the	 exchanges	 and	 this	would	mean,	 as	 I	 saw	 it,	 that	 they	would	 issue	 the	 necessary	 visas	 and,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 field	 of	education,	 the	 Canadian	 Government	 would	 permit	 professors	 or	students	 to	come	 to	Canada	and	 for	 its	part	 the	Soviet	Government	would	give	visas	for	the	Canadians	to	go	to	the	USSR.	Davis	and	Aroutunian	then	agreed	a	first	draft	should	be	developed,	in	consultation	with	the	Soviet	Embassy.	According	to	Davis,	“the	Ambassador	was	anxious	that	at																																																									66	If	Canadian	officials	seemed	uninterested	in	pursuing	a	formal	cultural	agreement,	and	in	addition	a	draft	agreement	was	not	receiving	the	necessary	support	from	the	Foreign	Ministry,	then	perhaps	Zhukov	was	quick	to	give	up	a	notch	on	his	cultural	agreement	belt.	This,	however,	is	mere	speculation	by	the	author.	
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the	outset	our	work	would	be	‘private,’”	because	Aroutunian	“did	not	want	to	have	to	 go	 to	 Moscow	 for	 every	 detail.”67	Why	 Aroutunian	 wanted	 to	 keep	 the	 work	“quiet”	is	unclear.	But	these	discussions	reveal	an	openness	to	enter	into	a	possible	agreement,	 despite	 inherent	 limitations	 on	 the	 Canadian	 side.	 Canadian	 officials’	willingness	to	accommodate	Soviet	insistence	on	some	kind	of	agreement	is	telling;	they	were	prepared	to	work	within	a	rather	confined	constitutional	framework,	if	it	meant	pleasing	Soviet	officials	and	achieving	some	balance	in	exchanges.	Of	course,	Canada’s	position	was	not	entirely	altruistic,	 given	 the	expectation	 that	exchanges	would	expose	Soviet	visitors	to	Western	modalities,	build	bridges	between	East	and	West,	and	ultimately	reduce	Cold	War	tensions.	
	 Davis’	 memorandum,	 rather	 frustratingly,	 is	 the	 last	 piece	 of	 available	evidence	 of	 the	 negotiations	 surrounding	 a	 potential	 Canadian-Soviet	 cultural	agreement.	While	 it	 is	 certain	 that	no	agreement	ever	 came	 to	 fruition,	 it	 remains	unclear	exactly	why	it	was	abandoned.68	Still,	even	without	an	official	agreement,	by	1960	Canada	and	the	USSR	began	engaging	in	more	consistent	exchange	programs,	but	these,	too,	were	not	without	their	frustrations.		 EXCHANGING	PEOPLE	AND	IDEAS		 Similar	 to	 the	 Russian	 frustrations	 regarding	 the	 trade	 imbalance	 between	the	two	countries,	by	1960	Canadian	officials	were	aggravated	with	an	imbalance	in	the	 initiation	 of	 exchanges	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	 Soviet	 authorities	 enjoyed																																																									67	DCER,	Vol.	26.	357.	Memorandum	from	Head,	European	Division	to	Information	Division,	“Possible	Soviet-Canadian	Cultural	Agreement,”	Ottawa,	July	20,	1959.	DEA/2727-V-40.	68	Note	on	sources:	Despite	the	author’s	best	efforts,	documents	surrounding	this	topic	remain	restricted	by	law,	and	only	“partially	open.”	It	is	assumed	that	the	documents	that	remain	restricted	may	very	well	reveal	why	specifically	negotiations	fell	apart.	
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the	 advantage	 of	 initiating	 exchanges	 of	 interest	 to	 them	 by	 approaching	 private	Canadian	groups	and	individuals	directly,	while	simultaneously	refusing	to	entertain	Canadian	 proposals	 for	 official	 exchanges	 in	 fields	 of	 interest	 to	 Canada.	 “On	balance,”	 one	 report	 asserted,	 “Canada	 is	 not	 obtaining	 reciprocity	 in	 exchanges	with	the	Soviet	Union.”69	
	 One	particular	 sore	 spot	 for	 Canadian	 officials	was	 the	 Soviet	 refusal	 of	 an	official	exchange	in	northern	affairs.	Opening	the	north	was	a	major	first	step	in	the	National	Development	Program	envisioned	by	the	Minister	of	Northern	Affairs	and	National	 Resources,	 Alvin	 Hamilton.	 To	 Hamilton,	 “the	 North	 represented	 a	 new	world	to	conquer,	[…]	a	great	vault,	holding	in	its	recesses	treasures	to	maintain	and	increase	 the	 material	 living	 standards	 which	 our	 countries	 take	 for	 granted.”70	According	 to	 Hamilton’s	 biographer,	 research	 was	 the	 first	 step	 in	 his	 plan	 to	develop	the	north.71	And	given	his	department’s	eagerness	 to	engage	 in	exchanges	in	 northern	 affairs	 with	 the	 USSR,	 the	 Russians,	 it	 was	 hoped,	 would	 play	 an	important	 role	 in	 this	 phase.	 Hamilton	 was	 suggested	 as	 head	 of	 a	 Canadian	delegation.	Since	 the	USSR	earlier	had	noted	 its	desire	 to	 increase	exchanges	on	a	ministerial	 level,	 Canadian	 officials	 thought	 that	 if	 a	 minister	 led	 the	 delegation,	Soviet	officials	would	be	much	more	inclined	to	accept	it.72	
																																																								69	DCER,	Vol.	27.	511.	Report	of	Meeting	with	Deputy	Minister	of	Northern	Affairs	and	Natural	
Resources,	“Exchanges	with	the	Soviet	Union,”	Ottawa,	February	4,	1960.	DEA/10438-V-14-40.	70	Hamilton’s	speech	to	Pacific	Northwest	Trade	Association,	September	4,	1959,	as	quoted	in,	Patrick	Kyba,	Alvin:	A	Biography	of	the	Honourable	Alvin	Hamilton,	P.C.	(Regina:	Canadian	Plains	Research	Center,	1989)	,	124-125.		71	Kyba,	Alvin,	126.	For	a	detailed	account	of	Hamilton’s	National	Development	Program	and	strategy,	see	Kyba,	Alvin,	122-149.	72	DCER,	Vol.	27.	511.	Report	of	Meeting	with	Deputy	Minister	of	Northern	Affairs	and	Natural	
Resources,	“Exchanges	with	the	Soviet	Union,”	Ottawa,	February	4,	1960.	DEA/10438-V-14-40.		
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	 Despite	 Aroutunian’s	 efforts,	 Soviet	 officials	 in	Moscow	 remained	 hesitant.	Aroutunian	indicated	that	he	had	been	unsuccessful	 in	allaying	suspicions	aroused	in	Moscow	that	Canadian	proposals	in	the	field	of	northern	affairs	were	connected	with	the	Prime	Minister’s	suggestion	for	Arctic	inspection	(of	nuclear	weapons)	and	were	 not	 genuine	 projects	 for	 the	 exchange	 of	 scientific	 information,	 but	 more	specifically	related	to	security	intelligence.73	Aroutunian	admitted	that	his	superiors	were	mistaken	in	their	assumption	that	Canada’s	desire	for	an	exchange	in	northern	affairs	 was	 a	 guise	 for	 intelligence	 gathering;	 he	 attempted	 to	 correct	 the	misapprehension	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	 visit	 accepted,	 but	 to	 no	 avail.74	Canada’s	inability	to	have	an	exchange	in	northern	affairs	accepted	by	the	Soviets	represents	an	 ongoing	 issue	 faced	 by	 Canadian	 officials	 during	 this	 period.	 The	 lack	 of	reciprocity	and	 the	continued	 imbalance	of	exchanges	was	a	constant	 thorn	 in	 the	side	of	Canadian	officials	who	wanted	additional	exchanges	arranged.	The	situation	highlights,	 in	some	ways,	 the	 limited	control	Canadian	officials	had	in	the	realm	of	cultural	 exchanges.	 In	 1962,	 Canadian	 Ambassador	 in	 Moscow	 Arnold	 Smith	lamented,	 “I	 doubt	 if	 Canada	 can	 expect,	 for	many	 years	 to	 come,	 to	 achieve	 one	hundred	 per	 cent	 reciprocity,	 since	 the	 USSR	 is	 a	 vastly	 bigger	 country	 with	correspondingly	greater	cultural	and	artistic	wealth	to	offer.”	Smith	then	concluded,																																																									73	DCER,	Vol.	27.	513.	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Deputy	Minister	of	Northern	
Affairs	and	National	Resources,	Ottawa,	February	7,	1960.	DEA/10438-V-14-40.	74	DCER,	Vol.	27.	512.	Memorandum	by	Head,	European	Division,	“Possible	Canadian-Soviet	Exchange	of	Visits	on	Arctic	Affairs,”	Ottawa,	February	16,	1960.	DEA/10438-V-14-40.	Interestingly,	in	1965,	a	Canadian	delegation	led	by	Minister	of	Northern	Affairs	and	National	Resources	Arthur	Laing	visited	the	Soviet	arctic,	with	special	emphasis	on	Eastern	Siberia.	For	a	detailed	account	of	this	exchange,	see	Lev	Golubev,	“Profitable	Exchanges	and	Contacts	between	USSR	and	Canada,	Arctic,	Vol.	18,	No.	4	(Dec.,	1965),	207-212.	Whether	the	persistent	efforts	by	officials	to	arrange	an	exchange	in	Northern	affairs	during	the	Diefenbaker	government	had	any	impact	on	the	1965	exchange	is	unclear.	Perhaps	it	was	simply	the	change	in	government	from	Diefenbaker	to	Pearson	that	caused	the	Soviets	to	lower	their	guard	with	respect	to	Canada’s	interest	in	the	Soviet	North.		
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“the	 degree	 of	 reciprocity	 thus	 far	 achieved	 has	 been,	 in	 my	 judgment,	 far	 from	satisfactory,” 75 	highlighting	 Canada’s	 constant	 struggle	 to	 achieve	 a	 balanced	exchange	program	with	the	USSR.	
	 Despite	 the	difficulties	 faced	by	 the	Canadian	government,	 and	 the	ongoing	lopsidedness	of	exchanges	in	favour	of	the	Soviets,	Canada	was	still	able	to	pursue	worthwhile	exchanges.	The	realm	of	science	and	technology	was	one	fruitful	avenue.	For	 instance,	 the	 exchange	 of	 letters	 between	 the	 National	 Research	 Council	 of	Canada	 (NRC)	 and	 the	 Academy	 of	 Science	 of	 the	 USSR	 proved	 to	 be	 of	 mutual	benefit	 to	both	nations’	 scientific	 communities.	 In	1958,	 the	Canadian	Council	 and	Soviet	 Academy	 put	 forward	 suggestions	 for	 exchanges	 of	 scientists	 in	 order	 to	become	familiar	with	the	organization	and	state	of	research	in	the	fields	of	physics,	mathematics,	 chemistry,	 biology,	 and	 technology	 in	 each	 country.	 As	 a	 result,	 a	group	 of	 senior	 Soviet	 scientists	 toured	 Canadian	 Government	 research	establishments,	 universities,	 and	 industrial	 laboratories	 in	mid-1959.	 In	 return,	 a	group	of	Canadian	scientists	representing	the	Council	toured	the	USSR,	as	guests	of	the	Academy.	During	 the	course	of	 the	visit	 to	 the	USSR,	NRC	President	Dr.	E.W.R.	Steacie	 and	 President	 of	 the	 Academy,	 Alexander	 Nesmeyanov	 exchanged	 letters,	setting	out	the	basis	of	an	exchange	program	between	the	Academy	and	the	NRC.76	
	 Both	 parties	 agreed	 that	 rather	 than	 pursuing	 an	 agreement	 at	 the	government	level,	an	exchange	of	letters	essentially	allowed	the	contracting	parties																																																									75	DCER,	Vol.	29.	441.	Despatch	No.	1004.	Ambassador	in	Soviet	Union	to	Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“Cultural	Exchanges	Between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	November	30,	1962.	DEA/2462-E-40.	76	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	4185,	File	2462-40,	part	12,	Agreement	Between	the	National	Research	Council	and	
the	Soviet	Academy	of	Sciences	for	the	Exchange	of	Scientists.	n.d.	
	 119	
to	 represent	 their	 specific	 institutions	 and	 did	 not	 directly	 represent	 their	respective	governments.	The	exchange	of	letters	was	signed	on	October	28,	1959.77	Overall,	 the	 Soviet	 scientific	 community	 impressed	 the	 NRC,	 and	 it	 believed	Canadian	 scientists	 had	 much	 to	 gain	 from	 an	 exchange	 program.	 Unlike	 the	imbalanced	 nature	 of	 Canadian-Soviet	 exchanges	 generally,	 the	 NRC	 and	 the	Academy’s	exchange	program	was	quite	reciprocal.	For	instance,	with	the	exception	of	 one	 scientist,	 the	 Academy	 accepted	 all	 the	 proposals	 for	 visits	 from	 Canadian	scientists	 for	 the	1960-61	academic	year,	 and	 the	NRC	assessed	 the	agreement	 as	“entirely	 satisfactory.” 78 	Additionally,	 the	 NRC	 explained,	 “all	 of	 the	 Canadian	visitors	 to	 the	USSR	have	returned	 to	Canada	 feeling	 that	 their	visit	has	been	well	worthwhile	and	that	 they	have	gained	 in	 their	own	 fields	a	valuable	knowledge	of	Soviet	 scientific	 developments.”	 Having	 Soviet	 scientists	 in	 Canada	 working	 daily	with	Canadian	researchers	also	had	“a	direct	benefit	to	Canadian	science.”79	
	 Exchanges	 between	 Soviet	 and	 Canadian	 scientists	 would	 have	 played	 an	important	role	 in	bringing	the	nations	closer	 together	and	 in	 improving	Canadian-Soviet	 relations	 generally.	 While	 very	 little,	 if	 anything,	 has	 been	 written	 on	Canadian-Soviet	 scientific	 exchanges	 during	 this	 period,	 American	 scholarship	 on	American-Soviet	 scientific	 exchanges	 does	 exist,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 such	interactions	 has	 been	 well	 established.	 Traditionally,	 the	 scientific	 and	 academic	communities	have	been	the	most	pro-Western	segments	of	Russian	society,	and	the																																																									77	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	2462-40,	part	10,	Despatch	Canadian	Chargé	d’Affairs,	Moscow	to	
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,		“Exchange	of	Letters	Between	the	National	Research	Council	and	the	Soviet	Academy	of	Sciences,”	October	29,	1959.	78	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	4185,	File	2462-40,	part	12,	Agreement	Between	the	National	Research	Council	and	
the	Soviet	Academy	of	Sciences	for	the	Exchange	of	Scientists.	n.d.	79	Ibid.	
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most	 prominent	 calls	 for	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights	 have	 come	 from	 their	ranks.80	A	former	US	science	attaché	in	Moscow,	John	M.	 Joyce,	stated	that	 in	what	was	considered	basically	a	conservative	Soviet	society,	“‘the	most	outward-looking	people,	 the	 people	 most	 susceptible	 to	 external	 influence,	 are	 the	 scientists.’”81	Exchanging	 researchers	 and	 scientists,	 then,	 would	 have	 fit	 well	 with	 Canada’s	policy	of	exposing	the	USSR	to	Western	practices,	while	also	gaining	knowledge	of	innovative	 ideas.	 In	 1959,	 the	 US	 National	 Academy	 of	 Sciences	 and	 the	 Soviet	Academy	 signed	 a	 similar	 agreement	 to	 the	 one	 entered	 into	 by	 the	NRC	 and	 the	Soviet	Academy.	The	general	terms	of	the	agreement	were	virtually	identical	to	the	Canadian-Soviet	 exchange	 of	 letters,	 and	 provided	 “for	 short-term	 exchanges	 of	scientists	 to	 deliver	 lectures,	 conduct	 seminars,	 and	 gain	 familiarization	 with	scientific	 research,	 as	 well	 as	 long-term	 exchanges	 for	 scientific	 research	 and	advanced	 study.”82 	As	 historian	 Yale	 Richmond	 aptly	 points	 out,	 the	 scientific	exchanges	 “served	 to	 establish	 the	 first	 postwar	 linkages	 between	 American	 and	Soviet	 scientists,	 helped	 to	 increase	 American	 knowledge	 of	 Soviet	 science,	 and	prepared	 the	way	 for	 an	 expansion	 of	 [science	 and	 technology]	 exchanges	 during	the	 détente	 years.” 83 	Piggybacking	 on	 Richmond’s	 observations,	 it	 is	 not	 an	unreasonable	 leap	 to	 suggest	 that	 similar	 conclusions	 could	 be	 drawn	 about	 the	Canadian	context.																																																									80	Yale	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War:	Raising	the	Iron	Curtain	(Pennsylvania:	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2003),	65,	referencing	Loren	Graham	and	Andrew	Kuchins,	in	
Washington	Post,	November	19,	1998,	2	81	John	M.	Joyce,	“US-Soviet	Exchanges:	A	Foot	in	the	Soviet	Door,”	paper	no.	11	in	Soviet	Science	and	
Technology:	Eyewitness	Accounts	(Cambridge:	Russian	Research	Centre,	Harvard	University,	1981),	as	quoted	in	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War,	65.	82	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War,	68.	83	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War,	69.	
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	 Also	to	 the	West’s	advantage	was	the	 fact	 that	Soviet	exchange	participants	appear	to	have	been	instructed	to	disseminate	widely	the	results	of	their	travel	and	study	abroad	and	did	so	through	lectures	and	published	papers.	It	is	safe	to	assume,	therefore,	 that	 these	 academics	 “must	 have	 told	 their	 educated	 and	 perceptive	audiences	 much	 about	 the	 world	 beyond	 Soviet	 borders.” 84 Canadian-Soviet	scientific	exchanges	proved	to	be	beneficial	not	only	from	the	academic	perspective,	but	 also	 from	 political	 and	 ideological	 vantages.	 While	 the	 Canadian	 government	played	a	limited	role	in	academic	exchanges,	scholarly	interaction	encouraged	East-West	 bridge	 building	 and	 nurtured	 ties	 between	 Canadian	 and	 Soviet	 academic	communities.		 FROM	ICE	RINKS	TO	CONCERT	HALLS		 While	 the	spirit	of	academia	 is	based	on	cooperation	and	collaboration,	 the	two	 nations	were	 not	 afraid	 to	 harness	 the	 competitive	 edge	 of	 sport	 to	 promote	national	 pride	 and	 patriotism.	 Hockey	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 popular	 pastime	 for	 both	countries,	 as	 each	 side	 sought	 to	 display	 their	 respective	 national	 vitality	 and	prestige.	 As	 one	 historian	 puts	 it,	 “sport	 can	 serve	 as	 an	 unobtrusive	 form	 of	propaganda.85	Politics	may	bleed	 into	 sport.	According	 to	 sociologist,	Alex	Nathan,	“international	competitive	sport	has	become	an	arena	for	ideologies,	mirroring	the	same	 tensions	 as	 are	 seen	 throughout	 the	 world	 on	 the	 purely	 political	 plane.”86	Rightly	 so,	 the	 1972	 Summit	 Series	 between	Canada	 and	 the	USSR	has	 captivated																																																									84	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War,	74.	85	James	Riordan,	“Soviet	Sport	and	Soviet	Foreign	Policy,”	Soviet	Studies,	Vol.	26,	No	3	(Jul.,	1974),	322.	86	Alex	Nathan,	“Sports	and	Politics,”	in	J.W.	Loy	and	G.S.	Kenyon,	eds.,	Sports,	Culture	and	Society:	A	
Reader	on	the	Sociology	of	Sport	(Philadelphia:	Lea	&	Febiger,	1981),	206.	
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Canadians,	 and	 the	 series	 represents	 the	 ultimate	 expression	 of	 “hockey	diplomacy.”87	Yet,	 Canadian-Soviet	 hockey	matchups	 preceded	 the	 Summit	 Series.	While	 their	 significance	 may	 not	 match	 the	 1972	 series,	 Canadian-Soviet	 games	played	 during	 the	 late	 fifties	 and	 early	 sixties	 indeed	 remained	 politically	 and	ideologically	 charged,	 and	were	 important	 opportunities	 for	 both	 sides	 to	 project	national	 greatness.	 Canada,	 in	 particular,	 could	 boast	 middle	 power	 prowess	 if	victorious	 over	 the	 Communist	 superpower,	 while	 simultaneously	 utilizing	 “its	position	[…]	as	a	 ‘peacekeeper’	 to	mediate	 the	tensions	between	East	and	West.”88	On	 the	 eastern	 side	 of	 the	 curtain,	 sports	 in	 general,	 and	 certainly	 hockey	 in	particular,	became	one	of	the	best	and	most	comprehensible	means	of	explaining	to	the	masses	the	advantages	of	socialism	over	capitalism.89	
	 At	the	very	least,	the	matches,	as	well	as	the	lead	up	to	the	games,	were	a	sign	that	the	Soviets	viewed	Canada	as	a	formidable	hockey	opponent.	Not	only	that,	the	Soviet	media	used	commentary	 from	Canadian	players	and	coaches	as	a	means	 to	highlight	 the	West’s	 positive	 perception	 of	 the	 USSR	 in	 general,	 and	 its	 advanced	sporting	infrastructure	in	particular.	For	instance,	one	article	reported	the	Canadian	Coach	of	the	Kelowna	Packers	hockey	team	as	praising	the	Moscow	Sports	Palace	as	“One	of	the	best	I’ve	ever	seen.	[…]	Excellent	ventilation,	good	ice	and,	what	is	even	more	 important,	 soft	 lighting	which	 never	 disturbs	 the	 players	 during	 the	 game.”	The	Soviet	article	spent	much	time	detailing	the	Canadians’	leisure	time,	describing																																																									87	Donald	Macintosh,	Michael	K.	Hawes,	Donna	Ruth	Greenhorn,	and	David	R.	Black,	Sport	and	
Canadian	Diplomacy	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1994),	21.	88	Sean	Rushton,	“The	Origins	and	Development	of	Canada’s	Public	Diplomacy,”	in	Potter,	Branding	
Canada,	92.	89	Riordan,	“Soviet	Sport	and	Soviet	Foreign	Policy,”	322.	
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the	 athletes’	 positive	 impressions	 of	 the	 Bolshoi	 Theatre,	 the	 two-tiered	 bridge	across	the	Moscow	River,	the	Kremlin,	and	the	Circus.	Additionally,	the	article	made	a	point	of	highlighting	the	skills	of	the	Soviet	players	as	seen	through	Canadian	eyes.	The	 coach	was	 quoted	 saying,	 “In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 excellent	 physical	 fitness	 of	Soviet	players	should	be	noted,	[…]	we	have	acquainted	ourselves	with	the	training	system	of	Soviet	teams	and	consider	it	to	be	perfect.”90	The	article	certainly	praised	the	Soviet	hockey	system	over	 its	Canadian	counterpart,	but	 it	 is	revealing	 that	so	much	 emphasis	 was	 placed	 on	 the	 positive	 views	 of	 the	 Soviet	 system	 held	 by	Canadian	athletes	and	coaches.	In	other	words,	because	Canadian	hockey	was	seen	as	world	class,	 the	Soviets	used	Canadians	praise	as	 leverage	 to	bolster	 their	own	excellence.	At	the	same	time,	however,	it	may	have	elevated	Canadian	hockey	status	by	indirectly	acknowledging	the	importance	of	Canadian	opinions.	
	 Self-affirmation	 was	 not	 the	 only	 tactic	 the	 Soviets	 adopted	 during	 their	reporting	on	Canadian-Soviet	hockey	matches.	In	fact,	in	March	1959,	one	despatch	from	 the	 embassy	 in	 Moscow	 to	 the	 SSEA	 highlighted	 how	 “by	 and	 large,	 Soviet	newspapers	have	been	quite	complimentary	to	the	team	with	respect	to	their	ability	as	hockey	players.”	In	fact,	after	one	game	where	the	Belleville	MacFarlands	beat	the	Soviet	team	at	the	World	Championships	in	Prague,	Ambassador	Johnson	explained	how	 “the	 Soviet	press	 continues	 to	praise	 [the	Canadian	 team]	and	 to	 admit	 their	superiority	over	the	Russian	team.”	The	despatch	then	pointed	out	how	an	article	in	
Sovietskaya	Rossiya	 made	 this	 view	 clear	 when	 it	 reported,	 “to	 speak	 objectively,	
																																																								90	Y.	Sterligov,	“Soviet	Players	are	good	Stick-Wielders,”	Soviet	News	Bulletin	(Published	by	the	Press	Office	of	the	USSR	Embassy	in	Canada),	December	2,	1958.	
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even	 before	 the	 game	 we	 could	 see	 that	 the	 Canadians	 surpassed	 our	 team	 in	technique	and	speed.”91	The	Canadians,	indeed,	were	seen	as	a	formidable	force	on	the	ice.	
	 The	 popularity	 and	 spectatorship	 surrounding	 Canadian-Soviet	 matchups	was	highlighted	when	the	1960	Allan	Cup	Champions,	the	Chatham	Maroons,	visited	the	USSR	 to	play	a	 series	of	games	with	various	Soviet	 teams.	The	Maroons	had	a	tough	seven	game	lineup,	and	even	prior	to	their	arrival	the	Soviet	press	referenced	the	 impending	 visit	 by	 noting,	 “publicity	material	 adorned	many	 of	 the	 billboards	throughout	 [Moscow].”	 The	 first	 two	 games	 witnessed	 the	 Maroons	 facing-off	against	the	Soviet	National	All-Star	team.	The	games	were	split	one	win	apiece,	with	Chatham	winning	 5-3	 in	 the	 first	 game,	 but	 getting	 clobbered	11-2	 in	 the	 second.	The	Canadian	embassy	explained	that	many	members	of	 the	 legation	attended	the	games,	and	the	popularity	of	the	matches	was	“quite	evident	as	all	20,000	seats	 in	the	stadium	[had]	been	sold	out	for	each	game.”	It	was	also	noted	that	the	“press	and	television	 coverage	 has	 been	 most	 extensive.”	 Stories	 appeared	 in	 Izvestia	 and	
Sovietskaya	Rossiya	prior	to	the	matchups	that	detailed	the	Canadian	team	and	the	players,	 while	 Pravda	 covered	 post-game	 analysis.	 Of	 the	 first	 game,	 Pravda	reported,	 the	 “guests	 played	 a	 most	 skillful,	 assured	 and	 exceptionally	 well-coordinated	game.”	The	coverage	did	not	stop	there.	The	first	two	games	against	the	Soviet	 All-Star	 team	 were	 televised	 in	 their	 entirety,	 which,	 according	 to	 the	Canadian	embassy,	was	an	“unusual	feature	in	that	relatively	little	live	telecasting	is	
																																																								91	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6824,	File	No.	2462-40	part	9,	Despatch	Canadian	Embassy,	Moscow	to	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canadian	Hockey	Team	at	World	Championships,”	March	16,	1959.	
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done	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union.”	 Additionally,	 there	 had	 been	 at	 least	 two	 televised	interviews	with	officials	accompanying	the	Canadian	team.92	
	 The	 Canadian	 press,	 however,	 was	 less	 enthusiastic	 about	 the	 Maroons’	performance	 against	 the	 USSR’s	 All-Star	 team.	 The	 Globe	 and	 Mail	 presented	 an	entirely	 different	 view	 than	 Pravda,	 by	 focusing	 on	 Canadian	 Amateur	 hockey	officials.	 One	 article	 scathingly	 titled,	 “Send	 Top	 Pro	 Team	 to	 USSR?	 One-Sided	Hockey	Wins	Embarrass	Russians”	opened	with	a	quote	 from	the	 former	manager	and	 coach	 of	 the	 Chatham	 Maroons,	 John	 Horeck,	 who	 stated,	 “Mediocrity	 of	Canadian	hockey	abroad	is	humiliating	to	Canada	and	embarrassing	to	Russia.”	The	main	 message	 of	 the	 article	 was	 that	 the	 Soviets	 were	 making	 rapid	 progress	 in	hockey,	 and	Canada	needed	not	only	 to	 respect	 this	 fact	but	 to	 face	 it	 head	on	by	sending	 not	 its	 amateur	 hockey	 teams	 but	 teams	 and	 players	 from	 the	 National	Hockey	 League	 (NHL).	 Horeck	 explained	 that	 the	 “Russians	 would	 prefer	 to	 see	[Montreal]	Canadiens	or	[Toronto	Maple]	Leafs.	[…]	They	respect	our	ability	to	play	hockey.	That	 is	why	 they	cannot	understand	our	sending	 inferior	 teams	 to	Russia.	[…]	 They	 realize	 they’ll	 probably	 be	 beaten,	 but	 they’ll	 enjoy	 the	 game	 and	 learn	something.”93	The	sense	of	national	pride	came	through	in	the	article,	though	there	was	marked	disappointment	that	Canada’s	greatness	as	a	hockey	nation	was	not	so	apparent	in	the	international	“arena,”	so	to	speak.	The	image	of	Canadian	dominance	
																																																								92	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	4185,	File	No.	2462-40	part	12,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Embassy,	Moscow	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Visit	of	Canadian	Hockey	Team	to	the	Soviet	Union,”	November	30,	1960;	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	4185,	File	No.	2462-40	part	12,	Memorandum	European	Division	
to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Visit	of	Canadian	Hockey	Team	to	the	Soviet	Union,”	December	15,	1960.	93	Globe	and	Mail,	“Send	Top	Pro	Team	to	USSR?	One-Sided	Hockey	Wins	Embarrass	Russians,”	December	21,	1960.	
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in	 hockey	was	 not	 corroborated	 on	 the	world	 stage,	 and	 countries	 like	 the	 USSR	expected	 more.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 the	 political	 and	 ideological	underpinnings	of	hockey	were,	no	doubt,	present	both	on	and	off	the	ice.	
	 Blatant	Cold	War	rhetoric,	however,	was	largely	absent	from	the	coverage	of	the	hockey	games	between	teams	representing	Canada	and	USSR	during	this	period.	This	 does	 not	mean,	 though,	 that	 their	 ideological	 and	 political	 significance	were	entirely	absent.	Just	as	scientific	and	performing	arts	exchanges	did	not	have	to	be	laden	 with	 Cold	 War	 jargon	 to	 be	 important	 avenues	 for	 lessening	 international	tensions,	hockey	too	served	as	a	viable	means	to	connect	two	otherwise	antithetical	national	systems.	Granted,	according	to	some,	Canadian	performances	 in	 the	USSR	left	much	to	be	desired,	but	 it	was	clear	 that	respect	 for	Canadian	hockey	abilities	permeated	Soviet	society.	As	a	result,	Canadian	hockey	served	as	a	modest	avenue	for	 projecting	 awareness	 of	 Canada,	 a	middle	 power	 in	 the	 Cold	War,	 behind	 the	Iron	Curtain.	
	 Not	 only	 did	 the	 hockey	 arena	 provide	 a	 venue	 for	 projecting	 Canadian	cultural	 greatness,	 but	 so	 too	 did	 the	 stage.	 Canada’s	 performing	 artists,	 as	 with	pianist	 Glenn	 Gould	 in	 1957,	 served	 as	 non-state	 actors	 who	 operated	 in	 the	international	 sphere	and,	 “through	 informal	penetration	of	 foreign	cultures,”	were	able	 to	 “gather	 information,	exert	policy	pressure,	and	 influence	public	opinion.”94	As	 historian	 Jeremi	 Suri	 argues,	 the	 success	 of	 non-state	 actors	 lies	 in	 person-to-
																																																								94	Carr,	“‘No	Political	Significance	of	Any	Kind’”,	12.	
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person	contact,	rather	than	government-to-government	relations.95	Addressing	US-Soviet	relations,	Richmond	notes	that	American	ensembles	and	soloists	touring	the	Soviet	Union	invariably	played	to	full	houses	and	were	likewise	appreciated	by	both	the	intelligentsia	and	the	general	public:	“The	intense	interest	of	the	Soviet	public	in	Western	 performing	 artists	 was	 amply	 demonstrated	 by	 sold-out	 halls,	 lines	 of	ticket	seekers	hundreds	of	yards	 long,	and	 the	storming	of	gates	by	 those	without	tickets.”96	Canadian	 Ambassador	 in	 Moscow	 Arnold	 Smith	 asserted	 there	 was	 a	genuine	 and	 very	 substantial	 Western	 interest	 in	 encouraging	 visits	 by	 Western	artists	and	cultural	groups	to	various	parts	of	the	USSR,		
	specifically	 in	order	 to	 increase	 the	exposure	of	various	 sections	of	this	 still	 essentially	 closed	 society	 to	 the	 outside	 world,	 and	 to	contribute	to	the	gradual	opening	up	of	Soviet	public	opinion	and	the	progressive	normalization	of	Western-Soviet	relations.	Provided	we	can	successfully	avoid	the	real	dangers	of	war,	and	do	not	blow	each	other	 up	 during	 the	 next	 decade	 or	 two	 (and	 I	 think	we	 can	 avoid	this),	 then	 there	 is	 I	 think	 substantial	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	further	 development	 of	 exchanges	 in	 cultural	 and	 other	 fields	(scientific,	 business,	 technical,	 etc.)	 can	 provide	 one	 of	 the	 best	hopes,	 and	 indeed	 one	 of	 the	 most	 effective	 instruments,	 in	encouraging	 the	 development	 of	 more	 normal	 and	 safer		international	attitudes	and	relations.97	Smith	 appeared	 to	 hold	 a	 particular	 soft	 spot	 for	 the	 performing	 arts.	 During	 his	time	 in	 Moscow,	 from	 1960	 to	 1963,	 Canada	 engaged	 in	 a	 series	 of	 meaningful	exchanges	of	performing	artists	with	his	host	nation,	much	to	his	delight.	
																																																								95	Jeremi	Suri,	“Non-government	Organizations	and	Non-State	Actors,”	in	Palgrave	Advances	in	
International	History,	ed.	Patrick	Finney	(Houndmills,	Hampshire,	UK:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2005),	224.	96	Richmond,	Cultural	Exchanges	and	the	Cold	War,	123-124.	97	DCER,	Vol.	29.	441.	Despatch	No.	1004.	Ambassador	in	Soviet	Union	to	Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“Cultural	Exchanges	Between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	November	30,	1962.	DEA/2462-E-40.	
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	 In	mid-1961,	 the	Montreal	 Symphony	Orchestra	 signed	 an	 agreement	with	the	 Soviet	 Ministry	 of	 Culture.	 Preliminary	 negotiations	 were	 carried	 out	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Culture	 and	 Ambassador	 Smith,	 before	 they	 were	 handed	 to	 Pierre	Beique	 of	 the	 Montreal	 Symphony	 Orchestra	 and	 Nicolas	 de	 Koudriavtzeff	 of	Canadian	 Concerts	 and	Artists	 in	Moscow.	De	Koudriavtzeff	 had	 been	 responsible	for	the	visits	to	Canada	of	many	Soviet	companies	and	individual	artists.	The	terms	of	 the	 agreement	 saw	 the	 Montreal	 Symphony	 Orchestra	 play	 five	 concerts	 in	Moscow,	followed	by	concerts	in	Leningrad,	Riga,	and	Kiev.	In	return,	Canada	hosted	the	Red	Army	Chorus	for	a	national	tour.98	
	 The	issue	of	reciprocity	continued	to	hover	over	Canadian-Soviet	exchanges	of	 performing	 artists.99	Regarding	 the	 Montreal	 Symphony	 Orchestra	 specifically,	
																																																								98	The	Montreal	Star,	“Celebrating	a	Cultural	Exchange:	Details	of	Orchestra’s	1962	Visit	to	Russia,”	July	7,	1961.	99	The	question	of	reciprocity,	according	to	Ambassador	Smith,	should	be	seen	in	three	aspects.	First	was	getting	contracts	for	Canadian	artists	or	artistic	groups	to	visit	the	USSR	as	counterparts	equal	in	size	to	those	arranged	to	tour	Canada.	Merely	arranging	for	an	individual	Canadian	singer	or	pianist	to	visit	the	USSR	in	exchange	for	the	visit	to	Canada	of	the	Bolshoi	Ballet	or	the	Moscow	Circus	was	not	considered	acceptable.	In	other	words,	Smith	called	for	some	degree	of	reciprocity	in	the	exchange	of	big	groups	for	big	groups	and	individual	artists	for	individual	artists.	This	was	a	constant	issue	related	to	all	types	of	exchanges	and	was	important	to	discussions	of	a	potential	cultural	agreement.	Second	was,	obtaining	a	reasonable	degree	of	reciprocity	in	the	number	of	cities	and	other	centres	in	which	the	visiting	artists	on	each	side	were	to	perform.	Ambassador	Smith	explained	that	the	Soviet	authorities	were	prone	to	trying	to	restrict	visiting	Western	artists	to	two	or	three	of	the	relatively	well-known	and	relatively	‘tame	or	civilized’	tourist	centres	in	the	Western	part	of	the	USSR	(e.g.	Moscow,	Leningrad,	Kiev,	and	sometimes	Yerevan	and	Tbilisi),	but	they	sought	opportunities	to	perform	in	all	parts	of	Canada.	It	was	difficult	and	very	unusual	for	western	artists	to	have	an	opportunity	to	perform	in	minor,	but	by	no	means	politically	or	culturally	unimportant,	Western	Soviet	cities	such	as	Odessa,	Rostov,	Kuibyshev,	Stalingrad,	and	Dniepropetrovsk.	Nevertheless,	the	populations	in	these	centres,	according	to	Smith,	“are	probably	even	more	anxious	than	those	in	Moscow,	Leningrad	and	Kiev	to	have	an	opportunity	of	seeing	representatives	of	Western	civilization	and	culture,	and	it	is	vastly	to	the	Western	political	interest	that	we	should	find	means	to	give	them	this	opportunity.”	DCER,	Vol.	29.	441.	Despatch	No.	1004.	Ambassador	in	Soviet	
Union	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Cultural	Exchanges	Between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	November	30,	1962.	DEA/2462-E-40.	The	imbalance	in	the	number	of	cities	the	respective	tours	visited	is	evident	in	that	the	Red	Army	Chorus	visited	no	fewer	than	eleven	Canadian	cities,	from	Vancouver	to	Montreal.	Red	Army	Singers,	Dancers,	and	Musicians,	Concert	Pamphlet,	August	1961.	The	third	aspect	deals	with	balanced	remuneration	and	is	discussed	above.		
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Smith	 highlighted	 the	 specific	 imbalance	 surrounding	 remuneration.	 In	 a	 most	revealing	and	highly	descriptive	despatch	to	the	SSEA,	Ambassador	Smith	explained	that	all	of	the	Montreal	Symphony	Orchestra	concerts	in	Soviet	cities	were	sold	out.	Nevertheless,	he	lamented,	that	whereas	the	Red	Army	Chorus	visited	several	cities	across	Canada	and	earned	high	pay	 in	convertible	dollars	(similar	to	several	other	major	 Soviet	 artistic	 troupes	 during	 that	 year	 and	 years	 prior),	 the	 Montreal	Symphony	 Orchestra	 “settled	 for	 payments	 solely	 in	 unconvertible	 rubles.”	 Their	tour	 became	 financially	 possible	 “only	 because	 the	 Quebec	 Government,	 the	Montreal	Arts	Council,	and	the	Canada	Council	all	considered	that	a	Soviet	tour	[…]	would	 offer	 such	 prestigious	 value	 to	 Montreal	 and	 Canada	 that	 they	 put	 up	 a	subsidy	 of	 $50,000	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 expenses.”	 As	 for	 the	 Orchestra	 itself,	 Smith	explained	 that	much	 like	 other	 performing	 groups	 or	 individual	 performers,	 they	found	it	in	their	interests,	“for	reasons	of	prestige	and	publicity	in	the	West,	as	well	as	for	understandable	reasons	of	personal	curiosity	and	satisfaction,	to	be	invited	to	perform	in	the	USSR,	which	still	has	some	of	the	glamour	of	the	exotic	unknown.”	As	a	result,	Western	artists	were	apt	to	accept	Soviet	contracts	offering	much	less	pay	than	they	normally	obtained	for	performances	in	the	West,	or,	as	was	often	the	case	for	Canadian	artists,	to	accept	contracts	“paying	them	wholly	or	in	substantial	part	in	 unconvertible	 rubles.”	 In	 contrast,	 Soviet	 officials	 in	 charge	 of	 arrangements	 in	this	field	“normally	drive	very	hard	and	very	successful	bargains	for	very	high	pay,”	which	 they	obtained	 in	 entirely	 convertible	 dollars,	 for	performances	 in	 countries	like	Canada	and	the	United	States.100																																																									100	DCER,	Vol.	29.	441.	Despatch	No.	1004.	Ambassador	in	Soviet	Union	to	Secretary	of	State	for	
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	 While	Canadian	impresarios	were	left	largely	to	fend	for	themselves	–	given	the	 natural	 arrangements	 of	 the	market	 economy	 –	 Soviet	 performing	 artists	 and	groups	had	the	weight	of	the	Soviet	government	behind	them,	 in	particular	that	of	the	 Ministry	 of	 Culture	 and	 the	 State	 Committee	 on	 Cultural	 Relations.	 After	 all,	sending	performing	artists	abroad	was	a	highly	organized	and	deliberate	element	in	Soviet	foreign	policy,	motivated	by	the	desire	to	further	influence	objectives	of	that	policy.	Yet,	an	important	tactic	existed	where	the	Canadian	government	could	help	Canadian	impresarios	and	where,	in	fact,	Canadian	officials	could	assist	in	balancing	Canadian-Soviet	exchanges.	Ambassador	Smith	explained:		
	The	 real	 bargaining	 lever	 for	 the	West	 in	 this	 area	 lies	 frankly	 and	bluntly	in	the	ability	of	Western	governments	to	refuse	the	necessary	visas.	This	lever	need	not	necessarily	or	normally	be	exercised	very	bluntly	or	overtly,	but	it	is	precisely	in	the	latent	recognition	that	this	lever	 exists	 that	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	 Western	 representatives	[…]	lies,	in	their	dealings	with	the	Soviet	government	representatives	with	whom	they	must	negotiate.	In	 other	 words,	 Smith	 was	 suggesting	 that	 the	 Canadian	 government	 did	 retain	some	power	in	the	field	of	cultural	exchanges	on	the	issue	of	reciprocity	and	should	wield	it,	albeit	in	a	calculated	way.	Smith	continued	and	cited	a	relevant	example	of	how	 he	 personally	was	 able	 to	 influence	 negotiations	 surrounding	 the	 agreement	between	the	Montreal	Symphony	Orchestra	and	the	Red	Army	Chorus.	
	 Ambassador	 Smith’s	 account	 of	 his	 role	 in	 the	 negotiations,	 while	 lengthy,	deserves	attention:		
	I	can	state	with	assurance	that	the	Soviet	authorities	would	not	have	gone	through	with	arrangements	for	the	visit	had	I	not	made	clear	to																																																																																																																																																																						
External	Affairs,	“Cultural	Exchanges	Between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	November	30,	1962.	DEA/2462-E-40.	
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them,	discreetly	but	effectively,	 that	 the	Canadian	public	would	not	for	long	accept	the	idea	of	cultural	exchanges	if	they	thought	that	this	field	was	 regarded	by	 the	 Soviet	 authorities	 as	 a	 one-way	 street.	 It	was	only	when	the	Soviet	authorities	got	the	impression	that	unless	they	 completed	 a	 contract	 for	 the	 visit	 of	 the	 Montreal	 Symphony	Orchestra	 they	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 continue	 sending	 important	Soviet	 cultural	 troupes	 to	 Canada,	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Government	organization	Gosconcert	and	 the	Soviet	Ministry	of	Culture	stopped	stalling	 and	 signed	 a	 firm	 contract	 for	 the	 visit	 of	 the	 Montreal	Symphony.	Nevertheless,	the	Montreal	Symphony’s	Soviet	tour	was,	I	think,	 a	 tremendous	 success,	 and	 it	 did	 a	 considerable	 amount	 to	make	 Canada	 better	 and	 more	 favourably	 known	 in	 the	 leading	western	 cities	 of	 this	 country.	 The	 Soviet	 Minister	 of	 Culture	 had	attached	particular	importance	to	our	permission	that	they	send	the	Red	Army	Chorus	to	Canada,	since	the	Americans	had	for	years	been	rejecting	Soviet	requests	that	it	be	allowed	to	tour	the	United	States.	They	regarded	the	Montreal	Symphony	tour	here	as	the	quid	pro	quo	for	the	Red	Army	Chorus.101	The	 significance	 of	 Smith’s	 role	 in	 the	 negotiations	 must	 not	 be	 underestimated.	Foremost,	 it	 demonstrates	 that	 even	 though	 the	 Canadian	 government	 did	 not	officially	sponsor	cultural	exchanges,	and	despite	the	absence	of	an	official	cultural	agreement,	 some	 officials	 still	 influenced	 exchange	 arrangements	 and	 played	 an	active	 and	 important	 role	 in	 their	 development.	 Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 official	agreement,	 there	 was	 opportunity	 for	 the	 Canadian	 government	 to	 exert	 some	influence.	In	addition,	Smith’s	support	for	cultural	exchanges	and	his	belief	in	both	their	cultural	and	political	significance	are	evident.	In	turn,	this	highlights	the	vital	role	 played	 by	 Canadian	 ambassadors	 in	 advancing	 Canada’s	 foreign	 policy	objectives,	 particularly	 in	 a	 cultural	 diplomacy	 context.	 Ambassador	 Smith’s	negotiations	 are	 also	 a	 small,	 but	 telling,	 example	 of	 how	 Canada	made	 advances	when	the	United	States	did	not.	While	the	Americans	had	routinely	rejected	a	tour																																																									101	DCER,	Vol.	29.	441.	Despatch	No.	1004.	Ambassador	in	Soviet	Union	to	Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“Cultural	Exchanges	Between	Canada	and	the	USSR,”	Ottawa,	November	30,	1962.	DEA/2462-E-40.	
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by	 the	Red	Army	Orchestra,	 the	Canadians	proved	more	 flexible	by	permitting	 the	tour.	 Consequently,	 while	 the	 Americans	 had	 refused	 to	 engage	with	 this	 specific	initiative	in	cultural	diplomacy,	Canada	was	able	to	contribute	to	the	West’s	overall	strategy	of	building	bridges	between	East	and	West.		
	 The	Symphony	as	a	whole	was	not	the	only	success	during	the	Soviet	tour,	as	Canadian	 soloists	 captivated	 Soviet	 audiences	 as	 well.	 Teresa	 Strates,	 a	 soprano	from	 Toronto,	 was	 asked	 by	 Ambassador	 Smith	 to	 perform	 a	 solo	 concert	 at	 the	Kremlin	Hall,	while	on	tour	with	the	Montreal	Symphony	Orchestra.	Soviet	Minister	of	 Culture	 Ekaterina	 Furtseva	was	 reported	 to	 have	 “applauded	 the	 young	 singer	enthusiastically	from	her	front	row	seat.”102	
	 In	 November	 1963,	 now	 as	 assistant	 undersecretary	 of	 state	 for	 external	affairs	 under	 the	 new	 Liberal	 government,	 Smith	 addressed	 the	 International	Council	of	Museum	of	Modern	Art.	In	a	speech	titled,	“The	Position	of	the	Artists	in	the	USSR,”	he	discussed	the	importance	of	freedom	of	expression	to	Soviet	society.	Smith	stated	that	Khrushchev	explained	to	him	personally	“that	as	society	becomes	technologically	more	advanced	and	more	complex	it	 is	necessary	[…]	to	encourage	more	initiative	on	the	part	of	the	increasingly	widespread	and	increasingly	educated	layers	of	the	population.”	If	freedom	of	expression	was	to	be	slowly	nurtured	in	the	Soviet	 Union,	 Smith	 explained,	 “much	 of	 it	 will	 be	 used	 to	 encourage	 awkward	questions	and	to	demand	also	an	increased	normalization	of	Soviet	life,	and	I	think,	
																																																								102	LAC,	MG31	E47,	Arnold	Cantwell	Smith	Papers,	Vol.	80,	File	No.	38-5,	Unknown	newspaper	source,	“Toronto	Soprano	Scores	Hit	With	Moscow	Performance,”	April	24,	1962.	
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less	 risky	 and	 less	 hostile	 attitudes	 to	 the	 West.”	 Smith	 saw	 an	 important	 link	between	freedom	of	expression	and	the	arts.	To	this	point,	Smith	asserted:		
I	 think	 that	 the	 West	 can	 help,	 in	 this	 vitally	 important	 matter	 of	which	way	Russia	will	go,	precisely	by	the	sort	of	activity	with	which	you	 [artists]	 are	 engaged.	 In	 my	 judgment	 cultural	 contacts	 and	exchanges	on	a	reciprocal	basis	with	the	Soviet	Union	can	play	a	role	of	 great	 strategic	 and	 political	 importance	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	 peace	and	 a	 more	 normal	 world.	 Getting	 to	 know	more	 here	 in	 the	West	about	Russia’s	 literary	and	artistic	 creations	enrich	us.	Helping	 their	public,	 and	 above	 all	 their	 intelligentsia,	 to	 learn	 something	 of	Western	 cultural	 achievement	 can	 stimulate,	 encourage	 and	strengthen	the	artists	and	certain	writers	and	taskmasters	among	the	Soviet	population,	giving	them	not	merely	a	desire	for	freer	and	more	normal	international	relations,	but	helping	them	to	develop	the	moral	courage	which	they	will	need	in	leading	and	pulling	their	own	country	toward	the	more	open	society	which	they	desire.103	Smith’s	 speech	 is	 a	 testament	 that	 his	 role	 as	 ambassador	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union	affirmed	his	view	regarding	the	importance	of	East-West	cultural	contacts.	It	is	clear	that	he	certainly	believed	in	the	viability	and	importance	of	such	contacts.	
	 Diefenbaker,	 too,	 was	 mindful	 of	 the	 significance	 of	 cultural	 exchanges	 to	Canadian	foreign	policy	initiatives.	The	Prime	Minister	made	public	his	support	for	the	 Montreal	 Symphony	 Orchestra’s	 tour.	 The	 Montreal	 Star	 reported	 that	Diefenbaker	paused	during	an	address	on	Canada’s	international	relations	to	point	out	that	“cultural	exchanges	such	as	the	tour	of	the	Montreal	Symphony	Orchestra	helped	 greatly	 to	 create	 a	 better	 climate	 for	 lessening	 of	 tensions.”	 In	 addition,	Diefenbaker	 said	 that	 international	 conferences	 could	 “get	 nowhere	 without	 the	necessary	goodwill	among	nations,”	and	that	exchanges	such	as	these	helped	foster																																																									103	LAC,	MG31	E47,	Arnold	Cantwell	Smith	Papers,	Vol.	82,	File	No.	27,	Address	by	Arnold	Smith,	
Assistant	Undersecretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	of	Canada	to	Annual	Dinner	Meeting	of	
International	Council	of	Museum	of	Modern	Art,	New	York,	“The	Position	of	the	Artist	in	the	USSR,”	November	13,	1963.	
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“an	atmosphere	of	mutual	goodwill.”104		While	Diefenbaker’s	statement	refers	to	the	importance	 of	 cultural	 exchanges,	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 his	 reference	 to	 international	conferences	that	they	were	not	seen	as	a	powerful	foreign	policy	tool	on	their	own;	rather,	he	recognized	these	exchanges	as	one	element	of	a	multi-faceted	approach	to	Canadian	 foreign	policy.	Also	 interesting	 is	his	 reference	 to	 “mutual	goodwill.”	His	acknowledgement	that	cultural	exchanges	have	the	ability	to	“lessen	tensions”	 is	a	testament	 to	 the	 power	 of	 cultural	 “weapons”	 in	 breaking	 down	 barriers.	 Music	could,	in	effect,	transcend	national	allegiances.		
	 Even	before	artists	made	their	way	to	the	USSR,	Diefenbaker	was	supportive	of	 their	 efforts	 to	 organize	 a	 tour.	 For	 instance,	 Alexander	Brott,	 a	 conductor	 and	professor	 in	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Music	 at	 McGill	 University,	 worked	 to	 organize	 a	conducting	tour	of	various	Soviet	orchestras,	making	arrangements	directly	through	the	 Soviet	 Embassy	 in	 Ottawa	 and	 the	 state	 concert	 management	 company	Goskoncert.105	Brott	received	confirmation	that	his	tour	was	included	in	the	plan	for	cultural	 exchanges	 for	 1962,	 but	 then	 heard	 nothing	 further	 from	 the	 Soviet	Embassy,	 despite	 numerous	 enquiries.106	Ambassador	 Aroutunian	 informed	 the	DEA	that	it	had	been	decided	that	Brott’s	fee	could	not	be	paid	in	dollars,	only	rubles	that	 could	 not	 be	 taken	 out	 of	 the	 USSR.	 Given	 this,	 Aroutunian	 was	 hesitant	 to	inform	 Brott	 of	 the	 news,	 anticipating	 it	 would	 be	 upsetting.	 Under-Secretary																																																									104	LAC,	MG31	E47,	Arnold	Cantwell	Smith	Papers,	Vol.	80,	File	No.	38-5,	The	Montreal	Star,	“PM	Praises	Orchestra’s	Europe	Trip,”	April	18,	1962.	105	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Letter	Secretary	to	the	USSR	Ambassador	to	A.	Brott,	March	5,	1962.	Microfilm,	429080;	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Letter	A.	Brott	to	S.	Shashkin,	Goskoncert,	Moscow,	March	11,	1962.	Microfilm,	429079;	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Letter	A.	Brott	to	Secretary	to	the	
USSR	Ambassador,	March	11,	1962.	Microfilm,	429078.	106	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Memorandum	N.A.	Robertson	to	the	Prime	Minister,	“Visit	to	the	Soviet	Union	of	Dr.	Alexander	Brott,”	March	12,	1962.	Microfilm,	429082.	
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Norman	Robertson,	 however,	 advised	Diefenbaker	 that	 the	DEA	 had	 suggested	 to	the	 Soviet	 embassy	 that	 Brott	 be	 informed	 immediately	 since	 “the	 tour	might	 be	important	to	him	for	reasons	other	than	financial	reward.”107	
	 Diefenbaker	wrote	Brott	personally,	explaining	that	enquiries	had	been	made	with	the	Soviet	Embassy	and	that	assurances	were	received	from	the	Embassy	that	the	Soviets	would	write	Brott	 immediately	about	his	 tour.	Diefenbaker	 then	asked	Brott	to	keep	him	updated.	If	the	professor	did	not	receive	word	from	the	Embassy	promptly,	 Brott	 was	 advised	 to	 let	 Diefenbaker	 know,	 suggesting	 that	 pressure	would	 again	 be	 applied	 from	 the	 Prime	 Minister’s	 office.108	Follow	 up	 proved	unnecessary.	 Shortly	 after	 the	 initial	 pressure	 had	 been	 applied	 to	 the	 Soviet	Embassy,	 Brott	 received	 confirmation	 regarding	 his	 upcoming	 tour.	 Brott	 then	expressed	 his	 gratitude	 to	 Diefenbaker	 for	 his	 “sympathetic	 interest.”109	The	 fact	that	 the	Prime	Minister	was	personally	willing	 to	 support	Brott	 and	his	 proposed	tour	of	 the	Soviet	Union	 further	 supports	 the	notion	 that	 cultural	 exchanges	were	viewed	as	an	important	component	of	Canadian	relations	with	the	USSR	during	the	Cold	War.	
	 CONCLUSION		 While	 Canada	 was	 entrenched	 firmly	 within	 the	Western	 bloc	 in	 the	 Cold	War	 and	 politically	 supported	 its	 NATO	 allies,	 it	 carved	 out	 a	 more	 independent	
																																																								107	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Memorandum	N.A.	Robertson	to	the	Prime	Minister,	“Visit	to	the	Soviet	Union	of	Dr.	Alexander	Brott,”	March	12,	1962.	Microfilm,	429082-429082-A.	108	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Letter	J.G.	Diefenbaker	to	A.	Brott,	March	16,	1962.	Microfilm,	429081.	109	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/U56),	Letter	A.	Brott	to	J.G.	Diefenbaker,	March	22,	1962.	Microfilm,	429077.	
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position	with	 the	 USSR	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 cultural	 realms.	 The	 appointment	 of	Aroutunian	as	Soviet	ambassador	confirms	the	notion	that	Canada	began	to	occupy	a	 more	 important	 place	 in	 the	 USSR’s	 foreign	 policy.	 While	 the	 Soviets	 hoped	 to	improve	 relations	 with	 Canada,	 the	 Americans	 were	 aggravating	 their	 North	American	 ally	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 PL	 480	 program.	 The	 United	States’	 giveaway	 program	 substantially	 reduced	 Canada’s	 ability	 to	 export	 wheat	and	 ultimately	 led	 Canada	 to	 seek	 out	 new	 export	 markets,	 particularly	 with	Communist	nations.	
	 Lester	 Pearson’s	 1955	 visit	 to	 the	 USSR	 was	 not	 primarily	 driven	 by	commercial	 factors,	yet	 it	 set	 in	motion	a	bilateral	 trading	relationship	 that	would	later	 prove	 important	 for	 Canadian	wheat	 growers	 and	 Canadian-Soviet	 relations	generally,	 beginning	 with	 a	 formal	 trade	 agreement	 in	 1956.	 Renewing	 the	 1956	Trade	 Agreement	 was	 important	 not	 only	 for	 domestic	 agriculture	 but	 also	 for	foreign	policy,	since	it	was	believed	that	commercial	relations	built	mutual	trust	and	reduced	suspicions.	Negotiations	were	by	no	means	smooth,	as	 the	Soviets	sought	an	 import	quota	 from	the	Canadian	government,	and	the	Canadians	sought	a	 fixed	importation	 of	 Canadian	 wheat.	 In	 the	 end,	 a	 1:2	 ratio	 was	 set	 that	 targeted	Canadian	imports	from	the	USSR	at	half	the	total	amount	of	goods	exported	to	the	USSR.	 In	 the	 end,	 however,	 this	 agreement	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 enforced.	 The	Diefenbaker	 years	 in	 Canadian-Soviet	 commercial	 relations	 may	 not	 have	 been	decisive	to	Canadian-Communist	European	relations	generally,	but	they	were	a	time	of	 bridge-building	 in	 relations	between	 the	 two	 sides	 in	 the	Cold	War.	Ultimately,	
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Canada	 and	 the	USSR	maintained	 economic	 ties	 important	 to	political	 relations	 in	the	uneasy	Cold	War	environment.	
	 In	 the	 field	 of	 cultural	 exchange,	 Canada	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 made	impressive	strides.	As	seen	with	economic	relations,	the	Diefenbaker	government’s	policy	 regarding	 cultural	 exchange	with	 the	USSR	was	 rooted	 in	 earlier	 initiatives	set	in	motion	by	the	Liberal	government	of	Louis	St.	Laurent	and	largely	developed	by	Jules	Léger.	The	Hungarian	Uprising,	however,	dampened	any	potential	exchange	programs	between	 the	 two	nations.	 It	would	 take	Glenn	Gould’s	 1957	 tour	 of	 the	Soviet	 Union	 to	 reignite	 these	 efforts.	 The	 Progressive	 Conservatives	 essentially	took	 up	 policy	 from	 where	 it	 had	 been	 left	 by	 the	 Liberals,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	challenging	 events	 in	 Hungary.	 Negotiations	 between	 Canada	 and	 the	 USSR	regarding	 an	 official	 cultural	 exchange	 agreement	 never	 materialized,	 in	 spite	 of	consistent	 Soviet	 pressure	 to	 obtain	 one.	 Instead,	 a	 quid	 pro	 quo	 approach	 to	exchanges	was	maintained.	
	 Academia,	 hockey,	 and	 the	 performing	 arts	 all	 proved	 to	 be	 mutually	advantageous	 avenues	 for	 advancing	 cultural	 exchanges,	 serving	 the	 larger	Canadian	 policy	 objective	 of	 exposing	 Soviet	 citizens	 to	 Western	 modalities	 and	cultural	life.	Canadian	officials	consistently	wrestled	with	the	ongoing	imbalance	in	reciprocity	of	exchanges;	in	particular,	Canadian	Ambassador	Arnold	Smith	worked	hard	to	address	these	imbalances.	Even	without	a	bilateral	exchange	agreement,	at	times	the	Canadian	government	intervened	in,	or	facilitated,	negotiations	to	ensure	Canadian	 artists	 received	 fair	 treatment	 and	 that	 the	 Canadian	 cultural	 footprint	was	 left	 on	 Soviet	 society.	 Ultimately,	 Canadian	 governments	 in	 this	 period	
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supported	the	expansion	of	exchanges	in	various	fields	and	saw	them	as	a	necessary,	effective,	 and	 appropriate	way	 for	 Canada	 to	 engage	 in	 Cold	War	 diplomacy	 as	 a	middle	power.	Exchanges	of	all	 sorts	proved	a	worthy	avenue	 for	Canada	 to	build	bridges	between	East	and	West,	and	engage	in	the	Cold	War	through	other	means.
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	Chapter	3		
Politics	in	the	Shadows	of	Powerful	Superpowers:	Canadian-Yugoslav	
	 Diplomatic	Relations			 Canada’s	 relations	 with	 communist	 Yugoslavia	 were	 politically	 and	ideologically	charged.	Despite	their	differences,	bilateral	relations	were	most	often	positive	and	perceived	as	mutually	advantageous.	Importantly,	the	Soviet	Union	was	an	 ubiquitous	 element	 that	 also	 shaped	 Canada’s	 approach	 to	 Yugoslavia.	 When	John	Diefenbaker’s	Progressive	Conservative	government	came	to	power,	relations	with	Yugoslavia	were	 relatively	 insignificant.	During	 the	Diefenbaker	 government,	however,	relations	developed	in	a	manner	and	pace	unforeseen	to	that	point;	from	the	 late	 1950s	 onward,	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	 increasingly	 became	 an	important	 component	 of	 Canada’s	 Communist	 Europe	 policy,	 and	 by	 extension	 a	Cold	War	“battleground”	on	which	Canada	tried	to	challenge	European	communism	with	non-military	tactics.	As	a	result,	Canada	sought	to	cultivate	healthier	political,	commercial,	 and	 cultural	 exchanges	 with	 Yugoslavia	 to	 expose	 it	 to	 Western	modalities.	So,	Canada	saw	Yugoslavia	as	a	viable	point	where	Soviet	hegemony	over	Eastern	Europe	might	be	penetrated,	 lessening	 the	 “threat”	 of	 global	 communism.	While	 Canada’s	 Yugoslav	 policy	 mirrored	 that	 of	 the	 United	 States	 in	 some	important	 respects,	 it	 did	 not	 do	 so	 passively	 or	 uncritically.	 The	 development	 of	Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	 was	 challenging,	 not	 least	 because	 of	 Yugoslav	minority	 communities	 in	 Canada	 who	 sometimes	 proved	 politically	 and	ideologically	 motivated	 to	 oppose	 the	 relationship	 that	 Canada	 was	 trying	 to	
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develop.	This	chapter	explores	Canadian	officials’	motivations	to	develop	closer	ties	with	Yugoslavia	and	examines	the	various	fields	in	which	progress	was	achieved.			
	 While	trade	and	bilateral	exchanges	were	modest,	there	were	problems	and	varying	 degrees	 of	 success	with	 both.	 The	 political	 atmosphere	 and	 international	climate	of	the	Cold	War	meant	that	their	importance	was	heightened,	particularly	in	the	 eyes	 of	 Canadian	 officials.	 They	 recognized	 that	 commercial	 and	 cultural	relations	 were	 not	 important	 for	 entirely	 economic	 and	 cultural	 reasons;	 rather,	they	were	vital	for	political	and	ideological	purposes.	In	other	words,	the	desire	to	establish	 closer	 ties	was	 politically	motivated,	 and	 the	 Soviet	Union	was	 a	 crucial	consideration	 in	 Canada’s	 Yugoslav	 policy,	 and	 vice	 versa.	 Canada	 promoted	Yugoslavia’s	 independence	 and	pursued	 closer	bilateral	 relations	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	entice	 it	 into	 the	Western	 sphere	 of	 influence	 and	 to	weaken	 the	 influence	 of	 the	Soviet	 Union	 and,	 by	 extension,	 global	 communism.	 Cognizant	 of	 the	 USSR’s	ambition	 to	 have	 Yugoslavia	 within	 its	 European	 sphere	 of	 influence,	 Canadian	officials	 perceived	 a	 contest	 to	 “win	 over”	 Yugoslavia	 as	 a	way	 to	 limit	 the	 Soviet	Union’s	 international	 influence,	a	contest	 in	which	a	middle	power	such	as	Canada	might	wield	some	influence.	Overall,	cordial	relations	and	an	increase	in	exchanges	between	 the	 two	 nations	 exemplified	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 Yugoslavia	 to	Canadian	foreign	policy.	Moreover,	the	effort	to	establish	constructive	and	positive	relations	with	 Yugoslavia	 demonstrates	 that	 this	 happened	 at	 a	 decisive	moment	when	 Canadian	 officials	 increasingly	 saw	 Eastern	 Europe	 as	 an	 important	 and	influential	region	 in	 international	affairs	and	saw	opportunities	 for	middle	powers	to	shape	the	global	Cold	War.	
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	 Canada	 had	 few	 issues	 with	 Yugoslavia	 during	 this	 period,	 so	 the	 state	 of	political	 relations	 tended	 to	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 international	 situation	 and,	 in	particular,	 by	 Yugoslavia’s	 position	 in	 it.	 In	 fact,	 Canada’s	 policy	 was	 especially	shaped	 by	 changes	 east	 of	 the	 Iron	 Curtain.	 Limitations	 existed	 in	 how	 Canadian	officials	could	best	cultivate	closer	relations	as	a	means	of	challenging	the	spread	of	communism.	 Nevertheless,	 Canada’s	 policy	 of	 closer	 cooperation	 was	commensurate	with	its	middle	power	position.	Improved	relations	between	the	two	countries	 highlight	 the	 Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	 years	 as	 a	 decisive	 moment	 in	Canadian-Yugoslav,	and	concurrently,	Canadian-Eastern	European,	relations.	
	 YUGOSLAVIA,	THE	USSR,	AND	THE	CANADIAN	PERSPECTIVE			 Following	in	the	footsteps	of	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States,	the	Canadian	government	officially	recognized	the	Yugoslav	regime	in	December	1945.	Ottawa	 initially	 mistrusted	 the	 new	 Yugoslav	 regime,	 and	 this	 made	 difficult	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 Canadian	 diplomatic	 mission	 there.	 Generally,	 the	 Canadian	government	 tended	 to	 share	 the	 American	 and	 British	 view	 that	 Yugoslavia	 was	simply	 part	 of	 the	 belligerent	 Soviet	 monolith	 that	 threatened	 Western	 security	interests.	The	DEA	essentially	 characterized	Yugoslav	 foreign	policy	up	 to	 the	 late	1940s	as	somewhat	aggressive	and	dogmatic,	 in	serving	the	interests	of	the	Soviet	Union.1		 Planning	 for	 a	 Canadian	 diplomatic	 mission	 in	 Yugoslavia	 began	 in	 late	1947.	The	government	promoted	its	position	by	explaining	that	Canada	was	merely	following	up	on	the	appointment	in	1942	of	General	George	P.	Vanier	as	minister	to	
																																																								1	Nicholas	Gammer,	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking:	Canada’s	Response	to	the	Yugoslav	Crisis	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2001),	21.	
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the	 exiled	 Yugoslav	 government	 in	 London	 and	 was	 following	 a	 policy	 of	maintaining	contacts	with	East	European	states.	With	 the	exception	of	Greece,	 the	Canadian	mission	in	Belgrade	was	the	first	one	established	in	the	Balkans.2	
	 Yugoslavia’s	 leader,	 Joseph	 Tito,	 had	 broke	 with	 –	 or	 depending	 on	 one’s	perspective,	was	excommunicated	by	 the	USSR.	Diplomat	 John	Holmes	 stated	 that	the	 schism	 was	 good	 for	 the	 West,	 but	 he	 cautioned	 the	 government	 against	assuming	that	the	crisis	was	indicative	of	an	opportunity	for	a	quick	Western	victory	in	 the	Cold	War.3	Relations	 between	Yugoslavia	 and	 the	USSR	 entered	 a	 period	 of	
rapprochement	following	Nikita	Khrushchev	and	Nicolai	Bulganin’s	visit	to	Belgrade	in	1955.	 In	an	effort	 to	attract	Yugoslavia	back	 into	the	Soviet	sphere	of	 influence,	the	 two	 Soviet	 leaders	 acknowledged	 Soviet	 responsibility	 for	 the	 rupture	 of	relations	after	1948.4	Efforts	 to	mend	 this	 split	 continued	 following	 the	Twentieth	Party	 Congress	 in	 1956	 and	 Khrushchev’s	 denunciation	 of	 Stalin’s	 “cult	 of	personality.”5	The	 high	 point	 of	 reconciliation	 came	 when	 Tito	 journeyed	 to	 the	Soviet	 Union	 in	 1956	 and	 both	 countries	 agreed	 to	 reestablish	 direct	 relations	between	communist	parties	as	well	as	between	states.6	Cooperation	did	not	last	for	long,	however,	and	Soviet-Yugoslav	relations	soon	soured	again	following	the	Soviet																																																									2	Gammer,	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking,	23.	3	Adam	Chapnick,	Canada’s	Voice:	The	Public	Life	of	John	Wendell	Holmes	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2009),	62.	4	DCC,	File	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Memorandum	Chief	of	Protocol	to	JGD,	SSEA,	USSEA,	&	European	
Division,	21	August	1958.	Microfilm,	434025-434026.	5	Ivan	T.	Berend,	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	1944	–	1993:	Detour	from	the	Periphery	to	the	Periphery	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	107;	Vladislav	Zubok,	A	Failed	Empire:	The	Soviet	
Union	in	the	Cold	War	from	Stalin	to	Gorbachev	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2007),	99.		6	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Memorandum	Chief	of	Protocol	to	JGD,	SSEA,	USSEA,	European	Division,	21	August	1958.	Microfilm,	434025-434026.	
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Union’s	 intervention	 in	 Hungary.	 Additionally,	 Tito’s	 last	 minute	 decision	 not	 to	attend	the	summit	meeting	of	communist	leaders	in	Moscow	on	the	occasion	of	the	fortieth	anniversary	of	the	Russian	Revolution,	and	Yugoslavia’s	refusal	to	sign	the	Twelve-Party	Declaration	in	November	1957,	further	marked	the	development	of	a	deep	 schism	 from	 which	 retreat	 was	 difficult.7	By	 not	 signing	 the	 Twelve-Party	Declaration,	Yugoslavia	refused	to	acknowledge	the	Soviet	Union	as	the	uncontested	leader	of	 the	Communist	world.	 It	also	highlights	Yugoslavia’s	refusal	 to	recognize	that	 –	 despite	 Moscow’s	 (and	 Peking’s)	 insistence	 –	 the	 Communist	 struggle	 for	world	 power	 hinged	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 two	 camps.8	Essentially,	 this	 epitomized	 the	fundamental	basis	of	Yugoslavia’s	foreign	policy:	the	doctrine	of	active	co-existence	between	all	nations,	irrespective	of	differences	in	ideology	or	economic	and	political	systems.	
	 The	 Canadian	 embassy	 in	 Belgrade	 paid	 close	 attention	 to	 these	developments	and	saw	the	growing	wedge	between	Yugoslavia	and	the	Soviet	bloc	as	 an	 inter-communist	 Cold	War.	 Indeed	 it	was.	 To	 the	 Soviet	Union,	 Yugoslavia’s	revisionism	 was	 treacherous,	 particularly	 from	 an	 ideological	 point	 of	 view.	Consequently,	 this	 period	 –	 exemplified	 by	 Yugoslavia	 snubbing	 the	 Twelve-Party	Declaration	 –	 marks	 a	 crucial	 moment	 when	 Canadian	 officials	 strategically	 and	pragmatically	 cultivated	 stronger	 bilateral	 relations	 with	 Yugoslavia.	 The	Diefenbaker	years	coincided	with	strained	Soviet-Yugoslav	relations,	which	created																																																									7	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Memorandum	Chief	of	Protocol	to	JGD,	SSEA,	USSEA,	European	Division,	21	August	1958.	(434025).	8	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ambassador	in	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	External	and	Internal	Policy	in	Retrospect	and	Prospect,”	October	15,	1958.	
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the	 opportunity	 for	 Canada	 to	 promote	 closer	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations.	 To	Canadian	 officials,	 Yugoslav	 independence	 represented	 something	 more	 than	 an	inter-communist	 quarrel;	 it	 represented	 a	 potential	 catalyst	 to	 challenge	communism	from	the	inside.	This	was	essentially	the	underlying	agenda	that	drove	Canada’s	Yugoslav	policy.	
	 America’s	 Yugoslav	 policy	 was	 undoubtedly	 more	 complex	 than	 Canada’s,	arguably	because	of	 its	 role	as	 “leader	of	 the	 free	world”	and	as	 the	assumed	 first	line	of	defence	against	Communist	 infiltration.	As	well,	 the	United	States	provided	substantial	aid	to	Yugoslavia	beginning	in	1948	and	led	efforts	to	lure	Tito	into	the	Western	camp.	America’s	general	policy	toward	Yugoslavia,	while	fluid	 in	practice,	followed	 the	 general	 principles	 established	 in	 National	 Security	 Council	 (NSC)	Report	5805,	 from	February	1958.	According	to	NSC	5805,	the	Tito-Kremlin	break	in	1948,	and	the	consequent	departure	of	Yugoslavia	from	the	Soviet	bloc,	served	US	interests	in	two	major	ways:	the	continued	denial	to	the	USSR	of	important	strategic	positions	and	other	assets,	and	the	political	effects,	on	both	sides	of	the	Iron	Curtain,	of	a	break	in	the	“monolithic”	Communist	bloc.	In	order	to	preserve	these	gains,	NSC	5805	maintained		
the	United	States	extended	economic	and	military	aid	to	Yugoslavia.	This	aid	 was	 of	 crucial	 importance	 in	 keeping	 the	 Tito	 regime	 afloat	 under	severe	Soviet	pressures	and—by	indicating	US	concern	with	Yugoslavia’s	independence—in	 discouraging	 any	 Soviet	 inclination	 to	 attack	Yugoslavia.	 A	 further	 US	 purpose,	 as	 the	 military	 and	 economic	 aid	programs	 developed,	 has	 been	 to	 utilize	 them	 to	 influence	 Yugoslavia	toward	 closer	 political,	 economic	 and	 military	 collaboration	 with	 the	West,	 and	 to	 encourage	 such	 internal	 changes	 in	 Yugoslavia	 as	 would	facilitate	this	orientation.	
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The	 report	 also	 explained	 how	 US	 support	 of	 the	 maintenance	 of	 Yugoslav	independence	fit	into	broader	Eastern	European	policy,	which	had	“as	its	objective	the	 eventual	 attainment	 of	 complete	 national	 independence	 by	 all	 of	 the	 Eastern	European	satellites.”	Importantly,	the	report	also	stated,	
the	 example	 of	 Yugoslavia,	 which	 has	 successfully	 maintained	 its	independence	of	Soviet	domination,	stands	as	a	constant	reminder	to	the	satellite	regimes,	serving	as	a	pressure	point	both	on	the	leaders	of	these	regimes	 and	 on	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 USSR.	 Moreover,	 it	 appears	 that	Yugoslavia	 has	 encouraged	 certain	 leaders	 in	 the	 satellites	 to	 seek	greater	independence	from	Moscow.9	Canadian	and	American	Yugoslav	policy	followed	the	same	general	approach.	This	is	not	 to	say,	however,	 that	Canada	was	dependent	on	American	policy	 initiatives.	 In	fact,	utilized	Canada’s	middle	power	position	to	cultivate	common	ground	with	the	Yugoslavs.	 In	 effect,	 Canada	 and	 Yugoslavia	 shared	 something	 in	 common:	 both	nations	 pursued	 their	 foreign	 policies	 in	 the	 shadows	 of	 superpowers.	 Still,	similarities	between	the	two	also	should	not	be	overstated.	After	all,	Yugoslavia	held	a	 special	 position	 as	 a	 leading	nation	 in	 the	non-aligned	movement,	while	Canada	was	firmly	entrenched	in	the	Western	orbit.	
	 In	 historian	 Nicholas	 Gammer’s	 work,	 From	 Peacekeeping	 to	 Peacemaking:	
Canada’s	 Response	 to	 the	 Yugoslav	 Crisis,	 he	 argues	 that	 Canadian	 policy	 towards	Yugoslavia	 during	 the	 1950s	 and	 60s	 was	 anchored	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 through	collaboration	smaller	states	could	regain	their	voice	and	greater	control	over	their	
																																																								9	FRUS,	Vol.	X,	Part	2,	National	Security	Council	Report	(NSC)	5805,	“Draft	Statement	of	US	Policy	Toward	Yugoslavia,”	February	28,	1958.	
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own	 futures	 through	 international	 cooperation	 and	 international	 organizations.10	While	 championing	 national	 sovereignty	 was	 indeed	 an	 important	 element	 of	Yugoslavia’s	foreign	policy,	and	Canada	was	acutely	aware	of	this,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	Yugoslavia	itself	was	also	an	important	component	of	Canada’s	Soviet	policy	 equation,	 since	Yugoslav	 independence	 fueled	 a	 rupture	within	 the	Eastern	bloc.	 Canada’s	 hope,	 and	 indeed	 belief,	 that	 a	 divided	 communist	 world	 could	contribute	to	 its	eventual	collapse	was	very	real;	 it	 is	 important,	 therefore,	 to	take	into	account	this	expectation	when	assessing	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations.		
	 Canadian	officials	viewed	Yugoslavia	as	a	major	dilemma	for	the	Soviet	bloc.	The	 significance	 of	 its	 independence	 was	 clear	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 Canadian	 officials,	including	Ambassador	George	Ignatieff	(1956-58),	who	remarked,	“Tito’s	heresy,	 if	not	suppressed,	may	well	mark	the	beginning	of	 the	dissolution	of	 the	Communist	empire	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 fundamental	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 between	 the	 central	leadership	and	its	constituent	nations	at	the	periphery.”11	Ignatieff	explained	that	if	the	USSR	“did	not	succeed	in	breaking	down	Yugoslavia’s	will	to	independence,	they	are	bound	to	face	more	trouble	in	the	long	run	not	only	from	Poland	and	Hungary,	but	 also	 from	 the	 Germans	 who	 have	 lived	 under	 their	 control	 as	 well.”12	The	potential	 for	 Yugoslavia	 to	 disrupt	 the	 communist	 alliance	 was	 indeed	 fortuitous																																																									10	Gammer,	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking,	37.	Gammer’s	assertion	that	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations	should	be	viewed	in	this	framework	is	entirely	justified,	given	the	larger	focus	of	his	study	and	his	central	claim	that	much	later	Prime	Minister	Brian	Mulroney	seized	an	opportunity	to	redefine	international	standards	on	humanitarian	intervention,	thus	shifting	Canadian	foreign	policy.	11	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ambassador	in	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	External	and	Internal	Policy	in	Retrospect	and	Prospect,”	October	15,	1958.	12	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ambassador	in	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	External	and	Internal	Policy	in	Retrospect	and	Prospect,”	October	15,	1958.	
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from	the	West’s	perspective,	and	Canadian	officials	believed	this	was	a	worthwhile	foreign	policy	objective.	Ignatieff	explained	that		
[s]ince	the	Yugoslavs	are	the	least	dogmatic	of	all	Communists,	they	are	[…]	 the	most	 apt	 to	 benefit	 from	 visitors	 from	 the	Western	world	 by	breaking	down	prejudices	and	understanding	our	way	of	life.	It	 is	well	to	 bear	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 quarrel	 of	 the	 Yugoslavs	 with	 the	 other	Communists	 has	 made	 significant	 breaches	 in	 the	 ideological	 walls	separating	 this	 country	 from	 the	 West.	 Every	 advantage	 should,	therefore,	be	taken	to	try	and	expose	the	Yugoslavs	to	the	thinking	and	ways	 of	 the	Western	 world	 and	 to	 establish	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 this	country	in	building	up	a	better	understanding	with	the	countries	of	the	West.13	Ignatieff	 maintained	 that	 Canada	was	 in	 a	 particularly	 good	 position	 to	 influence	Yugoslav	policy	because,	whether	in	the	artistic,	commercial,	or	diplomatic	realms,	all	 forms	of	contact	were	welcome.	 Ignatieff	 further	asserted	that	Canada	was	 in	a	special	position	to	contribute	to	such	beneficial	contacts	because	“Canadians	on	the	whole,	not	belonging	to	one	of	the	major	powers	which	have	intervened	in	this	area,	are	more	likely	to	be	trusted.”14	This	line	of	thinking	was	consistent	throughout	the	tenure	 of	 all	 Canadian	 ambassadors	 during	 the	 Diefenbaker	 years.	 Succeeding	Ignatieff	 as	 Ambassador	 in	 1959,	 Robert	 Ford	 also	 recognized	 the	 importance	 of	Yugoslav	independence,	which	could	have	potentially	significant	political,	social,	and	economic	 implications.	 He	 asserted	 that	 Canada	 “can	 exert	 a	 greater	 influence	 in	keeping	Yugoslavia	independent	and	oriented	away	from	the	Soviet	bloc	than	many	
																																																								13	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ambassador	in	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	External	and	Internal	Policy	in	Retrospect	and	Prospect,”	October	15,	1958.	14	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ambassador	in	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	External	and	Internal	Policy	in	Retrospect	and	Prospect,”	October	15,	1958.	
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other	 countries	 of	 much	 greater	 size	 and	 importance	 in	 the	 NATO	 alliance.”15	Consequently,	Canada	strongly	supported	and	promoted	Yugoslav	independence	by	cultivating	 closer	 relations	 on	 all	 fronts,	 and	 these	 efforts	 became	 the	 foundation	upon	which	Canada	built	its	Yugoslav	policy.	
	 IGNATIEFF	AND	THE	HUNGARIAN	REFUGEE	CRISIS		 Canadian	 ambassadors	 played	 a	 particularly	 important	 role	 in	 establishing	closer	relations	and	were	vital	to	their	success.	When	Ignatieff	was	first	appointed	Ambassador	 in	 1956,	 he	 quickly	 understood	 the	 underlying	 importance	 of	 his	mission	in	Belgrade.	 In	his	memoirs,	he	explained	that	 in	his	“thirty-three	years	 in	the	foreign	service,	this	was	the	only	time	when	the	Prime	Minister	and	members	of	his	cabinet	took	the	trouble	to	explain	to	me	what	they	expected	me	to	accomplish	or	made	me	feel	they	were	interested	in	my	mission.”16	He	was	instructed	to	give	the	Canadian	 government	 his	 assessment	 of	 Soviet	 intentions.	 For	 instance,	 was	 the	Soviet	suppression	of	the	Hungarian	uprising	simply	a	reaction	to	internal	events	in	that	 country	 or	 were	 they	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 scheme	 of	 Soviet	 expansionism?	Ignatieff	explained	“the	government	[also]	wanted	to	establish	a	closer	relationship	with	this	unorthodox	socialist	country	which	was	trying	to	free	itself	from	Stalinism,	and,	 in	 the	 process,	 embarking	 on	 all	 kinds	 of	 interesting	 political	 and	 economic	
																																																								15	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2349,	File	7-Y1-1	part	7.3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	in	Retrospect:	IV.	Canadian	Aims,”	May	9,	1961.	16	George	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger:	The	Memoirs	of	George	Ignatieff	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1985),	150.	
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experiments.”	He	was	to	“explore	the	possibility	of	developing	trade	not	only	with	Yugoslavia,	but	possibly	also	with	other	Balkan	countries.”17		
	 Yugoslavia’s	 Foreign	 Minister,	 Koča	 Popović,	 also	 appreciated	 Canada’s	global	position	and	said	that	given	its	present	international	situation,	Canada	could	wield	 important	 influence,	 perhaps	 more	 than	 Canada	 itself	 realized.18	Gammer	cogently	explains	the	Canadian-Yugoslav	dynamic:		
Canada	 and	Yugoslavia	 found	 in	 their	 developing	 relationship	 a	middle	power	perspective.	Contact	with	Canada	provided	the	Yugoslavs	with	the	benefit	of	a	more	moderate	view	of	Western	motivations	and	intentions,	which	 Canadian	 officials	 saw	 as	 an	 effective	 tool	 in	 influencing	Yugoslavia’s	 behaviour,	 external	 and	 internal.	 […]	 Both	 Canada	 and	Yugoslavia,	 as	 their	 diplomats	 and	 government	 officials	 were	 fond	 of	reminding	each	other,	lived	in	the	shadow	of	a	powerful	neighbour.19	The	fact	that	they	each	recognized	the	“shadow”	in	which	the	other	lived	suggests	a	degree	 of	 respect	 and	 mutual	 understanding	 from	 a	 political	 perspective	 that	offered	 common	 ground	 on	 which	 the	 two	 countries	 could	 build	 a	 worthwhile	relationship.	
	 Not	only	did	Canada	wish	 for	 closer	 cooperation,	but	Yugoslavia	welcomed	closer	 association	 as	well.	 Its	 flagship	 newspaper,	Borba,	 expressed	 the	 country’s	pleasure	with	Canada’s	independent	foreign	policy	decisions.	Specific	reference	was	paid	to	Canada’s	vote	in	favour	of	Poland	in	the	elections	for	membership	on	the	UN	Security	 Council,	 its	 vote	 against	 French	 atomic	 tests	 in	 the	 Sahara,	 and	 its	
																																																								17	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	150.	18	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Under-Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav-Canadian	Relations	–	Discussion	with	Yugoslav	Counselor,	Mr.	V.	Selic,”	November	12,	1959.	19	Gammer,	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking,	34.	
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divergence	 from	 American	 policy	 over	 Cuba	 and	 China.20	Yugoslavia	 could	 prove	receptive	to	Canadian	influence	because	Canadian	policy	positions	were	sometimes	perceived	to	be	independent	of	the	Western	bloc.	As	well,	Tito	personally	was	aware	of	 Canada’s	 linguistic	 diversity	 and	 saw	 this	 as	 a	 shared	 attribute,	 “because	multiculturalism	and	economic	regionalism	were	two	important	features	of	national	life	 which	 [both	 Canada	 and	 Yugoslavia]	 had	 in	 common.” 21 	While	 cultural	differences	 and	 divisive	 forces	 would	 ultimately	 prove	 far	 more	 serious	 for	Yugoslavia	 than	 Canada,22	the	 implications	 and	 challenges	 of	 cultural	 diversity	seemed	to	be	one	area	of	mutual	understanding	on	which	the	two	countries	could	offer	 reciprocal	 respect.	 Additionally,	 in	 April	 1958,	 in	 a	 lengthy	 exposition	 of	Yugoslavia’s	foreign	relations	in	the	Federal	Assembly,	Tito	“singled	Canada	out	for	special	 mention	 (apart	 from	 the	 United	 States,	 Britain,	 and	 France),	 stating	 that	relations	were	developing	normally,	 especially	 in	 trade	matters	 and	 at	 the	United	Nations.”23		
	 In	another	indication	of	cordiality	and	deference,	Ambassador	Ignatieff	was,	“along	with	the	Indian	and	Egyptian	Ambassadors,	the	only	foreign	head	of	mission	
																																																								20	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Despatch	Canadian	Embassy,	Belgrade	to	Secretary	
of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canada	in	the	Yugoslav	Press	–	Popovic’s	Visit,”	March	29,	1961.	21	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	155.	22	As	Ignatieff	explained,	in	the	north	was	Slovenia	and	Croatia,	both	previously	part	of	the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire	and	with	populations	predominantly	Roman	Catholic,	culturally	advanced,	and	western	in	orientation.	On	the	Adriatic	coast	there	was	Dalmatia	[which	is	in	Croatia],	at	one	time	under	Venetian	and	later	Italian	rule;	therefore,	it	had	a	strong	maritime	tradition.	These	provinces	were	also	fundamentally	different	from	Serbia,	Bosnia-Herzegovina,	Macedonia,	and	Montenegro,	the	inland	areas	that	had	suffered	a	long	and	cruel	domination	by	the	Ottoman	Empire,	with	a	strong	heritage	of	freedom	fighting.	While	most	of	this	region	is	Orthodox	and	the	official	alphabet	was	Cyrillic,	there	was	also	a	strong	Muslim	component.	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	155-156.	23	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Memorandum	Chief	of	Protocol	to	JGD,	SSEA,	USSEA,	&	European	
Division,	August	21,	1958.	
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to	 be	 invited	 to	 attend	 a	 celebration	 of	 Tito’s	 birthday.”24	It	 appears	 that	 at	 the	highest	levels	of	the	Yugoslav	government	Canada	made	a	good	impression.	Not	only	did	Canadian	Ambassadors	notice	friendlier	and	more	open	interactions,	but	Ottawa	also	reported	that	the	Yugoslav	Embassy	adopted	an	attitude	of	greater	willingness	to	consult	with	and	talk	to	Canadian	officials.25	Yugoslavia’s	penchant	for	Canadian	opinions	 reflects	 its	 positive	 view	 of	 its	 position	within	 the	Western	 sphere.	 This	may	likely	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	Yugoslavia	was	beginning	to	see	in	Canada	an	 independence	 of	 action	 that	 departed	 from	 the	 rigidity	 that	 had	 tended	 to	 be	associated	 with	Western	 policy,26	and	 its	 realization	 that	 Canadian	 foreign	 policy	was	not	necessarily	a	pale	reflection	of	London’s	or	Washington’s.27	
	 Cordial	 and	 more	 meaningful	 discussions	 coincided	 with	 more	 frequent	contact	 and	 a	 sincere	 desire	 to	 develop	 relations	 further,	 including	 immediate	collaboration	on	 international	 crises.	 “As	 compared	with	previous	years,”	 Ignatieff	explained,	“there	was	a	notable	upswing	in	activity	in	relations	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia	 in	 1957.”	 The	 two	 countries	made	 positive	 strides	 cooperating	 on	 the	political	 and	 diplomatic	 fronts,	 with	 collaboration	 sometimes	 based	 on	humanitarian	 grounds.	 Following	 the	 USSR’s	 brutal	 suppression	 of	 the	Hungarian	Uprising	 in	 1956,	 20,000	Hungarians	 fled	 to	 Yugoslavia	 and	 afforded	 one	 notable	
																																																								24	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Memorandum	Chief	of	Protocol	to	JGD,	SSEA,	USSEA,	&	European	
Division,	August	21,	1958.	25	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Friendlier	Attitude	on	the	Part	of	Yugoslav	Officials,”	March	6,	1959.	26	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2,	Despatch	Ford	to	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canada	and	Yugoslavia,”	April	22,	1959.	Ford’s	despatch	was	commenting	on	a	Yugoslav	news	article	in	Politika,	“Ottawa	More	Flexible	than	London.”	27	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Friendlier	Attitude	on	the	Part	of	Yugoslav	Officials,”	March	6,	1959.	
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point	of	contact	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia.	Canada	accepted	more	than	35,000	Hungarian	 refugees	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 St.	 Laurent	 and	 Diefenbaker	governments,	with	over	1,800	accepted	from	Yugoslavia	in	1957	alone.	This	gesture	was	 “warmly	 appreciated”	 by	 the	 Yugoslav	 government.28	In	 fact,	 upon	 Ignatieff’s	departure	 from	 his	 post,	 Tito	 personally	 thanked	 him	 for	 his	 contribution	 to	 the	improved	relationship	between	the	two	countries	and	singled	out	his	work	on	the	Hungarian	refugee	crisis.29	Ignatieff’s,	and	by	extension	the	Canadian	government’s,	efforts	to	ease	Yugoslavia’s	refugee	dilemma	contributed	to	the	increased	good	will	that	 was	 developing	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	 Yugoslavia’s	 role	 in	 providing	asylum	for	dissident	Hungarians	certainly	would	not	have	put	it	in	the	good	graces	of	 Soviet	 authorities,	 and	 the	 crisis	 added	 to	 the	 growing	 rift	 between	Yugoslavia	and	the	USSR.30	Yet,	Yugoslavia’s	role	in	facilitating	refuge	for	Hungarian	dissidents	was	by	no	means	the	first	point	of	friction	between	the	two	Communist	nations.	
	 YUGOSLAVIA	AND	NON-ALIGNMENT			 Since	 the	 mid-fifties,	 Tito	 had	 been	 searching	 for	 a	 way	 to	 end	 Yugoslav	isolation,	 and	 his	 solution	 was	 the	 non-aligned	 movement,	 which,	 according	 to																																																									28	RG25,	Vol.	2492,	File	10463-S-40,	Circular	Document	Review	of	Events	in	Yugoslavia	during	1957,	January	22,	1958.	In	his	memoirs,	Ignatieff	explained	that	one	of	the	highlights	of	his	mission,	and	the	incident	that,	more	than	anything	else,	established	his	cordial	relationship	with	Marshal	Tito,	was	the	part	he	played	in	resolving	the	Hungarian	refugee	problem.	The	Hungarian	refugees	who	fled	to	Yugoslavia	put	that	country	in	a	quandary.	On	the	one	hand,	they	did	not	want	to	send	the	refugees	back	to	Hungary,	where	they	would	most	certainly	be	executed	[the	truth	is	that	they	would	have	likely	been	persecuted,	but	not	executed].	On	the	other	hand,	the	government	was	hesitant	to	allow	the	Hungarians	to	go	free	and	risk	them	“infecting”	Yugoslav	youth	with	anti-communist	ideology.	Ignatieff	was	able	to	arrange	for	a	few	hundred	refugees	to	be	brought	to	Canada.	Once	Canada	set	the	example,	Ignatieff	explains,	the	United	States,	Australia,	the	UK,	Norway,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	and	France	followed	suit,	and	in	no	time	at	all	a	potential	problem	and	source	of	embarrassment	to	the	Yugoslav	government	had	disappeared.	For	a	more	detailed	account	of	Ignatieff’s	role	during	the	crisis,	see,	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	160-163.		29	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	170.	30	Zubok,	A	Failed	Empire,	118.	
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Robert	 Ford,	 “was	 a	 stroke	 of	 genius.”31	Speaking	 from	 ambassadorial	 experience,	Ford	 illuminated	 how	 Tito	 was	 indeed	 a	 communist,	 “but	 a	 Yugoslav	 nationalist	above	 everything	 else.”32	Tito’s	 nationalism,	 however,	 roused	 serious	 indignation	from	the	hardliners	in	Moscow.	For	instance,	Vyacheslav	Molotov	explained,	“Tito	‘is	a	nationalist,	and	that	is	his	main	defect	as	a	communist	[…]	he	is	infected	with	the	bourgeois	 spirit.’” 33 		 Initially,	 non-alignment	 was	 a	 way	 out	 of	 isolation	 for	Yugoslavia,	 but	 it	 proved	 even	 more	 politically	 expedient	 because	 it	 served	 to	dissuade	the	Soviets	from	attacking;	Moscow	would	not	want	to	alienate	other	non-aligned	 nations	 with	 such	 a	 hostile	 act.	 The	 Yugoslavs	 also	 hoped	 that	 non-alignment	 would	 contribute	 to	 their	 prestige,	 particularly	 in	 the	 UN,	 which	 it	certainly	did.34	Yugoslavia’s	isolation	from	the	Cominform	–	the	official	forum	of	the	international	 communism	 movement,	 whose	 purpose	 was	 to	 coordinate	 actions	between	 Communist	 parties	 under	 Soviet	 direction	 –	 resulted	 in	 an	 independent	foreign	policy	that	promoted	non-intervention	and	a	stance	critical	of	“imperialistic”	spheres	of	influence.35		
	 The	Canadian	government’s	attitude	toward	the	non-aligned	bloc	of	nations,	and	 more	 specifically	 Yugoslavia’s	 position	 within	 it,	 oscillated	 during	 the	Diefenbaker	period	–	but	not,	as	some	might	expect,	due	to	indecision	by	the	Prime	
																																																								31	Robert	Ford,	Our	Man	in	Moscow:	A	diplomat’s	reflections	on	the	Soviet	Union	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989),	40.	32	Ford,	Our	Man	in	Moscow,	40.		33	Albert	Reiss,	ed.,	Molotov	Remembers:	Inside	Kremlin	Politics	(Chicago:	Ivan	R.	Dee,	1993),	83,	as	quoted	in	Lorraine	M.	Lees,	Keeping	Tito	Afloat:	The	United	States,	Yugoslavia,	and	the	Cold	War	(Pennsylvania,	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	1997),	127.	34	Ford,	Our	Man	in	Moscow,	41.	35	Gammer,	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking,	33.	
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Minister.	Generally,	Canada	accepted	Yugoslavia’s	inclinations,	recognizing	that	non-alignment	 was	more	 helpful	 than	 harmful	 in	 the	 battle	 with	 communism	 since	 it	provided	an	alternative	to	the	Soviet	model.	Yugoslavia’s	independence	and	its	close	involvement	with	non-aligned	nations	went	hand-in-hand,36	as	non-alignment	was	a	cornerstone	 of	 its	 foreign	 policy.	 It	 believed	 that	 Afro-Asian	 countries	 presented	fertile	ground	for	spreading	communism	“by	example”	and	not	“by	conquest.”37	The	uncommitted	countries	of	Africa,	the	Middle	East,	and	Southeast	Asia	also	presented	a	 number	 of	 worthwhile	 markets	 for	 Yugoslavia	 with	 which	 to	 counteract	 the	economic	offensive	of	the	Sino-Soviet	bloc.38		
	 For	 the	most	part,	Canada	watched	Yugoslavia’s	 involvement	with	 the	non-aligned	group	of	nations	 from	the	sidelines,	understanding	and	even	sympathizing	with	 the	 domestic	 political	 and	 commercial	 necessities	 of	 its	 position.	 From	 an	international	affairs	perspective,	however,	the	Canadian	government	was	frequently	suspect.	For	instance,	in	the	early	1960s,	Ford	observed,	
	Yugoslavia’s	stance	followed	with	only	minor	deviations	the	Soviet	line	on	most	important	issues	of	foreign	affairs	–	disarmament,	cessation	of	nuclear	tests,	a	German	peace	treaty,	Berlin,	the	Congo,	and	so	on.	They	
																																																								36	Yugoslav	reaction	to	pressures	from	the	Soviet	bloc,	such	as	making	trade	deal	negotiations	difficult	or	suspending	credits,	caused	it	to	seek	friends	wherever	it	could	find	them	(e.g.	the	non-committed	group	of	nations;	its	neighbours	Greece,	Italy,	and	Austria;	and	the	West	–	including	Canada).		37	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ambassador	in	Belgrade	to	Under-	
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	External	and	Internal	Policy	in	Retrospect	and	Prospect,”	October	15,	1958.	38	RG25,	Vol.	2492,	File	10463-S-40,	Circular	Document	Annual	Review	for	Yugoslavia,	1958,	February	23,	1959.	Some	of	the	countries	Yugoslavia	pursued	for	trade	deals	were	Morocco,	Tunisia,	Libya,	Sudan,	Ceylon,	Iraq,	Ethiopia,	India,	and	Indonesia.	
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have	 only	 departed	 radically	 from	 this	 when	 their	 Afro-Asian	 friends	did	so.	This,	of	course,	is	no	service	to	us.39	While	Ford	recognized	the	alignment	of	Soviet-Yugoslav	foreign	policy	objectives,	he	believed	it	was	highly	unlikely	there	was	any	collusion	with	the	Soviets,	even	though	the	result	was	the	same.	Conversely,	Ford	maintained	that	Yugoslavia’s	activities	in	the	non-aligned	movement	afforded	new	nations	an	acceptable	socialist	alternative	to	 the	USSR,	which	could	 then	reduce	Soviet	 influence	 in	 the	 third	world.	 In	other	words,	third	world	nations	following	a	Yugoslav	model	were	seen	as	the	“lesser	of	two	evils,”	compared	to	those	under	Soviet	influence.	Additionally,	further	division	among	communist	states	could	only	benefit	 the	West.	Yugoslavia’s	activities	 in	the	non-committed	 countries	 of	 Asia,	 Africa,	 and	 Latin	 America	 are	 “probably	advantageous	to	the	West,”	explained	Ford,	since	“[Yugoslavia]	 introduced	a	white	face	 among	 the	 anti-colonialists,	 they	distracted	 the	 attention	of	 left-wing	opinion	from	 Moscow,	 [and]	 they	 represented	 a	 different,	 and	 probably	 more	 attractive,	socialist	example.”	Tito	also	likely	took	any	occasion	he	could	to	warn	these	nations	against	too	close	involvement	with	Moscow	and	Peking.	While	Ford	cautioned	that	Yugoslavia	might	 use	 anti-Western	 propaganda	 to	 promote	 a	 Yugoslav	 variety	 of	communism,	 he	 was	 unclear	 as	 to	 “just	 how	 effective	 this	 may	 be.”40	Yet,	 the	importance	of	non-aligned	countries	 to	Yugoslavia	was	not	always	consistent,	 and	by	the	early	1960s	this	appeared	to	diminish.	
																																																								39	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	4,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	in	Retrospect:	III.	The	Value	of	Yugoslavia	to	the	West,”	May	9,	1961.	40	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	4,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	in	Retrospect:	III.	The	Value	of	Yugoslavia	to	the	West,”	May	9,	1961.	
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	 In	January	1962,	Gordon	Crean	replaced	Ford	as	ambassador	in	Belgrade	and	had	the	opportunity	to	meet	with	Marshal	Tito,	and	concluded,	“actively	working	to	develop	relations	with	non-aligned	countries	does	not	seem	of	prime	importance	in	Tito’s	thoughts.”41	A	year	later,	the	view	from	Belgrade	was	that	Yugoslavia’s	policy	toward	non-aligned	 countries	 had	 two	broad	perspectives:	 to	 further	 the	 socialist	cause	 in	 general,	 and	 Yugoslavia’s	 form	 in	 particular;	 and	 to	 retain	 an	 important	bargaining	 counter	 in	 the	 rapprochement	 with	 Moscow	 by	 demonstrating	 the	influence	 that	 Yugoslavia	 has	 in	 the	 non-aligned	 movement. 42 	The	 Canadian	delegation	 to	 NATO	 also	 echoed	 many	 of	 Ford’s	 previous	 reservations,	 stating	Yugoslavia’s	 non-aligned	 policy	 serves	 the	 interest	 of	 Moscow	 –	 directly	 or	indirectly.43	Overall,	 however,	 Canadian	 officials	 were	 not	 overly	 concerned	 with	Yugoslavia’s	 non-alignment	 policy.	While	 Yugoslav	 and	 the	 Soviet	 positions	 at	 the	UN	often	mirrored	one	 another,	 Canada	understood	 that	 their	 policies	were	often	coincidental	 and	 independently	 motivated.	 Despite	 such	 parallel	 orientations	 in	policy	 generally,	 sovereignty	 was	 recognized	 as	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	Yugoslavia’s	 positions.	 The	 Canadian	 delegation	 to	 the	 North	 Atlantic	 Council	reported	that	solidarity	with	the	Afro-Asian	bloc	dominated	Yugoslavia’s	UN	policy	at	 the	 seventeenth	 UN	 General	 Assembly,	 and	 its	 policy	 even	 diverged	 from	 the	Soviet	bloc,	particularly	with	regard	to	its	future	importance	of	the	organization.44	
																																																								41	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	4,	Summary	Interview	with	Tito,	January	26,	1962.	42	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Charge	D’Affaires,	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	and	the	Non-Aligned	World,”	March	13,	1963.	43	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Charge	D’Affaires,	Belgrade	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	and	the	Non-Aligned	World,”	March	13,	1963.	44	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Numbered	Letter	The	Canadian	Delegation	to	the	
North	Atlantic	Council	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	February	5,	1963.	
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	 The	 Canadian	 government	 understood	 that	 Yugoslav	 foreign	 policy	 was	shaped	 by	 Marxist	 tenets;	 while	 it	 typically	 disagreed	 with	 that	 fundamental	framework,	 it	 frequently	supported	the	general	direction	taken	by	Yugoslavia	with	regards	 to	 the	 United	 Nations. 45 	The	 two	 countries	 respected	 the	 principles	espoused	 by	 the	 UN,	 and	 Canada	 believed	 the	 organization	 was	 a	 venue	 where	Yugoslavia	would	respond	favourably	to	Canadian	initiatives.	Relatedly,	Canada	also	recognized	the	UN	was	a	platform	for	Yugoslavia	to	champion	its	independent	global	position.	As	a	result,	Canada’s	encouragement	of	Yugoslav	independence	brings	into	sharper	 focus	 the	 rationale	 of	 Canadian	 support	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 non-intervention	and	the	sovereignty	of	the	state	within	a	multilateral	context.46	
	 By	1961,	Tito	had	successfully	organized	 the	 first	 summit	meeting	 for	non-aligned	nations,	 leading	 to	 the	practice	of	greater	 consultation	among	non-aligned	nations	 and	 greater	 coordination	 of	 their	 policies	 in	 the	UN.	While	 accomplishing	nothing	concrete,	the	summit	demonstrated	to	both	blocs	the	political	influence	Tito	could	 muster.	 How	 much	 actual	 influence	 Yugoslavia	 could	 exert	 on	 other	 non-aligned	 nations	 was	 unclear	 to	 Canadian	 officials.	 But,	 it	 was	 obvious	 that	 an	independent	 Yugoslavia	 was	 undoubtedly	 of	 great	 value	 to	 the	 West,	 since	 it	challenged	 the	 very	 foundations	 upon	 which	 world	 communism	 functioned,	including	 “synonymy	of	 the	 interests	of	 communism	and	 the	 state	 interests	of	 the																																																									45	Gammer,	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking,	35.	46	Historian	Nicholas	Gammer	has	advanced	this	idea,	arguing	that	Canada	played	an	important	part	in	a	number	of	Yugoslav	foreign	policy	issues	in	the	early	1950s.	Canada’s	role	in	reducing	tensions	between	Yugoslavia	and	its	immediate	neighbours	(Greece	and	Italy)	as	well	as	in	facilitating	improved	relations	between	Yugoslavia	and	the	major	Western	powers	(the	US	and	UK)	also	highlighted	the	rationale	of	Canadian	support	of	the	principles	of	non-intervention	and	the	sovereignty	of	the	state.	From	Peacekeeping	to	Peacemaking,	28.	
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Soviet	Union;	 the	unchallenged	 ideology	of	and	strategic	control	of	every	party	by	Moscow;	 and	 the	 slavish	 copying	 of	 all	 Soviet	 methods.”	 In	 Ford’s	 view,	 “The	Yugoslav	rejection	of	these	assumptions	had	an	unsettling	effect	in	Eastern	Europe,	and	it	proved	of	considerable	interest	to	the	Chinese	as	they	felt	their	way	towards	a	position	of	equality	in	the	Sino-Soviet	bloc.47	The	Canadian	government	understood	Yugoslav	 independence	 to	be	key	 in	 their	 battle	 to	 contain	European	 communism	and	their	aim	to	limit	Soviet	hegemony	in	Eastern	Europe.		
	 PERSONAL	DIPLOMACY		 In	 addition	 to	 multilateral	 cooperation	 within	 the	 UN,	 fostering	 closer	bilateral	 diplomatic	 relations	 with	 Yugoslavia	 was	 integral	 to	 bringing	 the	 two	countries	 closer	 together.	 Henry	 Davis	 visited	 Yugoslavia	 in	 November	 1959;	 the	visit	was	considered	a	success	by	both	sides.	As	head	of	Canada’s	European	Division,	Davis	was	well	positioned	to	critique	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations	and	to	assess	how	important	they	were	to	broader	Canadian	objectives.	The	main	purpose	of	the	visit	was	 political	 in	 nature.	 Essentially,	 Canadian	 officials	 wanted	 to	 maintain	 and	develop	 further	 ties	 with	 Yugoslavian	 officials	 at	 the	 highest	 levels.48	During	 his	short,	 two-day	 visit,	 Davis	 met	 with	 Ante	 Rukavina,	 Head	 of	 the	 American	Department,	 Joša	 Brilej,	 Assistant	 Under-Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Political	 Affairs,	Bogdan	 Crnobrjna,	 Assistant	 Under-Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Economic	 Affairs,	 and	Milovan	Matić,	Head	of	the	Committee	for	Cultural	Relations	with	Foreign	Countries.	Rather	unexpectedly,	Davis	also	met	with	Popović,	who	“seemed	genuine	in	insisting																																																									47	Ford,	Our	Man	in	Moscow,	42.	48	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	November	10,	1959.	
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that	he	wished	to	see	closer	political	consultations	and,	where	possible,	cooperation	between	[the]	two	countries.”		
	 Brilej	 explained	 that	 Yugoslav	 officials	 hoped	 that	 more	 frequent	conversations	 could	 be	 held	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	He	 cited	 the	 exchange	 of	detailed	 views	 on	 the	 United	 Nations	 agenda	 before	 meetings	 of	 the	 General	Assembly	as	particularly	valuable.	The	perception	of	each	country,	held	by	the	other,	is	made	perfectly	clear	in	Davis	and	Brilej’s	conversations:		
Mr.	 Davis	 said	 to	Mr.	 Brilej	 that	 he	 had	 been	 indeed	 impressed	 by	 the	identity	 of	 views	 between	 our	 two	 countries	 on	 many	 questions.	 We	appreciated	 that	 the	position	and	experience	of	Yugoslavia	vis-à-vis	 the	Eastern	 bloc	 provided	 them	 with	 unique	 possibilities	 for	 interpreting	events,	 such	as	 the	 recent	 changes	 in	 Soviet	 strategy.	Mr.	Brilej	 agreed,	but	added	that	we	occupied	a	comparable	position	with	the	other	great	powers.	Therefore,	we	had	much	to	trade.49	In	 essence,	 Canada	 and	 Yugoslavia	 saw	 each	 other	 as	 potential	 sources	 of	information	difficult	to	obtain	anywhere	else.	Sharing	perspectives	and	assessments	of	 international	 developments	 would	 be	 mutually	 beneficial.	 It	 was	 in	 the	 best	interests	of	both	countries	for	Cold	War	hostilities	to	be	kept	to	a	minimum,	as	they	functioned	more	freely	when	the	international	climate	was	calm.		
	 Reflecting	 on	 Davis’s	 visit,	 Ambassador	 Ford	 explained	 that	 it	 was	 “highly	successful	in	every	sense.”	In	addition	to	creating	an	atmosphere	of	good-will,	it	was	a	“definite	contribution	to	the	improvement	of	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations,”	which	“will	 be	 of	 great	 use	 to	 this	 Embassy…”50	The	 importance	 of	 genuine,	 cordial																																																									49	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	2.2,	Memorandum	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	November	10,	1959.	50	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	November	10,	1959.	In	his	memo,	Ford	also	complimented	Davis’s	“skill	and	tact	in	directing	
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relations	 to	 diplomacy	 is	 sometimes	 underestimated	 in	 international	 history,	 but	Davis’s	 visit	 to	 Yugoslavia	 is	 a	 testament	 to	 the	 significance	 both	 Canada	 and	Yugoslavia	 attached	 to	 personal	 contact	 as	 a	 means	 to	 maintain	 good	 diplomatic	relations.	 “The	 Yugoslavs,”	 explained	 Ford,	 “have	 a	 highly	 developed	 sense	 of	hierarchy,”51	so	 the	 visit	 by	 the	 Head	 of	 European	 Division	 would	 certainly	 have	demonstrated	 Canada’s	 genuine	 commitment	 to	 seeing	 relations	 improved.	Essentially,	 political	 consultation	 became	 increasingly	 important	 to	 each	 country	during	this	period,	as	the	avenues	for	discourse	became	wider	and	more	frequent.	
	 Davis	was	also	 eager	 to	have	Foreign	Minister	Koča	Popović’s	 visit	Ottawa.	Since	 a	 visit	 by	 Popović	 could	 precede	 his	 trip	 to	 New	 York	 for	 the	 UN	 General	Assembly,	Davis	discussed	how	it	would	be	expedient	to	have	Popović	and	Secretary	of	 State	 for	 External	 Affairs	 Howard	 Green	 meet	 if	 Canada	 and	 Yugoslavia	 were	expecting	 to	 cooperate	 during	 the	Assembly.52	This	 seemed	 fitting	 since	 Ford	was	told	 that	 Popović	 “came	 back	 from	 each	 General	 Assembly	 more	 enchanted	 with	Canada”	and	was	jokingly	asked,	“what	charm	[Canada]	put	on	Mr.	Popović.”53	Davis	also	 believed	 an	 invitation	 would	 be	 particularly	 appreciated	 since	 the	 US	government	had	not	yet	found	it	possible	to	invite	any	Yugoslav	leaders	to	visit	the	US.54	Clearly,	 Davis	 was	 not	 against	 scoring	 political	 points	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the																																																																																																																																																																						the	political	conversations	to	useful	ends,	and	his	ability	to	impress	the	Yugoslavs	with	the	genuineness	of	our	desire	for	better	relations	were	invaluable	in	making	the	visit	a	success.”	51	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	November	10,	1959.	52	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Personal	letter	Davis	to	Ford,	July	20,	1959.	53	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	November	10,	1959.	54	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Davis	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	July	27,	1959.	
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Americans.	While	it	took	more	than	a	year	after	Davis	first	suggested	a	visit,	Popović	came	to	Canada	in	March	1961.		
	 Yugoslav	officials	were	also	eager	to	see	the	visit	take	place	and	emphasized	the	importance	attached	to	close	and	frank	exchanges	of	views.55	US	Ambassador	in	Yugoslavia	Karl	Rankin	revealed	to	Ford,	in	confidence,	that	Soviet	Foreign	Minister	Andrei	 Gromyko	 had	 invited	 Popović	 to	 the	 USSR,	 but	 no	 date	 was	 set.	 Popović	explained	 to	 Rankin	 that	 the	 Yugoslavs	 were	 reluctant	 to	 agree	 because	 the	“Russians	were	 always	 trying	 either	 to	 enforce	 or	 entice	Yugoslavia	 back	 into	 the	Soviet	bloc.”	Popović	was	not	eager	to	visit	Moscow	“without	comparable	Western	visits	 to	 Ottawa	 and	 Washington.”56	Canada,	 therefore,	 was	 part	 of	 Yugoslavia’s	calculation	to	counterbalance	Popović’s	visit	to	the	USSR.		
	 But	 a	 mere	 balancing	 act	 was	 not	 the	 sole	 purpose	 of	 Yugoslavia’s	 policy	objectives.	 During	 their	 conversation,	 Popović	 explained	 to	 Green	 that	 Yugoslavia	was	often	accused	of	seeking	to	balance	East	and	West	relations	but	insisted	it	was	“attempting	 actively	 to	 develop	 constructive	 policies	 in	 relations	 to	 all	 areas	 and	countries”	 since	 Yugoslavia	was	 unique	 to	 other	 European	 countries	 insofar	 as	 it	was	 pursuing	 an	 active	 foreign	 policy.	 Green	 expressed	 his	 understanding	 and	suggested	Canada	was	trying	to	follow	a	somewhat	similar	line.	57																																																									55	DCER,	Vol.	28.	631.	Permanent	Representative	to	United	Nations	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Projected	Visit	of	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs	of	Yugoslavia	to	Canada,”	New	York,	February	3,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	56	DCER,	Vol.	28.	633.	Ambassador	in	Yugoslavia	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav	Foreign	Policy,”	Belgrade,	February	16,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	57	DCER,	Vol.	28.	642.	Record	of	Conversation	between	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	and	
Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs	in	Yugoslavia,	March	28	1961.	Ottawa,	April	5,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	
	 162	
	 During	his	visit,	not	only	were	diplomatic	relations	enhanced,	but	Canadian	officials	 viewed	 it	 as	 an	 opportune	 time	 to	 try	 and	 instill	 their	 views	 regarding	certain	UN	initiatives	in	hopes	that	Yugoslavia	would	provide	a	good	counterweight	to	 Soviet	 policies.	 To	 Canadian	 officials	 in	 Belgrade,	 Yugoslavia’s	 aims	 at	 the	 UN	were	 clear:	 to	 establish	 firmly	 the	 position	 of	 Yugoslavia	 as	 one	 of	 the	 leading	members	of	the	non-committed	countries;	to	consolidate	this	group	as	a	force	at	the	UN	equal	 in	 influence	 to	 the	Soviet	 and	Western	blocs;	 to	persuade	 the	Soviets	 to	accept	Yugoslavia	as	a	respectable	member	of	the	non-committed	group;	and	to	try	to	 prevent	 the	 complete	 isolation	 of	 the	 Soviets	 and	 to	 encourage	 a	 return	 to	conditions	 making	 renewed	 East-West	 contacts	 possible. 58 	The	 Canadian	government,	too,	wanted	to	encourage	East-West	contacts	and	occasionally	pressed	its	opinion	on	Yugoslavia,	 in	hopes	that	 they	would	encourage	the	Soviet	Union	to	follow	suit.		
	 In	advance	of	Green’s	talk	with	Popović,	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	Norman	Robertson	prepared	a	memo	for	the	minister.	Robertson	explained	that	 in	 a	 recent	 conversation	 with	 Soviet	 Foreign	 Minister	 Gromyko,	 Popović,	expressed	disappointment	 in	 the	 tough	Soviet	attitude	 taken	during	debate	on	 the	Congo	Crisis	at	the	UN.	Popović	explained	that	the	tough	line	not	only	disappointed	the	 majority	 of	 UN	 members	 who	 hoped	 for	 détente,	 but	 would	 also	 almost	inevitably	 produce	 a	 tough	 reaction	 from	 the	 United	 States.	 Popović	 had	 further	lamented	with	Gromyko	 that	 there	was	not	much	hope	 for	progress	on	any	of	 the																																																									58	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40	part	1,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Yugoslav	Aims	at	the	United	Nations,”	October	11,	1961.	
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important	 issues	unless	the	international	atmosphere	was	improved.59	Canada	and	Yugoslavia	were	in	similar	positions,	in	that	a	noose	seemed	to	choke	independent	national	 initiatives	when	Cold	War	 tensions	were	 amplified.	Thus,	 some	Canadian	officials	hoped	they	could	work	with	Yugoslavia	to	minimize	international	strain.	
		 Robertson	 also	 advised	 Green	 to	 pursue	 apparent	 differences	 in	 attitude	between	 the	 Soviets	 and	 Yugoslavs,	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 number	 of	 specific	 questions	before	 the	UN.	For	 instance,	Yugoslavia	 regarded	disarmament	as	one	of	 the	most	important	issues	and	was	particularly	concerned	about	nuclear	weapons	testing	and	proliferation.	Yugoslavia	co-sponsored	resolutions	on	both	points	in	late	1960,	and	Tito	 endorsed	 the	 one-treaty	 approach	 of	 the	 Soviet	 bloc.	 Yugoslavia	 also	 co-sponsored	the	Indian	draft	that	compromised	on	principles,	knowing	that	the	USSR	accepted	those	compromises.	However,	Yugoslavia	was	wary	of	accepting	the	Soviet	insistence	 on	 a	 tripartite	 structure	 in	 the	 UN	 as	 a	 prior	 condition	 to	 progress	 on	disarmament.60	Overall,	the	Yugoslavs	continued	to	identify	with	neutralist	opinion,	but	 would	 not	 oppose	 any	 substantive	 Soviet	 position.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 Robertson	advised	Green	to	take	the	opportunity	to	explain	to	Popović	the	Canadian	emphasis	on	the	early	resumption	of	negotiations,	the	addition	of	an	impartial	chairman,	and	the	 provision	 of	 a	 more	 meaningful	 role	 for	 the	 UN	 through	 the	 Disarmament	Commission.	 To	 advance	 these	 positions,	 Robertson	 recommended	 that	 Green	“stress	 how	 vital	 it	 is	 for	 the	 interests	 of	 small	 countries	 such	 as	 Canada	 and	Yugoslavia	 that	 the	 present	 discussions	 between	 [American	 UN	 Ambassador]																																																									59	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40,	Memorandum	Robertson	to	Green,	March	24,	1961.	60	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40,	Memorandum	Robertson	to	Green,	March	24,	1961.	
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Stevenson	and	Gromyko	[…]	lead	to	the	development	of	a	mutually	acceptable	basis	for	 the	 resumption	 of	 disarmament	 negotiations	 with	 the	 least	 possible	 delay.”61	Canada	was	 in	no	direct	position	 to	press	 the	Soviets	on	any	of	 these	 issues,	 so	 in	hopes	of	swaying	the	Soviet	position	to	some	degree,	Green	was	advised	to	employ	the	common	ground	of	middlepowerism	with	Yugoslavia	as	a	means	to	influence	the	USSR’s	direction.		
	 Green	did	 just	 that.	He	 stressed	 to	Popović	 the	 importance	attached	by	 the	Canadian	 Government	 to	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 smaller	 nations	 and	 their	assumption	of	 some	 responsibility	 for	disarmament	matters.62	Popović	 agreed	but	maintained	 that	 no	 progress	 had	 been	made	 on	 disarmament:	 “the	 great	 powers	may	have	found	lines	of	contact	through	which	discussions	may	develop	and	there	has	been	some	real	progress	in	the	field	of	nuclear	testing	which	is	helpful,	but	thus	far	 there	 has	 been	 no	 practical	 result	 in	 terms	 of	 actual	 disarmament.”	 Popović	emphasized	the	complicated	nature	of	the	negotiations	and	stressed	the	need	for	a	minimum	 of	 mutual	 faith	 to	 achieve	 any	 progress.	 He	 thought	 Canada	 and	Yugoslavia	had	a	part	 to	play	 in	 this	 respect.	Green	 concurred	and	 suggested	 that	there	was	some	hard	bargaining	on	this	subject;	the	major	powers,	in	Canada’s	view,	were	“adopting	perhaps	more	extreme	positions	than	was	necessary	because	of	the	
																																																								61	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8144,	File	5475-FA-44-40,	Memorandum	Robertson	to	Green,	March	24,	1961.	62	For	an	innovative	and	enlightening	history	on	Green’s	nuclear	disarmament	crusade,	see	Daniel	Heidt,	“‘I	think	that	would	be	the	end	of	Canada’:	Howard	Green,	the	Nuclear	Test	Ban,	and	Interest-Based	Foreign	Policy,	1946-63,”	American	Review	of	Canadian	Studies,	Vol.	42,	No.	3,	September	2012,	343-369.	
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basic	doubts	which	existed	on	both	sides	about	the	good	intentions	of	the	other.”63	The	conversation	between	Green	and	Popović	is	revealing	in	how	it	highlights	their	mutual	recognition	of	the	hardline	positions	of	the	superpowers	and	their	common	desire	 to	 employ	 their	 own	 middle	 power	 positions	 to	 soften	 or	 reduce	 the	contentious	nature	of	the	opposing	camps.	
	 While	 the	 Popović	 visit	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 concrete	 proposals	 and	 discussions	remained	 rather	 superficial,	 it	 did	 reveal	 the	 nature	 of	 Yugoslavia’s	 perception	 of	Canada	 and	 the	 undercurrents	 of	 political	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 nations.	Yugoslav	officials	understood	Canada’s	global	position	as	similar	to	their	own,	with	both	 nations	 operating	 diplomatically	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	 global	 superpowers.	 And,	they	appreciated	Canada’s	attempt	to	develop	an	independent	foreign	policy,	while	recognizing	 the	 inherent	 limits	 posed	 by	 Canada’s	membership	 in	 NATO.64	In	 the	end,	 Popović’s	 visit	 to	 Canada	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 important	 development:	 it	promoted	 open	 discourse	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 and	 certainly	 improved	bilateral	 relations.	 It	 is	 also	 a	 window	 into	 the	 rhetorical	 strategies	 Canadian	officials	used	–	like	middlepowerism	–	to	highlight	common	ground.		
	 Shortly	after	Popović’s	visit	to	Ottawa,	Ford	reflected	on	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations	 and	 suggested	 one	 of	 the	 most	 striking	 developments	 had	 been	 the	political	consultation	between	the	two	nations	at	the	UN,	in	Belgrade,	and	in	Ottawa.																																																									63DCER,	Vol.	28.	641.	Record	of	Conversation	between	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	and	
Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs	in	Yugoslavia,	March	27,	1961,	Ottawa,	April	5,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	64	While	Green	stressed	that	NATO	did	not	operate	as	a	bloc	in	the	UN,	Popović	replied	that	it	had	seemed	to	[Yugoslavia]	on	occasion	that	in	fact	it	did	appear	that	way.	DCER,	Vol.	28.	642.	Record	of	
Conversation	between	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	and	Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs	
in	Yugoslavia,	March	28	1961,	Ottawa,	April	5,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	
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He	 wrote,	 “The	 Yugoslavs	 have	 responded	 with	 alacrity	 to	 our	 willingness	 to	exchange	views	[…	and]	we	can	probably	expect	that	this	habit	of	consultation	will	have	 an	 accumulative	 effect	 on	 Yugoslav	 thinking	 over	 the	 years.”	 In	 reference	 to	Western	 economic	 aid	 to	 Yugoslavia,	 Ford	 concluded	 that	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 burden	must	 naturally	 fall	 on	 the	 Americans,	 but	 that	 Canada	 “can	 do	 our	 bit,	 and	 I	 am	convinced	that	 it	can	be	rather	 important,	both	for	our	own	national	 interests	and	for	the	aims	of	the	Western	alliance	as	a	whole.”65	
	 POPOVIĆ’S	VISIT	AND	CANADIAN-YUGOSLAV	MINORITY	COMMUNITIES		 While	 Green	 and	 officials	 at	 External	 Affairs	 saw	 the	 many	 advantages	associated	 with	 such	 a	 visit,	 Diefenbaker	 immediately	 weighed	 them	 against	 the	potential	domestic,	political	repercussions.	As	a	result,	the	Prime	Minister	was	more	hesitant.	Popović’s	visit,	therefore,	is	a	fine	example	of	the	juncture	where	national	foreign	 policy	 initiatives	 met,	 and	 often	 clashed,	 with	 arguments	 advanced	 by	certain	minority	communities	in	Canada.	
	 While	he	was	not	hesitant	about	the	visit,	Davis	had	concerns	about	certain	Serbian	émigré	groups,	the	same	groups	who	would	voice	their	opinions	directly	to	Diefenbaker	 and	 his	 ministers.	 During	 an	 informal	 conversation,	 Davis	 asked	 the	Secretary	of	the	Yugoslav	Embassy,	Mr.	Velasevic,	about	the	possible	reaction	of	the	Canadian-Yugoslav	 community	 to	 the	 Popović	 visit.	 Velasevic	 explained	 that	 the	embassy	 believed	 since	 Popović	 was	 only	 visiting	 Ottawa	 there	 would	 be	 no	difficulty,	particularly	with	 limited	advance	notice	of	 the	visit.	The	Secretary	went																																																									65	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2349,	File	7-YI-1	part	7.3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	May	9,	1961.	
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on	to	explain	that	if	Popović	were	to	visit	Toronto,	for	instance,	the	Serbian	émigré	organization	 there	 “might	make	 trouble.”66	Overall,	 the	Yugoslav	embassy	was	not	overly	 concerned	 about	 potential	 rabble	 rousing	by	Yugoslav	 ethnic	 communities.	Upon	 learning	 of	 an	 upcoming	 demonstration,	 however,	 officials	 revisited	 the	possibility	of	delaying	the	public	announcement	of	Popović’s	visit.	
	 Shortly	 after,	 Canadian	officials	 learned	 that	 the	Canadian	Serbian	National	Anti-Communist	 Committee	 planned	 to	 hold	 a	 ‘“great	 Serbian	 anti-communist	manifestation	 and	 entertainment’	 in	 Toronto…”	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 showing	“solidarity	 against	 communists	 in	 general	 […]	 and	 against	 Tito’s	 official	representatives	in	Canada	and	their	agents	[…]	and	also	to	draw	it	to	the	attention	of	the	Canadian	public.”	Initially,	the	DEA	thought	the	group	might	use	the	occasion	to	publicly	 attack	 Popović	 or	 his	 forthcoming	 visit	 to	 Ottawa,	 if	 they	 were	 to	 know	about	it,	and	suggested	the	Yugoslav	embassy	delay	the	public	announcement.	But	in	the	 end,	 both	 the	 Yugoslav	 embassy	 and	 the	 DEA	 concluded	 that	 since	 the	 press	release	 was	 already	 confirmed,	 the	 announcement	 should	 proceed	 as	 planned.67	Potential	 backlash	 from	 select	 Yugoslav	 ethnic	 groups	 did	 not	 ultimately	 deter	official	protocol,	and	the	announcement	proceeded	as	scheduled.		
	 Upon	hearing	news	of	Popović’s	prospective	visit,	a	number	of	protests	from	Members	of	Parliament,	leaders	of	ethnic	communities,	and	private	citizens	flowed	
																																																								66	DCER.	Vol.	28.	635.	Memorandum	Head,	European	Division	to	Protocol	Division,	“Popovic	Visit,”	Ottawa,	February	28,	1961.	DEA/12850-Y-2-1-40.	67	DCER.	Vol.	28.	636.	Memorandum	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	
for	External	Affairs,	“Popovic	Visit,”	Ottawa,	March	8,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	
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into	the	Prime	Minister’s	office.	68	Diefenbaker	“was	seriously	concerned	about	these	protests,” 69 	but	 Green	 stood	 his	 ground.	 In	 a	 clear	 attempt	 to	 limit	 public	controversy,	only	a	brief,	inconspicuous	encounter	with	Diefenbaker	was	arranged.	Popović	was	escorted	from	a	lunch	table	in	the	Parliament	Building	and	brought	to	meet	 Diefenbaker,	 who	 was	 ostensibly	 passing	 by	 on	 his	 way	 to	 the	 House	 of	Commons.	The	encounter	lasted	only	long	enough	for	a	handshake	and	the	briefest	of	 welcomes. 70 	In	 the	 end,	 it	 was	 Green’s	 “dogged	 determination	 to	 bridge	differences	between	governments	and	their	political	systems”	that	pushed	the	visit	forward.71	The	minister	 told	 the	Canadian	permanent	representative	 to	NATO	that	while	“the	visit	did	not	accomplish	anything	concrete,	 it	has	[…]	served	as	a	useful	purpose	 in	 providing	 occasions	 for	 a	 full	 exchange	 of	 views.”72	Green,	 Ford,	 and	Diefenbaker	 understood	 the	 various	 advantages	 associated	with	 closer	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations.	 But	 it	was	Diefenbaker	who	was	 far	more	 tentative	 about	 the	visit,	 as	 his	 opinion	 was	 more	 influenced	 by	 anticipated	 reactions	 from	 various	Yugoslav	minority	communities.	Since	historians	have	so	frequently	pointed	out	that	Diefenbaker	was	 influenced	by	these	opinions,	and	“perceived	himself	 through	the																																																									68	DCER.	Vol.	28.	639.	Memorandum	from	Special	Assistant	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
European	Division,	“Visit	of	the	Yugoslav	Foreign	Minister,”	Ottawa,	March	24,	1961	DEA/10277-40.	1071.	In	his	memoirs,	George	Ignatieff	explains	that	once	the	invitation	was	issued,	“the	next	thing	we	knew,	a	delegation	of	Yugoslav	Canadians	requested	a	meeting	with	the	Prime	Minister	and	informed	him	that,	should	he	receive	this	‘communist	murderer’,	no	Canadian	of	Yugoslav	extraction	would	ever	again	cast	a	vote	for	the	Progressive	Conservative	party.”	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	
Peacemonger,	196.	69	DCER.	Vol.	28.	640.	Ambassador	in	Yugoslavia	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Popovic	Visit,”	Belgrade,	March	26,	1961.	DEA/12850-Y-2-40.	70	Basil	Robinson,	Diefenbaker’s	World:	A	Populist	in	Foreign	Affairs	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1989),	191.	For	a	detailed	and	colourful	first-hand	account	of	the	meeting	between	Diefenbaker	and	Popović,	see	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	195-197.	71	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger,	195.		72	DCER.	Vol.	28.	643.	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Permanent	Representative	to	North	
Atlantic	Council,	“Visit	of	Yugoslav	Foreign	Minister,	Ottawa,	March	29,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.	
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eyes	 of	 anticommunist	 voters,”73	it	 is	 essential	 to	 look	 closely	 at	 the	 letters	 that	flowed	into	the	Prime	Minister’s	office.	
	 Of	 the	 letters	 from	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 groups	 in	 Canada,	 the	 Serbian,	Croatian,	 and	 Macedonian	 ethnic	 communities	 were	 most	 represented.	 Perhaps	most	 interesting	 is	 that	 while	 the	 Serbian	 and	 Croatian	 communities	 protested	Popović’s	 visit,	 often	 vehemently,	 the	 Macedonian	 community	 supported	 it.	 An	analysis	of	the	opinions	of	Serbian	and	Croatian	communities	surrounding	Popović’s	visit	reveals	that	the	Cold	War	only	partly	shaped	their	political	views.	Serbian	and	Croatian	protests	were	intertwined	with	strong	nationalist	sentiments	rooted	in	the	past.	 Yet,	 broader	 Cold	 War	 narratives	 were	 appropriated	 to	 substantiate	 their	position,	 and	 Cold	 War	 rhetoric	 was	 often	 used	 to	 support	 political	 positions	unrelated	to	Canada’s	efforts	to	contain	communism.	Moreover,	some	protest	letters	suggested	 that	 Diefenbaker	 might	 be	 abandoning	 his	 widely	 recognized	 human	rights	convictions.	In	the	end,	it	appears	that	strongly	held,	long-standing	beliefs	and	opinions	about	their	former	homeland	boiled	to	the	surface	and	fueled	the	Serbian	and	Croatian	passionate	protests.	
	 The	 Serbian	 and	 Croatian	 minority	 communities	 frequently	 referred	 to	Popović’s	World	War	 Two	 record,	 which	 was	 far	 from	 clean,	 and	 his	 murderous	past.	 The	 president	 of	 Toronto	 based	 Ravna	 Gora,	 the	 Serbian	 Chetnik	 Veterans	Organization,	 expressed	 his	 “strongest	 protest	 to	 the	 invitation	 of	 [the]	 Canadian	government	to	Koča	Popović,”	and	considered	him	to	be	“an	ordinary	criminal	who																																																									73	Jamie	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queens	University	Press,	2002),	106.	
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murdered	 thousands	 of	 Serbian	 people.” 74 	Other	 letters	 expressed	 fear	 that	Popović’s	visit	would	promote	Yugoslav	communist	agents	in	Canada	to	“undermine	the	organized	life	of	[…]	Serbian	Canadian	communities.”	This	same	letter,	from	the	Toronto	Branch	of	 the	 Serbian	League	of	Canada,	 also	 appealed	 to	Diefenbaker	 to	remain	 true	 to	 his	 “uncompromising	 principles.”	 Playing	 to	 his	 human	 rights	convictions,	 the	 League	 explained	 they	 “could	 hardly	 believe	 [the	 invitation	 to	Popović]	 possible	 after	 [Diefenbaker’s]	 historic	 reply	 to	Khrushchev	 in	 the	United	Nations.”75	Other	letters	were	shorter	and	more	to	the	point:	
	Deeply	disappointed	with	your	decision	to	bring	into	this	free	country	as	 invited	 guest	 notorious	 communist	 and	 Tito	 Minister	 of	 Foreign	Affairs	Ko[č]a	Popovi[ć].	I	beg	you	revise	by	all	means	your	decision	and	cancel	 this	 visit	 of	 the	 utmost	 representative	 of	 one	 dictatorial	 and	bloody	 government.	 I	 am	 submitting	 this	 appeal	 on	 behalf	 of	 all	members	 of	 Serbian	 Cultural	 Club	 […]	 but	 I	 am	 sure	 that	 it	 will	 be	approved	and	supported	by	all	Canadians	of	Serbian	origin.76	Disappointment,	hope	 that	 the	visit	would	be	cancelled,	and	unity	among	Serbian-Canadians	are	 the	main	points	here,	 and	are	 themes	 that	 appeared	 in	virtually	 all	letters	sent	to	Diefenbaker	and	his	ministers.	
	 When	 broad	 Cold	 War	 themes	 were	 present	 in	 Serbian	 protest	 letters,	 as	with	 the	 one	 from	 the	 Canadian	 Serbian	 National	 Committee,	 Yugoslavia	 was	presented	 as	 subservient	 to	 the	 USSR	 and	 the	 “‘Trojan	 Horse’	 for	 the	 world	communist	 cause.”	 The	 letter	 recounted	 (incorrectly)	 how	 the	 Soviets	 overran	Yugoslavia	 by	 force	 following	 the	 Second	World	War,	 and	 “by	means	 of	murders,																																																									74	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Geurge	Uzelac	to	Prime	Minister,	March	21,	1961.	Microfilm,	429470.	75	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Perovan	Susovich	to	Prime	Minister,	March	21,	1961.	Microfilm,	429479.	76	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Milan	Lazarevich	to	Prime	Minister,	March	21,	1961.	Microfilm,	429480.	
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imprisonment,	 and	 brutal	 force	 have	 kept	 that	 power.”77	But	 human	 rights	 and	Canada’s	 position	 as	 leader	 “in	 the	 field	 of	 ‘Red	 Apartheid’”	 were	 the	 driving	messages.	The	letter	praised	Diefenbaker’s	“heroic	stand	at	the	United	Nations	[…]	in	defending	Freedom	and	Democracy	against	communist	 lies	and	propaganda	[…]	and	 the	 valiant	 stand	 taken	 by	 Canada	 at	 the	 recent	 Commonwealth	 Conference.”	Whether	or	not	it	was	used	intentionally	as	a	rhetorical	device,	the	praise	seemed	to	highlight	 the	 Committee’s	 disappointment	 in	 the	 upcoming	 visit,	 suggesting	 that	Canada	–	and	Diefenbaker	personally	–	were	 loosing	sight	of	 their	commitment	 to	the	oppressed	peoples	of	the	world.	Shock,	disappointment,	and	solidarity	were	also	expressed:	 “We	 feel	 that	 all	 members	 of	 the	 Ethnic	 Groups	 in	 Canada	 who	 have	experienced	personally	 […]	 the	 tortures	 by	 the	Communist	Dictators,	 are	 shocked	and	 deeply	 disappointed	 by	 the	 act	 of	 the	 Government	 in	 inviting	 communist	dignitaries.”	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 letter	 (quite	 accurately	 and	 poignantly)	 emphasized	Diefenbaker’s	 personal	 commitment	 to	 human	 rights	 and	 urged	 him	 to	 let	 these	tendencies	determine	Canada’s	policy	with	communist	countries,	to	let	“Canada	be	the	Beacon	of	Hope	and	Freedom.”78	
	 Green	supported	the	visit	regardless	of	protest	letters;	the	Canadian	Serbian	National	 Committee	 wrote	 him	 personally	 as	 well.	 The	 committee	 warned	 Green	that	Popović‘s	 invitation	 to	 visit	Canada	 “has	brought	 the	 strongest	 resentment	of																																																									77	In	fact,	the	Soviet	Red	Army	overran	only	a	small	northern	part	of	Serbia	when	fighting	the	Germans.	Also,	the	Soviets	did	not	have	power	in	Yugoslavia;	Yugoslav	communists	did.	As	historian	Ivan	Berend	explains,	“Victorious	communist-led	partisan	warfare	created	the	possibility	of	gaining	power	and	led	to	the	introduction	of	the	Soviet	model	of	modernization,	an	attractive	one	for	backward	countries	after	its	historical	triumph	of	World	War	Two.”	Berend,	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe	1944	–	1993,	13-15.	78	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Alija	S.	Konjhodzich	and	Bozidar	Markovich	to	Prime	
Minister,	March	21,	1961.	Microfilm,	429501-429502.	
	 172	
the	 citizens	 of	 Canada	 of	 Serbian	 descent…”	 The	 letter	 also	 portrayed	 Tito	 and	Popović	 as	 Nazi	 sympathizers	 and	 stressed	 that	 their	 goals	 were	 communist	revolution	 and	world	 domination,79	which	 is	 untrue.	 In	 fact,	 Tito	 led	 the	 Yugoslav	Partisan	movement	against	the	Nazis,	and	accumulated	a	vast	and	loyal	following.80	It	seems	the	authors	of	the	protest	letters	either	believed	misguided	ideas,	or	were	hoping	Canadian	officials	were	uneducated	on	the	subject.	
	 Croatian	groups	who	protested	Popović’s	visit	 focused	on	his	Second	World	War	record	and	stressed	that	he	was	“one	of	the	worst	war	criminals,	and	virtually	a	fugitive	of	 International	 Justice	 and	Retribution.”	 In	 rather	 grisly	detail,	 one	 letter	highlighted	(whether	accurate	or	not)	some	of	Popović’s	war	crimes.	For	 instance,	as	commanding	general	of	the	communist	army,	the	letter	charged,	Popović	“issued	orders	to	remove	3,000	wounded,	disabled	Croatian	soldiers	[…]	and	killed	them	all,	on	the	8th	and	9th	of	May	1945.”	The	letter	continued:	
	It	was	he,	Koča	Popović,	present	Foreign	Minister	of	Tito’s	Yugoslavia,	who	ordered	the	slaughtering	of	16,000	Croatian	soldiers	and	civilians	in	Dugo	Selo	near	Zegreb	and	the	death	of	3,000	peasants	in	the	region	near	 Nova	 Gradiska	 –	 and	 committed	 many	 other	 unscrupulous	 and	simply	genocidal,	outrageous	crimes	against	humanity	and	its	accepted	codes	of	human	behaviour	and	decency.	In	 light	of	his	 record,	 the	 letter	 concluded,	 “we	Canadians	of	Croatian	descent	 […]	rise	in	protest	and	most	vigorously	denounce	the	coming	to	Ottawa	of	the	cruel	war	criminal	Koča	Popović.”	In	one	final	plea,	the	letter	stressed,	“we	hope	to	rearm	you	
																																																								79	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Alija	S.	Konjhodzich	and	Bozidar	Markovich	to	Prime	
Minister,	March	21,	1961.	Microfilm,	429464-429466.	80	Berend,	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	1944	–	1993,	14.		
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morally	 against	 this	man”,81	suggesting	 that	 the	 government	was	 forsaking	 ethical	high	ground	by	allowing	the	visit.		
	 Diefenbaker	 personally	 met	 with	 various	 ethnic	 community	 groups	 and	replied	 to	 written	 protests.	 The	 general	 tone	 and	wording	 of	 his	 responses	were	consistent.	Diefenbaker	showed	compassion	and	understanding	for	their	viewpoints	but	emphasized	the	importance	of	such	a	visit	to	maintaining	a	stable	international	climate.	The	Prime	Minister’s	typical	response	was	as	follows:	
	 	 I	 am	 grateful	 for	 your	 recent	 telegram	 and	 for	 your	 frank	expression	of	views	about	the	visit	to	Ottawa	of	the	Yugoslav	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs.		 	 You	will	be	aware	that	I	am	strongly	opposed	to	communism	and	that	I	am	determined	to	do	all	I	can	to	prevent	the	communist	bloc	from	attaining	its	worldwide	objectives.	I	am	also,	as	you	know,	fully	conscious	of	 the	 suffering	which	have	been	 imposed	upon	 the	peoples	 of	 Eastern	Europe	by	various	communist	governments,	and	it	is	my	view	that	we	in	Canada	must	do	all	we	can	to	alleviate	the	suffering	of	those	people.		 	 Visits	 to	 Canada	by	members	 of	 the	 government	 of	 communist	countries	 do	 not	 in	 any	 sense	 indicate	 approval	 by	 the	 Canadian	Government	of	 communism.	Yugoslavia,	however,	has	 shown	 itself	able	to	 resist	 foreign	 domination	 and	 at	 the	 United	 Nations,	 and	 in	 joint	participation	in	the	United	Nations	Emergency	Force	in	the	Middle	East.	Canada	and	Yugoslavia	have	found	some	common	interest	in	preserving	peace.		 	 I	hope	 that	you	and	other	Canadians	of	Serbian	origin	will	 find	yourselves	able	to	see	this	visit	in	this	light.82	Diefenbaker’s	 response	 is	 revealing	 in	 that	 it	 did	 not	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 past	atrocities	committed	by	communist	governments.	 It	simultaneously	reaffirmed	the	government’s	 anti-communist	 stance	 and	 the	 “colonial”	 nature	 of	 Soviet	 rule.	
																																																								81	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	unknown	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	March	23,	1961.	Microfilm,	429505-429508.	82	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Prime	Minister	to	Geurge	Uzelak,	April	11,	1961.	Microfilm	429469.	
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Additionally,	 it	 highlighted	 the	 common	 ground	 upon	 which	 Canadian-Yugoslav	bilateral	relations	have	been	developed.	Essentially,	Diefenbaker	utilized	a	Cold	War	context	to	frame	his	response.	
	 In	 light	 of	 personal	 discussion	 with	 Diefenbaker,	 the	 Canadian-Serbian	Committee	 “became	 convinced	 that	 the	 Canadian	 government,	 headed	 by	 Mr.	Diefenbaker,	 will	 unshakably	 continue	 with	 its	 stand	 in	 the	 fight	 against	Communism…,”	 explained	 Amerikanski	 Srbobran	 (The	 American	 Srbobran),	 an	American-based	 Serbian	 newspaper.	 It	 would	 seem	 the	 Canadian-Serbian	Committee’s	reservations	surrounding	the	visit	appeared	to	be	somewhat	alleviated	after	 meeting	 with	 Diefenbaker.	 	 Interestingly,	 the	 Canadian-Serbian	 newspaper,	
Glas	 Kanadskih	 Srba	 (Voice	 of	 Canadian	 Serbs)	 did	 not	 overemphasize	 the	community’s	 respite,	 but	 rather	 trumpeted	 the	 Serbian	 community’s	 active	 stand	against	the	visit.	The	news	item	focused	on	the	letters	that	Canadian-Serbians	sent	to	the	government	and	praised	the	official	delegation	that	met	with	Diefenbaker.83	Another	Serbian	language	newspaper,	Kanadski	Srbobran	(The	Canadian	Srbobran),	did	 not	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 political	 significance	 of	 the	 visit	 and	 what	 the	government	 hoped	 the	 visit	 would	 produce.	 Rather,	 similar	 to	 Voice	 of	 Canadian	
Serbs,	The	Canadian	Srbobran	highlighted	the	Serbian	community’s	effort	to	protest	the	 visit	 and	 its	 determination	 to	 defile	 Popović.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 with	 no	 clear	explanation	 as	 to	why	 the	 story	was	 told,	 the	 editorial	 aimed	 to	 tarnish	Popović’s	
																																																								83	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	3,	“Koca	Popovic	in	Canada,”	Glas	Kanadskih	Srba,	March	30,	1961.	
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image	by	explaining	how	his	nickname,	the	Sandman,	was	acquired.84	Neither	of	the	Canadian	 Serbian-languages	 newspapers	 focused	 on	 the	 Serbian	 delegation’s	reaction	 or	 response	 to	 their	meeting	with	 Diefenbaker,	 nor	 did	 they	 frame	 their	protests	in	a	Cold	War	context;	instead,	their	discontent	was	focused	on	their	former	homeland	and	its	leaders.		
	 As	 mentioned,	 not	 all	 Yugoslav	 ethnic	 communities	 protested	 the	 visit.	 In	fact,	 Canadian-Macedonians	 praised	 the	 government	 for	 setting	 “a	 wonderful	example	 for	 all	 the	 communist	 and	 capitalist	 nations…”85	Other	 letters	 from	 this	community	 expressed	 their	 belief	 that	 the	 Popović	 visit	 “will	 serve	 to	 strengthen	friendly	relations	existing	between	our	two	governments,	and	 further	 to	help	ease	tensions	 in	 a	 world	 much	 too	 dangerously	 fraught	 with	 them.”86	Thus,	 Canadian-Macedonian	ethnic	communities	viewed	the	visit	in	much	the	same	way	as	Canadian	officials,	at	least	with	respect	to	its	broader	political	significance.87	
																																																								84	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	3,	“Koca	Popovic	–	the	Sand-Man	–	in	Canada,”	Kanadski	
Srbobran,	March	30,	1961.	According	to	this	editorial,	the	nickname	“Sand-Man”	was	passed	onto	Popović	because	his	grandfather	(also	Koča	Popović),	a	wealthy	flourmill	owner	who	sold	flour	to	the	armed	forces,	was	said	to	have	added	sand	to	the	flour	in	order	to	increase	profits.	It	was	said	that	the	present	“Comrade	Minister	Popović,”	subsequently	having	lost	“every	respect	in	the	society	of	Belgrade,	became	a	communist.”		85	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	Chris	Vashov	and	Tom	Shapardan	to	Prime	Minister,	March	24,	1961.	Microfilm,	429484.	86	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Personal	letter	The	Executive	Committee	of	the	Toronto	Metro	
Committee	of	the	Canadian	Macedonian	to	Prime	Minister,	March	21,	1961.	Microfilm,	429482.	87	The	majority	of	Macedonians	in	Canada	originated	probably	in	about	equal	proportions	from	Yugoslavia	and	Greece.	The	only	well-organized	group	of	Macedonians	during	this	time	was	located	in	Toronto.	This	organization	hoped	to	see	all	territories	inhabited	by	Macedonians	united	in	a	free	Macedonian	State.	Besides	this	major	group,	there	also	existed	two	Macedonian	factions,	one	following	the	Moscow	line	and	the	other	supporting	Tito.	Both,	however,	were	described	as	being	small	and	of	little	significance.	LAC,	RG6,	File	10-33-1/119	Box	123,	Memorandum	Jean	Boucher	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Appointment	of	Mr.	Belovski,	Yugoslav	Ambassador	to	Canada,”	December	7,	1961.	
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	 Diefenbaker	did	read	the	letters	with	at	least	some	background	knowledge	of	the	 organizations	 that	 wrote	 to	 him,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 he	interpreted	 the	 letters	 with	 an	 unfiltered,	 biased	 sympathy	 toward	 the	 ethnic	communities.	 In	 a	 memo	 to	 Diefenbaker,	 the	 Prime	Minister’s	 advisor	 on	 foreign	policy,	 Basil	 Robinson,	 explained	 that	 a	 series	 of	 letters	 addressed	 to	 the	 Prime	Minister	were	 from	 groups	 “known	 to	 be	 strongly	 Serb-nationalist,	 anti-Tito,	 and	anti-Yugoslavia.88	With	 this	 in	 mind,	 it	 might	 be	 more	 accurate	 to	 suggest	 that	Diefenbaker’s	reluctance	and	hesitation	regarding	Popović’s	visit	stemmed	from	his	own	personal	proclivities,	most	notably	his	views	on	communism	and	human	rights,	rather	than	the	protests	 from	certain	ethnic	communities.	Regardless,	Diefenbaker	utilized	 the	 Cold	 War	 climate	 to	 justify	 the	 visit.	 Whether	 intentional	 or	 not,	 it	appears	 that	 this	 approach	 helped	 reestablish	 himself	 as	 the	 sympathetic,	 human	rights	advocate.	
	 Ultimately,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	to	what	degree	(if	any)	these	specific	letters	influenced	Diefenbaker’s	actions.	But	given	the	attention	paid	by	previous	scholars89	to	the	impact	of	minority	communities	on	Diefenbaker’s	policy	objectives,	they	are	worthwhile	exploring,	even	if	simply	to	glimpse	the	sorts	of	letters	he	received	and	their	 rhetorical	 nature.	 Even	 though	 concrete	 conclusions	 cannot	 be	 drawn	 about	the	significance	of	Yugoslav	minority	communities	on	policy	development,	assessing	their	 correspondence	 does	 suggest	 that	 deep-seeded	 nationalist	 sentiments	 drove																																																									88	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(846/Y94),	Memorandum	H.B.	Robinson	to	Prime	Minister,	March	29,	1961.	Microfilm,	429478.	89	See	John	Hilliker	and	Donald	Barry,	Canada’s	Department	of	External	Affairs:	Volume	2,	Coming	of	
Age,	1946-1968	(Montreal	and	Kingston:	McGill-Queen's	Press,	1995),	137;	Glazov,	Canadian	Policy	
Toward	Khrushchev’s	Soviet	Union,	77-78;	Peter	Newman,	Renegade	in	Power:	The	Diefenbaker	Years	(Toronto:	McClelland	and	Stewart,	1973),	347-350.	
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most	 (if	 not	 all)	 Serbian	 and	 Croatian	 protest	 letters.	 Rhetoric	was	 used	 by	 these	groups	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 suggests	 hostility	 was	 generated	 more	 by	 what	 was	happening	in	their	home	country,	both	in	the	past	and	present,	than	by	the	broader	Cold	 War	 confrontation	 and	 Canada’s	 position	 within	 it.	 Canadian-Macedonian	communities,	by	comparison,	viewed	the	visit	from	a	global	perspective	and	saw	it	as	 one	 component	 of	 larger	 Canadian	 policy	 objectives	 directed	 at	 reducing	international	 tensions	 and	 containing	 or	 defeating	 communism.	 Diefenbaker’s	conversations	with	and	letters	to	groups	who	protested	the	visit	demonstrate	how	the	 government	 used	 Canada	 and	 Yugoslavia’s	 similar	middle	 power	 positions	 to	justify	 Popović’s	 visit.	 Diefenbaker	 relied	 on	 the	 premises	 that	 he	 remained	 a	committed	anti-communist	and	that	such	a	visit	could	lessen	Cold	War	tensions.	
	 POPOVIĆ’S	VISIT	IN	THE	MEDIA		 Secretary	 Velasevic	 expressed	 the	 Yugoslav	 embassy’s	 hope	 that	 the	Canadian	 press	would	 pay	 considerable	 attention	 to	 Popović’s	 visit	 and	 said	 they	expected	 “to	 make	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 out	 of	 the	 visit	 in	 terms	 of	 Canadian-Yugoslav	relations.”90	In	the	end,	the	Canadian	press	did	not	make	much	of	Popović’s	visit	 and	 approached	 it	 rather	 unspectacularly.	 Reporting	 in	 major	 Canadian	newspapers	 closely	 followed	 the	DEA’s	 official	 press	 release,	 highlighting	 Popović	and	Green’s	agreement	“that	special	attention	should	be	directed	to	the	question	of	disarmament	 as	 one	 of	 the	major	 issues	 facing	 the	world	 at	 this	 time.”	Matter-of-factly,	the	press	release	stated	that	the	exchanges	between	the	two	ministers	“were	
																																																								90DCER.	Vol.	28.	635.	Memorandum	Head,	European	Division	to	Protocol	Division,	Ottawa,	February	28,	1961.	DEA/12850-Y-2-1-40.	
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conducted	 in	 a	 friendly	 and	 informal	 atmosphere”	 and	 suggested	 that	 discussions	between	such	top	officials	“are	a	natural	development”	from	improved	relations.91	
	 An	 article	 in	 the	 Globe	 and	 Mail	 framed	 Popović	 as	 a	 courageous	 fighter	against	 Nazi	 tyranny	 in	 the	 Second	World	War	 and	 leader	 of	 peace	 efforts	 in	 the	United	 Nations.	 It	 quoted	 Howard	 Green,	 who	 noted,	 “‘Yugoslavia,	 like	 Canada,	 is	one	of	the	middle	powers	of	the	world	today,	and	one	of	the	powers	which	depends	so	much	on	effective	world	organization.’”92	In	addition	to	commenting	on	the	tight	security	measures	 taken	 by	 the	 RCMP,	 the	Ottawa	Citizen	 explained	 that	 Popović	was	 not	 entirely	 happy	 with	 his	 visit,	 due	 to	 his	 radio	 interview	 with	 the	 CBC.	Popović,	 the	 article	 explained,	 “complained	 that	 the	 questions	 asked	 him	 were	unfriendly	to	Yugoslavia.”93	Despite	this	alleged	agitation,	the	press	coverage	of	the	visit	was	typical	in	that	it	did	not	provide	analysis	on	how	each	country	functioned	within	the	broader	Cold	War	context.		
	 In	Yugoslavia,	however,	Popović’s	visit	prompted	“an	unprecedented	number	of	 articles	 in	 the	 local	 press	 about	 Canada,	 her	 position	 in	 world	 affairs,	 and,	 in	particular,	 about	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations.”	 All	 articles	 portrayed	 Canada	favourably,	 as	 most	 paid	 particular	 attention	 to	 its	 efforts	 to	 carve	 out	 an	independent	foreign	policy.	For	 instance,	Borba	stated	that	although	Canada	was	a	member	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	 and	 NATO,	 “on	 the	 international	 stage	 Canada	distinguishes	 herself	 by	 her	 special	 foreign	 policy	 […]	 and	 she	 pursues	 a	 policy																																																									91	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	3,	DEA	Press	Release,	March	29,	1961.	92	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	3,	“House	Tribute	Warm	For	Yugoslav	Leader”,	The	Globe	
and	Mail,	March	29,	1961.	93	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5354,	File	10277-40	part	3,	“Radio	Interview	Mars	Yugoslav	Guest’s	Visit”,	The	
Ottawa	Citizen,	March	29,	1961.	
	 179	
based	on	the	indispensability	of	recognition	of	changes	which	have	occurred	in	this	part	of	the	world…”94		
	 Politika	stressed	that	Canada’s	pursuit	of	an	 independent	foreign	policy	has	resulted	 in	greater	cooperation	between	 the	 two	countries,	particularly	 in	 the	UN.	This	 independent	 stand,	 the	 article	 continued,	 has	 led	 Canadian	 officials	 to	understand	Yugoslavia’s	foreign	policy	position.95	Interestingly,	the	articles	stressed	that	 bilateral	 relations	 were	 underdeveloped	 and	 expressed	 enthusiasm	 for	increased	 connections,	 particularly	 in	 trade	 and	 cultural	 and	 scientific	 exchanges.	
Politika	 reflected	 on	 the	 visits	 of	 Yugoslav	 atomic	 scientists,	 film	 experts,	 and	cultural	 artists	 to	 Canada,	 and	 hoped	 that	 these	 types	 of	 contacts	 would	 be	expanded,	 especially	 since	 “desire	 and	 readiness	 has	 have	 been	 frequently	expressed	on	both	sides	to	expand	mutual	relations…”96		
	 Discussing	 the	 trade	 dimension	 of	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations,	
Spoljnopoliticki	 Bilten	 (Foreign	 Bulletin)	 said,	 “trade	 has	 showed	 tendencies	 of	increase	although	the	volume	of	trade	in	the	field	of	economic	cooperation	still	does	not	correspond	to	 the	real	possibilities	and	mutual	wishes.”97	Borba,	 too,	admitted	that	economic	and	cultural	exchanges	could	be	significantly	 improved	but	assured	readers	 that,	 on	 the	 political	 front,	 the	 two	 countries	 were	 making	 meaningful	
																																																								94	“Canada	Today,”	Borba,	March	26,	1961.	95	“Koca	Popovic	Arrives	in	Ottawa	Today,”	Politika,	March	27,	1961.	96	“Koca	Popovic	Arrives	in	Ottawa	Today,”	Politika,	March	27,	1961.	97	“Development	and	Progress	of	Yugoslav-Canadian	Relations,”	Spoljnopoliticki	Bilten		March	16,	1961.	
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headway;	 such	 efforts	 were	 strengthened	 by	 an	 exchange	 of	 views	 between	responsible	statesmen,	as	seen	with	Green	and	Popović.98	
	 The	 news	 reports	 highlight	 three	 key	 points:	 first,	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	genuine	desire	on	both	 sides	 to	develop	 closer	bilateral	 cooperation.	This	point	 is	substantiated	when	considered	with	various	other	factors	explored	below.	Second,	while	various	kinds	of	exchanges,	economic	and	cultural	for	example,	were	viewed	as	significant,	political	influences	were	still	considered	fundamental	to	the	bilateral	relationship.	Lastly,	the	importance	attached	to	Popović’s	visit	by	Yugoslavia’s	press	is	telling.	It	reveals	that	Yugoslavia	may	have	looked	upon	Canada	as	something	of	a	reflection	 of	 itself,	 highlighting	 for	 Yugoslavs	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 secondary	 power	 to	maneuver	independently,	even	within	the	shadow	of	a	superpower.	Each	country’s	press	coverage	highlighted	the	broader	political	significance	of	the	visit	and	focused	on	the	importance	of	open	discourse	and	mutual	understanding.	Frequently,	the	two	countries	 were	 portrayed	 as	 middle	 powers	 intent	 on	 achieving	 some	 degree	 of	independence	 in	 their	 foreign	 policies	 relative	 to	 their	 respective	 Cold	 War	superpowers.	Ultimately,	then,	press	coverage	mirrored	the	broader	political	issues	in	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations.	
	 CONCLUSION		 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	 were	 relatively	 insignificant	 when	 the	Progressive	 Conservatives	 gained	 power	 in	 1957.	 Canada’s	 relationship	 with	Yugoslavia,	however,	evolved	and	steadily	improved	over	the	nearly	six	years	of	the	Diefenbaker	 government.	 The	 rift	 between	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 Yugoslavia,																																																									98	“The	Visit	to	Canada,”	Borba,	March	29,	1961.	
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instigated	 by	 the	 latter’s	 refusal	 to	 sign	 the	 Twelve-Party	 Declaration,	 provided	 a	fortuitous	opportunity	for	Canada	to	cultivate	stronger	ties	with	Yugoslavia.	In	other	words,	events	east	of	the	Iron	Curtain	helped	shape	Canada’s	Yugoslav	policy,	as	the	Soviet	Union	 remained	 an	ubiquitous	 factor	 in	Canada’s	Yugoslav	policy	 equation.	Spearheaded	by	Canadian	ambassadors	 in	Belgrade,	Canada	was	able	 to	utilize	 its	middle	 power	 status	 to	 find	 common	 ground	 on	 which	 to	 build	 a	 fruitful	 and	mutually	 advantageous	 relationship.	 Yugoslavia	 underwent	 internal	 and	 external	changes	 as	 the	 Soviet	 bloc	 avoided	 any	 preferential	 treatment;	 consequently,	Yugoslavia	looked	for	ways	out	of	its	isolation.	As	a	result,	Canada	saw	Yugoslavia	as	a	viable	point	to	penetrate	Soviet	hegemony	over	Eastern	Europe.	Canadian	officials	considered	 Yugoslavia	 to	 be	 the	 least	 dogmatic	 of	 all	 communist	 countries;	therefore,	 it	 became	 Canada’s	 policy	 to	 promote	 and	 to	 cultivate	 closer	 political,	commercial,	and	cultural	 relations	more	assertively,	 in	order	 to	expose	Yugoslavia	to	Western	political	and	socio-cultural	modalities.	
	 Because	Yugoslavia	was	isolated,	 it	sought	company	with	other	non-aligned	countries.	 Generally,	 Canada	 sympathized	 with	 and	 understood	 the	 political	 and	economic	 necessity	 of	 Yugoslavia’s	 non-alignment.	 In	 fact,	 Canadian	 officials	believed	 that	 Yugoslavia	 could	 provide	 an	 alternative	 socialist	 route	 for	 nations	already	 heading	 down	 that	 ideological	 path	 and	 believed	 that	 further	 division	amongst	 communist	 states	 would	 only	 be	 advantageous	 to	 the	 West.	 Yugoslavia	proved	to	be	influential	among	the	group	of	non-aligned	nations,	notably	at	the	UN.	While	 Yugoslavia	 and	 the	 USSR’s	 UN	 policy	 frequently	 aligned,	 Canadian	 officials	believed	this	was	mostly	coincidental,	and	therefore	were	not	overly	concerned.	At	
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times,	 Canadian	 officials	 were	 optimistic	 that	 they	 could	 employ	 the	 common	ground	of	middlepowerism	 to	 influence	 certain	 initiatives,	 as	 seen	during	Green’s	meeting	with	Popović.	
	 Popović’s	visit	to	Canada	is	significant	because	it	highlights	the	genuineness	with	which	both	countries	pursued	improved	bilateral	relations,	and	demonstrates	the	challenges	of	pursuing	foreign	policy	objectives	at	odds	with	domestic	minority	communities,	the	Yugoslav	minority	communities	in	Canada	in	this	instance.	Serbian	and	Croatian	minority	communities	vehemently	protested	Popović’s	visit	to	Canada.	In	doing	so,	they	appropriated	broad	Cold	War	rhetoric.	However,	when	examined	closely,	 it	 appears	 that	 these	 groups	 were	 viciously	 opposed	 to	 Popović	 more	 so	because	 of	 his	 World	 War	 II	 record	 than	 Canada’s	 position	 vis-à-vis	 Yugoslavia	within	 the	 Cold	 War	 context.	 Macedonian	 minority	 communities,	 in	 contrast,	supported	the	visit	and	echoed	the	Canadian	government’s	general	policy	that	open	lines	 of	 communication	would	 help	 bridge	 the	 divide	 between	 nations,	 ultimately	weakening	global	communism.		
	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	 were	 unique	 in	 that	 while	 their	 ideological	proclivities	 were	 fundamentally	 opposite,	 they	 each	 lived	 in	 –	 and	 perceived	 the	other	as	living	in	–	the	shadow	of	a	powerful	superpower.	Middlepowerism	became	common	ground	upon	which	mutually	beneficial	 relations	were	built,	 as	Canadian	officials	 during	 this	 period	 attempted	 to	 develop	 an	 independent	 policy	commensurate	 with	 Canada’s	 international	 position.	 In	 addition	 to	 political	courtship,	less	conventional	forms	of	bilateral	exchanges	were	pursued	between	the	
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two	 nations.	 Commercial	 and	 cultural	 exchanges	 were	 slowly	 integrated	 into	 the	fabric	of	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations,	as	officials	hoped	to	chip	away	at	communism	from	behind	the	Iron	Curtain.		
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Chapter	4		
Peering	 Out	 from	 the	 Shadows:	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 Cultural	 Diplomacy	 &	
	 Canada’s	Economic	Statecraft			 The	political	dialogue	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia	 improved	during	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s,	as	each	nation	saw	in	the	other	a	pale	reflection	of	their	own	middle	power	position.	Simultaneously,	cultural	exchange	came	to	be	seen	as	an	effective	and	important	way	of	developing	closer	ties	between	the	two	countries.	Cultural	exchanges	during	this	period	were	not	overabundant,	but	their	developing	importance	 was	 clear,	 as	 they	 increased	 in	 number	 during	 John	 Diefenbaker’s	Progressive	 Conservative	 government.	 Even	 Yugoslav	 Foreign	 Minister	 Koča	Popović,	for	instance,	personally	inquired	with	the	Yugoslav	mission	in	Canada	as	to	how	 cultural	 exchanges	 could	 be	 developed.1	Arguing	 to	 prioritize	 Yugoslavia,	 the	European	Division	emphasized	that	“we	realize	that	[the	Information	Division]	faces	a	difficult	problem	in	 trying	to	reconcile	competing	claims	 for	a	 limited	amount	of	funds	 but	 since	 the	 Minister	 [of	 External	 Affairs	 Howard	 Green]	 seems	 to	 be	personally	interested	in	improving	relations	with	Yugoslavia	we	think	there	is	good	reason	for	taking	a	new	look	at	our	cultural	relations.”2		
	 The	 development	 of	 closer	 cultural	 ties	 further	 highlights	 this	 period	 as	 a	decisive	moment	and	demonstrates	that	Canadian	civil	servants	functioned	in	–	and	in	 fact	 helped	 carve	 out	 –	 a	 progressive	 and	 multidimensional	 foreign	 policy	
																																																								1	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Under-Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslav-Canadian	Relations	–	Discussion	with	Yugoslav	Counselor,	Mr.	V.	Selic,	November	12,	1959.	2	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2858,	File	490-YI	part	4.1,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Information	Division,	February	5,	1962.	
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framework.	 So,	 Canadian	 officials	 believed	 cultural	 ties	 contributed	 positively	 to	closer	political	relations.	Therefore,	in	assessing	the	impact	of	these	exchanges,	the	focus	here	 is	 less	on	 the	number	of	exchanges	and	more	on	 the	 ideas	 that	Canada	saw	communist	Yugoslavia	as	an	important	partner	for	generating	cultural	contacts	and	 viewed	 cultural	 exchange	 as	 a	 viable	 means	 to	 bring	 the	 countries	 closer	together.	This	highlights	how	cultural	diplomacy	came	to	be	seen	as	a	practical	tool	for	advancing	Canada’s	Eastern	European	policy.	Given	this,	 the	various	exchanges	that	 took	 place	 during	 this	 period	 will	 be	 examined	 and	 placed	 in	 their	 wider	political	 context.	 To	 both	 Canadian	 and	 Yugoslav	 officials,	 cultural	 relations	were	broadly	 defined,	 casting	 a	 wide	 net	 as	 to	 what	 this	 constituted.	 In	 the	 specific	Canadian-Yugoslav	context,	though,	scientific,	professional,	and	technical	exchanges	dominated,	while	exchanges	in	the	arts	were	much	less	frequent.	
	 CANADIAN-YUGOSLAV	ACADEMIC	EXCHANGES		 Communication	studies	expert,	Evan	H.	Potter,	states,	“fundamentally,	public	diplomacy	 requires	 an	 official	 purpose.	 Contacts	 between	 citizens	 from	 different	countries	constitutes	public	diplomacy	only	if	they	are	supported	by	a	government	–	either	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 –	 for	 a	 strategic	 purpose.”3	Canadian	 ambassadors	 in	Yugoslavia	and	officials	in	Canada	indeed	supported,	and	were	in	fact	a	driving	force	behind,	Canadian-Yugoslav	public	and	cultural	diplomacy.	In	his	review	of	the	past	two	 years	 as	 ambassador	 to	 Yugoslavia,	 Robert	 Ford	 commended	 on	 his	predecessor’s	 work:	 “there	 can	 be	 little	 doubt	 that	 [Canadian-Yugoslav]	 relations	
																																																								3	Evan	H.	Potter,	Branding	Canada:	Projecting	Canada’s	Soft	Power	Through	Public	Diplomacy	(Montreal	&	Kingston:	McGill-Queens	University	Press,	2009),	33.	
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during	 this	 period	 have	 improved	 considerably.	 Mr.	 [George]	 Ignatieff	 during	 his	tenure	of	this	post	set	the	process	in	motion	and	did	much	to	increase	both	political	consultation	and	cultural	exchanges.”4	Both	Ford	and	his	successor,	Gordon	Crean,	continued	 down	 the	 path	 forged	 by	 Ignatieff	 and	 further	 advanced	 relations	between	 the	 two	 countries.	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 general	 policy	debates	and	directions	related	to	Canada’s	cultural	diplomacy	with	the	USSR	were	essentially	mirrored	 in	 the	 approach	 to	Communist	Europe	 generally.	 The	driving	idea	 that	 cultural	 exchanges	 had	 the	 power	 to	 bring	 Eastern	 European	 nations	closer	 to	 the	Western	orbit	by	exposing	 them	 to	Western	practices	also	drove	 the	Canadian	government’s	desire	to	pursue	exchanges	with	Yugoslavia.	
	 Similar	 to	 Canada’s	 approach	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 professional	 and	academic	exchanges	were	considered	valuable	in	building	bridges	between	East	and	West.	 While	 balanced	 exchanges	 with	 Yugoslavia	 were	 important	 to	 Canadian	officials	 (as	with	 the	USSR),	reciprocity	was	achieved	more	easily	with	Yugoslavia.	Exchanges	with	Yugoslavia	were	mostly	balanced	and	were	also	 intended	 to	be	of	“equal”	 or	 similar	 substance.	 For	 instance,	 in	 July	 1958,	 a	 party	 of	 Canadian	university	 professors	 and	 students	 visited	 leading	 educational	 centres	 in	 the	country,	and	a	prominent	Canadian	seed	grower	from	Blenheim,	Ontario	visited	to	investigate	the	possibility	of	meeting	Yugoslavia’s	requirements	in	hybrid	corn	seed	and	livestock.	In	exchange,	five	Yugoslav	economists	and	officials	went	to	Canada	on	UN	 Technical	 Assistance	 Fellowships	 to	 study	 the	 operation	 of	 federal	 and	
																																																								4	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	in	Retrospect:	IV.	Canadian	Aims,”	May	9,	1961.	
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provincial	government	systems,	while	a	delegation	of	municipal	officials,	led	by	the	mayor	of	Sarajevo,	visited	to	learn	about	municipal	government	and	transportation	problems	in	Canada.5	In	other	words,	exchanging	academics	for	government	officials	was	seen	as	entirely	acceptable.	
	 In	1959,	the	Institute	of	Social	Sciences	in	Yugoslavia	was	created.	During	its	development,	 soon-to-be	director	Vlajko	Begovic	 spoke	with	Ambassador	 Ignatieff	about	 establishing	 connections	 with	 similar	 organizations	 in	 Canada.	 Canadian	departments	and	officials	considered	it	“most	desirable”	to	put	the	new	institution	in	contact	with	various	appropriate	bodies.	For	 instance,	 the	European	Division	at	the	 DEA	 indicated	 that	 they	 considered	 this	 opportunity	 of	 exchange	 to	 “have	considerable	potential	significance”;	not	only	was	the	exchange	considered	valuable	from	an	academic	perspective,	“but	also	because	it	would	help	to	put	our	Embassy	in	closer	touch	with	this	Institute,	which	is	examining	basic	problems	of	contemporary	Yugoslavia.”6	Put	 simply,	 exchanges	 in	 this	 realm	 would	 help	 facilitate	 greater	political	 understanding	 of	 the	 Communist	 state,	 and	 in	 turn	 provide	more	 fruitful	interpretation	of	Yugoslavia’s	international	agenda.	Agreeing	with	the	wide-ranging	potential	of	such	contacts,	the	DEA’s	Information	Division	went	to	work	contacting	various	 Canadian	 organizations	 that,	 in	 turn,	 contacted	 Yugoslavia’s	 Institute	 of	Social	 Sciences,	 with	 considerable	 success.	 The	 Social	 Science	 Research	 Council	
																																																								5	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	2492,	File	10463-S-40,	Circular	Document	Annual	Review	for	Yugoslavia,	1958,	February	23,	1959.	6	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3623,	File	2727-BM-40	part	1,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Information	
Division,	“Contacts	with	the	Yugoslav	Institute	for	Social	Science,”	February	18,	1959.	
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(SSRC)	 of	 Canada	 added	 the	 Yugoslav	 institute	 to	 its	 mailing	 list	 for	 reports.7	A	number	 of	 Canadian	 organizations	 and	 institutes	 welcomed	 the	 exchange	 and	provided	 ongoing	 publications,	 including	 the	 Canadian	 Political	 Science	Association,8	the	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs,9	the	Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	 and	 Political	 Science,10	and	 the	 Canadian	 Historical	 Association.11	In	exchange,	many	of	the	institutes	and	associations	asked	that	the	Yugoslav	institute	send	available	publications	on	an	ongoing	basis.	The	open	flow	of	information,	while	modest	 in	 its	 direct	 political	 and	 ideological	 impact,	 was	 viewed	 as	 a	 viable	subcomponent	 of	 integrating	Western	 thought	 into	 Yugoslav	 academic	 discourse.	But	the	academic	landscape	provided	for	more	than	an	exchange	of	information.	
	 By	 1959,	 Canada	 Council	 grants	 had	 been	 established	 and	 were	 being	awarded	 to	 deserving	 overseas	 students	 (including	Yugoslavs);	National	 Research	Council	 (NRC)	 post-graduate	 fellowships	 tenable	 in	 Canada	 for	 research	 in	chemistry,	 physics,	 biological	 science,	 mathematics,	 and	 engineering	 were	 also	available	 to	 Yugoslav	 scientists.	 Milovan	 Matic,	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Exchange																																																									7	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3623,	File	2727-BM-40	part	1,	Letter	Secretary-Treasurer,	Social	Science	Research	
Council	of	Canada	to	Information	Division,	February	25,	1959.	In	1940,	a	group	of	scholars,	led	by	Harold	Innis,	created	the	Social	Science	Research	Council	of	Canada.	The	Council,	like	the	Humanities	Research	Council	of	Canada	(HRC),	was	a	non-governmental	institution	created	by	the	academic	community.	As	the	Canadian	government	began	establishing	its	own	bodies	to	support	research,	first	in	the	form	of	the	Canada	Council	and	then	in	the	form	of	the	Social	Science	and	Humanities	Research	Council	(SSHRC),	the	two	original	councils—the	HRC	and	the	CSSRC—shifted	towards	becoming	representatives	for	academic	associations	and	universities.	Federation	for	the	Humanities	and	Social	Sciences	website.	http://www.ideas-idees.ca/about/history#1.	8	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3623,	File	2727-BM-40	part	1,	Letter	Information	Division	to	Secretary-Treasurer,	
The	Canadian	Political	Science	Association,	March	10,	1959.	9	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3623,	File	2727-BM-40	part	1,	Letter	Information	Division	to	President,	Canadian	
Institute	of	International	Affairs,	March	10,	1959.	10	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3623,	File	2727-BM-40	part	1,	Letter	Information	Division	to	Director,	Institute	of	
Social	Sciences,	June	29,	1959.	11	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	3623,	File	2727-BM-40	part	1,	Letter	English	Language	Secretary,	Canadian	
Historical	Association	to	Director,	Institute	of	Social	Sciences,	June	29,	1959.	
	 189	
Commission,	 was	 pleased	 to	 know	 these	 were	 available	 to	 Yugoslavs.12	The	 NRC	fellowships,	 however,	 got	 off	 to	 a	 slow	 start	 when	 Yugoslav	 authorities	 blocked	certain	 candidates,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 controlling	 who	 was	 allowed	 to	 go	 to	 Canada;	ideological	and	political	reasons	were	cited	to	justify	their	position.		
	 While	 the	exchange	of	open	 information	was	one	 thing,	allowing	academics	quick	 and	 easy	 access	 into	 the	 West	 was	 another.	 J.D.	 Babbitt,	 Secretary	 for	International	 Relations	 for	 SSRC,	 advised	 the	 DEA	 that	 several	 successful	postdoctoral	 candidates	 from	 Eastern	 Europe	 had	 been	 unable	 to	 receive	permission	 to	 leave	 their	 country	 to	 take	 up	 the	 fellowship.	 For	 instance,	 Dr.	 A.	Meniga,	a	Yugoslav	scientist,	was	unable	to	obtain	the	necessary	exit	papers	to	come	to	Canada.	Babbitt	asked	the	Under-Secretary	to	have	Ambassador	Ford	explain	to	the	Yugoslav	 authorities	 that	 it	was	discouraging	 to	 give	 fellowships	 to	Yugoslavs	only	to	find	that	they	were	unable	to	accept	the	award.	“We	must	confess,”	Babbitt	admitted,	“that	in	the	past	several	Yugoslav	fellows	have	obtained	positions	in	North	America	at	the	end	of	their	fellowships	and	have	not	returned	home.”	Still,	Babbitt	stressed	 that	 it	 was	 “not	 the	 intention	 of	 our	 fellowships	 to	 bring	 scientists	permanently	 to	 Canada	 and	 we	 make	 no	 effort	 to	 encourage	 fellows	 to	 remain	here.”13	Permanent	 settlement	 by	 Yugoslav	 scientists	 in	 North	 America	 was,	 of	course,	 the	 main	 trepidation	 of	 Yugoslav	 authorities.	 In	 addressing	 the	 situation,	Head	of	the	European	Division	Henry	Davis	explained	how																																																										12	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Visit	of	Mr.	Henry	Davis	to	Belgrade:	Cultural	Cooperation,”	November	11,	1959.	13	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Letter	J.D.	Babbitt,	Secretary	for	International	
Relation,	SSRC	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“NRC	Postdoctoral	Fellowships	for	Scientists	of	Yugoslavia,”	January	4,	1962.	
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	we	 cannot	 ignore	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 Yugoslav	 authorities	 may	have	of	these	fellowships	as	a	means	by	which	bright	Yugoslav	scholars	and	 technicians	may	 escape	 their	 responsibilities	 as	 Yugoslav	 citizens	and	establish	new	careers	in	North	America.	While	there	is	no	certainty	that	 this	 is	a	 reason	 for	 the	difficulties	which	 the	Yugoslav	authorities	are	placing	in	the	way	of	some	candidates	who	wish	to	come	to	NRC,	but	it	seems	to	us	a	possibility.14	Aware	 of	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 situation,	 yet	 still	 wanting	 NRC	 fellowships	 to	 be	awarded	 to	 Yugoslav	 scientists,	 Davis	 recommended	 that	 Ford	 have	 an	 informal	discussion	with	 the	 appropriate	 Yugoslav	 authorities,	 suggesting	 that	 perhaps,	 on	the	 Yugoslav	 side,	 a	 commitment	 to	 return	 to	 Yugoslavia	 for	 a	 specified	 period	following	 the	 termination	 of	 the	 fellowship	would	 be	 a	way	 of	 circumventing	 any	possibility	 of	 Yugoslavs	 remaining	 in	 North	 America	 immediately	 following	 their	fellowship.15	Davis’	 recommendation,	 while	 perhaps	 naïve,	 is	 a	 telling	 example	 of	how	the	Canadian	government	did	intervene	in	such	matters,	even	though	it	did	not	officially	sponsor	cultural	exchanges	and	did	not	have	a	formal	exchange	agreement	with	Yugoslavia.	Also,	it	highlights	the	sensitive	nature	of	such	exchanges,	given	the	Yugoslav	authorities’	concern	that	they	may	lose	a	good	scientist	to	the	West.	
	 The	NRC	consulted	 Josip	Kratohvil,	 a	Yugoslav	 scientist	who	was	granted	a	fellowship	in	Canada	and	later	found	employment	at	Clarkson	College	in	New	York,	with	 the	expectation	he	might	shed	 light	on	 the	Yugoslav	system	and	Dr.	Meniga’s	situation.	Kratohvil	revealingly	replied,	
																																																								14	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Memorandum	Davis	to	Information	Division,	“National	Research	Council	Postdoctorate	Fellowships	for	Scientists	from	Yugoslavia,”	February	10,	1961.	15	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Memorandum	Davis	to	Information	Division,	“National	Research	Council	Postdoctorate	Fellowships	for	Scientists	from	Yugoslavia,”	February	10,	1961.	
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	 It	appears	[…]	that	Dr.	Meniga	has	some	very	good	‘friends’	who	care	 very	 much	 that	 he	 stays	 in	 Zagreb.	 All	 those	 stories	 about	 new	regulations	 for	 professional	 people	 going	 abroad,	 etc.,	 are	 fakes,	transparent	 excuses	 for	 preventing	 particular	 individuals	 to	 leave	 the	country.	 Others	 are	 going	 without	much	 difficulty.	 […]	 Meniga	 finally	[spoke	 to]	 comrade	Uzelac,	who	 is	 the	 secretary-general	 of	 the	 newly	formed	 Council	 for	 Scientific	 Research	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	Croatia.	 This	 comrade	 had	 a	 very	 ‘convincing’	 reason	 why	 Meniga	cannot	 go	 to	 Ottawa.	 He	 declared	 that	 […]	 ‘we	 cannot	 allow	 that	foreigners	interfere	into	our	personal	policy	and	to	contact	whom	they	wish	 for	 fellowships,	 since	 it	 happens	 that	 they	 (foreigners)	 invite	people’s	 enemies	 or	 their	 children	 and	 refuse	 the	 candidates	 we	suggest.’	[…]	When	Meniga	asked	if	this	means	he	is	also	regarded	as	[a]	‘people’s	 enemy’	 the	 comrade	 hurried	 to	 convince	 him	 that	 he	 is	 not,	but	‘it	is	a	matter	of	principles.’16	Belgrade	 reassured	 Ottawa	 that	 they	 had	 heard	 a	 great	 deal	 from	 officials	 in	 the	Foreign	Ministry	and	elsewhere	regarding	the	desirability	of	exchanges	between	the	two	 countries	 and	 agreed	 that	 an	 informal	 discussion	 was	 appropriate.	 The	Canadian	embassy	strategically	wanted	the	Yugoslavs	to	suggest	a	solution	so	that	the	embarrassingly	high	proportion	of	award	winners	staying	in	Canada	might	not	be	 raised.	 The	 Yugoslav	 embassy	 in	 Ottawa	 reminded	 the	 Under-Secretary	 that	passport	 decisions	 were	 made	 by	 local,	 rather	 than	 federal,	 authorities	 and	acknowledged	 that,	 on	 a	 number	 of	 occasions,	 the	 Foreign	 Ministry	 had	 been	obviously	embarrassed	by	the	obstructiveness	of	their	colleagues	in	the	Ministry	of	the	 Interior. 17 	Indeed,	 Canadian	 diplomats	 in	 Belgrade	 believed	 the	 Yugoslav	Foreign	Ministry	would	likely	welcome	ammunition	in	the	form	of	evidence	that	the	tough	 attitude	 taken	 by	 the	 passport	 authorities	 was	 interfering	 with	 the	development	of	relations	with	another	country.	“Whether	or	not	they	would	win	the																																																									16	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Personal	Letter	Josip	Kratovil	to	W.H.	Cook,	
Director,	Division	of	Applied	Biology,	NRC,	January	9,	1961.	17	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Numbered	Letter	Pierre	Dumas,	Charge	d’Affaires,	
Embassy,	Belgrade	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“NRC	Fellowships	for	Yugoslav	Scientists,”	May	24,	1961.	
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argument	 is	 hard	 to	 say,”	 Canadian	 officials	 admitted,	 but	 they	 still	 considered	 it	“worth	 a	 try.”18	After	 this	 letter,	 the	 document	 trail	 goes	 cold,	 and	 it	 is	 unclear	whether	Dr.	Meniga	ever	made	it	to	Ottawa	to	take	up	his	fellowship.	
	 Nevertheless,	 the	 example	 of	 Dr.	 Meniga	 is	 telling.	 It	 highlights	 the	importance	 Canadian	 officials	 attached	 to	 the	NRC	 fellowships	 for	 breaking	 down	barriers	 with	 Yugoslavia,	 reveals	 their	 willingness	 to	 engage	 in	 diplomacy	 to	facilitate	exchanges	by	non-governmental	organizations,	and	demonstrates	how	the	bilateral	 relationship	 was	 still	 very	 much	 governed	 by	 ideological	 proclivities,	 a	reality	 that	underscored	 the	occasional	 fragility	of	 the	 relationship.	Ultimately,	Dr.	Meniga’s	case	did	not	appear	to	have	any	detrimental	effect	on	the	development	of	cultural	 and	 academic	 exchanges.	 Canadian	 professors	 visited	 and	 lectured	 in	Yugoslavia,	 and	 contacts	 were	 gradually	 established	 between	 universities.	 The	tempo	 of	 exchanges	 in	 mid-1961	 could	 be	 judged	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 April	 an	important	gift	of	Canadian	books	to	the	University	of	Belgrade	took	place.19		
	 TECHNICAL	AND	DIPLOMATIC	EXCHANGES			 Exchanges	 outside	 the	 realm	 of	 academia	 occurred	 as	 well.	 Dr.	 Vilfan,	Secretary-General	 to	 President	 Tito,	 explained	 that	 Yugoslavia	 was	 particularly	interested	in	exchanges	between	the	two	countries	on	the	technical	level,	especially	
																																																								18	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Numbered	Letter	Pierre	Dumas,	Charge	d’Affaires,	
Embassy,	Belgrade	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“NRC	Fellowships	for	Yugoslav	Scientists,”	May	24,	1961.	19	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2349,	File	7-Y1-1	part	7.3,	Despatch	Ford	to	-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Yugoslavia	in	Retrospect:	IV.	Canadian	Aims,”	May	9,	1961.	
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in	 the	 fields	 of	 agriculture,	 mining,	 and	 power.20	In	 the	 late	 1950s,	 the	 Yugoslav	government	tentatively	inquired	about	the	possibility	of	completing	with	Canada	an	agreement	 for	 the	exchange	of	 information	on	 the	peaceful	uses	of	atomic	energy.	One	notable	example	is	the	exchange	of	nuclear	science	information	and	personnel.	Yugoslavia,	at	this	point,	was	still	relatively	underdeveloped	but	was	making	serious	strides	 to	 industrialize	and	modernize.	 In	 fact,	 “the	Yugoslav	economy	maintained	an	 impressively	high	 rate	of	 growth	during	 the	years	1953	–	1965.”21	An	 informal	arrangement	was	developed	under	which	Atomic	Energy	of	Canada	Limited	(AECL)	sent	 published	 and	 unclassified	 papers	 to	 the	 atomic	 energy	 authorities	 in	Belgrade.22	Then,	in	late	1959,	the	Yugoslav	embassy	in	Ottawa,	acting	on	behalf	of	the	 Yugoslav	 Federal	 Commission	 for	 Nuclear	 Energy,	 expressed	 interest	 in	cooperating	 with	 the	 equivalent	 body	 in	 Canada.	 Specifically,	 the	 Commission	wanted	 to	 exchange	 “experience	 or	 the	 giving	 of	 technological	 aid,	 which	 is	necessary	 in	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 crude	 into	 the	 refined	 [uranium]	 product.”	 In	turn,	 AECL	 contacted	 Eldorado	 Mining	 and	 Refining	 Limited,	 since	 the	 work	appeared	 to	be	more	closely	 related	 to	 their	area	of	expertise.23	Subsequently,	 the	DEA	 became	 the	 intermediary	 between	 Eldorado	 and	 the	 Yugoslav	 Federal	Commission	for	Nuclear	Energy,	promoting	and	arranging	visits.		
																																																								20	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Numbered	Letter	Ignatieff	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Conversation	with	Dr.	Vilfan-Secretary-General	to	the	President,”	June	9,	1958.	21	John	R.	Lampe,	Russell	O.	Prickett,	and	Ljubiša	S.	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations	
Since	World	War	II	(Durham	and	London:	Duke	University	Press,	1990),	81.	The	uniqueness	of	Yugoslavia’s	“hybrid	economy”	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	below.	22	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Letter	Economic	Division	and	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	President,	Eldorado	Mining	&	Refining	Ltd.,	Mr.	W.	Gilchrist,	November	17,	1959.	23	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Letter	Economic	Division	and	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	President,	Eldorado	Mining	&	Refining	Ltd.,	Mr.	W.	Gilchrist,	November	17,	1959.	
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	 In	 response	 to	 the	 inquiry,	 Eldorado	 president,	William	 Gilchrist,	 reported	back	 that	his	company	would	be	happy	 to	 forward	any	published	and	unclassified	papers	specifically	connected	to	their	line	of	work	in	the	treatment	of	ores.	He	also	assured	 the	 government	 that	 he	was	 “quite	 happy	 to	 arrange	 a	 tour	 of	 treatment	plants	should	[the	Yugoslav	Federal	Commission	for	Nuclear	Energy]	wish	to	send	anyone	 to	Canada.”24	As	a	 result,	 in	 late	March,	 a	delegation	of	Yugoslav	 scientists	came	 to	 Canada	 (and	 the	 United	 States)	 where	 they	 visited	 the	 Atomic	 Centre	 at	Chalk	 River,	 the	 uranium	 processing	 factory	 at	 Port	 Hope,	 the	 laboratory	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Mining	 of	 Canada,	 and	 other	 laboratories	 of	 the	 State	 Atomic	 Energy	Corporation.25	The	Yugoslav	national	newspaper,	Borba,	dedicated	a	short	article	to	the	delegation’s	visit.	It	highlighted	the	delegation’s	conversation	with	the	chairman	of	 the	 Canadian	 Atomic	 Power	 Corporation,	 J.	 Lorne	 Gray,	 during	 which	 they	discussed	 the	 possibility	 of	 promoting	 cooperation	 in	 the	 field	 of	 atomic	 power	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia.26	
	 Following	 the	 delegation’s	 return	 to	 Yugoslavia,	 Ambassador	 Ford	 held	 a	dinner	 in	 its	 honor	 and	 reported	 on	 its	 impressions.	 The	 delegation	 was	 very	impressed	with	both	the	hospitality	it	received	and	what	was	described	as	Canada’s	advanced	research	and	practical	application	of	atomic	energy.	The	Yugoslavs	were	very	much	flattered	by	their	visit	with	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	Howard	Green	 and	 Under-Secretary	 Norman	 Robertson;	 overall,	 Ford	 concluded	 that	 the																																																									24	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Letter	President,	Eldorado	Mining	&	Refining	Ltd.,	Mr.	W.	Gilchrist	to	
Economic	Division,	November	20,	1959.	25	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	April	6,	1960.	26	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Despatch	Embassy	in	Yugoslavia	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	March	30,	1960.	
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visit	was	very	helpful	in	improving	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations.27	Witnessing	first-hand	 Canada’s	 nuclear	 energy	 capabilities	 impressed	 the	 delegation.	 Common	ground	was	found,	as	both	countries	insisted	on	including	adequate	safety	measures	for	 atomic	 reactors.	 The	 USSR	 had	 recently	 supplied	 Yugoslavia	 with	 an	 atomic	reactor	but	 imposed	no	 safeguards.	Canada’s	 emphasis	on	 safety	 set	 it	 apart	 from	the	Soviet	Union,	elevating	its	reputation	as	a	leader	in	atomic	energy	and,	perhaps,	providing	Canada	with	more	influence	on	Yugoslavia	in	atomic	matters.28	
	 Relations	 were	 further	 promoted	 by	 visits	 of	 high-ranking	 politicians	 and	ministers,	 which	 in	 turn	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 condition	 and	 future	 potential	 of	Canadian-Yugoslav	 commercial	 relations.	 In	 late	 1960,	 Yugoslav	 Minister	 of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	Dr.	Slavko	Komar	visited	Canada,	primarily	 for	economic	and	 political	 purposes.	 During	 his	 visit,	 Komar	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	meet	with	Diefenbaker.	 According	 to	Ottawa	 and	 Canadian	 officials	 in	 Belgrade,	 the	meeting	with	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 was	 “the	 key	 to	 the	 visit,”	 as	 it	 “could	 not	 have	 been	
																																																								27	LAC,	RG134,	Vol.	13,	File	1-5-Y,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	April	26,	1960.	28	Canada	also	helped	Yugoslavia	acquire	an	atomic	energy	pile	for	research	purposes.	Prominent	Canadian	scientist	Dr.	Jack	Mackenzie	attended	a	conference	on	energy	problems	in	non-aligned	countries	that	took	place	in	Yugoslavia	while	Ignatieff	was	ambassador.	During	his	visit,	admirers	promptly	surrounded	him.	During	the	conference,	he	explained	to	the	Yugoslavs	the	dangers	of	radiation	and	the	strict	precautions	that	would	have	to	be	observed.	Nevertheless,	the	inquisitiveness	got	the	better	of	them	and	some	Yugoslav	scientists	removed	the	top	of	the	calandria	of	the	zero	energy	pile	to	see	what	exactly	was	going	on	inside.	Five	of	them	suffered	radiation	poisoning,	and	though	they	were	all	rushed	to	a	specially	equipped	hospital	in	France,	one	scientist	died.	Tito	was	very	upset	when	he	heard	about	this	tragic	incident.	Had	Ignatieff	not	been	able	to	assure	him	that	they	had	done	everything	they	could	to	warn	the	Yugoslavs	about	the	dangers	of	radiation,	it	might	have	seriously	damaged	relations.	George	Ignatieff,	The	Making	of	a	Peacemonger:	The	Memoirs	of	
George	Ignatieff	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1985),	165-166.		
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described	 as	 a	 success	 if	 the	 call	 on	Mr.	 Diefenbaker	 had	 not	 taken	 place.”29		 For	reasons	 that	 are	 unclear,	 it	 seems	 Diefenbaker	 was	 considerably	 more	 at	 ease	meeting	Komar	than	Popović	(perhaps	due	to	the	latter’s	public	profile).	Regardless,	Komar’s	visit	reveals	the	importance	Yugoslav	officials	attached	to	expanding	their	commercial	 relations.	 Komar	 was	 cautiously	 optimistic.	 While	 “tremendously	impressed	by	the	economic	maturity	of	Canada,”	he	felt	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	find	 Yugoslav	 exports	 that	 would	 be	 acceptable	 in	 Canada	 and	 thought	 Canada’s	credits	were	“unrealistic.”	Komar,	however,	was	convinced	both	obstacles	could	be	overcome	 in	 three	 to	 four	 years.30	He	 appreciated	 the	 current	 trade	 situation,	stressing	 that	 it	was	 time	 “to	 lay	 the	basis	 for	 a	 considerable	 increase	 in	 trade.”31	Significantly,	 Komar’s	 visit	 highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 governments	 indeed	 saw	this	period	as	an	important	time	of	transition	and	an	opportunity	to	lay	a	foundation	for	 future	 commercial	 relations;	 this	 further	 corroborates	 the	 argument	 that	 the	Diefenbaker	period	was	a	decisive	time	in	Canadian-Eastern	European	relations.	 	
	 Canadian	 officials	 did	 not	 unconditionally	 promote	 exchanges	 with	Yugoslavia.	Ottawa	occasionally	had	reservations,	particularly	when	it	felt	the	Soviet	Union	 could	 reap	 immediate	 benefits.	 Various	 Canadian	 asbestos	 corporations																																																									29	LAC,	RG24,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Personal	Letter	Ford	to	Davis,	January	3,	1961.;	LAC,	RG24,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	January	3,	1961	30	On	the	Yugoslav	side,	Komar	said	that	the	new	Five-Year	Plan,	which	was	to	start	shortly,	would	double	the	economic	potential	of	Yugoslavia	in	five	years	and	would	make	the	country	not	only	an	attractive	trading	partner	but	would	provide	products	that	could	compete	on	the	Canadian	market.	Komar	also	understood	from	his	talks	in	Canada	that	the	government	and	Canadian	businesses	were	moving	in	the	direction	of	overcoming	the	obstacles	of	high	prices	and	highly	priced	credits.	LAC,	RG24,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Visit	to	Canada	of	Yugoslav	Minister	of	Agriculture,”	January	3,	1961.	31	LAC,	RG24,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“Visit	to	Canada	of	Yugoslav	Minister	of	Agriculture,”	January	3,	1961.	
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agreed	 to	 a	 multi-week	 technical	 training	 program	 in	 asbestos	 operations	 for	Yugoslav	specialists.32	The	Inter-Departmental	Panel	on	the	Exchange	of	Visits	with	Communist	Countries,	however,	expressed	concern	from	both	the	government	and	the	industry’s	point	of	view.	Canada’s	position	in	world	markets	for	asbestos	fibre,	it	was	explained,	had	weakened	over	the	past	few	years	due	primarily	to	competition	from	other	 sources.	 Since	 the	 early	1950s,	 the	 Soviet	Union	had	made	 “enormous	strides”	and	had	developed	to	the	point	where	it	challenged	Canada	as	the	“leading	asbestos	 producer	 of	 the	 world.”	 Additionally,	 asbestos	 exports	 from	 Eastern	Europe	 increased.	 “This	 penetration”	 the	 Inter-Departmental	 Panel	 warned,	 “has	captured	markets	from	the	Canadian	industry.”33	
	 It	was	also	the	opinion	of	Departmental	experts	that	the	USSR’s	recovery	of	short	fibre	grades	asbestos	was	not	as	advanced	as	Canadian	industry.	Yugoslavian	deposits,	however,	did	“contain	an	appreciable	proportion	of	short	 fibre	asbestos.”	This	was	cause	for	concern:		
	 [I]t	 may	 be	 presumed	 that	 recovery	 of	 short	 fibre,	 that	 is	 the	milling	 process	 to	 recover	 them,	 will	 be	 one	 of	 the	 larger	 items	 of	interest	during	the	proposed	visit	[by	Yugoslav	specialists].	Information	so	 learned	 could,	without	 difficulty,	 reach	 the	 Russian	 industry.	 Since	the	 latter	 country	 intends	 or	 plans	 to	 increase	 its	 production	 by	expanding	the	Bazhenova	operations,	and	developing	an	important	new	deposit	 in	Kazakhstan	to	an	estimated	two	million	tons	per	annum,	or	roughly	twice	the	current	production	level	in	Canada,	Russia	will	be	in	a	position	to	compete	more	strongly	with	Canada	in	world	markets.	
																																																								32	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Letter	Asbestos	Corporation	Limited	to	Department	
of	Trade	and	Commerce,	November	22,	1960.	33	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Letter	Deputy	Minister	of	Mines	and	Technical	
Surveys	to	Inter-Departmental	Panel	on	the	Exchange	of	Visits	with	Communist	Countries,	Department	
of	External	Affairs,	January	20,	1961.	
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For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Inter-Departmental	 Panel	 believed	 that	 supporting	 a	 training	program	that	provided	Yugoslavs	with	technical	knowledge	in	the	asbestos	industry	could	worsen	Canada’s	position	in	the	global	market;	as	a	result,	they	recommended	the	proposed	training	program	be	withdrawn	or,	at	most,	that	“a	token	three	to	four	days	visit”	be	offered.34	The	Asbestos	Fibre	Division	of	 Johns-Manville	Corporation	concurred	 and	 offered	 the	 Yugoslavs	 the	 chance	 to	 study	 their	 mining	 and	 ore	depressing	 techniques,	 but	 denied	 access	 to	 the	milling	 process	 of	 short	 fibres.35		 This	was	a	rare	instance	when	Yugoslavia	was	perceived	as	a	clear	surrogate	for	 the	USSR,	 potentially	 enabling	 the	 Soviets	 to	 obtain	 information	 that	 could,	 in	turn,	directly	challenge	Canadian	industry.	This	also	exemplifies	how	the	USSR	was	ever-present	 in	 Canada’s	 dealings	 with	 Yugoslavia.	 Typically,	 Canadian	 officials	wanted	to	promote	relations	with	Communist	Europe	to	challenge	Soviet	influence.	This	 example	demonstrates	how	occasionally	 it	 proved	more	 advantageous	not	 to	promote	 cooperation,	 if	 doing	 so	 jeopardized	 Canada’s	 ability	 to	 squarely	 combat	the	 Soviet	 economic	 offensive.	 That	 the	 Inter-Departmental	 Panel	 urged	 the	asbestos	industry	not	to	provide	training	to	Yugoslav	specialists	also	illustrates	how	seriously	Canada	viewed	 the	economic	offensive	and	 the	potential	 ramifications	 it	posed	to	Canadian	industry.		
	 	
																																																								34	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Letter	Deputy	Minister	of	Mines	and	Technical	
Surveys	to	Inter-Departmental	Panel	on	the	Exchange	of	Visits	with	Communist	Countries,	Department	
of	External	Affairs,	January	20,	1961.	35	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5378,	File	10438-BM-40	part	3,	Letter	Canadian	Johns-Manville	Co.	Limited,	
Asbestos	Fibre	Division	to	Training	Division,	External	Aid	Office,	January	6,	1961.	
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	 ROOM	FOR	IMPROVEMENT		 Unlike	 Canadian-Soviet	 cultural	 relations,	 which	 saw	 a	 healthy	 number	 of	exchanges	 in	 the	 arts,	 there	 were	 fewer	 such	 exchanges	 between	 Canada	 and	Yugoslavia.	Records	suggest	these	types	of	exchanges	did	not	appear	to	be	pursued	as	 assiduously,	 especially	 compared	 to	 Canadian-Soviet	 exchanges.	 This	 is	 not	 to	say,	however,	that	exchanges	in	the	arts	were	considered	unimportant	or	that	they	did	 not	 take	 place	 at	 all.	 Beginning	 in	 the	 early	 1950s,	 the	 Yugoslav	 government	discarded	 the	 Soviet	 attitude	 toward	 art,	 and	 socialist	 realism	was	 no	 longer	 the	dominant	genre	of	expression.36	More	similar	artistic	styles	likely	contributed	to	the	exchange	of	art	exhibitions	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia,	since	Yugoslav	artwork	was,	according	to	Davis,	“of	high	quality	and	Western	in	inspiration.”37	For	instance,	in	February	1959,	Yugoslavia	sent	a	graphic	art	exhibit	to	Canada’s	National	Gallery,	and	 Canada	 sent	 an	 Eskimo	 art	 exhibition	 that	 toured	 six	 major	 Yugoslav	 cities.	While	modest,	the	exchange	of	art	exhibits	represented	cultural	diplomacy	on	a	new,	and	 rather	 underdeveloped,	 plain	 in	 Yugoslavia,	 one	 that	 had	 the	 potential	 to	provide	new	linkages	between	the	two	nations,	inspired	by	artistic	expression.	
	 During	a	1959	conversation	between	Ford,	Popović	and	Edvard	Kardelj	(then	Acting	President),	Kardelj	broached	the	subject	of	improving	cultural	relations.	Ford	explained	 that	 he	 was	 a	 personal	 friend	 of	 pianist	 Glenn	 Gould	 and	 hoped	 to	
																																																								36	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Henry	Davis	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	
for	External	Affairs,	“Current	Canadian-Yugoslav	Relations,”	February	9,	1959.	37	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10277-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Henry	Davis	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	
for	External	Affairs,	“Current	Canadian-Yugoslav	Relations,”	February	9,	1959.		
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persuade	 him	 to	 play	 in	 Yugoslavia.	 To	 Ford’s	 surprise,	 both	Kardelj	 and	 Popović	had	 Gould’s	 records	 and	 were	 keen	 to	 have	 him	 play	 in	 their	 country. 38	Unfortunately	 for	 Ford	 (and	 Kardelj	 and	 Popović),	 Gould	 never	 went	 for	 reasons	that	are	unclear.	Nevertheless,	Ford’s	hope	of	having	Gould	play	in	Yugoslavia	was	clearly	aligned	with	the	positive	impacts	his	tour	had	on	Canadian-Soviet	relations	a	few	 years	 prior;	 classical	 music	 was	 seen	 to	 have	 the	 real	 ability	 to	 transcend	national	boundaries	and	create	common	linkages.	The	attempt	to	arrange	a	visit	by	Gould	 is	 also	 a	 testament	 to	 Ford’s	 desire	 to	 further	 improve	 Canadian-Yugoslav	cultural	 relations	 through	 the	 arts	 and	 to	 his	 belief	 in	 the	 impact	 that	 such	 visits	could	have.	
	 While	examining	various	exchanges	is	important	and	uncovers	an	interesting	juncture	where	ideological	barriers	could	be	surmounted,	what	is	most	revealing	is	the	 prominence	 officials	 attached	 to	 the	 various	 exchanges	 as	well	 as	 their	 belief	that	 cultural	 diplomacy	 was	 a	 viable	 means	 to	 bridge	 political	 and	 ideological	divides.	 Both	 Canadian	 and	 Yugoslav	 officials,	 on	 a	 number	 of	 occasions,	 credited	various	 exchanges	 with	 advancing	 political	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	Canada’s	 cultural	 exchanges	with	 Yugoslavia,	 while	 supporting	 traditional	 foreign	policy	objectives,	focused	less	on	immediate	outcomes.	Whether	it	was	through	art	exhibitions,	cooperation	in	atomic	energy	research,	academia,	technical	research,	or	visits	 by	 high	 officials,	 the	 two	 countries	 cooperated	 in	 a	 number	 of	 fields	 from	within	 a	 middle	 power	 framework.	 The	 shadow	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 indeed	 loomed	
																																																								38	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	January	14,	1959.	Microfilm,	432733.	
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large	 in	both	 countries’	 consciousness,	 and	 they	each	 saw	cultural	diplomacy	as	 a	practical	method	of	bypassing,	and	even	breaking	down,	ideological	barriers.	
	 A	NEW	LANDSCAPE	FOR	CANADIAN	ECONOMIC	STATECRAFT		 As	mentioned,	political	motivations	were	the	driving	force	behind	Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	 during	 this	 period,	 as	 each	 country	 used	middlepowerism	 not	only	to	find	common	ground	but	also	to	jockey	for	position	within	their	respective	ideological	blocs.	Trade	between	the	two	countries	was	another	 important	avenue	for	fostering	closer	relations.	Commercial	deals	and	ventures	were	not	without	their	hiccups,	and	trade	volume	paled	in	comparison	with	Western	nations	(particularly	the	US).	But	 it	was	 less	 the	revenue	that	was	generated	and	more	the	connections	and	 integration	 into	 Western	 markets	 that	 Canadian	 officials	 saw	 as	 important.	Additionally,	exposing	Yugoslavia	to	Western	business	practices	was	considered	an	added	benefit.	After	all,	international	commercial	relations	are	rarely	isolated	from	political	considerations.	
	 During	the	late	Stalinist	period,	as	Yugoslavia	became	increasingly	alienated	from	the	Eastern	bloc	as	a	result	of	its	firm	stance	toward	its	own	independent	road	to	 socialism,	 its	 economy,	 while	 never	 entirely	 firm,	 became	 even	 more	 fragile.	Immediately	following	Yugoslavia’s	expulsion	from	the	Cominform	–	and	the	Soviet	economic	 boycott	 of	 1948	 –	 a	 state	 of	 “virtual	 economic	 siege	 descended	 on	 the	country.”39	At	the	time,	Ambassador	Ignatieff	observed	if	“the	countries	of	the	Soviet	bloc	 mean	 to	 indulge	 in	 an	 all-out	 trade	 war	 on	 Yugoslavia,	 such	 developments	would	 have	 dire	 consequences	 on	 [Yugoslavia’s]	 economy.”	 And	 since	 the	 Soviet																																																									39	Lampe,	Prickett,	and	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations,	74.	
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Union’s	 economic	 pressure	 on	 Yugoslavia	 showed	 little	 sign	 of	 abating,	 it	 was	“understandable	 that	 Yugoslavia	 would	 turn	 to	 the	West	 for	 economic	 help.”40	In	fact,	 following	 Tito’s	 break	 with	 Stalin	 in	 1948,	 the	 United	 States	 alone	 had	furnished	the	Yugoslav	government	with	over	$1.5	billion	in	military	and	economic	assistance.41	While	 the	Canadian	 government	did	not	provide	 economic	 assistance	to	Yugoslavia,	keeping	economic	doors	open	was	part	of	a	broader	strategy	of	trying	to	 orient	 Tito’s	 regime	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 greater	 political	 and	 economic	liberalization.	 As	 a	 result,	 Canadian	 officials	 valued	 increased	 trade	 less	 for	 its	potential	economic	benefits	and	more	as	a	means	to	influence	Yugoslavia’s	political	direction,	 hopefully	 drawing	 it	 towards	 the	 West.	 In	 other	 words,	 Canadian–Yugoslav	commercial	relations	demonstrate	the	significance	of	economic	statecraft	in	Canada’s	Cold	War	diplomacy.		
	 While	 commercial	 relations	 developed	 between	 the	 two	 nations,	 Canadian	officials	 sometimes	 found	Yugoslavia’s	economic	 landscape	difficult	 to	navigate;	 in	fact,	Yugoslav	officials	were	not	unsympathetic.	The	Cold	War	not	only	pitted	East-West	 political	 systems	 and	 militaries	 against	 each	 other,	 but	 witnessed	 the	emergence	 of	 radically	 different	 and	 competing	 economic	 systems	 as	 well.	Essentially,	 the	 Yugoslav	 system	 could	 be	 described	 as	 “decentralized	 socialism	mixed	with	market	 forces.”	Typical	 of	 socialist	 economic	 systems	during	 the	 time,	Yugoslav	 leaders	 were	 committed	 to	 rapid	 economic	 development	 “based	 on	 the	
																																																								40	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	2348,	File	7-YI-1	part	4.2,	Numbered	Letter	Embassy,	Belgrade,	Yugoslavia	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	October	2,	1958.	41	Lorraine	M.	Lees,	Keeping	Tito	Afloat:	The	United	States,	Yugoslavia,	and	the	Cold	War	(Pennsylvania,	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	1997),	227.	
	 203	
extensive	growth	of	state	industrial	enterprises	and	on	the	Soviet	pattern	of	central	planning.”42	The	 Yugoslav	 system	 could	 not	 be	 described	 as	 a	 free	 enterprise	economy,	as	 the	West	understood	 this	 term.	There	was	some	scope	 for	enterprise	and	 initiative,	 but	 within	 severely	 circumscribed	 limits.	 Ignatieff	 used	 the	 term	“guided	 enterprise”	 to	 describe	 Yugoslav	 economic	 practices. 43 	Detailed	administrative	control	from	the	centre	had	been	abolished,	and	the	main	purpose	of	planning	 was	 to	 establish	 what	 proportions	 of	 the	 national	 income	 should	 be	allocated	 to	 investment	 and	 to	 consumption.	 Ignatieff	maintained	 that	 the	 system	provided	 room	 for	 the	 initiative	 of	 enterprises	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	industrial	 undertakings,	 but	 recognized	 that	 they	 were	 limited	 by	 the	 size	 of	investment	 funds.44	Both	 economists	 and	 Yugoslav	 officials	 became	 increasingly	aware,	 by	 the	 early	 1960s,	 that	 the	 fast-growing	 Yugoslav	 economy	 was	 not	producing	the	desired	results.	Not	only	was	the	Yugoslav	economic	system	different	from	 both	 the	 Soviet	 and	 Western	 systems,	 “but	 it	 also	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 both	systems	 and	 compete	 successfully	 with	 the	 [Western	 free-enterprise	 system]	 in	world	markets.”	And,	signals	from	these	world	markets	indicated	“that	the	Yugoslav	system	was	not	measuring	up	to	Western	standards	of	efficiency.”45	
	 Regardless,	 a	 controlled	 system	 determined	 the	 direction	 of	 trade	 and	 the	kinds	and	quantities	of	imports	and	exports.	This	system	of	comprehensive	control	
																																																								42	Lampe,	Prickett,	and	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations,	73-74.	43	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2348,	File	7-YI-1	part	4.2,	Despatch	Ignatieff	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Mr.	Wiles’	Views	on	the	Yugoslav	Economy,”	January	17,	1958.	44	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2348,	File	7-YI-1	part	4.2,	Despatch	Ignatieff	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Mr.	Wiles’	Views	on	the	Yugoslav	Economy,”	January	17,	1958.	45	Lampe,	Prickett,	and	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations,	81.	
	 204	
ensured	 that	 the	domestic	 industrial	programme	received	priority	and	protection,	both	 in	 terms	 of	 maintaining	 an	 artificial	 price	 structure	 between	 the	 domestic	market	and	the	foreign	market,	and	within	the	domestic	market	between	industrial	production	 and	 agricultural	 production.	 Available	 foreign	 exchange	was	 allocated	either	directly	to	importers	who	brought	in	high	priority	capital	equipment	and	raw	materials	 or	 to	 different	 importers,	 all	 the	 while	 guided	 by	 the	 overriding	requirements	of	the	domestic	economy.46	
	 SEARCHING	FOR	A	NICHE		 It	 was	 in	 the	 field	 of	 raw	 materials	 and	 capital	 equipment	 that	 Canada’s	ambassadors	in	Yugoslavia	saw	real	potential	for	the	two	countries	to	do	business.	This	would	obviously	complement	Yugoslavia’s	industrialization	drive.	To	Canadian	officials,	 there	was	 poetic	 political	 justification	 and	 appeal	 to	 doing	 business	with	the	 Yugoslavs:	 Canada,	 a	 middle	 power	 rich	 in	 raw	 materials,	 could	 help	industrialize	 another	 middle	 power,	 one	 caught	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	 an	 ostensible	communist	belligerent,	leading	to	eventual	Yugoslav	democratization	and	to	further	divisions	within	 the	 Eastern	 European	 communist	 bloc.	While	 perhaps	 naïve	 and	opportunistic,	 this	was	how	some	Canadian	officials	 interpreted	the	 importance	of	close	Canadian-Yugoslav	commercial	relations.	Upon	leaving	his	post	as	ambassador	in	1961,	Ford	explained	that	he	was	“interested	in	the	commercial	side	of	our	work	and	 [saw]	 it	 as	 closely	 interlinked	with	 the	political.”47	He	also	maintained	 that	 as	
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Yugoslavia’s	 economic	 policy	 became	 increasingly	Westernized,	 it	 “apparently	 felt	the	need	to	counter	this	by	following	a	Soviet	lead	in	foreign	policy.”	In	Ford’s	view,	anything	 Canada	 could	 do	 “to	 keep	 Yugoslav	 policy	 neutral	 would	 be	advantageous.”48	Commercial	links,	then,	proved	to	be	part	of	that	equation.	Again	it	should	 be	 stressed	 that	 Canadian	 exports	 were	 not	 extensive;	 the	 importance	 of	commercial	relations	was	less	economical,	and	more	political.	The	pervasiveness	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	Cold	War	in	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations	is	clearly	notable	and	helps	 to	explain	why	economic	 statecraft	became	an	 integral	part	of	Canada’s	Yugoslav	policy.	
	 At	 times,	Yugoslavia	was	 isolated	 from	trading	with	Warsaw	Pact	countries	or	faced	severe	restrictions	on	doing	business	with	its	communist	neighbours.	The	effects	of	Soviet	 rebukes	were	very	 real.	The	Yugoslav	economy	suffered	 from	the	withdrawal	 of	 Soviet	 bloc	 credits	 and	 from	 the	 reduction	 of	 trade	 with	 Eastern	Europe.49	Canadian	 officials	 in	 Belgrade	 believed	 the	 Yugoslav	 government	 may	have	exaggerated	the	danger	of	an	all-out	Soviet	military	and	economic	offensive	as	a	deliberate	calculation	to	strengthen	its	argument	for	Western	credits,	but	this	did	not	mean	that	Yugoslavia	truly	did	not	need	the	credits.	In	fact,	Canadian	officials	in	Belgrade	 noted	 that	 Yugoslav	 officials	 were	 apprehensive	 about	 their	 economic	situation	 and	 argued	 that	 the	 existing	 climate	 provided	 a	 politically	 propitious	moment	 for	Canada.	 In	 their	view,	 it	was	 in	 the	West’s	political	 interest	 to	extend																																																									48	DCER.	Vol.	28.	632.	Ambassador	in	Yugoslavia	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Visit	of	Yugoslav	Secretary	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs	to	Canada,”	Belgrade,	February	9,	1961.	DEA/10277-40.		49	Stephen	Clissold,	“Yugoslavia	and	the	Soviet	Union,”	Conflict	Studies,	No.	57	(London:	Institute	for	the	Study	of	Conflicts,	1975),	15.	
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credits	to	Yugoslavia.50	Yugoslav	Deputy	Minister	of	Foreign	Trade	Vladimir	Velebit	explained	 to	 Ford	 that	 they	 (Yugoslav	 officials)	 did	 not	 want	 to	 exaggerate	 the	effects	of	the	quarrel	with	the	Soviet	bloc	on	the	their	economy,	but	stressed	that	it	would	 be	 equally	 foolish	 to	 ignore	 it	 since	 it	 had	 required	 the	 scrapping	 of	 some	projects	 and	 a	 rather	 painful	 readjustment	 of	 trade.51	Ultimately,	 the	 Diefenbaker	government	worked	hard	with	Yugoslav	officials	to	advance	economic	relations.		
	 Yugoslavia’s	purchase	of	Canadian	pulp	and	paper	machinery	is	a	good	case	in	point	 that	 illustrates	 the	 importance	of	 credits	 and	 the	 importance	 attached	by	some	 Canadian	 officials,	 particularly	 Canada’s	 ambassadors	 in	 Yugoslavia,	 to	cultivating	closer	economic	ties	as	a	means	of	thwarting	Soviet	advances	and	luring	Yugoslavia	into	the	Western	camp.	On	the	surface,	the	bilateral	pulp	and	paper	mills	deal	 may	 seem	 pedestrian,	 but	 the	 differing	 views	 of	 various	 Canadian	 federal	departments	as	to	the	importance	of	the	deal	is	revealing.	The	purchase	of	the	mills	began	 during	 Diefenbaker’s	 tenure,	 spanned	 three	 ambassadors,	 and	 was	 not	concluded	until	late	1963,	by	which	time	Lester	Pearson’s	Liberal	government	was	in	 power.	 The	 purchase	 of	 this	 equipment	 was	 complicated	 by	 the	 Yugoslav	requirement	 that	 the	 Canadian	 government	 provide	 a	 guarantee	 of	 commercial	credit	under	the	export	insurance	act.		
	 In	early	January	1959,	representatives	from	Yugoslavia	approached	Canada’s	Ministry	 of	 Trade	 and	 Commerce	 regarding	 possible	 Canadian	 firms	 from	 whom	
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they	 could	purchase	 the	machinery,	worth	approximately	$24	million.	 Some	 firms	questioned	whether	 the	 Yugoslav	 government	 seriously	 intended	 to	 purchase	 the	machinery.	 H.B.	 Style,	 President	 of	 John	 Inglis	 Co.,	 wrote	 Ambassador	 Ford	personally	expressing	his	hesitation.52	In	a	letter	to	Howard	Green,	Ford	suggested	that	 if	 Style	 raised	 the	 matter	 with	 the	 minister,	 Green	 should	 stress	 that	 the	Yugoslav	government	is	“extremely	anxious	to	buy	this	equipment	from	Canada	and	will	 give	 us	 preference	 over	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Germany.”53	Still,	 while	 the	Yugoslav	 government	may	 have	 been	 sincere	 in	 its	 desire	 to	 purchase	 paper	mill	equipment	from	Canada,	not	all	Canadian	officials	were	behind	such	projects.		
	 Though	Ambassador	Ford	was	eager	to	see	a	deal	develop	between	the	two	countries,	not	all	departments	shared	his	enthusiasm.	For	instance,	some	officials	in	the	Ministry	of	Finance	expressed	chagrin	at	Ford’s	“promotional	activities”:	
	[Ambassador	 Ford]	 seems	 to	 be	 under	 the	 impression	 that	 we	 in	Ottawa	 are	 very	 anxious	 to	 make	 sales	 to	 the	 Yugoslavs	 under	Government	 guarantee:	 [Ford	 says]	 ‘we	 must	 send		representatives	to	Yugoslavia’	[and]	‘Anything	you	could	do	to	convince	the	 Canadian	 companies	 of	 the	 need	 to	 take	 some	 initiative	 to	 secure	this	business	would,	I	think,	be	useful.’			 Of	 course	 all	 Departments	 in	 Ottawa	 are	 glad	 to	 see	 Canadian	firms	 get	 business	 in	 any	 part	 of	 the	 world.	 […]	 But	 in	 this	 case	Government	 credit	 is	 involved	and	Yugoslavia	 cannot	be	 considered	a	good	 risk.	When	 the	 question	 of	 Government	 guarantees	 arose	we	 in	the	 Department	 [of	 Finance]	 were	 only	 willing	 to	 agree	 because	 we	understood	 that	 [the	 DEA]	 considered	 that	 some	 assistance	 to	Yugoslavia	would	be	politically	desirable.54	
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Deputy	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	John	English	was	also	concerned	by	Ford’s	“over	eagerness,”55	and	the	DEA’s	Economic	Division	soon	informed	the	ambassador	that	 he	 was	 to	 curtail	 his	 “promotional	 activities”	 regarding	 the	 paper	 mills	project.56	It	 is	 clear	 that	 Ford	 was	 unable,	 or	 perhaps	 reluctant,	 to	 ignore	 the	broader	 political	 implications	 of	 the	 deal.	 He	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 such	capital	 equipment	 to	 Yugoslavia’s	 industrialization	 and	 wanted	 to	 gain	 political	favour	 with	 a	 Canadian	 contribution	 to	 Yugoslavia’s	 economic	 development.	 The	possibility	of	the	Yugoslavs	purchasing	the	equipment	from	Canada	rather	than	the	United	States	was	an	added	bonus.	Although	Ford	was	perceived	by	some	as	“over	eager”	 in	promoting	Canadian-Yugoslav	business,	his	political	 intuition	was	 in	 line	with	many	senior	officials	and	ministers.	It	was	well	understood	by	all	departments	that	 political	 considerations	 were	 the	 underlying	 force	 behind	 the	 desire	 for	 the	pulp	and	paper	deal.	
	 On	the	brink	of	collapse,	new	life	was	breathed	into	a	possible	deal	when	the	Canadian	Export	Credit	Insurance	Corporation	(ECIC)	issued	a	favourable	economic	report	 on	 Yugoslavia	 in	 September	 1959.57	Even	 the	 skeptical	 Assistant	 Deputy	Minister	of	Finance,	A.F.W.	Plumptre,	was	impressed.	Additionally,	Canadian	Vickers	Limited	 (one	 of	 the	 companies	 vying	 for	 the	 contract)	 sent	 representatives	 to	Yugoslavia	 and	made	 a	 new	 approach	 to	 Trade	 and	 Commerce,	 one	more	 in	 line	with	 the	 ECIC,	 gaining	 the	 support	 of	 Finance	Minister	 Gordon	 Churchill.	 He	 then																																																									55	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7115,	File	9035-40	part	3.2,	Memorandum	LePan	to	Economic	Division,	“Credit	for	Yugoslavia,”	May	28,	1959.	56	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7115,	File	9035-40	part	3.2,	Letter	Grey	to	Ford,	June	3,	1959.	57	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4315,	File	8404/Y94-1,	Export	Credit	Insurance	Corporation:	Yugoslavia,	September	4,	1959.		
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submitted	 a	 memorandum	 to	 Cabinet	 suggesting	 the	 approval	 of	 export	 credit	insurance	 for	 Vickers,58	which	 was	 approved.59	The	 deal,	 however,	 temporarily	collapsed.	
	 Why	 the	 Vickers-Yugoslav	 deal	 fell	 apart	 is	 somewhat	 murky.	 As	 the	company’s	vice-president	explained,	the	Yugoslav	government	requested	too	many	concessions.60	Reports	from	the	Commercial	Division	at	Canada’s	Yugoslav	embassy,	however,	suggest	that	negotiations	were	delayed	due	to	the	troubles	Vickers	had	in	arranging	 financing	 and	 the	 high	 interest	 rates	 involved;	 moreover,	 the	 Vickers	representatives	did	not	seem	enthusiastic	about	 the	deal.61	During	Slavko	Komar’s	(Minister	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry)	visit	to	Canada,	he	suggested	that	memoranda	might	 be	 exchanged	 between	 the	 Canadian	 and	 Yugoslav	 authorities,	 expressing	their	 respective	 understandings	 of	 what	 happened	 in	 the	 Yugoslav-Vickers	negotiations.	 Under-Secretary	 Davis,	 however,	 stressed	 to	 Ford	 that	 he	 did	 not	consider	 this	 a	 “useful	 exercise”	 since	 “there	 continues	 to	 be	 rather	 too	 much	confusion	within	the	Canadian	side,	as	well	as	between	Canada	and	Yugoslavia,	as	to	what	actually	happened	and	who	was	to	blame.”	Davis	stressed	that	it	would	not	be	easy	to	“reconcile	the	views	of	the	various	departments	and	agencies,	the	Canadian	banks	 and	 the	 corporations	 involved…”	 Overall,	 Davis	 concluded,	 an	 attempt	 to	
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provide	clarity	on	the	subject	would	not	contribute	to	improved	Canadian	business	with	Yugoslavia.	He	hoped	that	the	embassy	would	not	raise	the	subject	and	that	the	ideas	would	be	“quietly	dropped.”62	Davis,	it	appears,	got	his	way.	
	 Negotiations	did	resume	in	late	1963	under	the	new	Liberal	government,	but	Vickers	 executives	were	 now	 skeptical	 since	 their	 previous	 experience	 cost	 them	nearly	 $60,000	 in	 preparing	 estimates	 and	 visits	 to	 Yugoslavia.63	Despite	 any	 last	ditch	 effort,	 no	 deal	 resulted.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 sustained	 efforts	 by	 Canadian	officials,	 and	 the	Belgrade	mission	 in	particular,	 underline	 the	 importance	Canada	attached	 to	 potential	 trade	 deals	 as	 means	 to	 cultivate	 closer	 relations	 with	Yugoslavia.	 Specifically,	 this	 episode	 also	 demonstrates	 Canadian	 officials’	awareness	 of	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 realities	 faced	 by	 a	 Yugoslav	 economy	struggling	under	the	burden	of	the	Soviet	bloc’s	treatment.	
	 Government	policy	permitting	the	export	of	military	equipment	to	Yugoslavia	was	 first	 developed	 in	1954,	 in	 consultation	with	 the	major	Western	powers.	The	policy	was	 based	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 this	would	 help	 Yugoslavia	 to	 resist	 Soviet	pressure.	“Canadian	policy,”	Green	asserted	in	a	submission	to	Cabinet,	“has	been	to	encourage	Yugoslavia	in	its	independent	attitude	and	to	foster	where	possible	more	friendly	 relations	 with	 the	 West.”	 Selling	 arms	 and	 military	 equipment	“complements	 other	 aspects	 of	 our	 policy	 toward	 [Yugoslavia].	 […]	 Believing	 that	
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the	political	 and	 strategic	 consequences	of	 approving	 these	 applications	would	be	consistent	 with	 Canada’s	 interests,	 I	 recommend	 that	 [the	 applications]	 be	approved.”64	Soon	after,	the	government	received	an	additional	35	applications	from	the	 Levy	 Auto	 Parts	 Company,	 in	 the	 same	 category.	 Some	 Cabinet	 Ministers	believed	Canada	should	not	export	arms	to	any	country	and	nothing	could	be	gained	politically	 by	 making	 friends	 with	 Yugoslavia.	65	Over	 these	 objections,	 Cabinet	approved	all	applications	which	then	valued	over	$400,000.66	 	The	 dollar	 amount	of	 the	 sale,	 practically	 negligible	 in	 terms	 of	 total	 Canadian	 export	 sales,	 is	 less	important.	 	 The	 true	 significance	 of	 the	 sale	 is	 twofold:	 first	 it	 highlights	 the	continuity	 of	 Canadian	 policy	 objectives	 towards	 Yugoslavia,	 across	 Liberal	 and	Progressive	 Conservative	 governments;	 second,	 it	 is	 another	 example	 of	 Canada’s	ability	 as	 a	 middle	 power	 to	 play	 some	 part	 in	 sustaining	 Yugoslavia’s	 more	independent	stance,	building	bridges	with	the	West	through	commercial	ties.	
	 Exportation	 of	 military	 equipment	 to	 Yugoslavia	 continued	 during	 the	Diefenbaker	years.	The	export	of	military	equipment	closely	 followed	Yugoslavia’s	purchase	of	updated	F-86	Sabre	 fighter	planes	 from	the	United	States.67	According	to	Ambassador	Ford,	Yugoslav	 senior	officers	were	 frustrated	 trying	 to	 run	an	air	force	without	tools	adequate	for	the	job.	New	fighter	planes	were	expected	to	give	a	“shot	 in	 the	 arm”	 to	 the	 air	 force,	 which	 had	 been	 suffering	 from	 a	 shortage	 of																																																									64	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5426,	File	11044-BQ-40	part	5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet:	Export	of	Arms	to	
Yugoslavia,	August	2,	1960.	The	Department	of	Defence,	Department	of	Defence	Production,	and	the	Joint	Intelligence	Bureau	all	approved	the	applications.	65	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	2746,	Cabinet	Conclusions,	April	1,	1960.		66	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5426,	File	11044-BQ-40	part	5,	Outgoing	Message	External	to	BELGRADE,	August	11,	1960.	67	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7585,	File	11044-BQ-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“US	Military	Equipment	for	Yugoslavia,”	March	25,	1959.	
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planes,	spare	parts,	and	other	military	equipment.68	The	Levy	Auto	Parts	Company	in	 Canada	 appealed	 to	 Ottawa	 in	 late	 1959	 for	 a	 permit	 to	 export	 over	 $63,000	worth	 of	 spare	 tractor,	 truck,	 car	 and	 tank	 parts	 –	which	 included	 approximately	$25,000	worth	of	combat	equipment	–	to	Yugoslavia.	
	 Similarly,	 the	 government	 received	 requests	 for	 export	 permits	 from	Canadair	 Limited	 for	 the	 sale	 of	 F-86	 aircraft	 spare	 parts	 and	 ground	 handling	equipment	 to	 Yugoslavia,	 valuing	 $391,500.69	Following	 the	 same	 logic	 in	 policy	regarding	the	sale	of	other	military	equipment,	Green,	with	the	concurrence	of	the	Ministers	 of	 Trade	 and	 Commerce,	 National	 Defence,	 and	 Defence	 Production,	recommended	the	permit	be	granted.	Cabinet	approved	the	permit	for	export.70	The	sale	 of	 combat	 equipment	 and	 fighter	 jet	 spare	 parts	 highlights	 the	 overlap	 of	military	 and	 non-military	 Cold	 War	 battlegrounds.	 Economics	 and	 politics	intersected	with	military	considerations,	and	while	trade	was	certainly	a	means	of	resisting	 Soviet	 economic	 advances	 in	 certain	 regions,	 it	 also	 supported	 military	strategy.	Moreover,	as	a	middle	power,	Canada	was	in	a	position	to	contribute	to	the	Western	 objective	 of	 keeping	 Yugoslavia	 from	 turning	 to	 the	 Eastern	 bloc	 for	equipment	and	goods.		
	 	
																																																									68	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7585,	File	11044-BQ-40	part	3,	Despatch	Ford	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“US	Military	Equipment	for	Yugoslavia,”	September	14,	1959.	69	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5426,	File	11044-BQ-40	part	5,	Memorandum	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Export	of	F-86	Aircraft	Spares	to	Yugoslavia,”	January	20,	1961.	70	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	6176,	Cabinet	Conclusions,	February	2,	1961.	
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	 WHEAT	EXPORTS	TO	YUGOSLAVIA		 In	 terms	 of	 quantity	 and	 monetary	 value,	 Canadian	 wheat	 was	 by	 far	 the	most	 profitable	 commodity	 in	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 trade,	 thus	mirroring	 Canadian-Soviet	commercial	relations.	The	first	significant	mention	of	Yugoslavia’s	interest	in	purchasing	Canadian	wheat	came	in	an	exchange	between	Komar	and	Ambassador	Crean	 in	 February	 1962.71	In	 response	 to	 this	 inquiry,	 the	 Canadian	Wheat	 Board	sent	a	mission	 to	Yugoslavia	 in	April	 to	examine	more	closely	potential	prospects.	The	mission	delivered	a	favourable	report	concluding,	“in	spite	of	present	financial	difficulties	 of	 the	 Yugoslav	 government	 and	 the	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 milling	 and	baking	 industries,	 […]	 Yugoslavia	 should	 be	 considered	 a	 promising	 market	 for	Canadian	wheat.”72	Previously,	Yugoslavia	was	not	considered	a	market	 that	 could	provide	regular	stable	purchases;	however,	the	report	explained	that	now		
	under	no	circumstance	should	Yugoslavia	be	thought	of	as	belonging	to	that	 group	 of	 countries	which	 are	 ready	 to	 buy	 Canadian	wheat	 only	when	 other	 sources	 of	 supply	 are	 exhausted.	 On	 the	 part	 of	 the	Yugoslavs,	there	now	exists	a	genuine	desire	to	include	Canadian	wheat	as	a	permanent	constituent	of	their	grist.73		Notably,	 the	 United	 States	 was	 one	 of	 the	 “other	 sources”.	 Under	 the	 PL	 480	Agreement,	 it	 had	 been	 supplying	 Yugoslavia	 with	 agricultural	 and	 other	 goods	since	the	early	1950s.	
																																																								71	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2349,	File	7-YI-1	part	7.3,	Numbered	Letter	Crean	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“Canadian-Yugoslav	Relations,”	February	14,	1962.	72	The	report	also	indicated	that	Government	circles	in	Yugoslavia	were	convinced	of	the	need	to	improve	the	quality	of	bread,	which	forms	such	a	large	part	of	the	Yugoslav	diet.	The	Canadian	Wheat	Board	believed	Canadian	wheat	could	play	a	small	but	important	role	in	improving	the	quality	of	bread	in	the	country.	73	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2858,	File	490-YI	part	4.1,	Report	on	a	Mission	to	Yugoslavia,	submitted	by	A.	
Presber,	Technical	Services	and	Market	Research	Department,	The	Canadian	Wheat	Board,	April	13	to	18,	1962.	
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	 Under-Secretary	 Norman	 Robertson	 readily	 recognized	 this	 and	 supported	the	 sale	 of	 Canadian	wheat	 to	 Yugoslavia	 on	 credit	 arrangements.	 He	maintained	that	 the	 conclusion	of	 such	 a	 contract	would	 afford	Canada	 a	market	 that,	 for	 the	past	 few	years,	 had	been	met	by	 shipments	 from	 the	United	States	under	PL	480.	The	 regular	 congressional	 review	 of	 the	 PL	 480	 program,	 however,	 placed	 the	Yugoslav	 exports	 in	 recurring	 jeopardy.	 Both	 the	 original	 1954	 legislation	 and	 its	expanded	1956	version	contained	provisions	that	prohibited	sales	to	a	Communist	regime.	The	Eisenhower	administration	tried	hard	to	insert	general	language	in	the	1956	 law	permitting	 sales	 to	 Eastern	Europe	 but	was	 rebuffed	 in	 both	 the	House	and	Senate.	As	a	result,	it	remained	necessary	to	insert	specific	language	in	each	act	exempting	Yugoslavia	from	the	general	ban.74	Additionally,	American	reaction	to	the	state	 of	 Yugoslav-Soviet	 relations	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 fluctuations	 in	 the	annual	 amount	 of	 wheat	 exports	 to	 Yugoslavia.75	It	 is	 understandable,	 therefore,	that	Yugoslav	authorities	sought	more	reliable	export	sources.		
	 Robertson	explained	to	Green	that	Yugoslavia	purchased	wheat	from	Canada	on	credit	both	in	1952-‘53	and	in	1954-’55,	76	and	there	was	no	default	of	payment	on	 either	 contract.	 Section	 21	 of	 the	 Export	 Credit	 Insurance	 Act	 guaranteed																																																									74	Lampe,	Prickett,	and	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations,	56-57.	75	Lampe,	Prickett,	and	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations,	57.	76	This	is	true,	and	in	fact	represented,	at	the	time,	a	departure	from	previous	practices	in	world	grain	trade.	Access	to	credit	terms	was	becoming	equally	as	important	as	price	in	the	negotiating	of	bilateral	agreements.	Throughout	the	history	of	the	Canadian	grain	trade,	commercial	practice	had	required	full	payment	before	the	grain	was	discharged	into	the	hold	of	the	buyer’s	ship.	But	in	1952-1953,	Ottawa	authorized	the	sale	of	wheat	to	Yugoslavia	under	short-term	credit,	provided	by	the	Canadian	exporters	as	agents	of	the	Wheat	Board,	and	was	insured	by	the	federal	government’s	Export	Credit	Insurance	Corporation.	The	first	sale	for	5,477,884	bushels	of	wheat	was	on	the	basis	of	20	per	cent	cash	and	the	balance	within	twelve	months	of	the	date	of	shipment.	The	Second	sale	of	3,619,998	bushels	allowed	for	only	ten	per	cent	down	and	the	balance	within	one	year.	William	E.	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument:	A	History	of	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board:	the	McIvor	Years	(The	Canadian	Wheat	Board,	1987),	237.	
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payment	 to	 Canadian	 companies	 by	 the	 ECIC	 upon	 a	 default	 of	 payment	 from	 a	purchasing	government.	Robertson	further	supported	the	sale	on	the	grounds	that	“the	 sale	 of	wheat	would	 also	 be	 in	 accordance	with	 our	 general	 policy	 of	 taking	every	 available	 opportunity	 to	 loosen	 Yugoslavia’s	 ties	 with	 the	 countries	 of	 the	Soviet	bloc.”77	
	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	 Commerce	 George	 Hees	 and	Minister	 of	 Agriculture	Alvin	Hamilton	supported	the	deal	and	explained	that	Yugoslav	authorities	wanted	to	purchase	up	to	300,000	metric	tons	(11	million	bushels)	of	wheat	to	be	supplied	at	 an	 early	 date.78	When	 Canadian	 authorities	 indicated	 that	 they	 had	 granted	Poland	 and	 Czechoslovakia	 credit	 terms	 for	 a	 period	 of	 three	 years,	 Yugoslav	officials	expressed	their	hope	that	they	would	receive	a	comparable	deal.	Yugoslavia	was	framed	as	a	good	and	viable	market	for	Canadian	wheat	for	a	few	reasons.	The	country	 had	 never	 defaulted	 on	 payment	 and	 had	 reached	 a	 decision,	 on	 both	economic	and	political	grounds,	to	extend	its	purchases	to	other	sources	in	order	to	avoid	 over	 dependence	 on	 any	 one	 supplier.79	The	 official	 consensus	 was	 that	 a	
																																																								77	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6509,	File	9035-A-40,	Memorandum	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	
Robertson	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	Green,	November	18	to	30,	1962.	78	In	1951-’52	and	1952-’53	Canada	made	cash	sales	to	Yugoslavia	of	9.3	million	bushels,	and	made	sales	on	credit	of	5.5	million	bushels	in	1952-’53	and	3.6	million	bushels	in	1954-’55.	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6509,	File	9035-A-40,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet	from	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	and	Minister	of	
Agriculture,	no	date.	79	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6509,	File	9035-A-40,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet	from	Minister	of	Trade	and	
Commerce	and	Minister	of	Agriculture,	no	date.	“Interestingly,	to	1959,	the	amount	of	American	economic	aid	to	Yugoslavia	under	PL	480	fluctuated	depending	on	the	state	of	Soviet-Yugoslav	relations.	As	tensions	between	the	communist	states	increased,	so	did	American	aid,	and	as	they	entered	periods	of	rapprochement,	American	aid	decreased.	However,	the	roughly	inverse	correlation	between	US	economic	aid	to	Yugoslavia	[…]	which	had	prevailed	throughout	the	1950s,	did	not	carry	over	into	the	1960s.	Any	such	simple	correlation	was	disrupted	by	the	variety	of	existing	American	programs,	the	Cuban	Missile	Crisis,	and	the	several	facets	of	Yugoslav	foreign	policy,	and	together	complicated	the	political	equation	between	the	two	countries.	To	illustrate,	while	sales	to	Yugoslavia,	after	declining	sharply	in	1960	and	1961,	rose	again	in	1962	and	1963,	yet	
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wheat	deal	with	Yugoslavia	was	fully	advantageous	to	Canada.	Some	officials	in	the	Department	of	Finance,	however,	believed	Canada	could	squeeze	the	Yugoslavs	into	a	stiffer	contract.		
	 Finance	officials	believed	recent	events	in	the	US	Congress	could	help	shape	the	deal	with	Yugoslavia.	Congressional	action	on	the	Foreign	Aid	Bill,	which	saw	the	Senate	 narrowly	 prevent	 the	 suspension	 of	 all	 aid	 to	 Poland	 and	 Yugoslavia,	may	have	 caused	 some	 concern	 over	 the	 future	 deliveries	 of	 wheat	 under	 PL	 480.	Additionally,	 officials	 believed	 that	 recent	 indications	 of	 rapprochement	 by	Yugoslavia	 with	 Russia	 might	 further	 solidify	 American	 reluctance	 to	 assist	Yugoslavia.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 maintained,	 “in	 view	 of	 these	 considerations	and	Yugoslavs’	expressed	desire	to	conclude	a	contract,	 terms	less	 liberal	 than	the	proposed	ones	might	be	possible.”80	Despite	 the	argument	that	“less	 liberal”	 terms	could	be	 stipulated,	 the	deal	went	 ahead	with	Yugoslavia	 offered	 terms	 similar	 to	those	 given	 Poland	 and	 Czechoslovakia.	 Put	 differently,	 political	 considerations	trumped	financial	sensitivities.	
	 By	 January	 1963,	 the	 deal	 was	 coming	 together.	 In	 the	 end,	 however,	Yugoslavia	 purchased	 200,000	 metric	 tons	 rather	 than	 the	 initial	 300,000.	 Jaksa	Petric,	director	of	 the	Department	 for	North	and	South	America	of	 the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	explained	that	for	balance	of	payment	reasons	they	simply	could	not	afford	 the	 additional	 100,000	 tons,	 and	 they	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 purchase	 the																																																																																																																																																																						Soviet-Yugoslav	relations	had	remained	chilly	for	the	first	two	years	and	warmed	up	again	noticeably	during	the	second	two.”	Lampe,	Prickett	and	Adamović,	Yugoslav-American	Economic	Relations	Since	
World	War	II,	59.	80	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	5165,	File	8404-Y94-2,	Memorandum	Finance	Central	Files,	“ECIC	Financing	of	Yugoslavia	Wheat	Purchases,”	December	17,	1962.	
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additional	 amount	 from	 anyone	 else.	 Petric	 assured	 Ambassador	 Crean	 that	 if	Yugoslavia	needed	wheat	next	year,	as	a	matter	of	government	policy,	it	would	make	the	purchase	from	Canada.	Crean	indicated	to	Ottawa	that	Yugoslavia	would	almost	certainly	have	requirements	for	Canadian	wheat	irrespective	of	PL	480.	Petric	told	Crean	that	he	regarded	this	purchase	as	the	beginning	of	a	policy	of	improved	trade	with	Canada.81		
	 While	 the	contract	became	an	 important	 transaction	 for	export	purposes,	 it	also	 served	 a	 broader	 purpose	 within	 Canada’s	 economic	 statecraft.	 In	 a	 press	release,	 Agricultural	 Minister	 Hamilton	 explained	 that	 Canada	 had	 entered	negotiations	 for	 long-term	 deals	 with	 five	 Communist	 countries,	 including	Yugoslavia.	“‘What	we	are	saying	to	them,’”	the	minister	explained,	“‘is	this:	You	use	your	grain	for	feed	to	build	up	your	livestock	industry.	We’ll	supply	you	with	grain	for	food.	Their	agricultural	minister	liked	the	idea.’”	Hamilton	continued,	“such	deals	would	 allow	 for	 long-range	 planning,	 and	 diversification	 of	 supply	 by	 these	countries	would	be	to	their	advantage.”82	Officially,	the	contract	was	completed	on	7	May	 1963,	 less	 than	 a	 month	 after	 the	 Liberals	 regained	 power.	 The	 Liberal	government	wasted	 little	 time	 in	 picking	 up	where	 the	 Progressive	 Conservatives	left	 off.	 The	 new	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	 Commerce,	 Mitchell	 Sharp,	 requested	authority	from	Cabinet	to	explore	the	possibility	of	long-term	arrangements	for	the	
																																																								81	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6509,	File	9035-A-40,	Telegram	Crean	to	External	Affairs,	“Wheat	for	Yugoslavia,”	January	8,	1963.	82	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5205,	File	6226-B-40	part	2,	“Wheat	sales	negotiated	with	Reds,”	The	Ottawa	
Citizen,	December	11,	1962.	
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sale	of	wheat	 to	Yugoslavia,	as	well	as	 to	Poland	and	Czechoslovakia.83	Permission	was	granted.	While	 the	examination	of	 long-term	wheat	deals	between	Yugoslavia	and	the	new	Liberal	government	is	not	considered	here,	the	important	fact	remains	that	the	Diefenbaker	government	built	upon	the	established	policy	of	wheat	sales	on	credit	established	by	its	predecessor.	The	Progressive	Conservatives	then	went	one	step	 further	 than	 the	 previous	 government,	 opening	 negotiations	 for	 long-term	deals.	The	 trend	was	subsequently	 resumed	by	 its	 successor.	Significantly,	Canada	had	 used	 wheat,	 one	 of	 its	 dominant	 capital	 goods,	 not	 only	 to	 expand	 its	commercial	relationship	with	Yugoslavia	but	also	to	employ	economic	statecraft	in	an	endeavor	to	coax	Yugoslavia	into	the	Western	sphere.	
	 Interestingly,	 while	 Diefenbaker	 was	 a	 prairie	 populist	 and	 notoriously	sought	markets	 for	 Canadian	wheat,	 no	 records	 indicate	 his	 opinion	 on,	 let	 alone	involvement	 in,	 the	 wheat	 deals	 with	 Yugoslavia.84	This	 is	 unfortunate,	 as	 this	development	 might	 have	 revealed	 interesting	 insights	 into	 the	 prime	 minister’s	perception	 of	 Eastern	 Europe	 generally,	 and	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	specifically.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 eagerness	 of	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	 board,	 various	federal	 ministries,	 and	 the	 mission	 in	 Belgrade	 to	 see	 a	 fruitful	 deal	 concluded,	highlights	 Canada’s	 effort	 to	 build	 bridges	 between	 East	 and	 West	 and	 to	 entice	Yugoslavia	into	the	Western	orbit.	
																																																								83	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4315,	File	8404/Y94-1,	Memorandum	R.	B.	Bryce	to	Minister	of	Finance,	“Cabinet	Agenda	–	Sale	of	Wheat	to	Poland,	Czechoslovakia	and	Yugoslavia,”	July	15,	1963.	84	In	his	work,	Diefenbaker’s	World,	Basil	Robinson	discusses	Canadian	trade	with	Communist	nations	surprisingly	little.	Discussion	about	Canadian	trade	with	Communist	China	and	Cuba	are	considered	mainly	in	relations	to	how	it	diverged	with	American	policy.	Regarding	Canadian-Yugoslav	trade,	there	is	nothing.	Diefenbaker’s	memoirs	also	reveal	little	about	trade	between	Canada	and	Communist	Europe,	and	nothing	about	Canadian-Yugoslav	trade	specifically.		
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	 CONCLUSION		 Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations	 were	 relatively	 insignificant	 when	 the	Progressive	 Conservatives	 gained	 power	 in	 1957.	 The	 bilateral	 relationship,	however,	evolved	and	steadily	improved	over	the	near	six	years	of	the	Diefenbaker	government.	 The	 rift	 between	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 Yugoslavia,	 instigated	 by	 the	latter’s	 refusal	 to	 sign	 the	 Twelve	 Party	 Declaration,	 provided	 a	 fortuitous	opportunity	 for	 Canada	 to	 cultivate	 stronger	 ties	 with	 Yugoslavia,	 an	 approach	mirrored	in	Western	policy	generally.	Events	east	of	the	Iron	Curtain	helped	shape	Canada’s	Yugoslav	policy,	 as	 the	 Soviet	Union	 remained	a	ubiquitous	 factor	 in	 the	Eastern	 European	 policy	 equation.	 Spearheaded	 by	 Canadian	 ambassadors	 in	Belgrade,	Canada	was	able	 to	utilize	 its	middle	power	status	 to	establish	common	ground	 on	 which	 to	 build	 a	 fruitful	 and	 mutually	 advantageous	 relationship.	Yugoslavia	was	undergoing	internal	and	external	changes	as	the	Soviet	bloc	treated	it	as	it	did	any	other	non-Warsaw	Pact	state,	omitting	if	from	preferential	treatment;	subsequently,	 Yugoslavia	 looked	 for	ways	 out	 of	 its	 isolation.	 As	 a	 result,	 Canada	saw	Yugoslavia	as	a	viable	point	where	Soviet	hegemony	over	Eastern	Europe	might	be	penetrated.	Canadian	officials	considered	Yugoslavia	to	be	the	least	dogmatic	of	all	 communist	 countries;	 therefore,	 it	 became	 Canadian	 policy	 to	 promote	 and	 to	cultivate,	 in	 a	 more	 deliberate	 way,	 closer	 political,	 commercial,	 and	 cultural	relations,	aiming	to	expose	Yugoslavia	to	Western	political,	commercial,	and	socio-cultural	modalities.	
	 Cultural	diplomacy	was	also	used	as	a	viable	means	of	exposing	Yugoslavia	to	Western	 modalities,	 believing	 this	 would	 entice	 it	 into	 the	 Western	 sphere	 of	
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influence.	 In	 addition	 to	 artistic,	 academic,	 and	 research	 exchanges,	 technical	information	was	exchanged	 in	 the	 fields	of	atomic	energy	and	mining.	There	were	limits,	 however.	 When	 it	 was	 thought	 that	 the	 USSR,	 through	 Yugoslavia,	 might	access	 information	 deemed	 vital	 to	 Canadian	 industry,	 access	 for	 Yugoslav	specialists	 was	 restricted.	 Canadian	 officials	 attached	 significant	 notoriety	 to	 the	various	exchanges;	they	firmly	believed	that	cultural	diplomacy	was	a	viable	means	to	bridge	political	and	ideological	divides.		
	 Economic	 ties	were	 also	 expanded	 between	 the	 nations.	While	 commercial	dealings	were	not	particularly	lucrative,	especially	relative	to	Canada’s	total	foreign	trade,	 their	political	significance,	nonetheless,	made	them	an	important	element	 in	Canadian-Yugoslav	 relations.	 Canadian	 officials	 understood	 the	 value	 of	 raw	materials	 and	capital	 equipment	 for	Yugoslavia’s	 industrialization	process,	 further	underscoring	 the	 significance	 of	 Canada’s	 economic	 statecraft.	 The	 determined	pursuit	 of	 the	 paper	 mill	 deal	 between	 Canadian	 Vickers	 and	 the	 Yugoslav	government,	in	spite	of	the	various	ups	and	downs	associated	with	it,	highlights	the	importance	that	Canadian	ambassadors	to	Yugoslavia	attached	to	the	development	of	 fruitful	 commercial	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 countries,	 and	 underlines	 the	continuity	 of	 Canadian	 policy	 objectives	 towards	 Yugoslavia	 across	 Liberal	 and	Progressive	Conservative	governments.	This	particular	deal	also	revealed	that	there	were	 occasional	 divergences	 in	 departmental	 opinions	 within	 the	 federal	government,	and	these	differences	did	sometimes	lead	to	administrative	tensions	in	Ottawa.		
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	 Finally,	 the	 sale	 of	 combat	 equipment	 to	 Yugoslavia	 exemplifies	 the	overlap	between	military	 and	non-military	Cold	War	battlegrounds,	 and	Canadian	wheat,	which	was	by	far	the	most	profitable	of	the	bilateral	commercial	deals,	was	confirmed	as	a	reliable	commodity	in	Canada’s	economic	statecraft.	 It	 is	 important	to	 remember	 that	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 trade	was	 less	 about	 the	 revenue	 generated	and	 more	 the	 connections	 and	 integration	 into	 Western	 markets	 that	 Canadian	officials	 saw	as	 important.	Thus,	Melakopides’	notion	 that	Canadian	 foreign	policy	was	 driven	 by	 pragmatic	 idealism	 –	 that	 Canadian	 officials	 believed	 in	communication,	cooperation,	all	the	while	showing	flexibility	and	adaptability	–	can	be	extended	 to	Canada’s	policy	with	Communist	Europe.	Canada’s	Yugoslav	policy	during	this	period	shows	that	Canada,	indeed,	worked	within	a	Cold	War	context	to	combat	European	communism	by	other	means.	
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Chapter	5		
Mending	the	Past	&	Pushing	Forward:	Canadian-Polish	Diplomatic	Relations	 		 		 Perhaps	one	of	the	most	striking	aspects	about	the	history	of	Canadian-Polish	relations	 is	 the	 shear	 scarcity	 of	 the	 literature.	 A	 truly	 comprehensive	 account	remains	to	be	written.	To	date,	Aloysius	Balawyder’s	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	
Eagle:	Canadian-Polish	Relations,	1918-1978	 is	 the	most	useful	book	written	on	the	subject.	1	While	 Balawyder’s	 study	 is	 an	 invaluable	 contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	Canadian-Polish	 relations,	 there	 is	 much	 about	 this	 history	 that	 has	 yet	 to	 be	addressed.	 The	 following	 two	 chapters,	 on	 Canadian-Polish	 political,	 cultural,	 and	economic	relations	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s,	aim	to	fill	a	small	void	in	what	can	only	be	described	as	a	gaping	hole	 in	the	history	of	Canadian	foreign	relations	with	Eastern	Europe.	
	 In	 the	 single	 chapter	 that	 examines	 Canadian-Polish	 relations	 after	 1945,	Balawyder	argues	that	relations,	throughout	the	postwar	period,	generally	ran	their	course	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 East-West	 relations	 and	 that	 successive	 Polish	governments,	consistently	subject	to	constraints	imposed	by	the	Soviet	Union,	were	not	free	to	act	as	they	otherwise	might	have.	Moreover,	he	suggests	Canada,	for	its	part,	generally	followed	the	lead	of	the	United	States	and	other	Western	countries	in	its	 approach	 to	 foreign	 policy.2	This	 framework,	 however,	 suggests	 a	 degree	 of	passivity	and	indifference	between	the	two	nations	that	is	not	entirely	accurate.	In	
																																																								1	Aloysius	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle:	Canadian-Polish	Relations,	1918-1978	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1980).	2	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	153.	
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fact,	because	of	changes	that	occurred	in	Poland	as	a	consequence	of	changes	in	the	USSR	itself,	Canadian	officials	actively,	albeit	in	a	limited	way,	engaged	with	Poland	to	 encourage	 its	 independent	 position	 and	 attenuate	 Soviet	 dominance	 over	 the	nation.	 Canada’s	 Polish	 policy,	 while	 limited	 in	 scope	 and	 maneuverability	 for	various	 reasons	 discussed	 below,	 mirrored	 Canada’s	 approach	 to	 Soviet	 and	Yugoslav	 relations.	 Examining	 Canadian-Polish	 relations	 during	 this	 decisive	moment	 in	Canadian	 foreign	policy	 is	 enlightening	because	 it	 reveals	how	Canada	approached	 a	 Communist	 European	 nation	 that,	 unlike	 Yugoslavia,	 was	 firmly	entrenched	 in	 the	 Soviet	 bloc.	 Yet,	 Poland	 was	 also	 distinctive,	 given	 its	 relative	independence	 from	 Soviet	 control	 and	 its	 ambition	 to	 carve	 out	 its	 own	 foreign	policy,	even	if	it	was	still	squarely	situated	within	the	Communist	orbit.	
	 WLADYSLAW	GOMULKA	AND	THE	LIBERALIZATION	OF	POLAND		 Following	 the	 Second	World	War,	 the	 imposition	 of	 Soviet	 hegemony	 over	Poland,	the	initiation	of	Stalinist	methods	of	rule,	and	the	inauguration	of	a	planned	economy	resulted	in	Poland’s	increasing	distance	from	the	West.	Then,	in	1956,	the	Poznań	 rebellion	 marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 change	 in	 the	 country.	 Leaders	 of	 the	United	 Polish	 Workers’	 Party	 believed	 only	 Wladyslaw	 Gomulka	 had	 sufficient	prestige	 and	 support	within	 the	 party	 to	 carry	 out	 political,	 social,	 and	 economic	reforms,	 without	 compromising	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 communist	 doctrine. 3	Gomulka	was	considered	a	moderate	and	a	reformer,	but	also	a	devout	communist;	he	 rejected	 subservient	dependence	on	 the	Soviet	Union,	but	 ensured	 that	Poland	
																																																								3	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	165.	
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would	 remain	 in	 the	Soviet	bloc.4	On	October	9,	1956,	 the	same	day	Gomulka	was	chosen	party	secretary,	Nikita	Khrushchev	led	a	Soviet	delegation	to	Poland	hoping	to	 halt	 the	 reforms.	 After	 a	 stormy	 encounter	 with	 Gomulka,	 Khrushchev	 was	convinced	that	acceptance	of	Poland’s	brand	of	communism	was	better	 than	strife	and	 turmoil.	 Khrushchev’s	 willingness	 to	 accede	 to	 Gomulka’s	 policies	 helped	 to	avert	 a	 bloody	 revolt,	 as	 seen	 in	 Hungary	 just	 weeks	 later.5	Poland,	 while	 still	 a	committed	 Communist	 state,	 had	 effectively	 avoided	 complete	 domination	 by	 the	USSR.	 The	 Canadian	 legation	 in	Warsaw	 compared	 Poland’s	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	Soviet	Union	in	the	1950s	to	Canada’s	relationship	with	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	mid-1860s.6	Poland	wanted	 to	 “strengthen	 its	 ties”	 both	 eastward	 and	westward,7	providing	Canada	with	another	opportunity	to	develop	bilateral	relations	that	might	undermine	 Soviet	 hegemony	 in	 the	 region,	 and	 European	 communism	 more	generally.	
	 Catalyzed	 by	 the	 new	Gomulka	 regime,	 the	 country	witnessed	 far-reaching	liberalization.	 An	 article	 titled	 “Is	 this	 the	 Twilight	 of	 Marxism?”	 published	 by	 a	Warsaw	weekly,	Po	Prostu,	and	edited	by	students	of	Warsaw	University	illustrated	the	increasing	civil	discontent	in	Poland.	The	article	coldly	reviewed	five	of	the	main	failures	 of	 the	 country’s	 economic	 system	 and	 confronted	 official	 Marxist	 theory.	Importantly,	as	the	Canadian	Chargé	d’Affaires	in	Warsaw	noted,	none	of	the	editors																																																									4	Ivan	T.	Berend,	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	1944	–	1993:	Detour	from	the	Periphery	to	the	Periphery	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	114.	5	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	165.	6	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Despatch	Canadian	Legation	Warsaw	to	Under-Secretary	
of	State	for	External	Affairs,	February	27,	1959.	7	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1.2,	Despatch	Embassy	Warsaw	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	
for	External	Affairs,	May	18,	1960.	
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were	 removed	 and	 the	 publication	 was	 spared	 censorship.8	This	 was	 a	 sign	 that	greater	freedom	of	expression	was	becoming	possible.	With	the	release	of	Cardinal	Wyszynski,	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 was	 given	 greater	 freedom	 as	 well,	 including	permission	to	offer	religious	instruction	in	schools.	Peasants	were	allowed	to	leave	cooperative	 farms	 and	 to	 engage	 in	 private	 farming,	 while	 artists	 and	 craftsmen	could	secure	 licenses	to	set	up	shops	and	employ	assistants.9	Cognizant	of	ensuing	domestic	 liberalization,	 Canadian	officials	 looked	 to	 cultivate	 closer	 relations	with	their	 Polish	 counterparts	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 encouraging	 Gomulka’s	 independent	course,	 which	 Canadian	 officials	 understood	 to	 be	 a	 vital	 component	 of	 Poland’s	foreign	policy.	
	 The	significant	changes	ushered	in	by	the	Gomulka	government	occurred	just	prior	to	the	election	of	John	Diefenbaker’s	Progressive	Conservative	government.	As	with	 their	 awareness	 of	 the	 changing	 tides	 between	 Yugoslavia	 and	 the	 USSR,	Canadian	 officials	 were	 also	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 importance	 attached	 to	 domestic	developments	 in	 Poland.	 In	 an	 April	 1957	 despatch	 to	 the	 secretary	 of	 state	 for	external	affairs,	 the	Canadian	chargé	d’affaires	 in	Poland	reflected	and	commented	on	 a	 recent	 statement	 by	 Adam	 Rapacki,	 Poland’s	 minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs.	Essentially,	 the	despatch	generally	 informed	and	outlined	what	would	become	the	basis	of	Canada’s	Polish	policy	for	at	least	the	next	decade.	Polish	foreign	policy	was	seen	 to	have	 three	parts.	First	was	 its	 relationship	with	 the	Eastern	bloc.	Friendly	relations	among	socialist	countries	were	significant.	 	 In	the	past,	unanimity	among																																																									8	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206,	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Despatch	The	Chargé	d’Affaires,	Canadian	Legation	
Warsaw	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	July	16,	1956.	9	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	165.	
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these	 states	was	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 Poland’s	 foreign	 policy.	 Significantly,	 Rapacki	argued	 that	 differences	 between	 the	 socialist	 states	 must	 be	 recognized,	 and	opposition	to	this	idea	must	be	removed	for	the	good	of	the	camp.	Polish	diplomacy,	he	 insisted,	 had	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 making	 this	 viewpoint	 understood.	Second	 was	 Poland’s	 relationship	 with	 Western	 capitalists.	 Poland	 wanted	 to	develop	 mutually	 profitable	 economic	 contacts.	 The	 Minister	 affirmed	 firmly,	however,	that	‘“we	will	not	accept	any	political	conditions	which	could	be	imposed	on	us	by	any	capitalist	country.’”	Furthermore,	Rapacki	stated	that	those	in	the	West	who	 hoped	 Poland	 would	 become	 a	 bourgeois	 democracy	 were	 wishful	 thinkers,	and	those	advocating	this	were	trying	to	bring	about	the	isolation	of	Poland	in	the	socialist	 camp.	 Finally,	 Rapacki	 discussed	 Poland’s	 new	 attitude	 toward	 émigrés.	Poland,	 he	 insisted,	 should	 encourage	 Poles	 abroad	 to	 become	 more	 closely	acquainted	with	the	cultural	achievements	of	Poland	and	to	educate	their	children	to	 love	Poland.	This	was	a	change	in	attitude	that	had	traditionally	affirmed	that	a	Pole	 abroad	was	 a	 bad	 Pole.	 The	 aim	 now	was	 to	make	 Polish	 émigrés	 unofficial	ambassadors	and	trade	commissioners	of	Poland.10		
	 The	despatch	elaborated	on	 the	 “neat	balance	which	Poland	must	maintain	between	East	 and	West,”	 and	 that	 “Poland	must	 remain	 independent.”	The	 chargé	d’affaires	 stressed	 Rapacki’s	 inference	 that	 Poland	must	 not	 be	 isolated	 from	 the	socialist	camp.	This,	he	argued,	was	significant	from	Canada’s	point	of	view	
	since	Poland,	as	a	member	of	the	bloc	progressing	slowly	towards	some	more	acceptable	form	of	government	from	[Canada’s]	point	of	view,	has																																																									10	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Despatch	The	Chargé	d’Affaires,	Canadian	Legation	
Warsaw	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	April	2,	1957.	
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the	opportunity	to	bring	with	it,	in	time,	other	countries	in	the	bloc.	Any	impatient	 efforts	 on	 our	 part	 to	 hasten	 the	 process	 may	 solidify	 the	opposition	 to	 these	 changes	 and	 severely	 limit	 Poland’s	 usefulness	 in	this	sphere.11	One	month	 later,	a	circular	document	on	Poland’s	 foreign	policy	expressed	similar	ideas.	It	explained	that	recent	events	in	the	country	had	resulted	in	greater	freedom	and	independence;	as	a	result,	a	thorough	reorganization	of	Poland’s	foreign	service	was	 anticipated	 in	 order	 to	 eliminate	 any	 remaining	 Stalinist	 elements.	Furthermore,	it	stressed	that	the	Polish	Delegation	at	the	UN	“went	to	considerable	lengths	 to	 develop	 contacts	 with	Western	 delegations,	 and	 their	 interventions	 in	debate	 had	 a	 very	 different	 character	 from	 other	 communist	 statements.” 12	Canadian	 officials	 were,	 in	 effect,	 witnessing	 firsthand	 the	 direct	 ramifications	 of	recent	 Polish	 liberalization	 on	 that	 country’s	 foreign	 policy.	 As	 a	 result,	 by	 mid-1957,	 Canadian	 officials	 proposed	 the	 development	 of	 a	 cautious	 policy	 that	encouraged	Polish	independence,	thereby	increasing	potential	exposure	to	Western	modalities,	while	simultaneously	being	careful	not	to	provoke	political	resentment.	
	 American	officials,	too,	saw	the	importance	of	Poland’s	ambition	for	greater	autonomy.	A	February	1958	national	 intelligence	estimate	suggested	 that	Poland’s	ability	to	maintain	 its	“semi-independence”	would	be	“a	key	factor	affecting	 future	political	developments	in	Eastern	Europe.”	Poland	was	expected	to	be	able	to	retain	its	relative	freedom	from	direct	Soviet	control,	and	this	would	have	clear	potential	benefits	for	the	West.	It	was	noted	that	Poland’s	independent	course,	“together	with	
																																																								11	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Despatch	The	Chargé	d’Affaires,	Canadian	Legation	
Warsaw	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	April	2,	1957.	12	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Circular	Document	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	the	Heads	of	External	Affairs	Posts	Abroad,	May	21,	1957.	
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Yugoslavia’s	 continued	 independence,	may	 tend	 to	 encourage	 nationalist-oriented	elements	in	the	other	Satellites	to	seek	greater	autonomy.”13	It	was	no	secret	to	the	West,	 then,	 that	 Poland	 was	 in	 a	 potentially	 transformative	 position,	 one	 that	Western	 nations	 should	 encourage	 by	 avoiding	 conflict	 and	 promoting	 bridge-building.			
	 	Poland,	 like	 Canada,	 functioned	 more	 freely	 when	 international	 tensions	were	 reduced,	 and	 Rapacki	 also	 expressed	 the	 importance	 of	 promoting	international	 stability	 and	 the	 consolidation	 of	 peace.14	The	 Canadian	 embassy	 in	Warsaw	reported,	 “any	 resumption	of	East-West	 tensions	 is	bad	news	 for	Poland:	both	for	the	man	in	the	street	who	still	fears	war,	and	for	those	in	government	who	believe	 that	 Poland	 should	 strengthen	 its	 ties	 in	 both	 directions.” 15 	Canadian	officials	 could	 certainly	 sympathize	 with	 this	 position,	 and	 common	 ground	 was	established	 on	 this	 matter.	 Yet,	 while	 officials	 on	 both	 sides	 wanted	 to	 nurture	
																																																								13	FRUS,	Vol.	X,	Part	1,	National	Intelligence	Estimate	(NIE)	12-58,	“Outlook	for	Stability	in	the	Eastern	European	Satellites,”	February	4,	1958.	14	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Circular	Document	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	the	Heads	of	External	Affairs	Posts	Abroad,	May	21,	1957.	15	Two	instances	highlight	well	Polish	officials’	desire	to	maintain	international	stability.	First	was	Rapacki’s	appeal	to	a	number	of	NATO	countries	in	late	1957,	just	prior	to	an	upcoming	NATO	ministerial	meeting.	Rapacki	explained	that	Poland	understood	that	NATO	was	about	to	discuss	a	buildup	of	modern	armaments	in	Europe	and	was	even	considering	arming	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	with	nuclear	weapons.	Rapacki	hoped	that	no	steps	would	be	taken	in	these	directions,	since	they	would	make	any	advancement	on	the	struggling	disarmament	negotiations	even	less	likely	to	succeed.	Rapacki	advised	the	Western	representatives	that	arming	Europe	would	only	increase	tensions	in	Central	Europe	and	further	the	division	of	the	world	into	two	powerful	camps.	Poland	wished	to	avoid	this	development.	Rapacki	also	made	it	clear	that	Poland’s	foreign	policy	aim	was	to	contribute	to	the	reduction	of	international	tensions	within	its	means.	Second,	Rapacki	and	the	Polish	press	treated	the	U2	incident	with	reserve,	minimizing	the	significance	as	long	and	as	far	as	possible.	The	coverage	tried	to	be	“factual,”	contained	limited	editorial	comments,	and	provided	wide	coverage	of	Western	reaction	in	hopes	of	suggesting	that	those	responsible	for	the	incident	represented	a	minority.	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1.2,	Numbered	Letter	Southam	to	Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	May	18,	1960;	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1.2,	Numbered	
Letter	Southam	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	May	25,	1960.	
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closer	 political,	 cultural,	 and	 commercial	 ties,	 one	 long-standing	 issue	 prohibited	such	developments:	Polish	art	treasures	that	had	been	stored	in	Canada	since	WWII.	
	 THE	POLISH	ART	TREASURES	AND	CANADIAN-POLISH	RELATIONS		 The	complicated	issue	of	the	Polish	art	treasures	loomed	large	in	Canadian-Polish	relations	until	the	late	1950s,	when	visible	progress	on	their	return	to	Poland	was	 finally	 made.	 The	 history	 of	 the	 treasures	 highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 seemingly	nonpolitical	matters	were	 in	 fact	politically	charged	 in	 the	atmosphere	of	 the	Cold	War,	 despite	 efforts	 by	both	 sides	 to	 reduce	political	 and	 ideological	 implications.	During	 negotiations	 on	 this	 issue,	 neither	 the	 Canadian	 or	 Polish	 governments	attempted	 to	 score	 propaganda	 points	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 other.	 In	 fact,	 the	negotiations	 for	 the	 return	 of	 the	 treasures	 reveal	 an	 interesting	 attempt	 by	 two	middle	powers	to	reduce	potential	negative	Cold	War	implications.	While	Canadian	officials	 wanted	 to	 improve	 relations	 with	 Poland	 in	 order	 to	 lessen	 Soviet	hegemony	over	 that	 country,	 the	 issue	of	 the	Polish	art	 treasures	was	an	obstacle	standing	 in	 their	 way.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 ultimately	 took	 the	necessary	steps	to	break	down	this	barrier.	
	 In	 1939,	 Polish	 officials	 managed	 to	 ship	 a	 collection	 of	 art	 treasures	 and	historical	 relics	out	of	 the	 country	 to	Canada,	 just	 ahead	of	 the	 advancing	Nazis.16	Balawyder	argues	that	 if	Poland	had	not	fallen	into	the	Soviet	orbit,	Canada	would	“unquestionably	 have	 returned	 the	 treasures	 sooner	 –	 presumably	 immediately	after	the	conclusion	of	hostilities	in	Europe.”	Canada’s	failure	to	return	the	treasures																																																									16	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	art	treasure’s	voyage	to	Canada,	see,	Gordon	Swoger,	The	Strange	
Odyssey	of	Poland’s	National	Treasures,	1939-1961:	A	Polish-Canadian	Story	(Toronto:	Dundurn	Group,	2004),	25-65.		
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promptly,	 according	 to	 Balawyder,	 “engendered	 a	 long	 controversy	 and	considerably	worsened	Canadian-Polish	relations.	 […]	For	almost	 fifteen	years,	 the	Polish	 government	 and	 press	 condemned	 Canada’s	 unwillingness	 or	 inability	 to	return	 the	 treasures,	 even	 taking	 the	 question	 to	 the	 UN	 and	 other	 international	forums.”17	The	 controversy	 surrounding	 the	 treasures	 was	 not	 resolved	 until	 the	new	Gomulka	regime	in	Poland	came	to	power	and	a	new	Progressive	Conservative	government	 in	Canada	made	sincere	strides	to	get	the	national	relics	back	to	their	rightful	owners.18	
	 While	 relations	were	 not	 improved	 immediately	 after	 Diefenbaker	 became	Prime	Minister,	it	was	clear	from	the	outset	of	his	government	that	the	issue	of	the	Polish	 art	 treasures	 was	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 Canadian-Polish	 relations.	 The	seriousness	of	the	issue	was	made	especially	clear	when	the	Canadian	government	suggested	 exchanging	 ambassadors	 and	 raising	 respective	 missions	 to	 embassy	status;	the	Polish	government	refused	until	satisfactory	progress	had	been	made	on	the	 return	 of	 the	 treasures.19	During	 a	 discussion	 with	 Polish	 Chargé	 d’Affaires	Mieczyslaw	Sieradzki,	SSEA	Sidney	Smith	reassured	him	that	Canada	wished	to	send	an	 ambassador	 to	 Warsaw	 “because	 we	 looked	 with	 sympathy	 upon	 the	 new	
																																																								17	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	187-190.		18	Author	Gordon	Swoger	explains	that	the	accession	of	Gomulka	marked	a	stark	difference	in	Polish-Canadians	attitudes	towards	the	art	treasures.	Many	expatriates	thought	that	there	was	no	longer	any	danger	of	the	Polish	treasures	being	seized	by	the	Soviets	if	they	were	returned	to	Poland	with	Gomulka	in	power.	In	fact,	many	Polish-Canadians,	including	many	non-Communist	Canadian-Polish	societies,	believed	that	seeing	the	treasures	back	in	the	Wawel	Castle	“might	reinforce	the	Polish	people’s	interest	in	their	past	and	weaken	their	allegiance	to	communism.”	The	trend	was	significant	enough	that	the	DEA	noted	the	marked	change	in	attitude.	Swoger,	The	Strange	Odyssey	of	Poland’s	
National	Treasures,	144-145.	19	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Memorandum	for	the	Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs,	“Relations	with	Poland,”	November	2,	1957;		
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Gomulka	 regime,”	 and	 that	 the	 “question	of	 the	 treasures	had	not	 come	up	 in	 the	Cabinet	 consideration	 of	 it	 all.”	 Smith	 also	 recalled	 the	 promises	 made	 by	Diefenbaker	and	himself	to	give	an	early	answer	on	the	subject	but	lamented	that	it	was	 difficult	 to	 make	 rapid	 progress	 since	 the	 new	 government	 was	 faced	 with	many	challenges.	Sieradzki’s	response	was	straightforward:	it	“would	be	difficult	for	people	in	Poland	to	appreciate	such	problems.”20	While	agitated	by	the	delays	on	the	part	 the	Canadian	government,	Polish	officials	 remained	patiently	 level-headed	on	the	issue.	
	 In	December	1957,	Polish	officials	“emphatically	expressed”	their	desire	not	to	 do	 anything	 that	would	 embarrass	 the	 Canadian	 government.	 In	 fact,	 they	 told	Canadian	 officials	 they	 would	 be	 content	 with	 receiving	 only	 a	 portion	 of	 the	treasures,	 for	 instance	 those	 housed	 at	 the	 Bank	 of	 Montreal	 in	 Ottawa.21	Polish	officials	 suggested	 that	 such	 a	 favourable	 gesture	 by	 Canada	 would	 be	 most	important	 for	 those	 who	 were	 trying	 very	 hard	 to	 draw	 the	 Polish	 government	closer	 to	 the	West.	One	Polish	official	explained	 frankly	 that	 “Gomulka	did	not	yet	understand	the	West	and	that	the	Canadian	attitude	on	the	treasures	was	the	sort	of																																																									20	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Memorandum	A.J.	Pick	European	Division	to	J.B.C.	
Watkins	and	J.W.	Holmes	DEA,	27	November	1957.	The	Legation	in	Warsaw	explained	how	“the	non-return	of	the	treasures	is	one	of	the	few	issues	on	which	the	government	has	the	support	of	the	nation	at	large.	The	characterization	of	the	treasures	as	the	equivalent	of	the	British	Crown	Jewels	was,	I	thought,	most	apt.”	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Personal	Letter	J.P.	Erichsen-
Brown	to	J.W.	Holmes,	January	8,	1958.	21	In	1944,	the	Polish	custodians	of	the	art	treasures	decided	to	disperse	the	treasures	to	four	places	of	storage,	hoping	to	reduce	losing	all	of	them	to	unscrupulous	art-hunters.	The	treasures	considered	most	valuable	–	the	Gutenberg	Bible,	Florian	Psalter,	the	prayer	book	of	Queen	Bona	and	the	Chopin	manuscripts	–	were	deposited	at	the	Bank	of	Montreal’s	branch	in	Ottawa;	The	Wawel	tapestries	were	stored	in	the	monastery	of	St.	Anne	de	Beaupre;	eight	other	boxes	had	been	entrusted	to	the	Precious	Blood	Convent	in	Ottawa;	the	rest	of	the	treasures	were	housed	at	the	Ottawa	Experimental	Farm.	While	the	dispersal	of	the	treasures	may	have	made	it	difficult	for	possible	art-hunters	to	locate	the	entire	collection,	it	also	caused	the	government	in	Warsaw	to	spend	several	years	simply	trying	to	find	all	of	them.	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	192.	
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thing	which	 confirmed	his	 views	 about	 ‘Western	 Imperialism.’”22	The	 fact	 that	 the	Polish	 government	 did	 not	 publicize	 the	 issue	 as	 an	 example	 of	 “Western	Imperialism,”	despite	Gomulka’s	perception	that	this	was	the	case,	suggests	intent	to	keep	 the	 controversy	 as	 depoliticized	 as	 possible.	 In	 many	 corners	 of	 the	 DEA,	however,	 the	 return	 of	 the	 art	 treasures	 was	 seen	 not	 only	 as	 an	 important	 and	necessary	 political	 gesture,	 but	 also	 as	 an	 initiative	 with	 potentially	 important	commercial	benefits.	
	 	In	a	memorandum	to	the	USSEA,	A.J.	Pick	of	the	European	Division	explained	that	the	commencement	of	serious	American-Polish	negotiations	over	US	aid	might	cause	 serious	 difficulties	 for	 Canada’s	 commercial	 sale	 of	 wheat	 to	 Poland.	 As	 a	result,	Pick	stressed	the	importance	of	speedy	consideration	by	Cabinet	on	the	issue	of	the	Polish	art	treasures.23	This	line	of	thinking	passed	upwards	to	Sidney	Smith.	USSEA	J.B.C.	Watkins	told	the	minister	that	the	Polish	request	to	purchase	800,000	tons	 of	 American	 wheat	 placed	 the	 Canadian	 government	 in	 a	 difficult	 position.	Watkins	asserted,	
	[w]e	 are	 anxious	 for	 political	 reasons	 that	 Poland	 should	 secure	essential	economic	aid	from	the	West,	without	which	it	will	be	unable	to	retain	 the	 limited	 freedom	which	 it	 secured	 from	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	October	 1956.	 The	principle	 of	 extending	 aid	 to	 Poland	has	 also	 been	approved	by	 the	NATO	Council	 of	Ministers.	We	have	 asked	 the	 State	Department	 to	 withhold	 committing	 themselves	 on	 the	 quantity	 of	wheat	to	be	offered	until	our	own	negotiations	with	the	Poles	have	been	completed	and,	in	the	meantime,	to	consider	the		possibility	 of	 offering	other	commodities	in	place	of	wheat.																																																									22	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Personal	Letter	J.W.	Holmes	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	
for	External	Affairs,	“Conversation	with	Members	of	the	Polish	Delegations,”	January	8,	1958.	23	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Memorandum	A.J.	Pick,	European	Division	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Polish	Treasures	and	Possible	Wheat	Sales	to	Poland,”	January	3,	1958.	
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Since	 Canada	 was	 also	 trying	 to	 negotiate	 a	 deal	 with	 Poland	 to	 purchase	 an	additional	 150,000	 tons	 of	 wheat,	 there	 was	 concern	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	Americans	 could	 jeopardize	 the	 sale.	 Polish	 officials,	 it	 was	 suggested,	 should	 be	approached	to	try	and	seal	the	Canadian	wheat	deal,	but	Watkins	cautioned	that	all	efforts	might	be	for	naught:		
	It	 is	 my	 belief,	 however,	 that	 none	 of	 these	 efforts	 will	 be	 successful	until	 the	 Polish	 Government	 is	 satisfied	 that	 it	 is	 making	 progress	 in	securing	the	return	of	 that	part	of	 the	Polish	treasures	which	 is	 in	 the	Bank	 of	 Montreal.	 Last	 May	 officials	 of	 the	 Department	 of	 Trade	 and	Commerce	and	the	Wheat	Board	went	to	Washington	to	place	our	views	before	 the	 Polish	 delegation.	 The	 senior	 delegate,	 after	 explaining	 he	was	 not	 responsible	 for	 negotiations	 with	 Canada,	 said	 that	 had	 he	been,	‘he	would	want	to	talk	about	two	Canadian	surpluses:	one	would	be	wheat;	the	other	would	be	tapestries.’24	Luckily	 for	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	 Board,	 the	 wheat	 deal	 negotiations	 were	 not	negatively	impacted	by	the	lack	of	progress	made	on	the	treasures.	The	seriousness	of	the	issue	did	not	fade,	however,	and	remained	at	the	forefront	of	Canadian-Polish	relations	in	the	late	1950s.		
	 Neither	 the	 Poles	 nor	 Canadians	 wanted	 to	make	 the	 issue	 overtly	 public.	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 certain	 quarters	were	 not	 aware	 of	 the	 friction	 caused	 by	Canada’s	 retention	 of	 the	 treasures,	 or	 of	 the	 broader	 implications	 for	 East-West	relations	 generally.	 Smith,	 for	 instance,	 told	 his	 Cabinet	 colleagues	 that	 the	 UN	Secretary-General	had	told	him	on	a	personal	basis	“that	he	was	trying	to	encourage	the	Poles	to	adopt	the	same	general	attitude	as	Yugoslavia,	and	it	would	be	helpful	if	
																																																								24	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Memorandum	J.B.C.	Watkins	to	Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“Polish	Treasures	and	Possible	Wheat	Sales	to	Poland,”	January	3,	1958.	The	Wawel	tapestries	were	the	largest	collection	of	Polish	treasures	stored	in	Canada.	There	were	140	large	16th	and	17th	century	arrases	that	had	adorned	the	walls	of	the	Wawel	Cathedral.	
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Canada	 could	 release	 these	 treasures	which	 had	 such	 great	 symbolic	 value	 to	 the	Polish	people.”25	
	 Returning	 the	 treasures	 was	 a	 much	 more	 complicated	 matter	 than	 most	realized,	and	 intricate	 legal	 issues	were	 involved.26	Diefenbaker	explained	 that	 the	major	part	of	the	treasures	were	now	in	the	Quebec	Museum	and	beyond	the	control	of	 the	 Federal	 government.27	Regarding	 the	 two	 trunks	 stored	 in	 the	 Bank	 of	Montreal	 in	 Ottawa,	 Diefenbaker	 believed	 the	 general	 feeling	 was	 that	 Canada	should	restore	part	of	the	treasures,	and	that	this	would	certainly	result	in	improved	relations	 with	 Poland.28	In	 a	 May	 1958	 Cabinet	 meeting,	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	most	 Ministers	 preferred	 that	 the	 Polish	 government	 secure	 the	 release	 of	 the	treasures	deposited	with	the	Bank	of	Montreal	by	action	in	the	courts,	rather	than	by	the	intervention	of	the	Canadian	government.29	
																																																								25	DCER,	Vol.	25.	496.	Extract	from	Cabinet	Conclusions,	“Polish	Art	Treasures,”	Ottawa,	20	May	1958.			26	For	a	fair	description	of	the	long	negotiating	process	and	the	various	legal	barriers,	see	Balawyder,	
The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	202-210.	For	a	detailed	and	comprehensive	examination	of	the	legal	and	constitutional	matters	involved	in	the	issue,	see,	Sharon	Williams,	The	Polish	Art	Treasure	in	
Canada:	Legal	Problems	and	Political	Realities	(York	University:	Master’s	Thesis,	1974).	27	Interestingly,	the	Federal	Government	had	to	face	serious	international	and	constitutional	problems	when	the	Quebec	Government	assumed	control	over	a	portion	of	the	treasures,	since	it	maintained	that	it	did	not	recognize	the	authority	of	the	new	Polish	Government.	Sharon	Williams	has	argued,	“What	was	essentially	a	dispute	between	two	rival	foreign	groups	and	could	easily	have	been	solved	by	the	Canadian	Government	in	accordance	with	recognized	principles	of	international	law,	became	a	domestic	dispute	which,	if	not	handled	properly,	could	have	done	much	harm	to	federal-provincial	relations.	This	may	help	explain	why	the	federal	authorities	argued	that	the	recovery	was	an	exclusively	Polish	matter	and	that	Poland	was	free	to	resort	to	Canadian	courts.”	Williams,	The	Polish	Art	Treasure	in	Canada,	vii.	For	a	detailed	background	on	Canada’s	constitutional	and	legal	framework	on	the	federal-provincial	dispute	surrounding	the	Polish	Art	Treasures,	see	Williams,	The	Polish	Art	Treasure	in	Canada,	117-133.	28	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1898,	Cabinet	Conclusions,	May	6,	1958.	29	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1898,	Cabinet	Conclusions,	May	6,	1958.	Gordon	Swoger	explains	that	some	treasure	had	been	stored	in	Ottawa	and	some	in	Quebec.	It	is	revealing	that	most	opinions	stemming	from	the	DEA’s	legal	division	stated	that	the	Canadian	government	was	responsible	for	the	protection	of	all	the	Polish	treasures,	regardless	of	their	location,	simply	because	they	were	the	property	of	the	Polish	state	and	were	located	within	Canada,	citing	long	established	principles	in	international	law.	“With	respect	to	that	part	of	the	collection	that	had	been	accepted	into	the	Provincial	Museum	under	
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	 By	 June,	however,	 Smith	 reported	 to	Cabinet	 that	 all	 avenues	not	 involving	the	 government	 had	 been	 investigated,	 and	 none	 had	 proved	 feasible.	 Smith	recommended	that	the	federal	government	direct	the	Bank	of	Montreal	to	return	the	trunks	 to	 the	Polish	 government	 through	 the	Legation	 in	Ottawa.	This	 gesture,	 he	inferred,	might	be	of	some	help	to	Gomulka	in	withstanding	Soviet	pressure	on	the	subject.	Smith	then	recommended	that	if		
	the	 Polish	 authorities	 agreed	 they	 would	 not	 hold	 the	 Canadian	government	 responsible	 for	 any	 damage	 the	 treasures	 might	 have	suffered	 and	 also	 agree	 to	 hold	 the	 government	 harmless	 from	 any	claims	 on	 the	 part	 of	 other	 owners	 of	 any	 objects	 in	 the	 trunks,	 an	indemnity	agreement	be	made	with	the	Bank	of	Montreal.		During	 the	 Cabinet	 discussion,	 it	 was	 agreed	 that	 Canada	 recognized	 the	 present	Polish	 government	 and	 its	 rights	 to	 the	 treasures.	 Furthermore,	 the	 issue	 was	recognized	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 international	 relations	 and	 a	 federal	 responsibility.	Cabinet	determined	that	the	matter	should	be	decided	with	those	interests	in	mind.	It	was	also	noted	that	a	decision	to	do	nothing	would	discredit	Canada	in	the	UN	and	elsewhere.30	
	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 pressed	 Polish	 Chargé	 d’Affaires	Sieradzki	 for	 specific	 guarantees,	 and	 he	 agreed	 not	 to	 hold	 the	 Canadian	government	 responsible	 for	 any	 loss,	 damage,	 deterioration,	 or	 injury	 suffered	 by																																																																																																																																																																						the	control	of	the	Quebec	government,	the	Canadian	government	was	indeed	responsible	for	the	recovery	of	the	treasures	from	the	museum.	According	to	international	law	the	Canadian	government	bore	the	responsibility	for	the	actions	of	all	Canadian	officials	–	federal,	provincial,	municipal	–	vis-à-vis	a	foreign	government.”	These	observations,	however,	would	prove	to	be	disconcerting	to	the	DEA,	especially	since	Premier	Maurice	Duplessis	had	in	1956	stated	that	‘“the	treasures	were	confined	to	the	government	by	Polish	patriots	and	they	shall	never	be	returned	to	the	Communist	government	of	Warsaw.’”	The	desire	of	the	federal	government	to	avoid	federal-provincial	friction	is	one	reason	it	wanted	the	issue	to	be	resolved	by	the	courts,	and	not	by	Ottawa’s	“heavy	hand”.	Swoger,	The	Strange	
Odyssey	of	Poland’s	National	Treasures,	147-148.	30	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1898,	Cabinet	Conclusions,	June	6,	1958;	DCER,	Vol.	25.	497.	Extract	from	Cabinet	
Conclusion,	“Polish	Art	Treasures,”	Ottawa,	July	2,	1958.	
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the	contents	of	the	two	trunks	deposited	in	the	Bank	of	Montreal.	The	use	of	seven	non-political	 figures	 gave	 the	 appearance	 of	 neutrality	 in	 the	 transfer,	 and	 on	January	9,	1959,	the	Bank	of	Montreal	officially	released	the	two	trunks	to	Poland.31	 	Once	 the	 trunks	were	 released,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 appeared	 less	 adamant	about	keeping	the	matter	quiet.	The	Globe	and	Mail	reported	that	the	DEA	issued	a	statement	indicating,	“…	the	two	trunks	of	treasures,	containing	jeweled	swords	and	armour	 and	 ancient	 scrolls,	 will	 be	 returned	 to	 Polish	 institutions.”	 The	 article	explained	that	the	gesture	“ends	some	bitter	diplomatic	wrangling”32	
	 Two	months	later,	Smith	instructed	the	Canadian	Chargé	d’Affaires	in	Poland,	G.	Hamilton	Southam,	during	his	 first	 call	 on	Foreign	Minister	Rapacki,	 to	 express	the	 Minister’s	 “appreciation	 of	 the	 discretion	 with	 which	 Polish	 authorities	 have	handled	the	return	of	the	two	trunks	of	art	treasures	which	had	been	deposited	in	the	 Bank	 of	 Montreal.”	 Smith	 also	 asked	 that	 Southam	 inform	 Rapacki	 of	 his	“personal	 satisfaction	 that	 a	way	was	 found	 to	 effect	 the	 return	of	 the	 trunks	and	that	 the	contents	have	apparently	not	suffered	damage.”	Smith	also	made	clear	he	was	 conscious	 of	 Polish	 officials’	 discretion	 in	 official	 statements	 about	 the	 part	played	by	 the	Canadian	 government	 in	 the	 arrangements	 for	 the	 release.33	Simply	put,	Smith	was	grateful	for	the	depoliticized	handling	of	the	issue	and	was	pleased	the	issue	had	not	devolved	into	a	Cold	War	rhetorical	assault	on	Canada.	The	return	of	a	part	of	their	national	heritage	was	greeted	with	much	enthusiasm	in	Poland.	An																																																									31	Swoger,	The	Strange	Odyssey	of	Poland’s	National	Treasures,	154-156;	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	
and	the	White	Eagle,	207.	32	“Long	Controversy	Ends:	Polish	Treasures	Go	Back,”	The	Globe	and	Mail,	January	9,	1959.	33	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Despatch	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
Chargé	d’Affaires,	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw,	“Your	First	Call	on	Foreign	Minister	Rapacki,”	March	9,	1959.	
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article	in	Trybuna	Ludu	described	the	public’s	reaction	upon	hearing	the	news:	“The	information	concerning	the	prospective	return	of	a	part	of	 the	Wawel	treasures	to	Poland	 from	Canada	 raised	 feeling	 of	 joy	 and	 satisfaction	 throughout	 the	 country.	The	information	concerning	the	treasure	was	[…]	the	main	subject	of	interest	of	the	majority	of	the	people.”34	The	remaining	treasures	were	released	in	late	December	1960	 and	 arrived	 in	 Poland	 in	 January	 the	 next	 year.35	The	Globe	 and	Mail,	 again	reported	on	the	event,	stating,		
	It	 is	 excellent	 news	 that	 the	 last	 of	 the	 Polish	 art	 treasures,	 stored	 in	Canada	 for	 safekeeping	during	 the	war,	 are	now	on	 their	way	back	 to	Poland.	The	treasures	have	been	a	source	of	embarrassment	to	Canada,	of	 controversy	 between	 the	 Canadian	 and	 Polish	 Governments,	 and	between	various	groups	of	Poles.	They	are	now	being	restored	to	their	rightful	owner,	the	Polish	nation,	amid	general	goodwill,	which	is	of	far	more	value	to	Canada	than	could	be	any	art	treasures.36	It	appears	 that	 the	Globe	and	Mail,	 too,	understood	 the	political	 significance	of	 the	return	of	the	treasures.	
	 The	controversy	surrounding	the	Polish	art	treasures	is	interesting	in	that	it	highlights	 the	 willingness	 of	 two	 middle	 powers	 in	 the	 Cold	 War	 to	 address	 a	difficult	 issue	 quietly	 and	 to	 minimize	 what	 otherwise	 could	 have	 been	 a	 public	spectacle.	Both	the	Polish	press	and	public	were	vocal	in	their	expectations	of	seeing	the	 treasures	 returned,	 yet	 Polish	 authorities	 refused	 to	 use	 the	 issue	 for	propaganda	 purposes	 to	 publicly	 attack	 Canada,	 or	 the	 West	 generally;	 Polish	authorities	 minimized	 confrontation	 in	 order	 not	 to	 escalate	 Cold	War	 hostilities	and	 divisions.	 From	 the	 Canadian	 perspective,	 officials	 understood	 the	 political																																																									34	As	quoted	in,	Swoger,	The	Strange	Odyssey	of	Poland’s	National	Treasures,	159.	35	Swoger,	The	Strange	Odyssey	of	Poland’s	National	Treasures,	168-181.	36	“Polish	Art	Treasures,”	The	Globe	and	Mail,	January	4,	1961.	
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significance	 attached	 to	 the	 issue.	 A	 lack	 of	 progress	 in	 returning	 the	 treasures	hampered	 their	 ability	 to	 cultivate	 better	 relations	 with	 Poland,	 which	 was	ultimately	counterintuitive	to	their	larger	policy	objectives.	
	 External	 Affairs	 almost	 immediately	 found	 that	 resolving	 the	 art	 treasure	issue	 had	 “removed	 an	 obstacle	 from	 the	 improvements	 of	 Canadian-Polish	relations.”37	From	Poland,	Southam	reported	that	there	was	even	talk	among	Polish	officials	 of	 extending	 an	 invitation	 to	 Diefenbaker	 to	 visit	 Poland,	 and	 those	 in	charge	 had	 welcomed	 the	 suggestion.	 Importantly,	 Polish	 officials	 “did	 not	 even	raise	 the	 question	 of	 the	 remaining	 treasures	 as	 an	 argument	 against	 such	 a	gesture.”	 Such	 discussions	 signified	 the	 great	 change	 in	 attitude	 that	 had	 been	achieved	with	the	return	of	the	trunks.38		
	 THE	RAPACKI	PLAN		 On	 the	whole,	 repatriating	 the	 art	 treasures	 had	 been	 carried	 out	 through	quiet,	 bilateral	 diplomacy.	 But	 this	was	 not	 the	 only	 sign	 of	 constructive	 political	relations	 between	 Poland	 and	 Canada	 during	 the	 Diefenbaker	 government.	 Other	instances	 were	 played	 out	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	 In	 October	 1957,	 Poland’s	Foreign	Minister	Rapacki	proposed	a	scheme	for	the	creation	of	a	nuclear-free	zone	in	 Central	 Europe,	 to	 encompass	 Czechoslovakia,	 East	 and	 West	 Germany,	 and	Poland.	 Both	 the	 manufacturing	 and	 possession	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 would	 be	
																																																								37	LAC,	MG32-B13,	Vol.	8,	File	14,	Memorandum	for	the	Minister,	April	20,	1961.	38	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.1,	Memorandum	J.W.	Holmes	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	
for	External	Affairs,	“Conversation	with	Polish	Chargé	d’Affaires,”	April	24,	1959.	
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excluded	 in	 this	 zone.39	This	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Rapacki	 Plan.	 Reacting	 to	 the	Polish	initiative,	the	US	State	Department	stated,	“after	careful	study,	our	reaction	is	heavily	 negative.	 While	 it	 might	 have	 some	 surface	 attraction,	 it	 poses	 totally	unacceptable	 risks.	 Therefore	 we	 cannot	 consider	 this	 scheme	 as	 basis	 for	 any	serious	 negotiations.” 40 	While	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 Federal	 Republic	 of	Germany	 would	 not	 entertain	 any	 suggestion	 that	 West	 Germany	 be	 disarmed	against	its	will,	other	NATO	heads	of	states,	including	Prime	Ministers	Gerhardsen	of	Norway	and	Hansen	of	Denmark,	and	Foreign	Ministers	Selwyn	Lloyd	of	Britain	and	Smith	 of	 Canada,	 insisted	 the	 Rapacki	 Plan	 be	 seriously	 studied.41	In	 the	 end,	however,	NATO	 rejected	 the	plan.	Discussions	 among	Canadian	officials	 regarding	the	 Rapacki	 plan,	 however,	 remain	 interesting	 and	 illustrate	 how	 Canada,	 as	 a	middle	 power,	 sought	 to	 engage	 in	 discussions	 to	 support	 a	 middle	 power	counterpart	on	the	other	side	of	the	Iron	Curtain.		
	 During	 Southam’s	 discussion	 with	 Rapacki,	 the	 Polish	 Foreign	 Minister	stressed	 that	 his	 government	 would	 attach	 particular	 importance	 to	 any	observations	 or	 suggestions	 the	 Canadian	 government	might	 have,	 and	 he	 hoped	there	 might	 follow	 an	 exchange	 of	 views	 between	 Poland	 and	 Canada	 through	diplomatic	 channels.	 From	 a	 discussion	 he	 had	with	 the	 Polish	 Chargé	 d’Affaires,	who	 in	 turn	was	 relaying	 the	 views	 of	 Polish	Deputy	 Foreign	Minister	Winiewicz,	John	 Holmes	 understood	 that	 the	 Poles	 were	 simply	 looking	 for	 anything	 but	 a																																																									39	Albert	Legault	and	Michael	Fortmann,	A	Diplomacy	of	Hope:	Canada	and	Disarmament,	1945-1988	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	1992),	158.	40	FRUS,	Vol.	X,	Part	1,	Telegram	from	the	Department	of	State	to	the	Mission	to	the	North	Atlantic	
Treaty	Organization	and	European	Regional	Organizations,	January	21,	1958.	41	Legault	and	Fortmann,	A	Diplomacy	of	Hope,	158.	
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complete	rejection.	Holmes	explained,	“Poland	would	be	grateful	if	[Canada]	could,	by	 asking	 for	 further	 explanations	 or	 suggesting	 alternatives,	 at	 least	 keep	 the	proposal	 alive.”42	Essentially,	 Poland	hoped	 that	 the	plan	would	not	be	 summarily	dismissed	and	that	there	could	be	further	discussions.	Under-Secretary	Jules	Léger	sympathized	with	Poland’s	position.	In	a	memorandum	to	the	minister,	he	explained	how	“Winiewicz	 is	one	of	 the	stronger	 forces	 in	Warsaw	trying	 to	maintain	Polish	foreign	policy	on	an	independent	a	plane	as	possible.”	As	a	result,	Léger	hoped	the	government	would	“give	due	regard	to	his	recommendations”	in	drafting	its	reply	to	Poland.43	Canada	agreed	to	support	the	plan,	provided	it	led	to	disarmament	by	the	USSR	 as	 well	 as	 by	 the	 Western	 powers.44	Canadian	 officials,	 in	 drafting	 their	response,	clearly	knew	their	conditions	would	be	unacceptable,	but	they	did	do	their	part	to	sustain	discussion	and	debate.	 In	 fact,	as	the	Polish	draft	of	 the	plan	stood,	Canadian	 officials	 had	 serious	 reservations.	 Specifically,	 “by	 concentrating	 on	nuclear	weapons	to	the	neglect	of	reductions	 in	conventional	weapons,	the	Plan,	 if	adopted,	 would	 result	 in	 seriously	 upsetting	 the	 strategic	 balance	 in	 Western	Europe	to	the	disadvantage	of	the	North	Atlantic	Alliance.”45	In	the	end,	the	Rapacki	plan	came	to	naught.	
	 Historians	 Albert	 Legault	 and	 Michael	 Fortmann	 also	 note	 that	 both	 the	Canadians	and	Norwegians	insisted	on	voicing	their	views	strictly	on	behalf	of	their																																																									42	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Holmes	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs,	“The	Rapacki	Plan,”	May	8,	1958.	43	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	6539,	File	10258-40	part	2.2,	Memorandum	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“The	Rapacki	Plan,”	May	8,	1958.	44	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	171.		45	TCL,	John	Holmes	Papers,	Series	15,	Box	86,	File	3,	Memorandum	Doug	LePan	to	J.W.	Holmes,	“Meeting	of	Foreign	Ministers	of	Canada,	Norway,	and	Poland,	14	October	1958.	
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own	 countries,	 and	 not	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 Alliance.	 Furthermore,	 they	explain	 that	 one	 of	 Canada’s	 objectives	 regarding	 the	 Western	 response	 to	 the	Rapacki	 plan	was	 to	 “avoid	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	White	 House	 spokesman	would	dismiss	 the	Plan	out	of	hand	simply	because	 it	originated	 in	 the	East,	without	any	prior	consultation	 from	member	nations	of	 the	North	Atlantic	Alliance.”46	In	short,	Canadian	 officials	would	 not	 officially	 endorse	 the	 plan,	 but	 they	 did	 not	want	 to	reject	 it	 outright	 either.	 They	 considered	 the	negative	 impact	 of	 a	 blunt	 rebuff	 on	Poland’s	foreign	policy	objectives;	it	was	important	to	keep	lines	of	communication	open	between	East	 and	West	 regarding	disarmament,	 because	 if	 discourse	halted,	Polish	 independence	 could	 be	weakened.	DEA	official,	Doug	LePan	 explained	how	Rapacki	was	“very	disappointed	with	 the	replies	of	some	NATO	Foreign	Ministers,	since	 they	seemed	 to	 reject	 the	Plan	almost	without	 reading	 it.	That	had	not	been	true,	however,	of	either	Canada	or	Norway,”	which	pleased	Rapacki.47		
	 While	 the	 Rapacki	 plan	 failed,	 it	 highlights	 an	 important	 dynamic	 between	middle	powers	operating	in	the	shadows	of	their	respective	Cold	War	superpowers.	Poland’s	 appeal	 to	 Canada	 to	 help	 continue	debate,	 and	Canada’s	 efforts	 –	 even	 if	nominal	 –	 to	 meet	 Poland’s	 request,	 demonstrate	 a	 commonality	 of	 position	 and	purpose	 among	 middle	 powers,	 something	 of	 a	 cross-curtain	 brotherhood	 in	 the	Cold	War.	Canadian	motives,	of	course,	were	not	completely	altruistic.	In	fact,	quite	the	 opposite	 is	 true.	 Consistently,	 it	 was	 Canadian	 policy	 to	 nurture	 the	
																																																								46	Legault	and	Fortmann,	A	Diplomacy	of	Hope,	599,	n.	24.	47	TCL,	John	Holmes	Papers,	Series	15,	Box	86,	File	3,	Memorandum	Doug	LePan	to	J.W.	Holmes,	“Meeting	of	Foreign	Ministers	of	Canada,	Norway,	and	Poland,	14	October	1958.	
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independence	obtained	by	the	Polish	October	in	hopes	of	reducing	Soviet	hegemony	and	ultimately	weakening	European	communism.	
	 EMBASSY	STATUS		 With	bilateral	relations	on	the	mend,	each	country	aimed	to	improve	affairs	further	by	raising	their	diplomatic	missions	to	embassy	status.	In	a	memorandum	to	the	 minister,	 Under-Secretary	 Norman	 Robertson	 explained	 that	 the	 Cabinet	 had	approved	 the	 appointment	 of	 an	 ambassador	 in	November	1957,	 but	 progress	 on	the	matter	was	 halted	 because	 the	 Poles	wanted	 to	wait	 until	 the	Bank	 treasures	were	 returned.	 Now	 that	 issue	 was	 resolved,	 Poland	 expressed	 its	 readiness	 to	proceed.	 Robertson	 argued	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Canadian	 mission	 in	 Poland	 was	impaired	 by	 inadequate	 standing:	 in	 Warsaw,	 Canada	 ranked	 last	 of	 all	 foreign	representatives.	Robertson	 insisted	 that	 this	gesture	was	“a	necessary	 first	step	 in	our	 policy	 of	 taking	 initiative	 […]	 to	 improve	 East-West	 relations.”	 He	 also	maintained	that	the	“appointment	of	an	ambassador	in	Warsaw,	as	an	expression	of	continuing	 Canadian	 support,	 would	 tend	 to	 encourage	 those	 Polish	 leaders	 who	favour	 closer	 relations	with	 the	West.”48	On	 April	 29,	 1960,	 both	 countries	 raised	their	 respective	 diplomatic	 missions	 to	 embassy	 status.	 G.	 Hamilton	 Southam	became	Canada’s	first	postwar	ambassador	to	Poland,	and	Zygfryd	Wolniak	became	Poland’s	first	postwar	ambassador	to	Canada.49																																																									48	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	8437,	File	10258-40	part	3,	Memorandum	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	
Affairs	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Representation	in	Warsaw	and	Prague,”	December	29,	1959.	49	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	171.	Canada	also	showed	its	inclination	to	cooperate	with	Poland	to	improve	international	relations	in	the	Cold	War	when,	in	1959,	it	supported	Poland’s	candidacy	for	a	seat	in	the	UN	Security	Council,	an	action	the	Polish	government	recognized	and	appreciated	as	a	step	forward	toward	more	cordial	relations.	
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	 In	 comparing	 the	 development	 of	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 and	 Canadian-Polish	relations,	 there	 were	 important	 differences	 with	 respect	 to	 Canadian	 diplomatic	activity	 and	 resources	 in	 each	 of	 the	 countries.	 Whereas	 Canadian-Yugoslav	relations	 were	 fervently	 and	 progressively	 nurtured	 by	 Canada’s	 Yugoslav	ambassadors	 from	 1956	 onwards	 –	 through	 the	 promotion	 of	 cultural	 and	diplomatic	exchanges	and	the	facilitation	of	commercial	deals	–	Canadian	diplomats	in	Poland	were	handicapped	by	tensions	over	the	unresolved	art	treasures	issue	as	well	 as	 embassy	 status.	 Additionally,	 Canada’s	 Yugoslav	 ambassadors	 during	 the	Diefenbaker	 years	were	Soviet	 specialists,	 specifically	George	 Ignatieff	 and	Robert	Ford.	 Both	 had	 deep-seated	 interest	 in	 Soviet	 affairs	 and	 Yugoslavia’s	 position	relative	to	the	USSR.	The	point	of	 this	observation	 is	not,	of	course,	 to	devalue	the	roles,	interests,	or	abilities	of	Canada’s	charge	d’affaires	and	ambassadors	in	Poland.	The	fact	that	Poland	was	a	member	of	the	Warsaw	Pact	and	a	committed	Soviet	ally	may	 also	 have	 been	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 relatively	 lesser	 influence	 of	 Canada’s	ambassadors	 in	Poland.	 In	the	end,	however,	 the	personalities	and	backgrounds	of	the	specific	Canadian	ambassadors	in	Yugoslavia	remains	important,	since	they	did,	without	doubt,	play	a	significant	role	in	Canadian-Yugoslav	relations.	
	 As	 the	 Canadian	 embassy	 in	 Poland	 settled	 in,	 the	 staff	 was	 increasingly	overloaded	with	visa	work.	As	a	result,	the	DEA	submitted	a	report	to	the	Ministry	of	Citizenship	 and	 Immigration,	 based	 on	 a	 special	 three-man	 inspection	 team.	 The	report	recommended	sending	a	second	senior	clerk	or	a	junior	immigration	officer	to	 Poland	 to	 help	 alleviate	 the	 workload.	 What	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 routine	administrative	upgrade,	however,	proved	to	have	deeper	political	significance.	This	
	 244	
time,	 reservations	 came	 not	 from	 the	 DEA.	 Department	 of	 Citizenship	 and	Immigration	Minister	Ellen	Fairclough	expressed	her	concerns	to	then	SSEA	Howard	Green.	Fairclough	stated:		
	…	this	will	be	the	first	employee	of	the	Immigration	Branch	to	be	posted	to	 an	 Iron	 Curtain	 country.	 Even	 though	 it	 is	 not	 proposed	 that	 the	employee	be	included	on	the	diplomatic	list,	or	even	posted	officially	as	an	 immigration	 officer,	 I	 would	 expect	 that	 it	 would	 in	 due	 course	become	known	to	the	Polish	authorities	that	the	employee	in	question	is	from	the	Immigration	Branch	on	secondment	to	External.	We	would	have	to	consider	pretty	carefully,	I	think,	the	effect	of	this	information,	should	 it	 become	 known.	 […]	 What	 would	 the	 Polish	 government’s	reaction	be	 if	 it	 learned	 that	we	had	seconded	 to	 the	embassy	 staff	 in	Warsaw	 an	 Immigration	 Branch	 employee?	 I	 assume	 that	 we	 do	 not	wish	 to	give	any	overt	 indication	of	an	 increased	 interest	on	Canada’s	part	 in	Polish	 immigration,	 through	posting	 an	 immigration	 employee	in	Warsaw.50	Fairclough	copied	the	letter	to	Diefenbaker	for	comment,	to	which	he	responded:	“it	seems	to	me	that	the	arguments	are	patent	and	inherent	 in	the	questions	that	you	have	asked	and	they	 indicate	that	 it	would	not	be	helpful	at	 this	 time	to	accede	to	the	 suggestion	 [for	 an	 additional	 clerk].	 […]	 I	 think	 that	 on	 balance	 the	disadvantages	 far	 outweigh	 the	 benefits.”51	The	 importance	Diefenbaker	 –	 and	his	ministers	–	attached	to	sound	relations	with	Poland	is	highlighted	by	the	discussion	over	this	otherwise	routine	and	mundane	administrative	improvement.	By	this	time,	relations	 with	 Poland	 were	 beginning	 to	 improve	 significantly,	 and	 jeopardizing	them	(in	order	to	alleviate	an	overworked	clerk)	was	not	an	option	when	placed	in	the	 broader	 context	 of	 Canadian-Polish	 and	 East-West	 relations.	 This	 example	 is	also	testament	to	the	importance	high-level	Canadian	officials	attributed	to	Poland																																																									50	DCC,	file	MG1/VIII/(861/P762),	Personal	and	Confidential	letter	Minister	of	Citizenship	and	
Immigration,	Fairclough	to	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	Green,	June	5,	1961.	51	DCC,	file	MG1/VI/(864/Y94),	Personal	and	Confidential	letter	JGD	to	Minister	of	Citizenship	and	
Immigration,	Fairclough,	June	7,	1961.	
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and	its	global	role	and	to	Canadian	officials’	perceptions	of	how	Canada	could	impact	international	Cold	War	relations,	vis-à-vis	Poland.	
	 CANADA,	POLAND,	AND	THE	ICSC		 Indochina	 (Cambodia,	 Laos,	 and	 Vietnam)	 had	 been	 part	 of	 the	 French	colonial	system	since	the	1880s.	France’s	difficulties	during	the	Second	World	War,	however,	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 Viet	 Minh,	 a	 national	 independence	coalition,	 to	 take	 control	 in	 North	 Vietnam.	 French	 attempts	 to	 reassert	 their	colonial	 administration	 in	 Indochina	 in	 the	 post	 war	 period	 faced	 stiff	 resistance	from	the	Viet	Minh	until	1954,	when	a	ceasefire	and	French	withdrawal	were	finally	negotiated	under	 the	Geneva	Agreements.	Vietnam	was	divided	 into	a	Communist	North	and	a	Western-backed	South,	while	Laos	and	Cambodia	were	 recognized	as	independent	 states.	 The	 Agreements	 established	 three	 International	 Commissions	for	Supervision	and	Control	(ICSC),	to	support	the	ceasefire	by	supervising	the	flow	of	refugees	across	territories	and	to	facilitate	a	reunification	election	in	Vietnam.			 Each	of	the	three	Commissions	was	comprised	of	a	western,	communist,	and	neutralist	 state,	 with	 Canada,	 Poland,	 and	 India	 asked	 to	 provide	 the	 respective	representatives.	 According	 to	 historian	 Adam	 Chapnick,	 “Although	 the	 Canadian	government	had	not	been	properly	consulted,	and	there	were	strong	doubts	among	Holmes	and	his	colleagues	as	to	whether	elections	to	unify	Vietnam	would	ever	be	held,	 there	was	 little	 option	 but	 to	 agree	 to	 serve.”	 If	 Canada	 had	 said	 no,	 it	was	believed	 this	 “would	 have	 risked	 re-igniting	 the	 conflict	 and	 perhaps	 even	expanding	it.”	Yet,	“the	opportunity	to	act	as	a	bridge-builder	throughout	the	period	
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of	the	ceasefire,”	explains	Chapnick,	“was	enticing”	to	the	Canadians.52	In	the	view	of	John	Holmes,	assistant	under-secretary	of	state	 for	external	affairs	at	 the	time,	 the	government	had	a	 “moral	obligation”	 to	 “honestly	and	objectively”	do	 its	best	 in	a	difficult	 situation	 to	 help	Vietnam	address	 its	 economic	 and	political	 challenges.53	Despite	 the	 involvement	of	 four	 successive	Canadian	governments,	one	overriding	concern	governed	policy:	 “how	best	 the	Canadian	government	might	contribute	 to	stabilizing	 or	 restoring	 peace	 in	 the	 troubled	 countries	 of	 Southeast	 Asia.” 54	Canadian	officials	generally	viewed	the	assignment	with	 limited	optimism	but	still	recognized	the	theoretical	value	in	its	cause.		 Despite	frequent	diplomatic	contact	between	the	two	nations	while	working	on	 the	Commission,	Canadian-Polish	 relations	 in	 the	 ICSC	during	 this	period	were	not	especially	significant	to	shaping	their	bilateral	relationship.	In	other	words,	the	Canadian	government’s	policy	to	foster	closer	relations	with	Poland	does	not	appear	to	have	been	meaningfully	impacted	by	their	respective	roles	on	the	ICSC.	Evidence	does	suggest,	however,	 that	 frank	and	open	discussion	did	occur	between	the	 two	nations	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Commission.	 Holmes,	 for	 instance	 spoke	 with	Polish	 Chargé	 d’Affaires	 Mieczyslaw	 Sieradzki	 about	 the	 situation	 in	 Laos.55	“The	most	 interesting	 part,”	 according	 to	 Holmes,”	 came	 when	 our	 candour	 led	 us	 to	discuss	each	other’s	motives	and	intentions.”	Holmes	explained	that	Sieradzki	“was	
																																																								52	Adam	Chapnick,	Canada’s	Voice:	The	Public	Life	of	John	Wendell	Holmes	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2009),	83.	53	Chapnick,	Canada’s	Voice,	83.	54	Douglas	A.	Ross,	In	the	Interests	of	Peace:	Canada	and	Vietnam,	1954-1973	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	1984),	9.	55	At	this	point,	the	International	Commission	in	Laos	had	been	adjourned,	much	to	the	chagrin	of	the	Poles,	as	well	as	the	USSR	and	Chinese.	
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prepared	 to	 accept	 my	 assurances	 that	 we	 wanted	 Laos	 to	 be	 neutral,”	 but	 was	“skeptical	 about	American	 intentions.”	Holmes	 sympathized:	 “we	are	 all	 disturbed	by	 the	 uninhibited	 comments	 of	 some	 Americans	 about	 Laos.”	 Holmes	 reassured	Sieradzki	he	was	“prepared	to	agree	 that	 the	Poles	wanted	Laos	 to	be	neutral	and	the	area	to	be	freed	of	tension.	However,	I	had	to	assume	that	the	Chinese	and	North	Vietnamese	intention	was	to	establish	a	Communist	government	in	Laos.”	Sieradzki	then	 asked	 rhetorically	 “if	 I	 really	 thought	 that	 ‘they’	 [China	 and	 North	 Vietnam]	were	so	completely	unrealistic.”	Sieradzki	assured	Holmes,	“with	every	appearance	of	 conviction,”	 that	 the	 Chinese	 and	 North	 Vietnam	wanted	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	neutral	Laotian	government.	Not	shying	away	from	broader	communist	ideological	intentions,	Sieradzki	admitted	that,	“of	course,	the	Communists	believed	ultimately	it	was	 in	the	 interest	of	all	countries	to	have	Communist	governments	but	 implied	this	 was	 a	 long-term	 aim	 which	 had	 no	 particular	 relevance	 to	 the	 immediate	situation	in	Laos.”56	This	type	of	forthright	and	candid	discussion	suggests	that	even	within	the	context	of	the	ICSC,	a	peace	observation	mission	deliberately	composed	on	 the	 basis	 of	 opposing	 Cold	 War	 alliances,	 Canadian	 and	 Polish	 officials	 were	sincere	about	maintaining	open	and	truthful	lines	of	communication.			 In	addition	to	candid	discussion	between	national	representatives,	Canadian	officials	were	 concerned	over	potential	harm	 to	Polish	Commission	members	as	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 death	 of	 the	 Chief	 of	 the	 Vietnamese	 Liaison	 Mission	 to	 the	International	 Commission,	 Colonel	 Hoang	 Thuy	 Nam.	 In	 October	 1961,	 an	 armed	
																																																								56	DCER,	Vol.	26.	418.	Memorandum	from	Assistant	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Laos:	Conversation	with	Polish	Chargé	d’Affaires,”	Ottawa,	June	12,	1959.	DEA/50052-B-40.	
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band	 captured	 Colonel	 Nam.	 While	 the	 Canadian	 Delegation	 sent	 a	 letter	 to	 the	Vietnamese	Liaison	Mission	expressing	sympathy	and	hopes	for	Colonel	Nam’s	safe	return,	the	Polish	Commissioner	refused	to	have	the	Commission	do	anything	at	all.	Soon	after,	Colonel	Nam	was	found	dead.	Fearing	reprisals,	the	Polish	Commissioner	agreed	 to	 a	 joint	 statement	 by	 the	 International	 Commission	 to	 the	 Vietnamese	Liaison	Mission	expressing	condolences.57			 During	 the	 next	month,	 a	 campaign	 in	 South	Vietnam	mounted	 against	 the	International	Commission,	and	the	Polish	Delegation	in	particular,	“trying	to	harass	by	threats	to	force	[the]	Commission	to	move	to	Hanoi	or	even	disband	altogether.”	While	 Canadian	 officials	 did	 not	 want	 the	 Commission	 disbanded,	 for	 fear	 of	destabilizing	 the	 region,	 they	 expressed	 particular	 concern	 for	 the	 safety	 of	 the	Polish	 Delegation	 and	 even	 expressed	 a	 degree	 of	 solidarity:	 “The	 Commission	cannot	 keep	 silent	 indefinitely	 on	 treatment	 of	 Polish	Delegation.”58	The	Canadian	Delegation’s	concern	for	their	Polish	counterparts	did	not	go	unnoticed.	SSEA	Green	explained	 to	 the	Canadian	Commissioner	 that	 the	Polish	Chargé	d’Affaires	Henryk	Laszcz	“called	on	the	department	[…]	on	instruction	from	Warsaw	to	express	thanks	and	 appreciation	 of	 his	 government	 for	 [the]	 helpful	 attitude	 of	 [the]	 Canadian	Commissioner	over	 current	difficulties	 to	Polish	Delegation.”	Green	explained	 that	the	DEA		
																																																								57	DCER,	Vol.	28.	753.	Letter	Commissioner,	International	Commission	for	Supervision	and	Control	for	
Vietnam	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“DRVN	Attitude	Toward	ICC	and	Rumoured	Introduction	of	United	States	Troops	into	South	Vietnam,”	Saigon,	October	31,	1961.	DEA/50052-A-40.	58	DCER,	Vol.	26.	754.	Telegram	Secretary	of	State	for	External	to	Ambassador	in	United	States,	High	
Commissioner	in	United	Kingdom,	and	High	Commissioner	in	India,	“Vietnam	Commission,”	Ottawa,	November	1,	1961.	DEA/50052-B-40.	
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	indeed	regard	difficulties	of	Polish	Delegation	as	a	matter	of	concern	to	[the]	 whole	 Commission.	 […]	 It	 was	 the	 [the	 Canadian	 government’s]	hope	 that	 [the]	 Polish	 Delegations	 present	 difficulties	 would	 be	overcome	 and	 that	 [the]	 ICSC	 would	 then	 be	 able	 to	 get	 down	 to	business.59	One	must	be	cautious	about	drawing	firm	conclusions	regarding	the	impact	of	such	moments	of	“solidarity.”	Certainly,	Canadian	officials	in	Ottawa	and	Indochina	wanted	the	Vietnam	Commission	to	continue,	since	its	disbandment,	they	believed,	could	destabilize	the	entire	region;	altruism	was	not	the	sole	driving	force	behind	Canadian	sympathy.	Yet,	given	the	emergent	effort	to	engender	good	political	relations	with	Poland,	Canadian	officials	can	also	be	seen	to	have	acted	in	a	manner	that	was	consistent	with	the	objective	of	improved	bilateral	relations.		
	 CONCLUSION		 The	 growing	 consensus	 among	 Canadian	 officials	 that	 increased	 contacts	with	 satellite	 countries,	 particularly	 Poland,	 could	 soften	 the	 communist	 doctrinal	attitude	and	loosen	ties	with	the	USSR	was	a	driving	force	behind	Canadian	foreign	relations	 with	 Poland.	 The	 1956	 Poznań	 rebellion	 ushered	 in	 a	 series	 of	 social,	political,	and	cultural	reforms,	and	Poland’s	increased	liberalization	was	marked	by	a	 sincere	 desire	 not	 to	 be	 dominated	 by	 Moscow.	 Poland	 strove	 to	 keep	international	tensions	as	low	as	possible	in	order	to	retain	its	relative	independence.	As	a	result,	the	Canadian	government	pursued	an	active,	if	cautious,	Polish	policy	of	engagement	in	an	attempt	to	expose	it	to	Western	modalities,	all	the	while	trying	to	gingerly	 reduce	 Soviet	 hegemony	 over	 the	 country.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 Canada’s	
																																																								59	DCER,	Vol.	26.	755.	Telegram	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Commissioner,	International	
Commission	for	Supervision	and	Control	for	Vietnam,	“Vietnam	–	ICSC,”	Ottawa,	November	2,	1961.	DEA/50052-B-40.	
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Polish	policy	mirrored	Canada’s	approach	to	Soviet	and	Yugoslav	relations,	despite	being	 limited	 in	 scope	 and	maneuverability.	 Unlike	 Yugoslavia,	 Poland	was	 firmly	entrenched	 in	 the	 Soviet	 bloc,	 so	 examining	 Canadian-Polish	 relations	 during	 this	decisive	moment	 in	Canadian	foreign	policy	 is	enlightening	because	it	reveals	how	Canada	 approached	 a	 Communist	 European	 nation	 that	 had	 less	 flexibility	 in	 its	foreign	policy.		 Before	 truly	 effective	 diplomacy	 could	 be	 exercised,	 the	 issue	 of	 Poland’s	national	 art	 treasures,	 a	 continuous	 point	 of	 grievance	 between	 the	 two	 nations	since	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Second	World	War,	 needed	 to	 be	 resolved.	While	 the	issue	 was	 politically	 charged,	 neither	 country	 tried	 to	 use	 the	 issue	 for	 political	leverage,	nor	did	either	country	use	it	to	garner	ideological	propaganda	points.	This	exemplifies	 the	 shared	 agenda	 of	 both	 governments	 to	 minimize	 Cold	 War	hostilities.	The	issue	of	the	Polish	art	treasures	was	kept	relatively	isolated	within	a	bilateral	 framework,	 even	 as	 Canadian-Polish	 relations	 were	 not	 always	 isolated	from	their	broader	Cold	War	pressures	and	contexts.		 Canada’s	modest	 support	 for	 Poland’s	 Rapacki	 plan	was	 very	much	 played	out	 in	 an	 international	 context,	 and	 it	 highlights	 an	 interesting	 dynamic	 between	middle	 powers	 during	 the	 Cold	 War.	 Canada’s	 support,	 while	 mostly	 gestural,	speaks	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 occasionally	 cross-curtain	 middlepowerism	 nuanced	traditional	 Cold	 War	 loyalties.	 Relations	 steadily	 improved	 between	 the	 two	countries,	 and	 in	 April	 1960,	 both	 nations	 raised	 their	 diplomatic	 missions	 to	embassy	 status,	 a	 testament	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 each	 nation	 was	 taking	 the	 other	seriously.	 Also	 played	 out	 in	 an	 international	 context	 was	 Canada	 and	 Poland’s	
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position	 as	 two	 of	 three	members	 of	 the	 ICSC.	While	 inherently	 important	 to	 the	security	and	stability	of	 Indochina,	Canadian-Polish	 relations	 in	 the	 ICSC	were	not	overly	 significant	 in	 shaping	 their	 bilateral	 relationship.	 Despite	 this,	 certain	situations	 in	 Indochina	 allowed	 for	 open	 candid	 discussions	 between	 the	 two	nations,	and,	at	times,	a	clear	sense	of	solidarity	between	the	two	governments	was	present,	even	if	not	for	entirely	altruistic	reasons.		
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Chapter	6		
The	Nexus	of	Middlepowerism:	Canadian-Polish	Economic	&	Cultural	
	 Diplomacy	
		 Canadian	officials	strove	to	cultivate	closer	relations	in	hopes	of	influencing	Poland	not	only	through	diplomatic	channels	but	also	through	cultural	and	scientific	exchanges.	 Exchanges	 with	 Poland	 were	 not	 as	 prevalent	 as	 with	 Yugoslavia,	 for	three	key	reasons:	political	relations	were	strained	by	the	lack	of	progress	made	on	the	return	of	the	art	treasures	until	1959,	Canada	did	not	have	embassy	status	until	April	 1960,	 and	 Polish	 officials	 were	 much	 less	 interested	 in	 nurturing	 cultural	cooperation	with	Western	countries	prior	to	the	Polish	October	in	1956.	By	the	time	the	Progressive	Conservative	government	came	to	office	in	mid-1957,	few	seeds	had	been	sown	to	advance	this	kind	of	relationship	building,	despite	the	existence	of	a	clear	 policy	 direction.	 The	 early	 1960s,	 however,	 witnessed	 a	 slow,	 but	 steady,	increase	in	cultural	cooperation	and	exchanges	between	Canada	and	Poland,	which	helped	bridge	the	Cold	War	divide	and	nurture	closer	relations	generally.		
	 Canadian-Polish	 commercial	 relations	 progressed	 steadily,	 relatively	speaking,	 and	 opened	 other	 important	 avenues	 for	 influencing	 developments	 in	Eastern	Europe.	The	sale	of	wheat	to	Poland	and	Canadian	participation	in	Poland’s	annual	 Poznań	 trade	 fair	 created	 opportunities	 to	 penetrate	 the	 Polish	 market,	engendered	 political	 goodwill,	 and	 became	 a	 consistent	 component	 of	 Canadian	economic	 statecraft	 in	 the	 region.	 Canada’s	 relations	with	 Poland	were	 politically	motivated,	and	the	debate	surrounding	Poland’s	accession	to	GATT	was	no	different.	Ottawa’s	 support	 for	Polish	accession	 into	GATT	was	 tied	closely	 to	 its	 role	 in	 the	
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Cold	War	and	East-West	relations,	and	reflects	its	broader	policy	of	engagement	as	a	means	 to	 attenuate	 connections	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Moreover,	 this	 episode	highlights	 Canadian	 officials’	 preference	 to	 use	 multilateral	 organizations	 as	 a	means	to	achieve	their	foreign	policy	objectives	in	Eastern	Europe.	
	 FIRST	POINTS	OF	CULTURAL	CONTACT			 In	early	1960,	Poland	created	the	new	Department	of	Cultural	and	Scientific	Cooperation	within	 the	 Foreign	Ministry.	 Poland’s	 former	 ambassador	 to	 the	 UN,	Mieczyslaw	Birecki,	headed	the	new	department.	Its	purpose	was	“to	coordinate	the	many	existing	programmes	of	international	cultural	and	scientific	cooperation	being	carried	on	by	Polish	institutions,	with	a	view	to	encouraging	and	augmenting	these	where	 they	were	most	 urgently	 needed.”1	While	 the	 department	was	 not	 directly	responsible	for	the	administration	of	the	programmes,	it	served	as	the	first	point	of	contact	 for	 the	 reception	of	 inquiries	 from	beyond	Poland.	During	 a	 conversation,	Birecki	 informed	Chargé	d’Affaires	 in	Poland,	G.	Hamilton	Southam	that	 the	Polish	government	 had	 not	 been	 entirely	 satisfied	 at	 the	 rate	 with	 which	 international	exchanges	 and	 fellowship	 programmes	 had	 been	 developed	 in	 Poland	 and	expressed	his	hope	that	such	programmes	would	be	facilitated	by	the	creation	of	his	department.	According	to	Southam,	Birecki	“seemed	most	interested	in	augmenting	all	forms	of	cultural	exchange	between	our	two	countries.”2	
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Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“New	Department	of	Cultural	and	Scientific	Cooperation	in	Foreign	Ministry:	Talk	with	Mr.	Birecki,”	January	12,	1960.	2	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	10496-40	part	1.2,	Numbered	Letter	The	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“New	Department	of	Cultural	and	Scientific	Cooperation	in	Foreign	Ministry:	Talk	with	Mr.	Birecki,”	January	12,	1960.	
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	 Some	of	 the	 first	points	of	contact	between	Poland	and	Canada	were	 in	 the	realm	of	academic	exchanges.	Polish	authorities	were	eager	to	engender	closer	ties	that	 would	 help	 advance	 areas	 of	 research	 and	 development,	 fields	 in	 which	 the	Poles	appeared	to	be	lacking.	Fellowships	in	the	arts,	humanities,	and	social	sciences	were	awarded	to	Polish	students,	but	progress	was	slow	at	first.	In	1958,	only	one	fellowship	was	awarded	 to	a	Polish	student,	with	 just	 two	more	 in	1959.	 In	1960,	five	 Polish	 candidates	 were	 submitted	 to	 the	 Canada	 Council	 for	 Non-Resident	Fellowships.	The	Canadian	National	Research	Council	also	offered	fellowships	in	the	field	of	natural	sciences,	but	these	were	rare	in	the	early	1960s.3	By	1962,	however,	there	 were	 signs	 of	 progress	 as	 the	 Polish	 Academy	 of	 Science	 forwarded	 to	 the	National	Research	Council	fourteen	applications	for	fellowships	under	the	informal	exchange	program.	Of	 special	 interest	 to	 Polish	 officials,	 and	Birecki	 in	 particular,	were	 courses	 available	 for	 foreign	 students	 at	 the	 Nuclear	 Reactor	 School,	 which	was	established	by	Atomic	Energy	of	Canada	Limited	at	Chalk	River.4	
	 In	 1960,	 the	 Canadian	 Legation	 had	 also	 arranged	 with	 the	 Ministry	 of	Culture	 an	 exhibition	 in	 Poland	 of	 the	 sculptures	 of	 Canadian	 ‘Eskimos’	 that	 had	
																																																								3	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40	part	1,	Aide	Memoir	Chargé	d’Affaires,	Warsaw,	Poland	to	
Director,	Department	of	Cultural	and	Scientific	Cooperation,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	March	22,	1960.	4	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	10496-40	part	1.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Embassy,	Warsaw	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Information	Report	for	the	Quarter	October-December,	1962,”	January	24,	1963.	Academic	dialogue	grew	between	Canada	and	Poland.	In	1967,	scholars	and	politicians	from	each	country	met	for	the	first	of	four	round	table	conferences	to	discuss	issues	of	mutual	interest.	Subsequent	conferences	were	held	in	1969,	1972,	and	1974.	Topics	covered	ranged	from	international	relations	in	general	to	questions	primarily	of	bilateral	interest	between	the	two	countries.	The	Canadian	Institute	of	International	Affairs	(CIIA)	and	the	Polish	Institute	of	International	Affairs	(PIIA)	cosponsored	each	conference.	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	
Eagle,	180-181.	
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toured	Yugoslavia	in	early	1959.5	Several	Polish	groups	were	also	warmly	welcomed	in	Canada.	For	instance,	the	Warsaw	Philharmonic	Orchestra	toured	some	Canadian	cities	in	1961,	and	the	Poznan	Boys	Choir,	the	Krakow	Philharmonic	Orchestra,	and	the	Mazowsze	folk	dance	troupe,	toured	in	1963.6		
	 Informing	 the	Polish	population	 about	Canada	–	 its	 geography,	 people,	 and	cultural	life	–	was	one	way	the	government	utilized	cultural	diplomacy	to	familiarize	Poles	 with	 as	 many	 aspects	 of	 Canadian	 living	 as	 possible.	 The	 overall	 objective,	while	 general	 and	modest,	was	 to	minimize	 negative	 sentiment	 about	 democracy,	capitalism,	 and	 the	West.	 In	 late	 1962,	 a	month-long	 exhibition	 took	 place	 at	 the	Szczecin	 Castle.	 It	 featured	 photographs	 taken	 in	 Canada	 by	 Polish	 photographer	Witold	Chrominski.	The	exhibition	of	Canadian	photographs	generated	considerable	interest.	 For	 example,	 an	 official	 of	 the	 Polish	 Association	 of	 Photographers	approached	the	Canadian	embassy	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	a	major	exchange	of	exhibitions,	 to	 take	 place	 sometime	 in	 1964.	 It	 was	 hoped	 that	 a	 well-known	Canadian	 photographer	 would	 come	 to	 Warsaw.	 In	 return,	 a	 high-profile	 Polish	photographer	 would	 present	 their	 photographs	 in	 Montreal.	 Southam	 expressed	genuine	 interest	 in	 the	 proposed	 project,	 and	 the	 Polish	 Ministry	 of	 Culture	 also	accepted	the	project	in	principle.7	
																																																								5	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40	part	1,	Aide	Memoir	Chargé	d’Affaires,	Warsaw,	Poland	to	
Director,	Department	of	Cultural	and	Scientific	Cooperation,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	March	22,	1960.	6	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	182.	Balawyder	explains	that	few	individual	Canadian	artists	performed	in	Poland	prior	to	1970.	The	number	of	performers,	however,	increased	markedly	in	the	1970s.	For	instance,	in	1973	the	Stratford	Festival	Theatre	performed	in	several	Polish	cities.	182.	7	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	10496-40	part	1.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Embassy,	Warsaw	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Information	Report	for	the	Quarter	October-December,	
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	 Southam’s	 interest	 in	the	exchange	of	photograph	exhibitions	highlights	the	government’s	policy	of	bringing	the	two	countries	closer	together	through	cultural	interactions.	Film	showings	also	became	a	regular	staple	of	the	Canadian	embassy’s	cultural	diplomacy	agenda,	and	were	considered	by	Southam	to	be	“one	of	the	most	important	of	 their	 informational	activities”	 in	Poland.	 In	a	1963	report	 to	External	Affairs,	 Southam	 lamented	 that	attendance	at	 their	 film	showings	 from	October	 to	December	was	 less	 than	 20,000,	 “which	 is	 about	 half	 the	 figures	 for	 the	 first	 two	quarters	of	[1962].”	The	reason	for	the	decline	in	viewers,	he	explained,	“lies	in	the	fact	that	we	have	had	on	many	occasions	to	refuse	requests	from	borrowers	for	lack	of	 new	 titles.”	 Poles	 became	 increasingly	 interested	 in	 Canadian	 films.	 In	 1962,	Canadian	titles	had	been	shown	to	more	than	100,000	Poles,	but	 the	embassy	had	only	received	seven	new	titles.	Southam	stressed,	“This	[…]	is	clearly	insufficient	to	cope	with	 the	 ever	 increasing	 demand	 for	 our	 films.”	 He	 requested	 that	 the	 DEA	(again)	ask	the	Canadian	Film	Board	to	send	more	new	films	on	subjects	as	the	Arts,	wildlife,	 sports,	 recreation,	 geography,	 and	 science. 8 	The	 importance	 that	 the	Canadian	 embassy	 attached	 to	 Canadian	 film	 is	 a	 fine	 example	 of	 how	 officials	perceived	 it	was	possible	 to	 indirectly	 influence	Polish	perceptions	of	Canada,	and																																																																																																																																																																						1962,”	January	24,	1963.	As	early	as	1961,	some	officials	in	the	Information	Division	appeared	to	want	their	division	to	be	more	proactive	in	projecting	Canada’s	cultural	image	through	exhibitions.	For	instance,	one	internal	memorandum	stated,	“What	worries	me	is	that	the	initiative	behind	[existing	Canadian	exhibitions	abroad]	lies	elsewhere,	and	we	seem	to	be	fully	occupied	in	cooperating	in	response	to	outside	initiatives	that	we	do	not	get	around	to	taking	initiatives	ourselves	[…].	When	I	talk	about	‘outside’	initiatives,	I	mean	outside	the	Information	Division	in	Ottawa;	the	exhibition	in	Poland	will	be	the	result	of	initiatives	taken	by	Hamilton	Southam	and	Donald	Buchanan,	of	which	I	fully	approve;	but	the	fact	remains	that	neither	the	Embassy	in	Warsaw	nor	the	National	Gallery	has	the	same	responsibility	as	we	have	in	the	Information	Division	for	development	of	cultural	relations	on	a	global	basis.”	LAC,	MG31	E31,	Marcel	Cadieux	Papers,	Vol.	35,	File	n/a,	Memorandum	N.F.M	Berlie	to	Mr.	Small,	“Policy	for	Cultural	Exhibitions,”	30	May	1961.	8	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7788,	File	10496-40	part	1.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Embassy,	Warsaw	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Information	Report	for	the	Quarter	October-December,	1962,”	January	24,	1963.	
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the	West	in	general.	While	subtle,	it	was	believed	that	such	exchanges	and	points	of	contact	 could	 help	 bridge	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 East	 and	 West,	 which,	 for	ideological	and	propaganda	purposes,	had	traditionally	been	portrayed	as	regions	of	unambiguous	contrast.	
	 THE	CBC-INTERNATIONAL	SERVICE,	POLISH	DIVISION		 Another	 important	 element	 to	 the	 Canadian	 mission’s	 informational	activities	 was	 the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 Canadian	 Broadcasting	 Corporation-International	Service	(CBC-IS)	Polish	division.	Similar	to	the	 lack	of	scholarship	on	Canadian-Polish	 relations	 generally,	 little	 has	 been	written	 on	 the	 CBC-IS;	 in	 fact,	there	 is	 no	 published,	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 the	 CBC-IS	 in	 Eastern	 Europe.	Bernard	Hibbitts’s	unpublished	master’s	thesis,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	in	the	Cold	War,	1948-1963,”	is	an	 informative	 work	 and	 provides	 a	 good	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 role	played	 by	 the	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	 in	 Canada’s	 policy	 objectives	 in	 Poland.	9		Similar	 to	 diplomatic	 and	 commercial	 contacts,	 the	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	 was	politically	motivated.	One	significant	difference,	when	compared	to	previous	years,	was	apparent	by	 the	 time	Prime	Minister	 John	Diefenbaker’s	government	 came	 to	power:	 radio	 commentary	 and	 political	 motivations	 were	 much	 more	 innocuous	than	had	been	the	case	prior	to	1956.	
	 CBC-IS	broadcasts	before	1956	generally	tended	to	reinforce	traditional	Cold	War	divisions	and	highlighted	the	ideological	global	battles	that	raged	between	East																																																									9	Bernard	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	in	the	Cold	War,	1948-1963”	(Unpublished	M.A.	Thesis,	Carleton	University,	1981).	
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and	West.	 By	 1956,	 however,	 events	 were	 aligning	 that	 encouraged	 depoliticized	programs,	 most	 notably	 the	 Twentieth	 Party	 Congress	 and	 Khrushchev’s	denunciation	 of	 Stalin’s	 cult	 of	 personality.10	This	 direction	 dovetailed	 with	 the	DEA’s	 growing	 awareness	 of	 the	 increasing	 heterogeneity	 of	 various	 Eastern	 bloc	states,	 and	 its	 policy	 of	 encouraging	 and	 promoting	 their	 autonomy.	 The	increasingly	depoliticized	agenda	of	 the	CBC-IS	complemented	 the	DEA’s	objective	of	 luring	various	Eastern	bloc	nations	 into	 the	Western	orbit	 by	building	 contacts	and	making	 connections	with	Eastern	European	communities.	 In	 terms	of	 agenda,	the	CBC-IS’s	role	in	cultural	diplomacy	was	the	distribution	of	information.11	
	 Canadian	 officials	 understood	 that	 the	 Cold	 War	 increasingly	 could	 be	influenced	 not	 just	 by	 the	 superpowers,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 various	 secondary	 and	middle	powers.	Thus,	officials	believed	Canada	should	promote	friendlier	relations,	not	confrontation.	As	for	the	CBC-IS,	diplomat	Robert	Ford	maintained	that	
	our	 immediate	problem	 is	 to	 alter	 the	 ‘tone’	 of	 our	broadcasts	 to	 this	end.	 We	 need	 a	 directive	 which	 will	 call	 for	 a	 wholly	 different	atmosphere.	[…]	It	is	in	the	sustained	failure	to	observe	[the	principles	of	 absolute	 objectivity	 in	 the	 presentation	 of	 news]	 that	 the	 CBC	 has	permitted	a	tone	which	differs	mournfully	from	the	sobriety	and	dignity	of	Canadian	public	expression	as	a	whole.12	It	 was	within	 this	 context	 that	 the	 DEA	 decided	 to	 formulate	 a	 new	 directive	 for	CBC-IS	 transmissions	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 its	 satellites.	 The	 directive	 did	 not	overlook	 political	 struggle	 and	 still	 regarded	 IS	 activity	 as	 part	 of	 a	 “coordinated																																																									10	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	155.		11	Andrew	Fenton	Cooper,	“Canadian	Cultural	Diplomacy:	An	Introduction,”	in	Canadian	Culture:	
International	Dimensions,	ed.	Andrew	Fenton	Cooper	(Waterloo:	Centre	on	Foreign	Policy	and	Federalism,	1985),	4.	12	R.A.D.	Ford,	“Political	Co-ordination,”	August	28,	1956,	as	quoted	in,	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	156.	
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political	offensive	of	the	Western	world,”	but	aggressive	rhetoric	and	the	philosophy	of	 aggressive	 Cold	 War	 language	 was	 gone. 13 	The	 1956	 directive	 declared,	“broadcasts	 should	 be	 restrained	 and	 moderate	 in	 approach,	 clear	 and	 vivid	 in	language	and	style,	and	should	show	respects	for	the	foreign	listener’s	intelligence,	common	 sense,	 and	 national	 feelings.”14	The	 considerations	 guiding	 this	 direction	were	 twofold.	 First,	moderation	was	 deemed	 “more	 likely	 to	 attract	 the	 listeners’	attention	and	therefore	more	likely	to	be	effective	propaganda.”	Second,	moderation	would	make	it	easier	to	suggest	to	Soviet	authorities	that	“if	they	are	serious	in	their	desire	 to	 promote	 good	 relations	 with	 Canada	 they	 should	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	jamming	of	our	short-wave	broadcasts.”15	Jamming	was	a	serious	problem	in	many	countries	behind	 the	 Iron	Curtain.	Under	 the	new	Gomulka	government,	however,	jamming	Western	 broadcasts	 had	 stopped	 as	 early	 as	 November	 1956.	16	In	 early	January	 1960,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 stopped	 jamming	 all	 BBC	 transmissions,	 but	 then	resumed	the	interruptions	following	the	U2	incident	in	May	1960.17		
	 In	August	1960,	a	joint	DEA-IS	report	was	submitted	to	the	Treasury	Board,	with	 five	 major	 recommendations.	 Most	 relevant	 here	 was	 the	 report’s	recommendation	to	maintain	all	East	European	transmissions,	even	though	they	had	been	considered	for	termination.	Significantly,	this	was	recommended	at	the	drastic																																																									13	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	157.	14	“CBC-IS	Operations,”	September	24,	1956,	as	quoted	in,	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	157.	15	“CBC-IS	Operations,”	September	24,	1956,	as	quoted	in,	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	157	–	158.	16	See	note	72	in	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	189.	17	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	176.	
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cost	of	 eliminating	 the	 Italian,	Dutch,	Norwegian,	 Swedish,	 and	Danish	divisions.18	The	decision	to	keep	all	East	European	transmissions	highlights	the	 importance	of	Eastern	Europe	to	Canadian	foreign	policy	initiatives,	not	to	mention,	the	belief	that	the	transmissions	were	generating	at	least	some	positive	benefits.	
	 By	the	time	of	the	Diefenbaker	government,	the	general	policy	of	the	CBC-IS	Polish	 division	 (as	 it	 was	 for	 the	 IS	 generally)	 was	 to	 increase	 knowledge	 and	understanding	 of	 Canada	 in	 all	 its	 aspects. 19 	The	 Legation	 in	 Warsaw,	 too,	understood	the	 importance	of	a	moderate	tone	for	the	broadcasts,	especially	since	the	Gomulka	period	“has	seen	a	substantial	modification	made	to	previous	policy	of	attempting	 to	 isolate	 Poland	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world.”	 The	 Legation	 concurred	that	 transmissions	 should	 “be	 a	 complementary	 facet	 to	 our	 general	 information	work	 abroad,	 that	 they	 should	 assist	 in	 projecting	 an	 image	 of	 Canada	 and	 the	Canadian	way	of	life,	[and]	that	they	should	not	be	regarded	or	used	as	a	specialized	weapon	of	 psychological	warfare.”20	The	ways	 in	which	 the	CBC-IS	Polish	division	portrayed	the	“Canadian	way	of	life”	were	numerous.	
	 Some	 material	 was	 transmitted	 directly	 from	 the	 IS	 Polish	 division	 in	Montreal,	 while	 other	 material	 was	 sent	 directly	 by	 the	 CBC-IS	 to	 Polski	 Radio	 i	Telewizja	 (Polish	 Radio	 and	 Television),	 the	 national	 institution	 that	managed	 all																																																									18	Hibbitts,	“The	CBC	International	Service	as	a	Psychological	Instrument	of	Canadian	Foreign	Policy,”	178.	The	other	recommendations	included	the	elimination	of	all	Western	European	sections	except	for	English,	French,	and	German;	the	reduction	of	the	Latin	American	service;	the	inauguration	of	an	English	and	French	beam	to	Africa;	and	the	expansion	of	the	shortwave	service	to	northern	Canada.	19	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	Memorandum	Information	Division	to	Political	
Coordination	Section,	“CBC-IS	Contact	with	Radio	Warsaw,”	May	23,	1958.	20	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	Numbered	Letter	The	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	
Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“CBC-IS	Broadcasts	to	Eastern	Europe,”	February	17,	1959.	
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Polish	radio	and	television	stations.	It	was	not	until	late	1958,	however,	that	direct	contact	 was	 made	 between	 the	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	 and	 Polish	 radio	 agencies.	Prior	to	1958,	transcriptions	were	sent	by	the	CBC-IS	to	various	nations	through	the	DEA’s	Political	Coordination	Section.	In	mid-1958,	the	Political	Coordination	Section	inquired	with	Information	Division	about	sending	the	senior	announcer-producer	of	the	Polish	section,	Mr.	P.	Sytpniewski,	to	Poland.	During	his	visit,	it	was	hoped	that	he	 would	 have	 unofficial	 and	 informal	 discussions	 with	 Radio	 Warsaw.21 	The	Information	Division	responded	by	asserting	that		
	in	 the	 case	 of	 Poland	we	may	 now	be	 in	 a	 position	 to	make	 progress	towards	achieving	something	approaching	normal	information	activity.	[…]	The	low	level	of	activity	is	partially	our	responsibility	in	that	we	do	not	have	enough	suitable	information	material	for	Poland.	This	is	slowly	being	remedied	by	the	production	of	Polish	language	films	and	a	 large	exhibit	in	Poznan.	It	was	argued	 that	direct	 contact	between	 the	CBC-IS	and	Poland	would	be	highly	satisfactory.	 In	 other	 countries	where	 this	was	 the	 case,	 the	 Information	Division	reported	seeing	notable	results	as	it	puts	“experts	in	touch	with	experts	without	the	bureaucratic	 filter.”	 The	 memo	 concluded,	 “in	 view	 of	 the	 easing	 information	situation	 in	 Poland,	 our	 desire	 to	 increase	 Canadian	 information	 there,	 but	 our	limited	means	of	accomplishing	this,	we	are	of	the	opinion	that	advantage	should	be	taken	of	Mr.	 Sypniewski’s	 visit	 to	Poland	 to	 initiate	 informal	 and	unofficial	 liaison	with	Radio	Warsaw.”22	
																																																								21	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Memorandum	Political	Coordination	Section	to	
European	Division,	Information	Division,	“CBC-IS	Contacts	with	Radio	Warsaw,”	May	21,	1958.	22	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Memorandum	Information	Division	to	Political	
Coordination	Section,	“CBC-IS	Contacts	with	Radio	Warsaw,”	May	23,	1958.	
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	 Sypniewski’s	informal	discussions	with	Radio	Warsaw	led	to	Poland’s	official	request	 that	Polish	 radio	organizations	establish	direct	 contact	with	CBC-IS	Polish	division.	 It	 was	 hoped	 Canada	 would	 supply	 Canadian	 music	 transcriptions	 and	other	requests	of	a	similar	nature.	Under-Secretary	Watkins	was	pleased	with	these	developments	and	expressed	his	satisfaction	to	the	director	of	CBC-IS,	C.R.	Delafield,	directly:	
	The	 International	 Service	 is	 to	 be	 warmly	 congratulated	 on	 this	commendable	 initiative	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 projection	 of	 Canada	 in	Eastern	Europe.	Indeed,	the	extension	of	this	kind	of	cultural	contact	is	highly	desirable,	and	we	wish	not	only	to	agree	to	the	means	of	contact	discussed	 above,	 but	 also	 to	 provide	 all	 possible	 assistance	 and	encouragement	in	this	regard.23	The	tape	recordings	were	passed	from	Delafield	directly	to	Eliza	Przastkowa,	Head	of	 International	 Relations	 of	 Polski	 Radio	 i	 Telewizja.	 As	 for	music	 transcriptions,	CBC-IS	 sent	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 selections	 to	 Poland,	 including	 vocal	 pieces	 by	Jacqueline	Francois	and	Dora	Kalincwna,24	recitals	of	the	week,	performances	by	the	Boys’	and	Men’s	Choir	of	the	Philharmonic	Society	of	Poznan,25	and	Choral	Music	of	the	Polish	Renaissance	and	Jazz	Jamboree.26	
	 A	 variety	 of	 other	 material	 was	 sent	 to	 Radio	 Warsaw,	 including	 general	news	pertinent	to	Canada	and	Poland,	commentary	on	films	and	film	festivals,	book	reviews,	 and	 sports	 news.	 For	 instance,	 a	 short	 news	 piece	was	 dedicated	 to	 the																																																									23	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	Letter	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	
Watkins	to	C.R.	Delafield,	Director,	CBC-International	Service,	October	31,	1958.	24	LAC,	RG25	Vol.	7788,	File	12496-40	part	1,	Transmission	from	CBC-	IS	Polish	Division,	Montreal,	March	31,	1958.	25	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Embassy,	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Information	Report	for	the	Quarter	October-December,	1962,”	January	24,	1963.	26	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Eliza	
Przastkowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	January	16,	1963.	
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Polish	 ship	 “BATORY”,	 which	 made	 its	 fiftieth	 trip	 to	 Canada.	 During	 a	 five-year	period	(1957-1962),	it	brought	with	it	roughly	fifty	thousand	passengers.	Members	from	 the	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	 interviewed	 the	 skipper	 and	 other	 passengers	aboard.27	Inherent	in	the	news	piece	was	the	obvious	cooperation	between	the	two	nations.	
	 Hockey	 was	 also	 a	 frequently	 covered	 topic.	 In	 1962,	 Delafield	 sent	 a	program	that	presented	“a	true	picture	of	what	is	hockey	in	Canada	today.”	Delafield	also	 took	 it	upon	himself	 to	 remind	Przastkowa	 that	 the	Canadian	 “hockey	season	opens	 here	 about	 the	 tenth	 of	 October.”28	The	 embassy	 in	 Warsaw	 encouraged	Ottawa	to	continue	to	send	material	on	hockey.	The	embassy	reported	that	one	item	of	 particular	 interest	 to	 Poles	 is	 “Canadian	 participation	 in	 the	 World	 Hockey	Championships	 [coming	 up	 in]	 Stockholm	 […]	 which	 has	 evoked	 a	 lively	 interest	here.”29	As	a	result,	Delafield	sent	commentary	on	the	hockey	team	called	the	Trail	“Smoke	Easters”	 (from	Trail,	British	Columbia),	who	were	 representing	Canada	 in	the	 upcoming	World	 Amateur	 Hockey	 Championship.	 “We	 think	 that	 it	 will	 be	 of	interest	 to	Polish	 listeners	as	Poland	 is	one	of	 the	participants	of	 that	 tournament	which	will	 take	place	 in	March,”30	commented	Delafield.	 The	CBC-IS	 also	 began	 to	keep	Polish	listeners	updated	with	a	once-a-month	report	from	the	National	Hockey	
																																																								27	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Eliza	
Przastkowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	October	15,	1962.	28	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Eliza	
Przastkowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	September	28,	1962.	29	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Embassy,	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Information	Report	for	the	Quarter	October-December,	1962,”	January	24,	1963.	30	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Eliza	
Przastkowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	February	5,	1963.	
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League.31	Commentary	on	other	sports,	like	the	International	Automobile	Grand	Prix	of	Canada,32	and	those	less	conventional,	like	the	Canadian	Soaring	Championships,	were	 also	 sent	 to	 Poland.	 This	 event	 seemed	 pertinent	 since	 the	 only	 Pole	 to	participate,	Adam	Witek,	placed	second,	flying	a	glider	of	Polish	construction.33	This	type	of	 information,	 it	was	hoped,	would	have	modestly	 contributed	 to	projecting	the	 image	of	Canada	 in	Communist	Eastern	Europe,	an	 initiative	supported	by	 the	DEA.	
	 The	 CBC-IS	 also	 tried	 to	 keep	 Poles	 informed	 on	 the	 exchange	 of	 visits	between	the	Polish	Academy	of	Science	and	Canada’s	National	Research	Council.	In	1962,	 a	 three-man	delegation	of	Canadian	 scientists	 arrived	 in	Warsaw	 for	a	 two-week	 tour	 of	 Polish	 universities	 and	 research	 centres.	 Just	 months	 earlier,	 a	delegation	 of	 Polish	 scientists	 had	 similarly	 visited	 Canada.	 The	 transcription	contained	a	discussion	on	the	National	Research	Council,	as	well	as	interviews	with	scientists	from	both	delegations.34	
		 Most	 of	 the	 material	 CBC-IS	 sent	 to	 Poland	 had	 some	 kind	 of	 Polish	association.	 As	 a	 result,	 an	 image	 of	 Canada	was	modestly	 projected	 onto	 Poland.	The	 cultural	 realm	 was	 an	 ideal	 crossroads	 where	 ideological	 barriers	 could	 be	breached,	or	simply	omitted	from	the	commentary	altogether.	The	material	sent	by	
																																																								31	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Janina	
Kowalikowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	October	3,	1963.	32	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Janina	
Kowalikowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	October	3,	1963.	33	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Janina	
Kowalikowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	July	26,	1963.	34	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	C.R.	Delafield,	Director	of	International	Services	to	Eliza	
Przastkowa,	Head	of	International	Relations,	Polski	Radio	i	Telewizja,	September	20,	1962.	
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the	CBC-IS	often	complemented	various	cultural	exchanges	taking	place	between	the	two	countries,	which	in	turn	reinforced	the	importance	of	such	exchanges.		
	 POLISH	LETTERS	TO	THE	CBC-IS		 “This	 is	 Canada	 calling”	 were	 the	 words	 uttered	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 each	broadcast	 from	 Montreal	 to	 Poland.	 Yet,	 the	 Polish	 division	 was	 not	 simply	 an	isolated,	one-way	broadcasting	entity	sending	transmissions	across	the	Atlantic.	 In	fact,	 it	 received	 a	 number	 of	 letters	 from	 Polish	 listeners.	 These	 letters	 allow	 the	history	of	Canadian-Polish	relations	to	be	viewed	through	the	window	of	the	CBC-IS	Polish	 division.	 The	 letters	 not	 only	 attest	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Poles	 were	 actually	listening,	 but	 they	 also	 suggest	 that	 Canadian	 broadcasting	 served	 a	 broader,	positive	political	purpose.	Additionally,	examining	the	 letters	sent	by	Poles	gives	a	human	 face	 to	 an	 otherwise	 impersonal	 government	 policy.	 In	 1959,	 the	 Polish	Section	 surveyed	 108	 letters	 they	 received	 from	 listeners;	 99	 came	 directly	 from	Poland.	
	 Many	of	the	letters	asked	the	CBC-IS	Polish	division	for	help	finding	relatives	or	some	other	type	of	assistance.	For	instance,	one	listener	requested	that	the	Polish	division	 send	 birthday	 wishes	 to	 a	 brother	 living	 in	 Canada.	 The	 broadcast	 was	heard	when	the	listener	from	Warsaw	reported:	“Many	sincere	thanks	for	your	kind	help.	 I	 have	 learned	 that	my	 brother	 has	 heard	 over	 the	 radio	 both	 the	 birthday	greetings	and	the	music	played	especially	for	him.”	Others	requested	help	learning	English.	A	listener	from	Zarnow	inquired,	“encouraged	by	your	broadcasts,	I	would	like	 to	 ask	 […	 if	 someone	 could]	 send	 me	 regularly	 a	 Canadian	 English-language	weekly	 or	 monthly.	 I	 would	 very	 much	 appreciate	 a	 geographical	 magazine.”	 A	
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request	 for	 English	 textbooks	 came	 from	 a	 listener	 in	 Gryfice	 who	 lamented,	“English	books	are	difficult	 to	obtain	 in	Poland	 […]	contrary	 to	Russian	 textbooks,	which	are	plentiful	on	the	market,	piled	up	high	in	the	book	store,	because	nobody	wants	to	buy	them.”	
	 Other	letters	requested	suitable	pen	pals.	The	survey	indicated,	“there	are	a	growing	 number	 of	 listeners	 who	 wish	 to	 correspond	 with	 Canadians	 of	 Polish	origin	and	others.	The	majority	of	them	are	young	people	and	they	often	send	their	letters	in	English.”	A	young	collage	woman	from	Skrzyszow	stated,	“I	would	like	to	correspond	with	 a	 girl	 aged	 15	 or	 16.	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 painting,	 folk	 songs	 and	dance,	also	literatures.	I	also	collect	picture	postcards.”	A	young	girl	from	Bydgoszcz	appealed	to	the	Polish	section	to	connect	her	with	Canadians	of	similar	age:	“I	would	like	to	make	friends,	through	letters,	with	girls	and	boys	in	grade	6	and	7.	 I	would	appreciate	 it	 if	 you	would	 refer	my	 letter	 to	 a	 scout	 organization	 and	 tell	 them	 I	would	like	them	to	write	to	me	in	Poland.”	
	 Other	 letters	 simply	 expressed	 their	 general	 gratitude	 for	 the	 broadcasts.	One	 listener	 from	Bedzin	stated,	 “Thank	you	 in	 the	name	of	all	Poles	 for	your	 fine	broadcasts,	 for	 your	 friendliness	 and	 your	 willingness	 to	 help.”	 Another	 listener	from	Cracow	expressed	her	satisfaction:	“Since	April	I	have	been	listening	regularly	to	Radio	Canada	Polish	language	broadcasts	and	find	them	most	interesting.	I	know	Canada	only	from	my	school	lessons.	Nevertheless,	books	like	Jules	Verne’s	Volcano	
d’Or	 and	Montgomery’s	Anne	of	Green	Gables	 left	 an	 impression,	which	 remain	 to	this	 day.”	 A	 man	 from	 Dabrowka	 said,	 “Your	 constant	 listeners	 from	 Bialystock	province	 sends	 warmest	 greetings	 from	 Poland.	 […]	 Your	 broadcasts	 are	 very	
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popular	with	us	in	Poland.”	A	fourth-year	economic	student	from	Poznan	had	this	to	say	about	the	broadcasts:	
	Quite	 by	 chance,	 I	 came	 across	 the	Canadian	broadcast,	 and	 then	 and	there	 our	 ‘acquaintance’	 developed.	 Many	 of	 my	 friends,	 too,	 are	listening	 to	 your	 voice	 from	 Canada.	 […]	 we	would	 like	 to	 hear	 a	 lot	about	Canada	and	its	life	–	this	is	what	we	like	very	much	and	we	find	a	great	 deal	 of	 it	 in	 the	 interviews,	 which	 are,	 perhaps,	 the	 most	interesting	 feature.	 […]	 Sometime	 […]	 we	 come	 across	 political	commentary	–	your	commentary	–	which	saves	us	reading	the	eternally	monotonous	 Polish	 Press,	 our	 own	 press.	 Tell	 us	 as	much	 as	 you	 can	how	things	are	in	Canada,	for	we	know	perfectly	well	what	is	going	on	here.35	Caution	 must	 be	 exercised	 when	 assessing	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 letters	 from	Polish	 listeners,	 and	 their	 significance	 should	 be	 kept	 within	 context.	 While	 it	 is	certainly	 difficult	 to	 assess	 the	 precise	 impact	 of	 the	 CBC-IS’s	 broadcasts	 on	Canadian-Polish	 relations,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 transcriptions	 and	 broadcasts	complemented	official	Canadian	policy	by	 cultivating	 closer	 ties	on	various	 fronts.	The	1956	directive	to	reduce,	or	eliminate	altogether,	Cold	War-style	rhetoric	within	transmissions	 and	 transcriptions	 and	 fostering	 a	 more	 moderate	 and	 respectful	“tone,”	was	carried	out	under	the	Progressive	Conservative	government.	Indeed,	the	work	carried	out	by	the	CBC-IS	Polish	division	during	the	Diefenbaker	government	helps	to	reinforce	the	notion	that	the	1957-1963	period	was	a	decisive	moment	in	Canada’s	foreign	policy	in	Eastern	Europe.	Moreover,	the	broadcasts	are	meaningful	in	 that	 they	 indicate	 the	 Polish	 division’s	 work	 seemed	 to	 be	 having	 a	 positive	impact	on	at	least	some	of	the	Polish	population.	Significantly,	these	letters	highlight	the	culmination	of	Canada’s	Polish	policy	“on	the	ground”	or	“in	the	trenches,”	so	to																																																									35	LAC,	RG25	G2,	Vol.	2221,	File	9901-BA-40,	“Survey	of	Letters,	Received	by	the	Polish	Section	of	the	CBC	International	Service	from	Listeners	in	Poland”	by	T.	Sypniewski,	Senior	Producer,	November	8,	1960.	
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speak.	 They	 demonstrate	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 one	 facet	 of	 Canada’s	 Polish	 policy,	nurturing	 closer	binational	 ties;	 the	CBC-IS	Polish	division	 certainly	helped	nudge	this	goal	along.	
	 In	 light	 of	 Poland’s	 nascent	policy	 goal	 of	 fostering	 an	 independent	 foreign	policy	 position	 separate	 from	 direct	 Soviet	 oversight,	 Canadian	 officials	 sought	 to	nurture	 such	 aspirations	 by	 expanding	 cooperation	 in	 places	 other	 than	 the	traditional	political-diplomatic	realm.	Expanding	cultural	contacts	was	one	piece	of	Canada’s	 policy	 equation	 that	 helped	 project	 an	 image	 of	 Canada	 in	 Poland,	 thus	exposing	it	to	Canadian	social	and	cultural	modalities.	Canada’s	cultural	diplomacy	with	Poland	during	this	time	was	slow,	but	it	steadily	improved	over	the	course	of	the	 PC	 government’s	 time	 in	 office,	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 less	 ideologically	 charged	atmosphere.	 While	 cultural	 exchanges	 developed	 at	 a	 leisurely	 pace,	 Canadian-Polish	 commercial	 relations	 progressed	 steadily,	 relatively	 speaking,	 and	 Poland	provided	 Canada	 a	 market	 behind	 the	 Iron	 Curtain	 that	 could	 prove	 beneficial,	particularly	to	Canadian	farmers.	
	 CANADIAN	TRADE	FAIRS	IN	POLAND		 Poland’s	 limited	 trade	 with	 Canada	 in	 the	 immediate	 postwar	 period	 was	impeded	by	disagreements	over	the	Canadian	customs	valuation	of	Polish	imports.36	During	the	St.	Laurent	government,	however,	Canada	and	Poland	resolved	the	issue,																																																									36	Historian	Aloysius	Balawyder	states,	“On	the	one	hand,	Poland	claimed	that	Canada,	by	imposing	a	50	percent	customs	charge	on	such	Polish	exports	as	glassware	and	Christmas	tree	ornaments,	was	in	violation	of	the	most-favoured-nations	treatment	accorded	Poland	in	the	commercial	treaty	of	1935.	Canada,	on	the	other	hand,	accused	Poland	of	dumping,	of	offering	its	goods	to	Canadian	buyers	at	prices	far	below	the	world	trade	market	prices.	Since	the	Polish	government	continued	to	refuse	to	permit	Canadian	officials	to	ascertain	the	value	of	Polish	goods,	Canada	maintained	that	its	policy	of	imposing	a	custom	charge	was	legal.”	Aloysius	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	
Eagle:	Canadian-Polish	Relations,	1918-1978	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1980),	93.	
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when	Canadian	officials	 recognized	 that	 “the	Gomulka	government	was	 in	difficult	times”	 and	 that	 it	 “was	 trying	 to	maintain	 some	degree	of	 independence	 from	 the	USSR	 and	 anything	 Canada	 could	 do	 to	 help	 would	 be	 useful.” 37 	Such	accommodationist	tactics	began	under	the	Liberal	government	would	continue	once	the	Progressive	Conservatives	came	to	office.	
		 Given	 the	 importance	 of	 Poland	 as	 an	 avenue	 for	 challenging	 Soviet	hegemony	 in	 Eastern	 Europe,	 Canadian	 officials	 promoted	 participation	 in	 the	annual	 Poznań	 International	 Trade	 Fair.	 A	 Canadian	 presence	 could	 showcase	Canadian	 goods	 and	 provide	 an	 effective	means	 of	 penetrating	 the	 Polish	market.	The	DEA’s	European	Division	argued	 that	participation	 in	Eastern	European	 trade	fairs	 could	 not	 only	 improve	 trade	 relations,	 but	 also	 foster	 political	 goodwill.38	Beginning	 in	 1957,	 Canadian	 exhibitions	 became	 a	 regular	 staple	 at	 Poznań,	highlighting	 “one	or	 two	of	 [Canada’s]	 leading	export	 industries”	 that	might	prove	enticing	 to	 the	 Poles.	 While	 the	 general	 purpose	 of	 the	 pavilion	 was	 to	 promote	“trade	as	a	vehicle	for	information	about	Canada,”	immediate	commercial	sales	did	occasionally	 occur.	39		 For	 instance,	 during	 the	1959	 fair,	 the	Polish	Foreign	Trade	Enterprise	Varimex	purchased	 the	Gammacell	220	 from	Atomic	Energy	of	Canada.	The	machine,	 used	 for	 checking	 the	 reactions	 of	 various	materials	 to	 the	 effect	 of	
																																																								37	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1892,	Cabinet	Conclusions,	January	17,	1957.	38	LAC,	RG20-A-5,	Vol.	1261,	file	T-8-61,	Letter	European	Division	to	Department	of	Trade	and	
Commerce,	“1961	Trade	Fair	Programme	–	Most	Likely	Territories	for	Canadian	Participation	in	Europe,”	May	4,	1960.	39	LAC,	RG20-A-5,	Vol.	1261,	File	T-8-61,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Poznan	International	Trade	Fair:	Report,”	October	13,	1959.	
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gamma	rays,	had	direct	 application	 in	 the	plastics	producing	 industry.40	While	 the	commercial	deals	reached	at	Poznań	were	not	especially	lucrative,	they	do	suggest	Canada’s	 awareness	 that	 such	 a	 venue	 might	 serve	 as	 a	 conduit	 for	 cultivating	favourable	trade	relations	with	Poland	in	the	future.	
	 Serving	as	Canadian	chargé	d’affaires	during	 the	XXVIII	 International	Trade	Fair	 in	 Poznań	 in	 1959,	 Southam	 conveyed	 Canadian	 interest	 in	 the	 event	 in	 the	Polish	Journal,	Polska	Gazeta	Targowa.	Southam	stated,	
	 Although	the	volume	of	trade	between	Poland	and	Canada	is	not	large	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 total	 volume	 of	 trade	 of	 either	 country,	 the	Canadian	 Government	 fully	 appreciates	 the	 importance	 of	 its	development.	 In	 order	 to	 promote	 trade,	 officials	 of	 the	 Canadian	Legation	 in	 Warsaw	 are	 ready	 at	 any	 time	 to	 put	 Polish	 firms	 and	trading	organizations	 in	 touch	with	Canadian	 firms,	 and	vice	versa,	 in	an	effort	to	find	markets	for	each	country’s	products.			 For	 the	 past	 three	 years,	 the	 Canadian	 Government	 has	participated	in	the	Poznan	International	Trade	Fair	to	encourage	trade	further.	From	a	modest	beginning	in	1957	we	entered	a	larger	exhibit	in	1958	 and	 this	 year’s	 exhibit	 of	 Canadian	 industrial	 products	 is	 much	more	 comprehensive	 and	 displays	 a	 cross-section	 of	 products	 from	 a	number	of	important	Canadian	industries.41	It	is	true,	outside	the	realm	of	wheat	and	barley,	commercial	sales	between	the	two	nations	were	modest	 at	 best.	 Even	 the	 sale	 of	 Canadian	wheat	 to	 Poland	was	 not	especially	striking	when	compared	to	sales	elsewhere.	But	the	significance	lies	less	in	 the	quantity	of	wheat	 sold	 and	more	 in	 the	political	 implications	of	 such	deals.	Canadian	participation	in	the	Poznań	Trade	Fairs	supported	a	key	policy	objective:																																																									40	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	1261,	File	T-8-61,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation	Warsaw	to	Under-Secretary	
of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Varimex	purchased	from	Canada	the	Gammacell	220,”	Polish	Foreign	Trade	News,	October	13,	1959.	Inquiries	for	the	purchase	of	power	chain	saws	from	Vancouver’s	Power	Machinery	Limited	and	C.C.M.	hockey	equipment	were	also	made	by	the	Poles,	but	there	was	no	evidence	to	suggest	deals	occurred.		41	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	1261,	File	T-8-61,	“Canadian	Government	is	Interested	in	Trade	Exchange	with	Poland”,	Polska	Gazeta	Targowa,	15-17	June	1959,	No.	10(53).	
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bringing	 the	 two	 nations	 closer	 together	 on	 various	 fronts.	 The	 DEA’s	 European	Division	explicitly	explained	the	importance	of	Canada’s	participation	at	trade	fairs	in	Eastern	European	countries.	They	were,	 in	 the	view	of	 the	Division,	 “one	of	 the	only	means	our	missions	there	have	of	doing	public	relations	work	for	Canada.	Our	participation	 at	 [the	 fairs]	 is	 therefore	 of	 great	 interest	 to	 us	 provided	 our	informational	activities	are	not	hamstrung.”42	This	acknowledgment	 reinforces	 the	notion	that	Canadian	participation	in	trade	fairs	was	more	political	than	commercial	in	nature	and	that	officials	deliberately	pursued	various	avenues	to	cultivate	closer	relations	with	Poland.			
	 CANADIAN-POLISH	TRADE	RELATIONS			 In	his	 inaugural	 address	on	October	20,	1956	 to	 the	Plenary	Session	of	 the	Sejm, 43 	Wladyslaw	 Gomulka	 criticized	 the	 five-year	 plan	 (1956-1961),	 which	prioritized	industrialization	and	the	development	of	heavy	industry.	He	recognized	there	was	a	great	gap	 in	production	between	the	state	 farms	and	the	co-operative	and	 private	 farms.	 While	 making	 clear	 his	 determination	 to	 develop	 home	industries,	 Gomulka	 regretfully	 admitted	 that	 Poland	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 buy	grain.44	Gomulka	had	 reason	 for	 concern.	 From	 the	 early	1950s	until	 1956,	 Polish	agricultural	 productivity	 had	 declined	 at	 an	 alarming	 rate;	 communist	 policies	
																																																								42	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5205,	File	6226-B-40	part	2,	Memorandum	European	Division	to	Under-Secretary	of	
State	for	External	Affairs,	July	30,	1962.	43	The	Polish	Parliament	44	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	95.	
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transformed	 Poland	 from	 an	 important	 food	 exporter	 to	 a	 desperate	 food	importer.45			 This	helps	to	explain	why,	as	early	as	1954,	the	Polish	government	applied	to	Canada	 for	 credit	 purchases	 similar	 to	 those	 arranged	with	 Yugoslavia;	 however,	Poland’s	request	was	initially	refused.	46		At	the	time,	Liberal	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce	C.D.	Howe	justified	the	decision	stating,	“no	monies	have	been	voted	by	Parliament	 for	 the	extension	of	such	credits,”	and	the	Yugoslav	sale	was	 indirectly	explained	away	by	stating	that	“only	under	very	special	circumstances,	and	only	on	very	few	occasions,	had	the	facilities	of	the	Export	Credit	Corporation	been	used	to	facilitate	 the	 extension	 of	 private	 credit	 for	 wheat	 purchases.”47	By	 mid-1955,	however,	Howe	modified	his	resistance	to	credit	sales	to	Poland,	and	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board	sold	it	250,000	tons	of	wheat	on	the	basis	of	fifteen	percent	cash	with	a	balance	payable	within	one	year.48		 In	January	1957,	 just	months	before	the	end	of	the	St.	Laurent	government,	Polish	 officials	 approached	 the	 Canadian	 Legation	 in	Warsaw	 to	 discuss	 Poland’s	balance	owing	on	a	 contract	of	wheat	purchases.	Under	authority	of	Section	21	of	the	Export	Credits	Insurance	Act,	the	Canadian	government	had	guaranteed	sales	of	wheat	to	Poland	totaling	$22	million;	$12.5	million	remained	to	be	paid.	The	Polish	government	asked	for	the	remaining	balance	to	be	deferred	for	one	year.	If	Canada	
																																																								45	Robert	Mark	Spaulding,	‘“Agricultural	Statecraft’	in	the	Cold	War:	A	Case	Study	of	Poland	and	the	West	from	1945	to	1957,”	Agricultural	History,	Vol.	83,	No.	1	(Winter,	2009),	6.	46	Recall	in	chapter	4,	that	in	1952-53,	Ottawa	authorized	the	sale	of	wheat	to	Yugoslavia	under	short-term	credit,	which	was	insured	by	the	Canadian	Export	Credit	Insurance	Corporation.		47	William	E.	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument:	A	History	of	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board:	the	McIvor	Years	(The	Canadian	Wheat	Board,	1987),	237.	48	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	238.	
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provided	 Poland	 with	 a	 two-year	 credit,	 the	 Poles	 indicated	 they	 “‘would	 give	Canada	preference	over	other	suppliers	on	 future	wheat	purchases.’”	The	Minister	of	Trade	 and	Commerce	 recommended	 that	 “agreement	be	 given	 in	principle	 to	 a	deferment	 to	 Poland	 up	 to	 one	 year	 on	 existing	 credits	 only	 on	 the	 proviso	 that	Poland	make	additional	purchases	of	grain	from	Canada.”49	The	terms	were	agreed	to,	and	unlike	the	1955-56	agreement,	which	stipulated	Poland	pay	fifteen	percent	immediately	with	the	remaining	balance	paid	over	one	year,	the	new	agreement	was	for	 ten	percent,	with	 the	remaining	 to	be	paid	over	 three	years.	 “The	difference	 is	not	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	 risk	 calculation,”	 explained	 the	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	Commerce,	but	the	Poles	“regard	the	90%	credit	as	important.”	The	agreement	was	also	new	insofar	as	it	“may	set	a	new	pattern	for	future	sales	of	grain	under	export	credit	 insurance	 […]	 The	 essential	 difference	 from	 previous	 arrangements	 is	 the	commitment	 by	 the	 recipient	 countries	 to	 guarantee	 purchases	 not	 only	 for	 the	immediate	 crop	 year,	 but	 for	 a	 year	 ahead.”	50	Indeed,	 this	 marked	 the	 first	 ever	extended	credit	 sale	authorized	by	 the	 federal	government,	and	became	known	as	“Polish	 Credit	 terms.”51	Just	 over	 a	 month	 later,	 Polish	 negotiators	 requested	 an	additional	 150,000	 tons	 of	 wheat	 –	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 existing	 150,000	 tons	 –	 be	
																																																								49	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1891,	File	c-20-5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Sales	of	Wheat	to	Poland	Under	Export	Credit	Guarantees,”	January	17,	1957.	50	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	99;	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1891,	File	c-20-5,	Memorandum	
to	Cabinet,	“Sale	of	Wheat	to	Poland	Under	Export	Credit	Guarantees,”	March	14,	1957.	51	Morriss,	Chosen	Instrument,	238.	
	 274	
added	 to	 the	 purchase	 of	 the	 current	 crop	 year. 52 	The	 Canadian	 government	agreed.53			 While	 Howe’s	 initial	 reluctance	 to	 revise	 Polish	 credit	 terms	 was	 clearly	reversed,	leading	to	increased	wheat	sales	to	Poland	in	the	final	years	and	months	of	the	Liberal	government,	this	may	have	proved	to	be	too	little	and	too	late	to	address	the	domestic	political	consequences	of	the	financial	pressures	confronting	Canadian	Prairie	farmers.	They	faced	an	international	wheat	market	undermined	by	American	wheat	surpluses	that	were	partly	disposed	of	through	gifts	of	international	aid.54	In	fact,	 shortly	 after	 Gomulka's	 politburo	 election	 as	 first	 secretary,	 American	Secretary	 of	 State	 John	 Foster	 Dulles	 instructed	 the	 American	 ambassador	 in	Warsaw	 to	 inform	 the	 new	 government	 that	 the	 United	 States	 was	 studying	possibilities	 of	 assistance.	 According	 to	 historian	 Robert	 Mark	 Spaulding,	 seven	months	of	negotiations	followed	that	produced	an	economic	agreement	between	the	two	 countries,	 “the	 central	 element	 of	which	was	ninety-five	million	dollars	 in	US	economic	aid	to	Poland.	Sixty-five	million	dollars	of	the	package	was	agricultural	aid	under	the	terms	of	PL	480.	Half	of	that	amount,	thirty-two	million	dollars,	was	long-term	credit	for	immediate	Polish	purchases	of	five	hundred	thousand	metric	tons	of	
																																																								52	LAC,	RG2,	Vol.	1891,	File	c-20-5,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Sale	of	Wheat	to	Poland	Under	Export	Credit	Guarantees,”	April	3,	1957.	53	An	interesting	side	note	to	what	became	known	as	“Polish	credit	terms,”	was	that	the	Soviet	delegation,	when	negotiating	their	1956	purchase,	insisted	on	having	precisely	the	same	credit	terms	as	those	accorded	the	Poles	written	into	their	agreement.	Having	received	that	concession,	“the	Russians	then	punctiliously	paid	cash	on	all	shipments	under	the	agreement.”	Morriss,	Chosen	
Instrument,	238.	54	By	1955,	the	United	States	had	a	carryover	of	more	than	a	billion	bushels	of	unsold	wheat.	Try	as	it	might,	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board	could	not	market	the	growing	glut,	particularly	in	the	face	of	aggressive	US	competition	and	giveaways	under	its	PL	480	food	aid	program.	Michael	Hart,	A	Trading	
Nation:	Canadian	Trade	Policy	from	Colonization	to	Globalization	(Vancouver	&	Toronto:	UBC	Press,	2002),	189.		
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US	grain.”55		The	US	government,	too,	saw	political	value	in	agricultural	aid,	and	was	willing	to	upset	even	its	closest	allies.	Spaulding	argues,	“The	US	government	was	so	firmly	attached	to	these	views	regarding	the	role	of	agricultural	aid	to	Poland	that	they	 refused	 to	 heed	 Canadian	 commercial	 objections	 to	 US	 plans.”	 Spaulding	succinctly	summarizes	Canadian-American	tensions:		According	 to	 [American]	Deputy	Under-Secretary	of	State	 for	Economic	Affairs	C.	Douglas	Dillon,	“the	Canadians	object	vigorously,	claiming	that	any	wheat	shipment	on	a	concessional	or	long-term	credit	basis	will	hurt	future	Canadian	sales.”	Although	the	Americans	made	several	high-level	approaches	 to	 the	 Canadian	 government	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 resolve	 these	differences,	 the	 Department	 could	 not	 convince	 the	 Canadians	 to	 drop	their	 objections.	 In	 a	 very	 rare	break	with	 its	Canadian	allies,	 the	 State	Department	 “determined	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 proceed	 with	undertakings	to	supply	wheat	to	Poland	despite	Canada's	position	in	the	matter.”	 […]	 [L]arge-scale	 Polish	 imports	 produced	 an	 unusually	 bitter	split	among	North	American	allies	that	happened	also	to	be	commercial	rivals	in	agriculture.56		While	Canadian	and	American	policy	objectives	coincided,	in	that	they	each	saw	the	political	benefits	of	“agricultural	statecraft,”	in	this	instance	the	consequence	was	a	bitter	commercial	rivalry.	This	highlights	the	fact	that	Cold	War	alliances	were	not	impervious	to	serious	tension	when	national	self-interests	were	at	stake.	
	 ACCOMMODATING	POLISH	AGRICULTURAL	NEEDS		 Once	 Diefenbaker	 became	 Prime	 Minister,	 historian	 Michael	 Hart	 states,	“Prairie	wheat	 farmers	 had	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 someone	 in	 Ottawa	would	 pay	attention	to	their	problems.”	Silos	in	the	West	were	still	filled	with	surplus	wheat,	a	situation	worsened	 by	 the	 American	 PL	 480	 program	 that	 continued	 to	 undercut																																																									55	Spaulding,	‘“Agricultural	Statecraft,’”	23.	According	to	Spaulding,	not	only	did	agricultural	aid	emerge	as	the	chief	element	in	US	efforts	to	influence	the	Gomulka	regime,	but	the	primary	purpose	of	US	aid	was	to	help	effect	a	restructuring	of	Polish	agriculture	away	from	its	Stalinist	practices.	56	Spaulding,	‘“Agricultural	Statecraft,’”	23-24.	
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Canadian	 sales	 everywhere,	 through	 concessional	 or	 dumped	 sales.	 According	 to	Hart,	 “the	 world	 glut	 was	 driving	 prices	 to	 levels	 that	 seriously	 reduced	 Prairie	incomes.	[…]	The	Liberals	had	lost	all	but	six	seats	on	the	Prairies.	Now	Diefenbaker	had	 to	deliver.”57	Consequently,	accommodationist	 tactics	with	communist	Eastern	Europe	 continued	 under	 the	 Diefenbaker	 government.	 As	 has	 been	 shown	 in	previous	chapters,	these	same	pressures	had	contributed	to	the	development	of	the	USSR	and	Yugoslavia	trade	deals.	Ultimately,	Canada’s	greatest	commercial	success	with	Poland	would	prove	to	be	in	the	area	of	grain	exports.	Hoping	to	find	markets	in	 Eastern	 Europe,	 Canada	 remained	 eager	 to	 sell	 its	 surplus	 wheat	 to	 Poland	 in	spite	of	America’s	PL	480	program.			 As	of	the	late	1950s,	selling	wheat	under	credit	agreements	was	of	interest	to	a	limited	number	of	countries,	which	had	found	short-term	credit	desirable	because	of	 foreign	 exchange	 and	 other	 financial	 considerations.58	Positive	 results	 from	 the	sales	 to	 Poland	 led	 Canadian	 officials	 to	 further	 promote	 export	 of	 wheat	 to	 the	Communist	nation.	Rapid	growth	in	Poland’s	population,	the	industrialization	of	its	economy,	 and	 the	gradual	 improvement	of	 its	 standard	of	 living	were	 factors	 that	ensured	 a	 steady	 market	 for	 Canadian	 grains	 in	 Poland.59	In	 a	 memorandum	 to	Cabinet,	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	 Commerce	 Gordon	 Churchill	 supported	 selling	Canadian	wheat	to	Poland	and	cited	the	DEA’s	perception	of	the	importance	of	the	broader	political	context	in	helping	Poland	during	times	of	internal	struggles:	
																																																								57	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation,	229.	58	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7202,	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Sale	of	Wheat	and	Barley	under	Section	21	of	the	Export	Credit	Insurance	Act,”	January	6,	1959.	59	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7202	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	September	17,	1959.	
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The	Department	of	External	Affairs	reports	that	on	October	18th	(1959)	in	an	atmosphere	of	crisis	the	Polish	Government	announced	an	increase	of	25	percent	in	the	price	of	meat,	reflecting	a	sharp	deterioration	in	the	food	supply	situation.	This	is	a	source	of	popular	discontent,	and	on	the	opposite	 side	 an	 opportunity	 to	 be	 exploited	 by	 Stalinists	 who	 favour	greater	central	control	of	the	economy.	[…]	In	the	Canadian	view,	there	is	no	 doubt	 that	 the	 Gomulka	 regime	 is	 the	 best	 Polish	 Government	 the	West	 can	 hope	 for	 in	 present	 circumstances	 and	 for	 the	 foreseeable	future	 and	 it	 is	 in	 the	West’s	 interest	 to	 assist	 this	 regime	 to	maintain	stability.60		In	other	words,	the	sale	of	Canadian	wheat	to	Poland	was	advantageous	from	both	commercial	 and	 political	 points	 of	 view,	 aligning	 as	 it	 did	 with	 the	 government’s	policy	of	helping	to	promote	Polish	stability	as	a	means	to	strengthen	its	autonomy	within	Eastern	Europe.	Said	differently,	the	wheat	sales	were	both	domestic	politics	with	a	‘foreign	policy	hat	on’	and	were	motivated	by	international	policy	initiatives.	As	Spaulding	aptly	states,	the	importance	of	agricultural	strategies	“underscores	the	power	of	agricultural	factors	within	the	larger	set	of	political	and	economic	relations	between	Poland	and	the	West.”61		 In	1961,	Polish	representatives	approached	officials	from	the	Departments	of	Trade	 and	 Commerce	 and	 Agriculture	 and	 indicated	 they	 wished	 to	 purchase	300,000	tons	of	wheat	under	credit	arrangements.62	They	stated	that	Poland	wanted	to	 increase	 trade	 with	 Canada	 in	 order	 “to	 reduce	 its	 dependency	 for	 imported	wheat	 requirements	 on	 the	 USSR	 and	 the	 USA.”63	Years	 prior	 in	 1959,	 however,	Polish	 authorities	 were	 told	 the	 Canadian	 government	 wanted	 a	 ceiling	 of																																																									60	LAC,	RG2	B2,	Vol.	2743,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Sale	of	Wheat	and	Barely	to	Poland	Under	Section	21	of	the	Export	Credit	Insurance	Act,”	November	2,	1959	61	Spaulding,	‘“Agricultural	Statecraft,’”	6.	62	LAC,	RG2	B2,	Vol.	2743,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Sale	of	Wheat	and	Barely	to	Poland	Under	Section	21	of	the	Export	Credit	Insurance	Act,”	November	1,	1959.	63	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	“Sale	of	Wheat	to	Poland	Under	Section	21	of	the	Export	Credit	Insurance	Act,”	September	5,	1961.	
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approximately	$40	million,	at	any	one	time,	on	total	export	insurance	coverage.	As	of	September	1961,	Canada’s	Export	Credit	liability	for	previous	grain	shipments	to	Poland	 amounted	 to	 $38.9	million.	 Given	 that	 the	maximum	 estimated	 insurance	coverage	required	for	the	purchase	of	300,000	tons	of	wheat	was	an	additional	$25	million,	 the	 export	 insurance	 coverage	 for	 Poland	would	 total	 approximately	 $64	million,	substantially	higher	than	the	$40	million	ceiling	agreed	to	in	1959.	Despite	this,	both	the	Departments	of	Trade	and	Commerce	and	Agriculture	recommended	that	 “Poland	 be	 granted	 the	 request	 given	 its	 excellent	 record	 with	 respect	 to	payments	against	previous	shipments.”64	DEA	officials	also	supported	this	position,	despite	suggestions	then	being	advanced	in	NATO	for	the	potential	use	of	economic	sanctions	 on	 bloc	 countries	 if	 access	 to	 Berlin	 was	 further	 threatened.	 It	 was	recognized	“the	sale	of	wheat	on	credit	at	this	time	to	a	Soviet	bloc	destination	might	appear	 inconsistent”	with	 potential	 NATO	 policy.65	Nevertheless,	 DEA	 officials	 felt	“recent	developments	should	not	stand	 in	the	way	of	 this	sale.”66	Cabinet	made	no	immediate	decision.			 In	the	meantime,	Polish	ambassador,	Zygfryd	Wolniak	met	with	Diefenbaker	to	 discuss	 Canadian-Polish	 trade	 relations,	 among	 other	 things.	 Ambassador	Wolniak	 stressed	 Poland’s	 appreciation	 that	 the	 credit	 balance	 would	 exceed	 the	$40	 million	 ceiling,	 and	 “according	 to	 Poland’s	 traditional	 record,	 due	 payments	would	 follow	 in	 due	 times.”67	Diefenbaker	 explained	 that	 the	 recommendations	 of																																																									64	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Memorandum	to	Cabinet,	September	5,	1961.	65	LAC,	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Memorandum	to	the	Minister,	August	17,	1961.	66	LAC,	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Memorandum	to	the	Minister,	September	12,	1961.	67	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Letter	Polish	Ambassador	to	Prime	Minister,	October	3,	1961.	
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the	Ministers	of	Trade	and	Commerce	and	Agriculture	were	“favourable,”	and	that	Cabinet	would	consider	the	question	soon.68	Before	Wolniak	had	the	opportunity	to	write	Diefenbaker	expressing	his	gratitude	for	their	cordial	discussion,	Cabinet	met	and	 approved	 further	 credit	 sales	 to	 Poland.69	The	 1961	 Canadian-Polish	 wheat	agreement	 confirms	 Canada	 was	 pragmatic	 in	 its	 business	 relations	 with	 Poland.	Additionally,	 it	 is	an	example	of	Canadian	 independence	within	 the	broader	NATO	alliance,	 demonstrating	 how	 officials	 in	 External	 Affairs,	 Trade	 and	 Commerce,	Agriculture,	 and	 the	Prime	Minister	were	willing	 to	 resist	potential	NATO	alliance	policies.	 Officials	 not	 only	 understood	 that	 Poland	was	 a	 good	market	 for	 surplus	wheat,	 but	 also	 that	 such	 deals	 proved	 politically	 advantageous	 on	 the	 domestic	front.	
	 THE	CANADIAN	WHEAT	BOARD	VISITS	POLAND		 Having	 become	 an	 important	 component	 of	 Canada’s	 export	market	 to	 the	Communist	world,	in	April	1962	the	Canadian	Wheat	Board	sent	a	two-man	team	to	Poland	to	investigate	and	analyze	the	Polish	agricultural	economy.	While	the	task	of	Mr.	 C.C.	 Boxer,	 Canada’s	 European	 representative	 of	 the	 Board,	 was	 to	 engage	 in	sales	 talks	with	 the	proper	Polish	authorities,	Adolf	Presber,	 a	Canadian	official	of	the	Board’s	Technical	Services	and	Market	Research	Department,	was	to	“go	beyond	the	normal	points	of	 contact	 for	 foreign	 sales	organizations,”	 by	meeting	 “officials	and	 organizations	 not	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 grain	 importing	 business,	 but	
																																																								68	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Memorandum	Protocol	Division	to	Economic	Division,	October	3,	1961.	69	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	5321	File	9533-40	part	6,	Memorandum	H.B	Robinson	to	Economic	Division,	“Sale	of	Wheat	to	Poland,”	October	2,	1961.	
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representing	that	part	of	the	country’s	productive	and	distributive	system	which	is	using	grain,	and	especially	wheat,	as	a	raw	material	for	industrial	food	processing.”	As	Presber	explained	in	his	report	on	the	mission	to	Poland,	“No	previous	attempt	had	been	made	to	get	acquainted	with	intermediate	or	end-users	of	Canadian	wheat	in	Poland.”	In	fact,	officials	were	initially	skeptical	about	whether	the	mission	would	be	well	received	by	Polish	authorities.	Their	skepticism	was	quickly	dispelled.	As	it	turned	out,		
	the	 cordiality	 with	 which	 the	 mission	 was	 actually	 received	 and	 the	detailed	 and	drawn-out	 execution	 of	 the	programme	exceeded	 [Boxer	and	 Presber’s]	 most	 optimistic	 expectations.	 […]	 The	 hosts’	 immense	interest	 in	technical	details	of	Canadian	grain	handling	and	processing	was	 only	 surpassed	 by	 their	 pride	 in	 their	 own	 work,	 and	 their	eagerness	for		comments	regarding	it.	[…]	There	was	a	marked	tendency	to	 compare	 the	 information	 [Presber]	 could	 provide	 with	 their	knowledge	 of	 Russian	 methods	 and	 of	 technical	 progress	 in	 that	country.	From	 the	Polish	perspective,	 the	mission	was	valuable	as	 it	provided	 insight	 from	one	 of	 the	 world’s	 leading	 agricultural	 experts.	 This	 was	 particularly	 important	since,	as	Presber	explained,	“Poland	[is	in]	the	throes	of	industrial	expansion,	which	is	 pushing	 her	 towards	 a	 place	 with	 the	 league	 of	 modern	 industrial	 states,	 but	experiencing	 the	 agonies	 of	 lagging	 progress	 in	 agricultural	 development.”	 As	 a	result	 of	 their	 visit,	 the	 mission	 made	 a	 few	 suggestions	 and	 voiced	 some	apprehensions:	
[The	Wheat	Board	and	Canadian	government]	should	try	and	do	more	to	make	known	to	interested	[Polish]	government	officials	and	technical	people	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 foundations	 on	 which	 the	 reputation	 of	 our	wheat	has	been	established,	and	try	to	see	that	these	groups	receive	the	reports	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 Canadian	 shipments,	 regularly	 published	 by	the	 Grain	 Research	 Laboratory.	 The	 Poles	 are	 very	 eager	 for	 further	exchanges	 of	 technical	 experience	 and	 data.	 It	 was	 quite	 evident	 […]	
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that	 their	 admiration	 for	 Canadian	 quality	 wheat	 found	 its	 match	 in	their	conviction	of	Russia’s	lead	in	technical	progress.	Such	a	conviction	could	 have	 detrimental	 consequences	 for	 Canada	 if	 the	 time	 comes	when	 Russia	 is	 able	 to	 improve	 her	 export	 volume	 and	 grading	programmes.	 Continuous	 proof	 of	 the	West’s	 advances	 in	milling	 and	baking	science	might	easily	be	a	factor	in	persuading	Poland	to	adhere	to	its	policy	of	‘two-source’	supply,	even	when	such	policy	is	no	longer	essential.70	From	 the	mission,	 it	was	 clear	 that	 Polish	 officials	 admired	 Canadian	 agricultural	techniques	 and	products.	The	hope	was	 to	maintain	 these	positive	 impressions	 in	the	face	of	Soviet	advances	in	agricultural	techniques.	Accommodating	the	Poles	in	the	 area	 of	 wheat	 sales	 and	 working	 closely	 with	 them	 to	 help	 improve	 their	utilization	 of	 imported	 Canadian	 wheat	 complemented	 the	 government’s	 broader	policy	 objective	 of	 supporting	 Poland’s	 drive	 toward	 self-sufficiency	 and	 greater	international	 autonomy.	 Additionally,	 it	 showcased	 the	 triumphs	 of	 Western	industrial	innovations	in	the	agricultural	industry.		The	Canadian	embassy	in	Poland	was	a	proponent	of	the	visit	and	was	responsible	for	preparing	the	mission’s	entire	programme.71	
	 The	 Wheat	 Board’s	 mission	 undoubtedly	 set	 a	 precedent	 for	 how	 to	 do	business	 in	Eastern	Europe.	Shortly	after	 the	visit,	an	article	was	published	by	the	Department	of	Trade	and	Commerce’s	periodical	Foreign	Trade	titled,	“Trading	with	Eastern	 Europe.”	 The	 article	 explained	 to	 readers	 that	 foreign	 trade	 in	 these	countries	was	 conducted	as	a	 state	monopoly,	with	 trading	 carried	out	by	a	 small	group	of	state-owned	and	operated	foreign	trade	enterprises,	comparable	in	scope																																																									70	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2857	File	490-P6	part	10.1,	“Report:	on	a	Mission	to	Poland,”	A.	Presber,	1962.	The	exact	date	the	report	was	completed	is	not	given.	The	mission	took	place	from	3-4	April	1962,	so	it	is	assumed	the	report	was	submitted	shortly	thereafter.		71	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2857	File	490-P6	part	10.1,	The	Canadian	Ambassador,	Warsaw	to	Under-Secretary	
of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canadian	Wheat	Board	Visit,”	April	5,	1962.		
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and	operation	to	substantial	import/export	firms	in	Canada.	When	dealing	with	the	foreign	trade	enterprises,	the	article	explained,		
	personal	 contact	 is	 by	 far	 the	most	 effective	method	 of	 introducing	 a	new	product.	When	discussing	business	[…]	a	number	of	copies	of	trade	literature,	specifications	and	price	lists	should	be	made	available	[…]	It	is	 sometimes	 possible	 for	 Canadian	 businessmen	 to	 achieve	 direct	contact	not	only	with	the	trade	enterprise	but	also	with	the	end-users;	in	this	way,	technical	salesmanship	can	be	made	more	effective.72	The	 personal	 contact	 and	 technical	 salesmanship	 of	 Boxer	 and	 Presber’s	 visit	certainly	 proved	 valuable	 to	 Canada’s	 Wheat	 Board.	 The	 Poles	 were	 altogether	impressed	with	 the	 Canadians’	 knowledge	 and	willingness	 to	 engage	 in	 technical	discussions.	
	 In	 September	 1964,	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	 Board	 sent	 another	 two-man	mission	to	Poland,	this	time	for	a	full	week.	In	their	1964	report,	Adolf	Presber	(who	went	to	Poland	on	the	1962	mission)	and	A.	Kubicek	stated,	“the	outstanding	feature	of	our	one	weeks	stay	in	the	country	was	the	overwhelming	hospitality	with	which	we	 were	 received	 by	 government	 officials,	 traders,	 millers,	 bakers,	 and,	 indeed,	everybody	 concerned	with	our	visit.”	As	 a	 result	of	 their	 visit,	 they	 recommended	Poland	be	included	in	the	Boards’	1965	Mission	program.	The	report	explained,		
	the	use	of	Canadian	wheat	has	become	part	of	the	established	order	for	mills	 and	 bakeries	 and	 we	 are	 convinced	 that	 regardless	 of	 further	development	of	the	economy	this	state	of	affairs	is	not	likely	to	change	[…].	 As	 far	 as	 our	 competitors	 are	 concerned	 we	 found	 that	 French	wheat	was	considered	generally	unreliable	in	quality	[…]	With	regard	to	Russia,	 Poland’s	 traditional	 supplier	 of	 cereals,	 our	 hosts	 were	manifestly	 uncertain	 as	 to	 whether	 they	 could	 expect	 a	 partial	restoration	of	the	usual	pattern	of	imports.		
																																																								72	R.K.	Thomson,	Commercial	Counsellor,	Vienna,	“Trading	with	Eastern	Europe,”	Foreign	Trade,	Vol.	118,	No.	1,	July	14,	1962.	
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Presber	 and	 Kubicek’s	 recognition	 of	 Canadian	 wheat	 as	 part	 of	 the	 “established	order”	 in	Poland	is	 in	stark	contrast	to	the	1962	report	and	alleviated	some	of	the	earlier	1962	mission’s	concerns	over	the	potential	improvement	of	Russia’s	export	problems	and	grading	programmes.	According	to	 their	report,	regardless	of	Soviet	improvements,	Poland	 intended	 to	continue	buying	Canadian	wheat	because	of	 its	reliability	and	quality.		
	 Similar	 to	 the	Board’s	1962	report,	 in	1964	Presber	and	Kubicek	explained	that	 the	 Poles	 made	 very	 evident	 their	 desire	 to	 establish	 closer	 relations	 with	technical	 people,	 and	 the	 Canadian	 officials	 recommended	 that	 the	 regular	publications	of	the	Wheat	Board	and	of	the	Board	of	Grain	Commissioners	be	made	available	to	a	number	of	Polish	scientific	institutions	and	flour	mills.	They	claimed,	“our	 own	welcome	would	 not	 have	 been	worn	 out	 had	we	 extended	 our	 stay	 by	another	 two	weeks,	 and	were	 told	 time	 and	 again	 that	 visits	 such	 as	 ours	 should	continue	 on	 a	 regular	 basis.”73	The	 experience	 and	 expertise	 provided	 to	 Polish	officials	and	others	concerned	with	the	visit	by	the	Canadian	mission	is	a	clear	sign	of	 bilateral	 cooperation	 that	 positively	 buttressed	 both	 commercial	 and	 political	aspects	of	Canada	and	Poland’s	relationship.	As	Canada	sought	new	markets	for	its	wheat	 –	 particularly	 in	 the	 face	 of	 America’s	 PL	 480	 program	 –	 Poland	 became	 a	steady	market	for	wheat	export,	albeit	smaller	than	their	relatively	new	Soviet	and	Chinese	customers.74	
																																																								73	LAC,	RG20,	Vol.	2857	File	490-P6	part	10.1,	“Report:	on	the	Visit	to	Poland,”	A	Kubicek	and	A.	Presber,	1964.	74	For	instance,	China	purchased	a	total	of	$91.8	million	of	Canadian	wheat	in	1961,	and	$134	million	of	Canadian	wheat	in	1962,	and	the	USSR	purchased	$147	million	of	Canadian	wheat	in	1963.	Ian	M.	
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	 The	wheat	sales	to	Poland	that	took	place	from	the	1956	to	1962,	which	were	marked	by	annual	short-term	individual	contracts,	ultimately	generated	a	series	of	long-term	grain	agreements	between	the	two	countries,	with	the	first	negotiated	in	1963.	 As	 a	 result,	 in	 1964,	 Canada	 sold	 to	 Poland	 the	 largest	 amount	 of	 wheat	bushels	to	date	–	over	$55	million	worth	–	an	amount	that	would	not	be	surpassed	until	1976,	when	Canada	sold	over	$63	million	in	wheat	to	Poland.	Subsequent	long-term	grain	agreements	were	signed	in	1966,	1972,	1977,	and	1979.75		
	 Credit	is	given	to	Alvin	Hamilton,	Diefenbaker’s	Minister	of	Agriculture	from	1960	 to	 1963,	 for	 finding	 new	 markets	 for	 Canadian	 wheat.	 With	 his	 Cabinet	appointment,	 Hamilton	 assumed	 responsibility	 for	 the	 Wheat	 Board,	 which,	according	to	one	historian,	marked	a	breakthrough	for	Canadian	wheat	sales,	since	the	 minister	 was	 willing	 to	 be	 “unconventional”	 and	 gave	 “officials	 in	 the	Wheat	Board	room	to	try	new	approaches”76	While	attention	is	usually	focused	on	Canada’s	wheat	 deals	with	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 and	 the	 USSR	 during	 the	 1960s,	wheat	 sales	 to	 other	 Eastern	 European	 Communist	 nations	 should	 not	 be	overlooked;	their	importance	is	particularly	noteworthy	when	placed	in	the	broader	context	of	Canada’s	general	policy	toward	Communist	Europe.		
	 While	 the	 Tories	 survived	 the	 1962	 election	 with	 a	 minority	 government,	Canadians	 voted	 in	 a	 Liberal	 minority	 government	 the	 following	 April.	 Lester	 B.	
																																																																																																																																																																					Drummond,	Canada’s	Trade	with	the	Communist	Countries	of	Eastern	Europe	(The	Canadian	Trade	Committee,	Private	Planning	Association	of	Canada,	1966),	4.	75	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	Eagle,	95.	Grain	sales	statistics	were	taken	from	a	table	on	Canadian	Grain	Exports	to	Poland,	which	can	be	found	in	Balawyder,	The	Maple	Leaf	and	the	White	
Eagle,	98.	76	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation,	231.	
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Pearson’s	new	government	was	held	 to	a	minority	 thanks	 largely	 to	Diefenbaker’s	strong	support	in	the	Prairies.	Somewhat	ironically,	at	least	given	the	loyal	support	of	 the	 prairie	 demographic	 for	 Conservative	 agricultural	 policy,	 even	more	wheat	was	 then	 sold	 under	 the	 Liberal	 government	 in	 subsequent	 years.	 Yet,	 the	 Tories	continued	 to	 take	 credit	 for	 the	 breakthrough	 in	wheat	 sales,77	and	 arguably	 they	were	justified	in	doing	so.	
	 CANADA,	POLAND,	AND	GATT		 Canadian-Polish	wheat	deals	were	carried	out	bilaterally,	and	this	continued	until	Poland	was	admitted	into	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT)	in	1967.	Poland’s	road	into	GATT	was	quite	 long,	but	the	Diefenbaker	government	had	 supported	 Poland	 during	 its	 various	 stages	 of	 membership	 and	 since	 it	 first	announced	its	desire	to	participate	in	the	multilateral	trading	organization	in	1958.	The	Canadian	government’s	support	for	Poland’s	participation	in	what	was,	to	that	point	in	time,	primarily	a	Western	economic	club,	was	motivated	by	both	economic	and	 political	 objectives.	 Essentially,	 the	 debate	 surrounding	 Poland’s	 accession	 to	GATT	 was	 tied	 closely	 to	 its	 role	 in	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 East-West	 relations,	 and	Ottawa’s	 support	 of	 Poland’s	 accession	 reflects	 its	 broader	 policy	 of	 luring	 in	 the	Poles	as	a	means	of	attenuating	 their	connection	 to	 the	Soviet	Union.	Moreover,	 it	highlights	Canadian	officials’	desire	to	use	multilateral	organizations	as	a	means	of	buttressing	its	policy	objectives	for	Eastern	Europe.	
	 In	April	1958,	Poland	announced	its	desire	to	join	GATT.	If	accepted,	it	was	to	be	 the	 first	Communist	nation	 to	 join	 the	organization	since	 its	 inception	 in	1947.																																																									77	Hart,	A	Trading	Nation,	231.	
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Czechoslovakia,	while	 a	member,	was	 not	 Communist	when	 it	 participated	 in	 the	organization	of	GATT.78	Since	its	inception,	many	GATT	members	wished	to	keep	the	organization	predominantly	Western.	But	as	historian	Francine	McKenzie	explains,	“the	 desirability	 of	 keeping	 Communist	 countries	 out	 of	 GATT	 became	 a	 more	complex	and	pressing	question	 in	 the	 late	1950s	when	Poland,	Romania,	Hungary,	and	Yugoslavia	all	applied	to	join.”79	The	move	by	Poland,	Hungary,	and	Romania	to	join	GATT	was	especially	politically	charged	given	they	were	also	founding	members	of	the	Council	of	Mutual	Economic	Assistance	(CMEA),	established	by	Stalin	in	1949	as	a	means	to	tighten	Soviet	control	over	the	satellites.80	As	a	result,	accession	into	GATT	by	 communist	 nations	 could	have	 repercussions	on	 the	CMEA,	 causing	 it	 to	loose	 strategic	 value.	 Considering	 Communist	 applications	 to	 enter	 GATT	 were	multidimensional,	McKenzie	explains	some	of	the	perplexities:	
	At	 one	 level,	 the	 contracting	 parties	 considered	 these	 applications	 in	terms	of	commercial	compatibility	with	the	GATT.	How	could	countries	without	a	 tariff	structure	or	a	 free	market	 join	GATT?	How	could	they	participate	 in	 trade	 negotiations	 that	 had	 hitherto	 primarily	 involved	the	 lowering	 of	 tariff	 barriers?	 Making	 a	 decision	 about	 their	admissibility	 based	 on	 GATT	 rules	 alone	 would	 have	 led	 to	 a	 fairly	straightforward	 refusal	 despite	 GATT	 provisions	 for	 state	 trading	countries.81	
																																																								78	New	York	Times,	“Poland	Asks	GATT	Admission,	Posing	Problems	for	Trade	‘Club’”,	2	April	1958.	79	Francine	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War:	Accession	Debates,	Institutional	Development,	and	the	Western	Alliance,	1947	–	1959.”	Journal	of	Cold	War	Studies,	Vol.	10,	No.	3.,	(Summer	2008),	97.	80	Francine	McKenzie	states	that	early	US	assessment	had	predicted	that	“jolting”	the	CMEA	would	weaken	Soviet	dominance	and	that	“the	repercussions	are	bound	to	be	felt	in	the	political,	military,	and	cultural	spheres.”	See,	f.n.	79,	FRUS,	Vol.	V,	p.	53,	Report	to	the	President	by	the	National	Security	
Council,	“United	States	Policy	toward	the	Soviet	Satellite	States	in	Eastern	Europe,”	December	8,	1949,	in	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	97.	81	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	97-98.	
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Economic	 considerations	 were	 not	 the	 lone	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 decision	 of	whether	 or	 not	 to	 admit	 Communist	 nations	 into	GATT.	 Political	 and	 geostrategic	considerations	were	also	important.	
	 From	 the	moment	 Poland	 applied	 to	 GATT,	 Canada’s	 position	 revealed	 the	nuanced	 perspective	 of	 the	 contracting	 parties;	 Canada’s	 views	 aligned	 with	 the	executive	secretary	of	GATT,	Eric	Wyndham	White.	Wyndham	White	believed	 that	GATT	 had	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 state	 trading	 countries,	 and	 his	 position	 was	exemplified	when	the	secretariat	unilaterally	granted	Poland	and	Romania	observer	status	 in	1957.82	Some	members	 feared	 that	Polish	membership	would	undermine	GATT	and	be	unfair	 to	 the	contracting	parties	who	were	trying	to	adhere	to	GATT	standards;	 this	 objection,	 however,	 was	 often	 exaggerated.83	Canada	 had	 already	extended	most	favoured	nation	status	to	Poland,	so	Polish	access	to	GATT	would	not	necessitate	any	drastic	change	 in	economic	relations.84	The	American	position	was	noncommittal	and	other	contracting	parties	supported	a	variety	of	positions.	Some	favoured	 Polish	 accession	 while	 others	 were	 opposed,	 fearing	 Poland	might	 be	 a	stalking	 horse	 for	 the	 Soviet	 Union.85	A	 compromise	 was	 reached,	 which	 neither	shut	 Poland	 out,	 nor	 let	 it	 in.	 A	 new	 category	 of	 “associate	 state”	was	 created	 for	Poland	that	gave	it	partial	access	to	GATT	forums	without	the	commercial	privileges.	
																																																								82	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	100.	83	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	101.	84	DCER,	Vol.	26.	63.	Memorandum	for	Acting	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	Minister	of	Trade	
and	Commerce,	and	Minister	of	Finance	to	Cabinet,	“Instructions	for	the	Canadian	Delegation	to	the	Fourteenth	Session	of	GATT,”	Ottawa,	April	30,	1959.	Document	No.	137-59.	By	1960,	Poland	shared	MFN	status	with	about	eighty	percent	of	GATT	countries.	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7202	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	
Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canadian-Polish	Trade,”	February	5,	1960.	85	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	103.	
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As	McKenzie	aptly	puts	it:	“This	in-between	stage	reflected	different	Western	views	about	 whether	 isolation	 and	 containment	 were	 more	 effective	 than	 contact	 and	engagement	 as	 tactics	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 defeat	 of	 Communism.”86	Canada	 clearly	supported	 the	 latter	 position,	 preferring	 engagement	 and	 cooperation	 to	 temper	Polish	dependence	on	 the	USSR.	Polish	Vice	Minister	of	Foreign	Trade,	Franciszek	Modrzewski,	 expressed	 his	 appreciation	 for	 the	 part	 played	 by	 the	 Canadian	member	of	the	working	party	during	discussions	pertaining	to	Polish	membership:	‘“the	 Canadian	 was	 the	 most	 active	 member	 of	 all	 in	 seeking	 a	 formula	 for	 a	meaningful	 association	 for	 Poland.’” 87 	Not	 only	 does	 Modrzewski’s	 statement	indicate	 Polish	 appreciation	 for	 Canada’s	 genuine	 desire	 for	 a	 meaningful	association,	 but	 it	 also	 reflects	 Canada’s	 use	 of	 multilateral	 organizations	 in	 its	pursuit	of	carrying	out	its	foreign	policy	in	Eastern	Europe.	
	 The	 DEA	was	 even	 anxious	 about	 potentially	 delaying	 responses	 to	 Polish	requests.	Following	its	admission	as	an	“associate	state,”	the	Polish	government	had	engaged	in	informal	discussions	with	various	contracting	parties	to	assess	whether	full	 membership	 should	 be	 pursued.	 Canadian	 officials	 believed	 the	 Poles	 would	expect	a	firm	decision	on	their	application	to	be	taken	at	the	fourteenth	session	in	1959.	Norman	Robertson	expressed	the	DEA’s	trepidation:	“In	this	department	we	are	concerned	about	the	possible	effects	of	the	long	delay	in	dealing	with	the	Polish	issue	on	the	efforts	of	the	Polish	authorities	to	develop	their	political	and	economic	
																																																								86	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	103.		87	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7202	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Visit	of	Commissioner	Dallas,	Canadian	Wheat	Board,”	September	17,	1959.	
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relations	 with	 the	 West	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 to	 reduce	 their	 dependence	 on	 the	USSR.”	 The	 Under	 Secretary	 stated,	 “even	 a	 negative	 decision	 on	 the	 Polish	application	 would	 be	 preferable	 to	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 present	 uncertain	situation.”	Essentially,	the	DEA	feared	that	any	prolongation	of	a	decision	might	lead	Poland	 to	 withdraw	 its	 application. 88 	In	 the	 end,	 the	 DEA’s	 anxiety	 proved	unwarranted	 since	Poland	did	 not	withdraw	 its	 application.	 To	Canadian	 officials,	however,	whether	Poland	was	 incorporated	 into	GATT	was	considered	 “especially	significant	since	it	may	set	a	pattern	for	relations	under	GATT	with	the	Communist	countries.”	In	the	view	of	USSEA	O.G.	Stoner,		
	The	 formula	 adopted	 for	 Poland	 simply	 provides	 the	 framework	 for	closer	 relations	 and	 for	 consideration	 in	GATT	of	 particular	 problems	and	 difficulties.	 The	 exact	 significance	 of	 the	 Polish	 association	 will	therefore	 emerge	 gradually	 as	 particular	 problems	 come	 to	 be	considered	and	the	policy	of	the	Polish	government	is	developed.89	In	 other	 words,	 the	 value	 of	 Poland’s	 association	 with	 GATT	 –	 even	 though	 this	would	 require	a	pragmatic	 and	 flexible	 approach	 to	ongoing	 initiatives	–	 trumped	the	challenges	bound	to	surface	as	a	result	of	their	state	trading	policies.	
	 At	 GATT’s	 fifteenth	 session	 in	 November	 1959,	 members	 agreed	 on	 a	declaration	that	stated	their	“desire	to	have	the	further	development	of	their	trade	relations	 [with	 Poland]	 guided	 by	 the	 objectives	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Preamble	 to	 the	General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	 and	 Trade.”	 This	 meant	 essentially	 a	 limited	association	 for	Poland,	and	 that	contracting	parties	wished	 to	see	an	expansion	of																																																									88	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	
Deputy	Minister,	Department	of	Trade	and	Commerce,	Deputy	Minister,	Department	of	Finance,	Deputy	
Governor,	Bank	of	Canada,	“GATT	–	Polish	Application,”	April	27,	1959.	89	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Numbered	Letter	Under-Secretary	of	State	for	
External	Affairs	to	Canadian	Embassy,	Warsaw,	“Polish	Accession	to	GATT,”	December	23,	1959.	
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trade	with	Poland.	The	declaration	would	only	come	into	force	when	it	was	accepted	by	Poland	and	by	 two-thirds	of	 the	contracting	parties.90	Modrzewski	explained	to	Southam	that	Polish	officials	 sincerely	hoped	 that	Poland’s	new	association	would	be	helpful	in	developing	its	trade	relations	with	Western	countries.		“The	next	step,”	Modrzewski	noted,	“was	to	round	up	the	necessary	ratifications	by	two-thirds	of	the	GATT’s	members.”91		
	 Southam	suggested	to	the	USSEA	that	since	Canada	“was	one	of	the	countries	which	 gave	 particular	 support	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 Poland’s	 association	 with	 GATT,	 it	would	be	seemly	for	us	to	be	among	the	first	countries	to	ratify	[the	declaration].”92	Howard	Green	agreed.	On	behalf	of	 the	Minister	of	Finance,	Minister	of	Trade	and	Commerce,	 and	 his	 own	 department,	 Green	 asserted,	 “it	 is	 expedient	 that	 this	declaration	be	signed	on	behalf	of	Canada.”93	In	the	end,	the	contracting	parties	kept	the	declaration	vague.	Only	a	weak	 form	of	association	between	Poland	and	GATT	was	 formed,	 and	 there	 was	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 future,	 full	 GATT	membership	 for	 Poland.	 While	 Canadian	 officials	 took	 the	 lead	 in	 pressing	 for	 a	more	meaningful	formula	with	substantive	commercial	policy	content,	their	efforts	were	frustrated,	mainly	by	the	UK,	various	other	Western	European	countries,	and	the	United	States,	which	worked	for	a	compromise	formula	that	mostly	favoured	the	UK.	Canadian	officials	believed	the	UK	favoured	a	weak	association	partly	due	to	a																																																									90	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	the	
Governor	General	in	Council,	April	5,	1960.	91	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7202	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canadian-Polish	Trade,”	February	5,	1960.	92	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7202	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	Numbered	Letter	Canadian	Legation,	Warsaw	to	Under-
Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs,	“Canadian-Polish	Trade,”	February	5,	1960.	93	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	the	
Governor	General	in	Council,	April	5,	1960.	
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disinclination	 to	 forego	 benefits	 arising	 from	 their	 bilateral	 trade	 relations	 with	Poland.94	Additionally,	 as	 McKenzie	 explains,	 British	 officials	 “were	 sceptical	 that	trade	 ties	 could	 facilitate	 a	 diplomatic	 realignment,	 particularly	 because	Khrushchev’s	intention	to	use	CMEA	to	create	‘an	integrated	economic	empire’	was	moving	forward	and	Poland’s	‘freedom	of	manoeuvre’	seemed	restricted	because	it	now	required	CMEA’s	permission	to	import	Western	products.”95	Regardless,	this	is	another	 example	 of	 Canadian	 officials	 pursuing	 a	 policy	 at	 odds	 with	 its	 most	important	allies,	thus	highlighting	how	the	blocs	were	not	always	united.		
	 The	 next	 decision	 for	 Canada	was	whether	 it	would	 negotiate	with	 Poland	during	 the	 course	 of	 GATT’s	 1960/61	 Tariff	 Conference.	 The	 Poles	 proposed	 to	negotiate	 “minimum	 import	 commitments”	 against	 tariff	 concession	 by	 GATT	countries.	 This	 was	 not	 in	 the	 original	 declaration,	 but	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	argued	that	going	beyond	what	was	embodied	in	the	recent	GATT	declaration	would	be	 in	 Canada’s	 economic	 and	 political	 interest. 96 	Canada’s	 Permanent	Representative	 to	 the	European	Office	of	 the	UN	 in	Geneva,	Max	Wershof,	 saw	six	major	 benefits	 to	 Canada’s	 engagement	with	 Poland	 during	 the	Tariff	 Conference.	First,	a	closer	trading	relationship	between	Poland	and	GATT	countries	would	have	important	political	implications	as	“it	would	bring	Poland	closer	into	the	orbit	of	the	Western	world	and	make	a	lasting	contribution	to	improved	and	more	stable	East-West	 relations.”	 Second,	 if	 trading	arrangements	 could	be	worked	out	 they	 “could																																																									94	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Note	on	the	Association	of	Poland	to	the	GATT,	
Finance	Central	Files,	n.d.	95	McKenzie,	“GATT	and	the	Cold	War,”	103.	96	LAC,	RG19,	Vol.	4206	File	8714-33/P762	part	1,	Note	on	the	Association	of	Poland	to	the	GATT,	
Finance	Central	Files,	n.d.	
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provide	 a	 general	 basis	 for	 orderly	 multilateral	 trade	 relations	 between	 state	trading	 and	 free	 trading	 enterprise	 countries.”	 Third,	 the	 Polish	 proposal	 would	open	up	new	opportunities	for	expanding	trade,	since	
	the	 greater	 multilateralization	 of	 trade	 with	 Poland,	 and	 the	corresponding	 decrease	 in	 bilateralism	 in	 its	 trade	 with	 Western	European	countries	would	open	up	new	opportunities	 for	competitive	suppliers.	This	in	our	view	is	an	important	consideration	for	countries	such	 as	 Canada,	 which	 are	 efficient	 producers	 of	 raw	 materials	 and	agricultural	products,	 and	whose	 trading	 interests	 are	being	damaged	by	bilateralism,	not	only	in	the	Polish	market	but	also	in	the	markets	of	Western	 European	 countries	 which	 exchange	 trade	 advantages	 with	Poland	on	a	bilateral	basis.	Fourth,	negotiating	with	Poland	would	 likely	 lead	to	a	steady	growth	of	 the	Polish	import	market.	In	turn,	this	would	result	in	increases	in	living	standards	in	Poland.	And	in	a	country	with	a	population	of	nearly	25	million,	sharing	“the	benefits	of	the	expansion	of	the	Polish	market	is	[…]	an	important	long	term	consideration.”	Fifth,	Canada	 already	 extended	MFN	 tariff	 treatment	 to	 Poland	 and	had	no	 quantitative	restriction	against	Polish	exports.	A	number	of	other	contracting	parties,	however,	had	 not	 extended	 MFN	 status	 to	 Poland	 (particularly	 the	 US)	 while	 others	 had	quantitative	restrictions	on	Polish	goods	(notably	most	Western	European	nations	and	the	UK).	If	these	obstacles	could	be	reduced,	the	possibility	for	Poland	to	export	would	 increase,	which	would	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 import,	 which	could	 lead	 to	 “a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 Canadian	 export	 sales	 to	 Poland.”	 Lastly,	since	 Canada	 already	 extended	 MFN	 tariff	 treatment	 to	 Poland,	 “satisfactory	commitments	by	Poland	to	purchase	products	in	which	Canada	enjoys	a	competitive	advantage	(like	hard	wheat,	aluminum,	synthetic	rubber,	or	wood	products)	might	be	 expected	 in	 return	 for	 little	 or	 no	 further	 tariff	 concessions	 on	 the	 part	 of	
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Canada.”97	While	 all	 but	 one	 of	 the	 beneficial	 factors	 are	 specifically	 and	 firmly	rooted	 in	 economic	 concerns,	 political	 sensitivities	 still	 informed	 the	 others	 and	buttressed	 all	 commercial	 considerations	 by	 relating	 them	 to	 the	 inescapable	political	context	of	the	Cold	War.	
	 Cabinet	 saw	 the	 benefits	 as	 well.	 In	 his	 instructions	 to	 the	 Canadian	delegation	of	the	sixteenth	session	of	GATT	in	May	1960,	Green	advised,	
								Cabinet	has	approved	 the	Declaration	associating	Poland	with	 the	General	 Agreement	 and	 has	 agreed	 to	 procedures	 whereby	consultations	 are	 to	be	 conducted	by	 individual	 contracting	parties	 to	explore	the	possibility	of	Polish	participation	in	the	negotiations.										In	 line	with	 the	 Canadian	Government’s	 policy	 of	 exploring	ways	and	 means	 of	 establishing	 mutually	 advantageous	 trading	 relations	with	 countries	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Bloc,	 the	 Canadian	 Delegation	 should	 be	authorized	to	enter	into	consultations	with	the	Polish	representatives	at	this	 Session	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 possibility	 of	meaningful	 negotiations	between	Canada	and	Poland…98	Canada’s	position	regarding	the	accession	of	Poland	into	GATT	is	telling	insofar	as	it	reveals	Canada’s	desire	to	engage	with	Poland	through	a	multilateral	organization.	Canada’s	objective	 to	have	Poland	play	a	more	meaningful	role	 in	GATT	was	often	contracted	by	various	Western	nations.	Regardless,	Canada’s	position	exemplifies	its	desire	 to	engage	with	Poland	 to	expose	 it	 to	capitalist	modalities	and	 to	attenuate	the	USSR’s	control	over	that	country.	Moreover,	 the	Canadian	government’s	desire	for	Poland	to	be	an	active	member	of	GATT	is	a	reminder	that	matters	of	commercial	importance	were	rarely	isolated	from	political	considerations.	
																																																								97	LAC,	RG25,	Vol.	7292	File	9533-40	part	5.2,	Telegram	Permanent	Representative,	Geneva,	to	DEA,	“GATT	Relations	with	Poland,”	March	21,	1961.	98	DCER,	Vol.	27.	138.	Memorandum	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	to	Cabinet,	“Instructions	for	the	Canadian	Delegation	to	the	Sixteenth	Session	of	GATT,”	Ottawa,	May	10,	1960.	Cabinet	Document	No.	156-60.	
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	 CONCLUSION		 As	bilateral	Canadian-Polish	relations	improved,	Canada	engaged	in	a	modest	cultural	 diplomacy	 program.	 While	 cultural	 exchanges	 were	 not	 as	 prevalent	 as	compared	with	Yugoslavia	or	the	USSR,	Canada	and	Poland	did	slowly	nurture	these	relations,	 and	 they	 became	 an	 important	 component	 of	 Canada’s	 Polish	 policy	equation.	Whether	 through	art	exhibits,	academic	exchanges	or	 film	showings,	 the	predominant	motivation	 was	 exposing	 the	 Polish	 population	 to	 Canada’s	 “way	 of	life.”	 The	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	 was	 one	 important	 element	 of	 Canada’s	informational	 activities,	 and	 its	 actions	 dovetailed	 nicely	 with	 External	 Affairs’	policy	 of	 increasing	 Polish	 autonomy	with	 respect	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 The	 1956	directive	 to	 eliminate	 Cold	 War-style	 rhetoric	 and	 foster	 a	 more	 moderate	 and	respectful	“tone,”	was	carried	out	under	the	Progressive	Conservative	government,	and	 the	work	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	 during	 this	 time	 helps	 to	reinforce	the	notion	that	the	1957-1963	period	was	a	decisive	moment	in	Canada’s	foreign	 policy	 in	 Eastern	 Europe.	 On	 top	 of	 that,	 it	 highlights	 consistency	 across	Conservative	and	Liberal	administrations.			 Through	direct	 transmissions	 from	Montreal	 and	by	 sending	 transcriptions	to	Radio	Warsaw,	Canada	was	able	to	disseminate	knowledge	of	Canada,	on	various	subjects,	within	Poland.	As	a	result	of	the	CBC-IS	Polish	division’s	efforts,	a	modest	following	of	Polish	listeners	developed,	some	so	engaged	they	would	send	letters	to	Montreal.	Often	 this	 correspondence	 expressed	 gratitude	 and	 appreciation	 for	 the	content.	 Many	 of	 the	 letters	 also	 conveyed	 a	 sense	 of	 relief,	 knowing	 that	 others	were	 listening	 to	 their	 struggles	 and	 providing	 hope.	 The	 CBC-IS	 Polish	 division	
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illustrates	 an	 effective	 approach	 to	 Canadian	 cultural	 diplomacy,	 intended	 to	challenge	and	break	down	ideological	barriers.		 While	Canada’s	cultural	diplomacy	in	Poland	was	one	arrow	among	many	in	its	 Cold	War	 foreign	 policy	 quiver,	 commercial	 relations	 opened	 other	 important	avenues	for	influencing	developments	in	Eastern	Europe.	Canadian	participation	in	Poland’s	 annual	 Poznań	 trade	 fair	 created	 opportunities	 to	 penetrate	 the	 Polish	market,	 engendered	 political	 goodwill,	 and	 became	 a	 consistent	 component	 of	Canadian	economic	statecraft	in	the	region.		 International	 and	 environmental	 events	 aligned	 to	 bring	 the	 two	 nations	together,	as	Poland	needed	wheat	and	Canada	needed	international	consumers	for	its	 excess	 grain	 supply.	 Sales	 with	 Poland	 were	 carried	 out	 under	 Section	 21	 of	Canada’s	 Export	 Credit	 Insurance	 Act,	 whereby	 the	 government	 guaranteed	payment	 in	 case	 a	 purchasing	 party	 defaulted	 on	 payment.	 The	 Canadian	government	proved	flexible	with	respect	to	the	grain	sales	to	Poland,	as	seen	when	it	 agreed	 to	 temporarily	 increase	 the	 existing	 insurance	 ceiling	 by	 approximately	$24	 million.	 Poland	 became	 an	 important	 market	 for	 Canadian	 grain	 when	 the	Canadian	Wheat	Board	looked	east	of	the	Iron	Curtain	to	bolster	international	sales	undermined	by	America’s	crippling	PL	480	program.			 In	1962	and	1964,	the	Wheat	Board	sent	a	two-man	delegation	to	Poland	to	expand	 networks	 of	 contacts.	 The	 delegation	 struck	 an	 immediate	 rapport	 with	Polish	officials	and	others	involved	in	various	stages	of	cereal	processing.	Canadian	wheat	 and	 technical	 knowhow	 in	 the	 handling	 and	 processing	 phases	 greatly	impressed	 the	Poles,	and	undoubtedly	contributed	 to	Poland’s	continued	desire	 to	
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buy	 Canadian	 grain.	 Initially,	 the	 two	 nations	 conducted	 short	 term	 wheat	agreements	 until	 1963,	 when	 the	 first	 long	 term	 contract	 was	 signed,	 ultimately	leading	to	a	series	of	future	long-term	arrangements.			 Most	 often,	 if	 not	 always,	 Canada’s	 relations	 with	 Poland	 were	 politically	motivated,	and	the	debate	surrounding	Poland’s	accession	to	GATT	was	no	different.	From	 the	 beginning,	 Canadian	 support	 for	 Polish	 accession	 into	 GATT	 was	 tied	closely	 to	 its	 role	 in	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 East-West	 relations.	 Essentially,	 Ottawa’s	support	of	Poland’s	accession	reflects	its	broader	policy	of	engagement	as	a	means	to	 attenuate	 connections	with	 the	 Soviet	Union.	Moreover,	 this	 episode	 highlights	Canadian	 officials’	 preference	 to	 use	 multilateral	 organizations	 as	 a	 means	 to	achieve	their	foreign	policy	objectives	in	Eastern	Europe.		 Overall,	relations	between	Canada	and	Poland	were	governed	by	the	nexus	of	middlepowerism,	as	both	countries	wished	to	see	international	tensions	eased	in	order	for	each	to	exercise	some	degree	of	autonomy	and	national	control	relative	to	their	superpower	Cold	War	patrons,	especially	given	that	relations	were	often	governed	by	international	events	beyond	their	control.	Direct	bilateral	relations,	as	well	multilateral	institutions,	proved	important	for	advancing	their	relationship.	Clearly,	contact	and	engagement	with	Poland	was	preferred	over	isolation	and	containment.	Canada	sought	to	cultivate	closer	ties	with	Poland	to	encourage	Polish	independence,	and	promote	Gomulka’s	independent	course,	which	Canadian	officials	understood	to	be	a	vital	component	of	Poland’s	foreign	policy.	Simultaneously,	this	policy	of	engagement	was	mutually	advantageous	for	quite	pragmatic	reasons,	such	as	buying	and	selling	grain.	Regardless	of	the	context	–	
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bilateral	or	multilateral	–	and	despite	the	motive	–	political,	cultural,	ideological,	or	economic	–	Poland	became	an	important	component	of	Canada’s	policy	toward	Communist	Eastern	Europe,	an	especially	notable	development	given	Poland’s	obvious	alliance	with	the	group	of	Warsaw	pact	nations.	
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Conclusion				 In	 a	 Cold	War	 dominated	 by	 two	 superpowers,	 it	was	 not	 always	 easy	 for	Canadian	governments	to	navigate	the	waters	of	international	relations	in	directions	that	maximized	a	middle	power’s	 freedom	of	maneuver.	Building	on	 the	post	war	foundation	 established	 by	 Liberal	 governments	 from	 the	 late	 1940s	 to	 the	 mid	1950s,	 John	Diefenbaker’s	 Progressive	Conservative	 government,	when	 it	 came	 to	office	 in	 1957,	mainly	 adopted	 a	moderate	 stance	 towards	 the	 USSR	 and	 Eastern	European	communism	generally.	Such	an	approach	was	informed	by	a	fundamental	understanding	 that	 reduced	 global	 tensions	 created	 opportunities	 for	 more	independent	 directions	 in	 Canadian	 policy-making,	 both	 in	 and	 out	 of	 alliance	frameworks.		 Why	 this	 period	 is	 significant	 lies	 not	 in	 the	 idea	 that	 stark	policy	 changes	occurred	 under	 the	 Diefenbaker	 government,	 but	 in	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 general	policy	 direction	 toward	Communist	 Eastern	Europe	 remained	 consistent.	Much	 of	the	existing	scholarship	on	Diefenbaker’s	foreign	policy	unfavourably	compares	the	dismal	failures	of	the	Progressive	Conservative	leader	to	the	so-called	‘golden	age’	of	Canadian	foreign	policy	that	was	shaped	by	preceding	Liberal	governments.	Yet,	the	progressive	thinking	and	pragmatic	policy	development	that	began	during	the	post-war	Liberal	government	continued	with	the	Progressive	Conservatives,	even	as	the	international	 situation	 changed	 significantly,	 suggesting	 Diefenbaker’s	 foreign	policy	was	less	an	aberration	than	has	been	previously	argued.	Canadian	diplomats	and	civil	servants	worked	equally	hard	to	cultivate	closer	political,	commercial,	and	
	 299	
cultural	 relations	 with	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe	 during	 Diefenbaker’s	 time	 as	Prime	Minister	as	they	did	under	Louis	St.	Laurent’s	Liberal	government.			 Another	 reason	 why	 this	 period	 is	 important	 lies,	 again,	 not	 with	 policy	directions	set	by	the	Progressive	Conservatives,	but	instead	with	the	fact	that	their	time	 in	 office	 coincided	with	major	 international	 changes	beyond	 their	 control,	 in	the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe.	 The	 increased	 liberalization	campaign	 ushered	 in	 by	 Khrushchev	 encouraged	 the	 Canadian	 government	 to	pursue	a	policy	of	Cold	War	by	“other	means,”	engaging	in	cultural	and	commercial	policy	 more	 proactively	 and	 aggressively.	 This	 is	 a	 policy	 that	 would	 have	 most	surely	been	pursued	by	the	Liberal	Party	had	they	been	re-elected	in	1957.		 Arguably,	Canada’s	 international	 stature	was	at	 its	height	 in	 the	 immediate	post-war	period	and	then	began	to	wane	 in	the	years	that	 followed,	 largely	due	to	broader	 global	 developments	well	 beyond	 its	 control.	 Still,	 Canada’s	 international	influence	was	not	completely	diminished	and	its	foreign	policy	was	hardly	dormant	or	 unproductive	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s.	 In	 fact,	 as	 noted	 in	 chapter	 one,	widely	respected	diplomat	Robert	 Ford	maintained	 that	 Canada	was	 actually	 entering	 an	era	of	greater	flexibility	in	the	international	arena,	in	large	part	due	to	the	strategic	stasis	 that	had	developed	between	the	superpowers.	As	a	moderate	middle	power	and	 a	 nation	 that	 shared	 a	 continent	 with	 one	 of	 two	 global	 superpowers,	 other	governments	 sometimes	 perceived	 Canada	 as	 uniquely	 situated	 to	 influence	international	affairs.	And,	Canada	shared	many	geographic	and	natural	similarities	with	 its	 Soviet	 superpower	 neighbour,	 so	 both	 countries	 inevitably	 had	 vested	
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interests	 in	 one	 another’s	 innovations	 and	 developments,	 further	 contributing	 to	Canada’s	unique	global	position.		 Having	fully	recognized	the	important	political	developments	occurring	east	of	 the	 Iron	 Curtain,	 most	 notably	 the	 changing	 of	 the	 Soviet	 old	 guard	 and	subsequent	effects	of	this	throughout	Eastern	Europe,	the	Diefenbaker	government	continued	the	nascent	approach	of	its	predecessor	and	pursued	a	pragmatic	policy	with	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 the	 primary	 goal	 of	 the	government’s	 policy	 was	 to	 attenuate	 Soviet	 control	 over	 Eastern	 Europe	 by	fostering	 closer	 ties	 with	 select	 Eastern	 European	 nations.	 Engendering	 closer	political,	commercial,	and	cultural	relations	with	the	region,	it	was	believed,	would	build	 bridges	 between	 East	 and	 West,	 break	 down	 ideological	 barriers,	 and	ultimately	reduce	Cold	War	tensions.	The	Canadian	government	viewed	Yugoslavia	and	 Poland	 as	 two	 important	 countries	 where	 Canada	 could	 cultivate	 closer	relations	 to	 offset	 Soviet	 influence.	 Recall	 from	 chapter	 one,	 for	 instance,	 SSEA	Sidney	Smith’s	advice	to	Cabinet	that	the	government	should	be	as	forthcoming	as	possible	with	exchanges	with	Poland	and	Yugoslavia	in	order	to	weaken	the	ties	of	these	countries	with	the	Soviet	bloc	and	to	increase	their	political	and	commercial	links	with	 the	west.	Yugoslavia,	having	broken	with	 the	Warsaw	Pact	 in	1948	and	having	 championed	 the	 non-aligned	 movement,	 was	 a	 more	 obvious	 target	 of	Canada’s	 attention	 in	 Communist	 Europe;	 yet	 even	 Poland,	 firmly	 situated	 in	 the	Soviet	 bloc,	 was	 also	 courted.	 Additionally,	 Canada	 pursued	 closer	 political,	commercial,	 and	 cultural	 relations	 with	 the	 USSR	 as	 well,	 hoping	 to	 expose	 it	 to	
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Western	modalities	and	showcasing	that	the	West	was	neither	entirely	homogenous	nor	blindly	following	American	foreign	policy	initiatives.			 As	 the	 communist	 and	 capitalist	 camps	 moved	 ever	 closer	 to	 military	strategic	 stasis	 by	 the	 mid-1950s,	 various	 other	 “battlegrounds”	 would	 prove	important	 in	 waging	 the	 Cold	War	 by	 “other	means.”	 Of	 course,	 geostrategic	 and	geopolitical	 considerations	 were	 still	 very	 much	 woven	 into	 the	 fabric	 of	international	 policy	 frameworks.	 Other	 strategic	 policy	 initiatives,	 however,	 were	becoming	 increasingly	 recognized	 as	 viable	 means	 to	 advance	 a	 nation’s	 foreign	policy	 objectives.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 pragmatically	 pursued	favourable	 political,	 and	ad	hoc	 commercial,	 and	 cultural	 relations	with	 the	USSR,	Yugoslavia,	and	Poland.		 Khrushchev’s	 revelations	 at	 the	Twentieth	Party	Congress	 in	1956,	 and	his	denunciation	 of	 Stalin’s	 cult	 of	 personality,	 paved	 the	way	 for	 a	 new	 direction	 in	international	 diplomacy.	 Canadian	 officials	 understood	 that	 Khrushchev	 still	believed	 in	 the	 inevitable	 victory	 of	 communism	 over	 capitalism,	 but	 now	 most	believed	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 would	 not	 pursue	 this	 end	 through	 aggressive	military	 means.	 Instead,	 ideological	 supremacy	 would	 be	 achieved	 through	economic	and	cultural	methods.			 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 Cold	 War	 by	 “other	 means,”	 the	 Canadian	government	 pursued	 a	 three-pronged	 approach	 to	 advance	 its	 policy	 interests:	constructive	 political-diplomatic	 engagement	 through	 traditional	 interactions	 and	exchanges	 of	 diplomats	 and	 civil	 servants,	 closer	 commercial	 relations,	 and	 the	development	and	implementation	of	cultural	exchanges.	
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	 On	 the	 political-diplomatic	 front,	 Canada’s	 foreign	 relations	with	 the	 three	communist	nations	were	quite	different.	When	Secretary	of	State	for	External	Affairs	Lester	Pearson	visited	Moscow	in	1955,	 this	proved	to	be	a	watershed	moment	 in	Canadian-Soviet	relations.	While	the	visit	reaffirmed	Pearson’s	belief	that	the	Soviet	Union’s	main	objective	remained	national	security,	it	also	opened	the	door	to	more	open	political	discourse,	not	 to	mention	 fruitful	 trade	deals.	What	 contemporaries	deemed	 the	 Soviet	 economic	 offensive	 represented	 the	 broad	 extent	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union’s	non-military	“threat”	and	epitomized	for	Canadian	officials	the	new	course	of	 Soviet	 foreign	 strategy.	 Other	 Western	 nations	 also	 regarded	 the	 economic	offensive	 as	 a	 significant	 issue	 requiring	 serious	 analysis	 and	 response.	 Yet	while	there	was	 open	 dialogue	 on	 Soviet	 economic	 tactics	within	 the	NATO	 alliance,	 its	members,	 particularly	 Canada,	 insisted	 that	 this	 economic	 dimension	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 could	 be	 better	 addressed	 not	 just	 through	 multilateral	 relations,	 but	 also	through	direct	bilateral	approaches	with	the	USSR.		 With	 all	 three	 communist	 nations,	 Canada	 engaged	 in	 constructive	diplomacy.	 The	 issue	 of	 the	 Polish	 art	 treasures	 initially	 stunted	 Canadian-Polish	relations.	 The	 Polish	 government	 refused	 to	 promote	 its	 diplomatic	 mission	 to	embassy	 status	 until	 the	 treasures	were	 at	 least	 partially	 returned.	 Yet,	 the	 issue	was	 kept	 relatively	 quiet,	 and	 the	 Polish	 government	 did	 not	 use	 the	 affair	 for	political	 propaganda	 purposes.	 This	 suggests	 an	 implicit	 mutual	 understanding	between	middle	powers:	neither	party	would	gain	politically	 if	 the	 issue	became	a	Cold	 War	 spectacle.	 Once	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 Polish	 art	 treasures	 was	 resolved,	 the	Canadian	 and	 Polish	 governments	 pursued	 open	 communications	 and	 promoted	
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sound	diplomatic	relations,	best	illustrated	by	the	establishment	of	their	respective	embassies	in	April	1960.	The	Canadian	government	also	displayed	deference	for	the	Polish	 government	 when	 it	 entertained,	 at	 least	 modestly,	 the	 Rapacki	 Plan.	 For	Canadian	officials,	it	was	believed	that	open	and	respectful	political	dialogue	was	an	important	 first	step	 in	softening	 the	Polish	communist	doctrinal	attitude,	which	 in	turn	could	help	loosen	ties	with	the	USSR.		 While	diplomatic	relations	with	Yugoslavia	were	politically	and	ideologically	charged,	 they	 were	 mostly	 positive	 and	 were	 seen	 as	 mutually	 advantageous.	Yugoslavia’s	 refusal	 to	 sign	 the	 Twelve	 Party	 Declaration	 in	 late	 1957	 signaled	Canada’s	opportunity	to	establish	closer	ties	with	the	“renegade”	communist	nation.	Yugoslavia’s	 position	 as	 unofficial	 leader	 of	 the	 non-aligned	 movement	 meant	 it	occasionally	 faced,	 head-on,	 the	 wrath	 of	 the	 Soviet	 bloc.	 Canada	 generally	supported	Yugoslavia’s	non-aligned	position,	since	it	presented	a	clear	alternative	to	Soviet	communism	and	showcased	for	other	Eastern	European	communist	nations	that	 independence	 was	 attainable,	 at	 least	 theoretically.	 While	 Canada	 and	Yugoslavia	subscribed	to	fundamentally	different	ideologies,	both	saw	in	each	other	the	 similarity	of	 living	 in	 the	 shadow	of	 a	powerful	 superpower;	middlepowerism	became	common	ground	on	which	to	build	a	working	relationship.		 While	 high-level	 meetings	 between	 superpowers	 have	 received	 much	attention,	 much	 less	 has	 been	 accorded	 great	 power-middle	 power	 meetings.	Anastas	Mikoyan’s	brief	stopover	in	Nova	Scotia	in	1959	and	the	genial	reception	he	was	 accorded	 testified	 to	 the	 Canadian	 government’s	 efforts	 to	 maintain	 a	 good	political	 rapport	 with	 the	 USSR.	 The	 exchange	 of	 letters	 between	 Prime	Minister	
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Diefenbaker	and	Premier	Khrushchev	confirmed	 the	Prime	Minister’s	belief	 in	 the	value	of	 frank	exchanges	of	views	and	 the	Progressive	Conservative	government’s	desire	to	foster	an	open	political	dialogue	with	the	communist	superpower,	despite	the	 fact	 that	 the	 ideas	expressed	never	went	beyond	 the	general	positions	of	each	respective	 alliance.	 The	 exchange	 of	 letters	 proved	 a	 stark	 contrast	 with	Diefenbaker’s	scathing	address	to	the	UN	General	Assembly	 in	1960,	during	which	he	 fiercely	 criticized	 Soviet	 “imperialism”	 and	 their	 treatment	 of	 the	 region’s	“captive	nations.”	The	speech	was	a	public	forum	through	which	Diefenbaker	could	engage	 in	 a	 fiery	 rhetorical	 assault	 on	 Soviet	 communism,	 but	 the	 exchange	 of	letters	proved	that	he	was	equally	capable	of	engaging	in	cordial	private	diplomacy.		 While	 the	 Canadian	 government	 was	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 so-called	 Soviet	economic	offensive	and	its	potential	implications	for	Canadian	businesses,	an	almost	equally	disconcerting	problem	came	not	 from	Canada’s	 communist	neighbour,	but	from	its	closest	alliance	neighbour	to	the	south.	The	United	States’	PL	480	program	significantly	 harmed	 Canadian	 wheat	 exports.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	Board	 sought	 out	 new	 markets,	 and	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe	 proved	 itself	 a	viable	 export	 region.	 The	 USSR,	 Poland,	 and	 Yugoslavia	 all	 purchased	 Canadian	wheat	 in	 large	 quantities	 during	 Diefenbaker’s	 time	 in	 office.	With	 respect	 to	 the	USSR	specifically,	Canadian	officials	expediently	dropped	the	 ideologically	charged	economic	offensive	perspective	and	welcomed	the	USSR	as	an	important	customer.	Moreover,	 the	 Diefenbaker	 years	 should	 be	 seen	 more	 as	 a	 bridge	 in	 bilateral	relations	between	the	two	nations	rather	than	a	decisive	moment.	While	the	Liberal	government	 signed	 a	 groundbreaking	 trade	 deal	 with	 the	 USSR	 in	 1956,	 such	 an	
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agreement	 would	 not	 again	 be	 reached	 during	 the	 subsequent	 Progressive	Conservative	 government.	 Although,	 negotiations	 surrounding	 the	 renewal	 of	 the	1956	agreement	(which	saw	a	fraction	of	the	trade	of	the	previous	agreement)	are	telling	 insofar	 as	 they	 represented	 a	 crossroads	 between	 the	USSR’s	 state-trading	and	Canada’s	capitalist	economic	systems.	The	Soviets,	with	grain	supplies	boosted	by	 the	 success	 of	 their	Virgin	 Lands	 campaign,	 pushed	hard	 to	 level	 a	 large	 trade	imbalance	with	Canada,	while	 the	Canadians	 sought	not	 to	 commit	 to	 any	kind	of	purchase	obligation	and	instead	offered	to	promote	Soviet	imports	in	a	“presidential	manner.”			 The	Diefenbaker	government	witnessed	more	success	in	both	Yugoslavia	and	Poland.	 Granted,	while	 the	 amount	 exported	 to	 both	 countries	was	modest	when	compared	 to	 Canada’s	 overall	 wheat	 exports,	 the	 broader	 political	 significance	cannot	 be	 overlooked.	 Both	 trade	 deals	were	 carried	 out	 under	 Section	 21	 of	 the	Export	 Credit	 Insurance	 Act,	 which	 provided	 that	 the	 ECIC	 guarantee	 payment	should	 the	 contracting	 government	 fail	 to	 pay	 its	 bills.	 It	 is	 also	 notable	 that	 the	terms	 of	 the	 agreements	 were	 made	 more	 favourable	 for	 both	 nations,	 when	compared	 to	 the	 previous	 Liberal	 government;	 for	 instance,	 the	 Diefenbaker	government	 allowed	 the	 ceiling	 to	 be	 raised	 on	 the	 dollar	 amount	 of	 export	insurance	coverage	on	a	Polish	purchase	of	wheat.		 The	 two-man	 delegation	 sent	 to	 Poland	 by	 the	 Canadian	 Wheat	 Board	 in	1962	and	1964	is	a	fine	example	of	Canada’s	economic	statecraft	taken	to	the	next	level.	 The	 delegation	 went	 beyond	 talk	 of	 sales	 and	 directly	 engaged	 with	 Poles	involved	 in	 the	 productive	 and	 distributive	 system.	 This	 unquestionably	
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strengthened	Poland’s	commitment	to	purchase	Canadian	wheat	as	a	deep	respect	for	Canadian	understanding	of	agricultural	processes	was	entrenched	within	Polish	officials	and	professionals.			 Wheat	 exports	 to	 the	 USSR,	 Poland	 and	 Yugoslavia	 are	 good	 examples	 of	domestic	 politics	 ‘with	 a	 foreign	 policy	 hat	 on’	 –	 as	 they	 sought	 to	 alleviate	 the	growing	surplus	of	Canadian	wheat	–	and	were	calculated	foreign	policy	initiatives	designed	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 East	 and	 West.	 Moreover,	 wheat	 exports	 to	Communist	 Eastern	 Europe	 were	 not	 only	 calculated	 moves	 in	 the	 government’s	Cold	 War	 economic	 statecraft	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 Soviet	 bloc,	 but	 were	 also	motivated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 address	 the	 challenging	 global	 wheat	 market	 that	 was	undermined	by	Canada’s	most	important	ally,	the	United	States,	through	its	PL	480	program.		 Canada	also	participated	 in	Poland’s	annual	Poznań	 trade	 fair,	 largely	 in	an	effort	 to	 penetrate	 the	 Polish	 market	 and	 to	 engender	 political	 goodwill.	 With	Yugoslavia,	 Canadian	 officials	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 raw	 materials	 and	capital	equipment	to	Yugoslavia’s	industrialization	process.	As	a	result,	Ambassador	Robert	Ford	pushed	aggressively	 to	see	certain	Canadian	 firms	engage	 in	business	deals	 with	 the	 Yugoslav	 government,	 sometimes	 to	 the	 annoyance	 of	 Canada’s	Ministry	of	Finance.		 The	 third	 non-military	 prong	 of	 the	 government’s	 foreign	 policy	 equation	was	 cultural	diplomacy.	Cultural	 exchanges	during	 this	 time	were	beginning	 to	be	seen	 as	 a	 real	 and	 viable	 foreign	 policy	 tool.	 Primarily,	 they	 supported	 broader	political	initiatives	that	had	been	defined	by	normal	policy	channels.	In	this	period,	
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the	 Canadian	 cultural	 footprint	 was	 indeed	 imbedded	 into	 select	 Communist	Eastern	European	states.	Canada	and	 the	Soviet	Union	made	 impressive	strides	 in	the	realm	of	cultural	exchanges	during	this	period.	Canada	did	not	establish	a	formal	cultural	agreement	with	 the	USSR,	or	with	any	nation	 for	 that	matter.	 Instead,	 the	governments	 worked	within	 a	 quid	 pro	 quo	 style	 arrangement.	While	 the	 Soviets	pushed	 for	 a	 formal	 agreement,	 the	 Canadian	 government	 hesitated	 principally	because	 there	was	no	 federal	agency	 through	which	 to	administer	such	exchanges	and	because	 Canada’s	 federal	 system	of	 government	 complicated	matters	when	 it	came	to	the	subject	of	culture.			 The	 Canadian	 government	 struggled	 to	 maintain	 equal	 and	 balanced	reciprocity	of	exchanges	with	the	Soviets	in	this	field,	especially	since	Soviet	artists,	athletes,	and	academics	had	the	weight	of	the	government	behind	them	in	the	form	of	the	Ministry	of	Culture	and	the	State	Committee	on	Cultural	Relations.	Canadian	ambassadors	 in	 Moscow,	 notably	 Arnold	 Smith,	 worked	 hard	 to	 try	 and	 even	imbalances	 and	 suggested	 that	 the	 government	 actually	 exercise	 some	power	 and	authority	 by	 withholding	 the	 necessary	 visas	 for	 Soviet	 artists,	 athletes,	 and	academics.	 Additionally,	 Smith	 himself	 was	 initially	 involved	 in	 the	 exchange	 of	visits	between	the	Montreal	Symphony	Orchestra	and	the	Red	Army	Chorus,	among	others,	thus	highlighting	that	government	officials	both	saw	the	importance	of	such	exchanges	and	were	willing	to	do	their	part	in	advancing	them.		 Hockey	 also	 became	 a	 viable	 point	 of	 contact	 between	 Canada	 and	Communist	 Europe.	 Poland	 and	 the	 USSR	 were	 keen	 to	 be	 kept	 up	 to	 date	 on	Canadian	hockey.	Canadian	amateur	teams	often	visited	the	USSR	and	were	greeted	
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with	much	fanfare	by	both	the	public	at	 large	and	the	media.	The	Poles	were	kept	informed	through	radio	broadcasts.			 Canadian	radio	broadcasts	to	Poland	by	the	CBC-IS	Polish	Division	proved	to	be	 an	 important	 component	 of	 Canada’s	 informational	 activities	 in	 Communist	Eastern	Europe,	and	dovetailed	well	with	External	Affairs’	desire	to	increase	Polish	autonomy	 through	 increased	 exposure	 to	 Western	 culture	 and	 practices.	 Letters	sent	 directly	 to	 CBC-IS’s	 Polish	 Division	 do	 suggest	 that	 Polish	 citizens	 were	listening	 and	 that	 Canadian	 broadcasts	 were,	 at	 least	 modestly,	 building	 cultural	bridges	between	East	and	West.		 Of	 the	 three	 countries	 examined,	 Canadian-Yugoslav	 cultural	 exchanges	perhaps	 witnessed	 the	 greatest,	 though	 still	 modest,	 success	 with	 respect	 to	academic	 and	 technical	 exchanges.	 NRC	 fellowships,	 while	 setting	 off	 at	 a	 snail’s	pace,	slowly	generated	momentum.	Yet,	hanging	over	these	exchanges	was	the	fear	of	 Yugoslav	 authorities	 who	 worried	 that,	 once	 in	 the	 West,	 Yugoslav	 scientists	would	never	 return	home;	 this	 highlights	 the	 very	 real	 fact	 that	 cultural	 relations	were	still	governed	by	ideological	proclivities.		 Overall,	 the	 Diefenbaker-Khrushchev	 period	 marks	 a	 decisive	 moment	 in	Canada’s	 history	with	 Communist	 Eastern	 Europe.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	period	witnessed	groundbreaking	initiatives	or	that	the	government	wielded	power	beyond	 its	moderate,	middle	power	 influence.	Rather,	building	on	 the	 foundations	laid	 out	 by	 the	 previous	 Liberal	 government,	 the	 Progressive	 Conservative	government	 pragmatically	 utilized	 its	 unique	 position	 between	 the	 two	 global	superpowers	 –	 both	within	multilateral	 frameworks	 and	bilaterally	 –	 to	 engender	
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closer	 political,	 commercial,	 and	 cultural	 relations	 with	 select	 Eastern	 European	nations	 as	 a	 means	 of	 building	 bridges	 between	 East	 and	 West.	 With	 its	 goal	 of	attenuating	 the	 influence	 of	 European	 communism,	 the	 Canadian	 government	pursued	avenues	old	and	new,	as	they	engaged	in	the	Cold	War	by	“other	means.”	
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